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Preface
Since the repeal of the state liquor regulations in Australia that prevented 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples from having legal access 
to alcohol, numerous strategies have attempted to minimise the harms 
associated with problem drinking. This book tells the story of how 
governments, their advisers and Indigenous people themselves believed 
they could minimise such harms by changing the way people drank: how 
they tried to ‘civilise’ the drinking act itself. In a sense, this endeavour 
started in 1789 when Governor Arthur Phillip first taught the captured 
Aboriginal man Bennelong to raise his wine glass in a toast; however, it 
was two centuries before the notion found its way into policy in the form 
of government-endorsed liquor outlets serving Indigenous people in or 
near remote communities. In the 1970s and 1980s, canteens and clubs 
were licensed to serve rations of beer in remote Indigenous communities, 
and government agencies made it possible for Indigenous organisations 
to purchase public hotels whose sales were affecting their communities. 
These two approaches to the distribution of alcohol were originally driven 
by the belief that drinking on regulated premises over which Indigenous 
people had some control would help to inculcate moderate drinking 
patterns, and help to prevent damaging binge drinking and sly grog sales. 
This idea, that people would be able to ‘learn to drink’ in a conducive 
setting, forms a narrative thread throughout this book.
Both of these somewhat controversial approaches (having drinking clubs 
and purchasing hotels) attempted to manage Indigenous drinking by 
making the sale of alcohol a social enterprise that drew in community 
members as participants, and ostensibly benefited them by allowing 
them to share in the income generated by alcohol sales. The idea that 
these outlets could help to cultivate moderate ‘civilised’ drinking patterns 
while simultaneously making a profit created a number of moral and 
social dilemmas and unforeseen outcomes that also form a major theme 
for the book. Indigenous social clubs and hotels were social enterprises 
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insofar as they were (and are) run (or at least advised) by community-
based organisations with participatory governance structures that gave 
voice to community stakeholders. Perhaps most importantly, as quasi-
social enterprises, these projects were intended to benefit their owners 
by reinvesting profits in charitable or community-led activities. Even if 
a club or a hotel could not make a profit, the money they spent on wages 
and other locally sourced production costs would stay in the community.
Some of these ideas about reducing drunkenness by regularising drinking 
venues, making local citizens shareholders and allocating profits for the 
betterment of the community had been popular in nineteenth-century 
Europe. The Swedish ‘Gothenburg’ system, for example, was a style 
of alcohol control based on the municipal or community ownership of 
liquor outlets. Designed to improve standards of behaviour and to civilise 
uproarious drinking, the Gothenburg system offered an alternative to 
prohibition by emphasising moderation, and downplayed profiteering 
by employing ‘disinterested’ managers who had no pecuniary interest 
in alcohol sales. As documented in this book, the idea of community 
ownership of hotels was disseminated from Sweden to Britain and later 
to Australia where the (non-Indigenous) citizens of several rural South 
Australian towns purchased their local public hotels as co-operative 
ventures. I use the principles of the Gothenburg system and its variations 
as an analytical framework with which to examine the case studies 
presented in the second part of the book. 
This book is based on fieldwork conducted in Indigenous communities 
and towns in northern and central Australia, visits to community 
hotels in South Australia and interviews with Indigenous and non-
Indigenous protagonists and knowledgeable observers. It also makes 
use of documentary evidence from reports, archives, local libraries and 
newspapers. The book contributes to three fields of scholarship: it is 
a socio-historical study of alcohol; it examines the history of Australian 
Indigenous policy; and it constitutes a study of social enterprise. 
The opening chapter examines the social history of the idea that people 
can learn to drink in moderation: that drinking, along with other aspects 
of personal comportment, can be ‘civilised’. The work of Norbert Elias sets 
the scene here. An example from early Australia illustrates the rudimentary 
attempts made by elites to impart the rules of cultured, moderate 
comportment around food and drink to the representatives of the invaded 
Aboriginal groups encountered during the first days of  colonisation. 
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Offering alcohol to Aboriginal people in and around Sydney Cove, and 
seeing how they responded and how quickly they could learn, was a test of 
how amenable they might be to ‘civilisation’ and assimilation. The chapter 
continues by addressing the more modern formulation of the idea of 
learning to drink that arose in the 1930s and 1940s following the end 
of Prohibition in the United States (US) (1920–1933) and restrictive 
war-time policies in other countries. At this time, with the influence of 
the temperance movement waning, the public wanted an alternative to 
abstinence. By the 1960s, behavioural psychologists working in addiction 
programs began to experiment in teaching alcoholics and others with 
drinking problems how to control their drinking. I argue that this 
thinking, together with the idea that drinking was a learned behaviour, 
permeated the Australian policy approaches to Indigenous drinking that 
accompanied the repeal of alcohol prohibitions. 
Since the 1830s in Australia, legislation had created a number of 
prohibitions attached to the possession and consumption of alcohol by 
people classified as Aboriginal as well as people of mixed descent, Torres 
Strait and Pacific Islanders. Following federation, these became state or 
territory laws that varied by jurisdiction and applied differentially to 
Indigenous people depending on their perceived degree of assimilation 
and where they lived. This form of race-based ‘prohibition’ in Australia 
thus differed markedly from the National Prohibition Act (the Volstead 
Act) enacted in the US in 1920, which involved amendments to the 
Constitution, grew out of local option laws and was the culmination of a 
politically effective social movement led by the Anti-Saloon League and 
the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). The Volstead Act 
was repealed in 1933 following the election of Franklin D Roosevelt and 
the loss of popular support.
In Australia, the ‘prohibition’ laws affecting Indigenous people were 
repealed in each state and territory between 1957 and 1972. This was 
accompanied by the gradual removal of racial discrimination from state 
laws and the recognition of Indigenous civil rights. However, there were 
(and are) exceptions. Despite the official end of the prohibition on selling 
or serving alcohol to Aboriginal people, some publicans continued to 
refuse them service in a variety of overt or covert ways: in the 1980s, several 
Aboriginal non-government organisations explicitly requested licensees 
to desist from selling alcohol to members of their communities; and in 
TEACHING 'PROPER' DRINkING?
xviii
the Northern Territory in particular, but in other regions as well, some 
Aboriginal communities continue to apply their own local ‘prohibition’ 
laws and maintain their lands as dry areas by choice. 
Chapter 2 traces how the Gothenburg ideas of alcohol control were 
disseminated to Britain, the US and ultimately to Australia. In the late 
nineteenth century, local citizens of several towns along the Murray River 
bought hotels to raise funds for local causes and to diminish sly grog sales. 
They raised funds through their personal resources or bank loans and 12 
premises were purchased in South Australia: nine of the original 12 are still 
in community hands. In a parallel but separate development that began in 
the mid-1970s, several Indigenous community associations also bought 
hotels, usually in an attempt to curtail the troublesome sales practices 
of their owners. To make the purchases, Aboriginal groups obtained 
loans or grants from various Aboriginal economic development funds, 
first established by the Australian Government in 1968. I pay particular 
attention to the Aboriginal Development Commission (ADC), appointed 
and funded from 1980 to 1989, and its successor agencies. I present case 
studies of these enterprises later in the book. Chapter 2 continues by 
outlining how the investment policies pursued by Indigenous business 
and development agencies changed over time, forcing some enterprises 
to concentrate on commercial rather than socially responsible goals; with 
alcohol as the commodity, this indifference to social objectives sometimes 
had undesirable outcomes. Reference is also made to kava, a mood-
altering substance over which an Aboriginal association held licensing and 
distribution rights. Like the Gothenburg system, the arrangement created 
a monopoly, raised revenue that was distributed for community benefit 
and created an antidote to illegal sales. 
At around the time of the first experiments in Aboriginal ownership of 
hotels, some Australian state and territory governments encouraged remote 
communities to establish beer canteens and licensed social clubs as a means 
to communicate moderate and sociable drinking behaviour to Aboriginal 
people who were adjusting to newly granted drinking rights. Many of 
these enterprises evolved from the beer rationing systems through which 
‘native administration’ officials had hoped to inculcate moderate drinking 
patterns. Chapter 3 deals with this episode in policy thinking: it focuses 
on the influence of government advisers, community superintendents and 
missionaries that led to the birth of these clubs and the mixed motivations 
that underpinned their development. Primary among these motivations 
was the belief that Aboriginal people could ‘learn’ to drink in more 
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acceptable ways if they were presented with limited amounts of alcohol in 
pleasant settings—a reprise of earlier ideas about the so-called civilising 
process of the eighteenth century, about managing the post-Prohibition 
era of the 1930s in the US and about adopting middle-class norms in the 
1950s. In the Australian Indigenous policy context, it was an exercise in 
assimilation. 
The second part of the book (Chapters 4 to 7) presents case studies of 
community-based clubs and community-owned pubs to illustrate how 
theories of community and citizen ownership and notions of teaching 
moderate drinking were put into practice. In Chapter 4, I describe the 
Murrinh Patha Social Club, one of the earliest of its kind, instigated by 
Catholic missionaries at what was then known as Port Keats, now Wadeye, 
in the Northern Territory. The Tyeweretye Club, the topic of Chapter 5, 
was located in a town (Alice Springs) rather than in a remote community. 
Instigated by an Aboriginal non-government organisation, the club 
was designed to provide a convivial and non-racist drinking venue for 
Aboriginal town dwellers and visitors from outlying communities alike. 
Both clubs were intended to cultivate moderate drinking styles, but only 
Tyeweretye achieved this goal, and then only partially. I relate how each 
of these clubs became the subject of vigorous resistance, primarily from 
Aboriginal women’s groups’ campaigns against grog in all its forms, and 
analyse why neither club survived for much longer than a decade.
Chapter 6, ‘Indigenous communities buy hotels’, describes the sequence 
of hotel purchases made by, or on behalf of, Indigenous organisations—
an initiative that started in 1975, before the advent of Aboriginal 
development agencies. Some of these projects, such as the Oasis Hotel 
at Walgett and the Woden Town Club in Canberra, both funded in the 
1980s by the ADC, proved to be disastrous and short lived. By contrast, 
other premises, such as the Transcontinental Hotel at Oodnadatta and the 
licensed roadhouse at Mt Ebenezer in the Northern Territory, have lasted 
for a decade or more. The chapter is primarily made up of observational 
and interview data from fieldwork visits, but also pieces together the 
fragmented documentary record on these enterprises. Chapter 7, ‘The 
Indigenous purchase of the Crossing Inn’, is a case study of a ‘community’ 
hotel in Fitzroy Crossing, one of a suite of enterprises purchased by an 
Indigenous investment company representing the peoples of the Fitzroy 
Valley, Western Australia, with funds from the ADC. Despite early hopes 
that ownership of the hotel would constrain sales and ‘civilise’ drinking, 
there were accidental and deliberate deaths, hundreds of injuries and cases 
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of violence against women; there was also an increase in alcohol-related 
damage to unborn children. By 2007, the situation was so serious that 
the State Coroner conducted an inquest into 22 deaths in the region 
(many of which implicated the Crossing Inn): two courageous Aboriginal 
women sparked a grassroots movement to petition for an end to the inn’s 
takeaway sales; the director of liquor licensing imposed restrictions on 
sales; and child health experts called for a major study of fetal alcohol 
spectrum disorders. I analyse how the original ambition for the hotel to be 
a crucible for moderate drinking was thwarted by the investment policies 
of the Indigenous business and development agencies that funded the 
project, as well as by the hotel’s own Indigenous controlling body. The 
concluding chapter reminds the reader of the major themes that make up 
the book.
A number of questions have pursued me throughout this research. 
Can people learn to drink differently? Do the social clubs introduced into 
some remote communities help to cultivate moderate drinking styles, or 
do they make things worse? Is Indigenous ownership of pubs in small 
country towns a viable and sustainable strategy to bring about local control 
over sales? Does such ownership provide the economic and social benefits 
envisaged by the Indigenous proponents of such enterprises? As well as 
answering these questions, I want this book to show how a  policy of 
‘self-determination’ encouraged a certain type of engagement between 
Indigenous people and the supply and sale of alcohol. 
xxi
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1
Learning to drink: The social 
history of an idea
The idea that you could teach people to drink sensibly has been around 
for decades. In the United States, this notion was of particular interest 
after the end of Prohibition in 1933,1 prompted by the challenge of 
encouraging moderation after years of binge drinking, criminal gangs 
selling illicit grog, adulterated drinks and speakeasies.2 One who rose 
to the challenge was American etiquette aficionado Alma Whitaker 
(1933:  2), who endeavoured to communicate to post-Prohibition 
drinkers what older, more experienced countries knew about the ‘precious 
creed’ of moderation. In her aptly titled book Bacchus behave! The lost art 
of polite drinking, she stressed the need to appreciate the sacred rituals 
of etiquette to experience the benefits of wines and spirits as social 
lubricants. In this way, we could learn to drink and, ‘properly fortified 
with instructive information, we may yet learn to carry our liquor like 
gentlemen. It’s deucedly messy when we don’t’ (2). Whitaker declared that 
the ‘right quantity imbibed under the right conditions affords a pleasant 
stimulation’, while people who became drunk revealed all their nastier 
1  Prohibition (1920–33) was a political failure, but was positive in other ways. There is good 
evidence that there was less drinking and abuse than before World War I; the cirrhosis mortality rate 
dropped sharply then plateaued, as did the alcoholism mortality rate. There was a differential affect 
across social classes and across regions: while the law was flouted in the north and east (and in New 
Orleans), the working-class people of the south and west were largely dry (Cook 2007: 26). 
2  Speakeasy: an illicit drinking venue of the Prohibition years.
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inhibitions (4–5).3 She believed that women had a civilising influence on 
men and that they would be an important influence in post-Prohibition 
America. Above all, Whitaker argued that it was deplorable to drink 
enough to become beyond one’s self. To avoid any such loss of composure, 
her first simple rule of behaviour was never to get drunk. Intoxication has 
remained morally reprehensible, or at least questionable, in most public 
discourse throughout the modern period (Room 2005: 149). However, 
rather than banishing alcohol altogether, societies have held out hope that 
neophyte drinkers, as well as established drinkers with bad habits, could 
learn or re-learn ‘civilised’ moderate drinking. In the 1970s, behavioural 
research suggested that this would indeed be possible. Many of these ideas 
permeated Australian governments’ thinking about the potential solutions 
to problem drinking among Indigenous people.
Taming undisciplined consumption
In the tradition of books of manners through the ages, Whitaker (1933) 
not only advised on personal comportment, but also provided advice on 
being a good guest, serving the right sort of food and drink for particular 
occasions and which customs should be frowned upon. By the time she was 
writing, the cultures of the West had come to despise a lack of self-control 
and to attribute success and respectability—indeed morality itself—to the 
power of a disciplined will (Room 1985: 135). However, the qualities of 
self-constraint and control over one’s conduct were not innate: they had 
to be conditioned in people and produced through the internalisation of 
socially constructed rules of politeness and good manners. Norbert Elias 
(1982) described how this conditioning—the ‘civilising process’, as he 
called it—required the pacification of the individual and the absorption 
into social norms of notions of bodily propriety, cleanliness and order, so 
that people came to believe that these represented the features of a good 
and proper life (Frykman & Löfgren 1987). These notions had their origins 
in post-medieval European courtly society, during a transformative period 
that served as a bridge between the Middle Ages and modernity, as observed 
by Elias (1982) in his analysis of books on manners and the concept of 
civilité.4 During this period, manners among the elite were softened to 
3  I am grateful to Robin Room for alerting me to Alma Whitaker’s book and to the work of Morris 
Chafetz and others. 
4  Civilité: civility, politeness, courtesy.
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distinguish them from the coarse manners of peasants. At the same time, 
outward manifestations of bodily propriety came to be seen as expressions 
of the inner, whole person. These ‘civilised’ ways of comporting oneself 
were elaborated further among the elite in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Eventually, these behaviours became transformed into the 
dominant, mainstream culture of modern European society. In fact, they 
became the norms of Western middle-class culture: second nature. Elias 
(1978) saw civilisation both as a process and a concept. As a concept, it 
was a self-conscious construct by the ‘West’ in which European society 
came to believe itself to be superior to earlier societies, as well as to 
contemporary but more ‘primitive’ ones (3–4). In  their analysis of the 
making of the middle-class world view of nineteenth-century Swedes, 
Jonas Frykman and Orvar Löfgren (1987) went further, suggesting that 
barbarism was eliminated by using health as ammunition in the civilising 
process: a civilised person had to be convinced that if he or she transgressed 
or failed to internalise social norms, then he or she would actually come 
to physical harm (255). In this way, ‘civilised’ people who worried about 
their physical as well as their spiritual health had to watch themselves; they 
had to be clean, wholesome, of good conduct and exert self-discipline. 
By contrast, ‘uncivilised’, unconstrained, rowdy comportment (such as 
uproarious drinking among peasants) demonstrated a heedlessness of the 
consequences. 
In pre-industrial England, daily drinking was the means by which social 
relations were both generated and reinforced. Among the labouring 
classes, there was a mutual obligation to treat others with drinks, as it was 
through this giving and exchanging of drinks that people established and 
remade the social ties of obligation and reciprocity. For English villagers, 
these symbolic values were more important than the possibility of 
a drunken accident or a bad hangover; not to drink was virtually unheard 
of, as it would represent a complete withdrawal from socially meaningful 
existence (Adler 1991: 381, Schivelbusch 1993).5 These descriptions of 
the symbolic meanings attached to alcohol in English village society prior 
to 1830 bear remarkable similarity to the meaning of drinking among 
many Aboriginal people in Australia today. For Aboriginal people, as 
for eighteenth-century English villagers, the integrity of social relations 
rest on claims to rights and the fulfilment of mutual obligations that are 
5  The same was true of colonial Sydney, according to an account by F Fowler in 1859, in which 
‘not to drink is considered a crime. Aut bibat, aut abeat—which means, in Australia, if you will not 
“stand” you may walk’ (Birch & Macmillan 1962: 156–7).
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often prior to other considerations. With the advent of modern industrial 
society in Europe, there was additional reason to subdue the excesses of 
the labouring classes, often expressed through unrestrained drinking at 
carnivals and festivals as well as shared daily drinking. Rural labouring 
work, such as haymaking and sheep shearing, had been punctuated by 
four or five meal breaks a day accompanied by pints of strong beer, but this 
could not occur in a factory, for the timing, location and style of this kind 
of drinking threatened the orderly development of industrial production. 
A new industrial workforce had to learn the disciplines of punctuality, 
routine and perseverance (Adler 1991). It became necessary to quarantine 
drinking, confining it to acceptable physical and temporal limits, and to 
create a separate sphere for leisure time. By the late eighteenth century, the 
eight-hour day was widely adopted in industries in Britain and Australia 
(Melbourne, in particular, was a focus of eight-hour day activism) and 
this helped indirectly to create the notion of recreational time and, with 
it, a burgeoning of alternatives and counterattractions to drinking for 
members of the public: sport, outdoor activities, dancing and museums.
Modern societies expect that adults will respect the divide between work 
and leisure: adults are expected to be soberly attentive and conscientious 
when in charge of small children, when driving, using machinery and at 
work (Room 2011). Of great assistance in this project was the temperance 
movement that arose in England and America (and Australia) in the 
nineteenth century. By preaching discipline, sobriety and self-control, 
the temperance movement’s urgings dovetailed well with the needs of 
an emergent industrial economy. Indeed, by discouraging workers from 
spending their wages at the tavern, and by encouraging a middle-class 
home life and promoting thrift, temperance became a vehicle for the 
transmission of a middle-class domestic ideology (Adler 1991, Kociumbas 
1995, Burnett 1999). Ideas of temperance and moderation helped to create 
a domestic market for consumer goods; there would, after all, be more 
cash and leisure time available to devote to buying things. The temperance 
movement itself was class conscious: wine, for example, (considered 
a civilised drink consumed by the educated classes) was not often singled 
out for condemnation, whereas ‘spirituous liquors’ (preferred by the 
lower orders) were. Reflecting this inclination, the temperance movement 
initially called for moderation, thus allowing for the consumption of 
wine rather than complete abstinence. It was only later in the nineteenth 
century that temperance advocates rejected social drinking altogether and 
promoted abstinence from all alcoholic beverages. 
5
1. LEARNING TO DRINk
For employers, controlling their workers’ alcohol consumption and giving 
support to temperance activities were ways in which they could improve 
productivity and ensure a healthy industrial labour force. This explains 
why, in late nineteenth-century England, several villages and ‘garden cities’ 
were built by industrialists for their workers. It also explains why these 
complexes not only provided appropriate accommodation for the workers, 
but were often designed to be alcohol-free towns, equipped with dry 
‘temperance’ hotels (Howard 1902). The socially reformist businessmen 
and philanthropists of the time genuinely wanted to improve the living 
conditions and quality of life of their workers, but they also wanted to 
secure and protect their labour force from the evils of drink.6 For example, 
chocolate maker John Cadbury (2010) was a Quaker and a supporter of the 
temperance movement who eventually became a total abstainer. To house 
his chocolate-factory workers, he built the ‘model’ village of Bournville 
near Birmingham in the 1890s. As a result of his influence, Bournville 
remained free from pubs and off-licence sales until recently, although it 
did have two licensed working men’s clubs.7 In Cheshire, William Lever 
created a planned village (‘Port Sunlight’) to accommodate workers at the 
nearby Lever Brothers Sunlight soap factory. The social reformer Joseph 
Rowntree, who was a member of another chocolate and confectionary-
making family, believed that temperance would improve the lot of the 
working classes. He later became a supporter of the Swedish Gothenburg 
system of municipal or community control over alcohol sales as a means of 
diminishing drunkenness. Like these philanthropic capitalists in Britain, 
the teetotaller Chaffey brothers in Australia tried to protect their workforce 
by making their ‘irrigation colony’ on the border between Victoria and 
South Australia alcohol free. When this became unworkable because of 
sly grog sales, Gothenburg-style community-owned hotels were deemed 
the lesser of two evils and several were opened in South Australia. The 
idea that a more controlled hotel environment would trammel citizens’ 
excess drinking, thereby helping them to learn to drink in a more civilised 
manner, flourished. This ‘lesser of two evils’ thinking also influenced the 
repeal of prohibition for Indigenous Australians, provoking experiments 
6  In Austria, supporters of workers’ temperance, including ‘socialist teetotallers’ such as Viktor 
Adler, were, in effect, trying to ‘impose a bourgeois-puritanical model on the working class’ largely 
for political rather than health reasons (Schivelbusch 1993: 166). 
7  In September 2015, in a controversial decision, a local shopkeeper was granted the first licence 
for 120 years to sell takeaway alcohol in Bournville (Finnigan 2015).
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in social learning in the form of beer rations in canteens and fostering 
hopes for controls over sales by having Indigenous people themselves take 
on ownership of licensed hotels. 
The ‘civilising’ toast
In the earliest days of the colony of New South Wales, only the most 
cursory attempt was made to mould or curtail the drinking behaviour of 
Aboriginal people. Indeed, it appears that some early colonists and visitors 
freely offered alcoholic beverages to Aboriginal people, as they would 
have to other colonists, probably assuming that Aboriginal people did not 
need to ‘learn’ about alcohol. Peter Mancall (1995) suggested that this 
was the case in North America too: when English explorers encountered 
Algonquian leaders, they greeted them with wine, meat and bread (43).8 
Within a few days of arriving at Botany Bay in January 1788, a British 
second lieutenant on board the First Fleet offered a glass of wine to two 
spear-bearing Aboriginal men they met on the shore. Philip Gidley King 
(1980: 34–5) of HMS Sirius wrote in his private journal:
Governor Phillip then went up another branch & I followed the one we 
were in, & soon perceived that the natives were following us, we soon 
came to the head of this inlet where we perceived the same party of 
Indians, wading over, we rowed up to them & many of them came up to 
the boat, we made them a few more presents, but found it necessY [sic] 
to put a stop to our generosity as they were increasing fast in numbers 
& having only a boats crew with me I was apprehensive that they might 
find means to surprise us as every one of them were armed with lances, 
& short bludgeons—I gave two of them a glass of Wine which they had 
no sooner tasted than they spit it out, and we asked them the name of a 
number of articles.9
8  Of course, there are numerous historical accounts from Australia and elsewhere of alcohol being 
forced upon Indigenous people in an uncharitable and prurient manner to deliberately provoke 
inebriation and spectacle. 
9  For an Aboriginal oral history version of this story, see Brady (2008) and Bertie (1924).
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King’s tone in this description was entirely matter-of-fact: he was simply 
trying to make contact. He offered wine: they spat it out; he asked for 
some vocabulary.10 Similarly, accounts of the first meetings between 
Tasmanian Aboriginal people and the men of Nicolas Baudin’s two 
ships, the Geographe and the Naturaliste, suggest that alcohol was offered 
without ill-intent. The Frenchmen, Baudin (1974: 318) wrote, frequently 
embraced the ‘naturels’ and on numerous occasions offered them food 
and drink (bread, fish, brandy and arrack from Mauritius). They also 
danced together and the Frenchmen performed tricks, sang and played 
instruments.11 
These early Europeans who offered wine or spirits may not have fully 
realised that the people they encountered in Australia or North America 
and elsewhere did not have any comparably strong alcoholic drinks of 
their own. While we now know that Aboriginal people in some regions 
did make mildly alcoholic fermented drinks, they had no strong alcoholic 
drinks (e.g. as strong as wine) prior to contact with outsiders (Brady 2008). 
It is likely that early visitors assumed that some form of liquor did in fact 
exist, if only because they had experienced such drinks in other locations 
in the region. Mariners, such as James Cook and Dumont d’Urville, had 
been offered (and had consumed) the narcotic drink kava, used widely in 
Melanesia and Polynesia, and may have thought that the native Australians 
had something similar. In the Malay Archipelago to Australia’s north, on 
the island of Savu and at ports such as Kupang and Batavia, Europeans 
had drunk locally made palm wine, mild toddies and strong spirits, such 
as aniseed-flavoured arrack, and they also would have observed local 
people chewing betel nut and smoking opium.
As the colonisation project proceeded at Port Jackson, there were 
instances in which Europeans offered alcohol to Aboriginal people as 
a test of their level of civilisation and as a ‘civilising’ gesture—an active 
experiment across cultures in the teaching of manners surrounding food 
and drink. Alcoholic beverages, particularly wine, were understood to be 
10  It seems a little surprising to us now that an exploratory party about to land on an alien and 
potentially threatening shore would even have wine on board, but this was apparently common, 
especially when water was unpredictable and scarce. In May 1788, George Worgan (1978: 45), also 
of the Sirius, described taking a ‘delightful excursion’ up the harbour in which his party partook of 
cold kangaroo pie, plum pudding and a bottle of wine.
11  However, the Tasmanians (and, indeed, Aboriginal people in other parts of Australia) frequently 
rejected the food and drink offered to them by Europeans; even food that was recognisable to them, 




a natural feature of such an endeavour. From medieval times in Europe, 
the conditioning of polite behaviours was just one aspect of the overall 
civilising process designed to improve the peasants and the lower orders, 
as Elias’s (1978, 1982) work demonstrates. In the eighteenth century, it 
was considered desirable to avoid public displays of passionate anger, hot 
temper and drunkenness, and women were to be treated with respect and 
decorum (Gascoigne 2002: 149, Salmond 2003: 393).12 People had to 
learn the rules of behaviour expected at the table: for example, how one 
should sit (with a goblet and a well-cleaned knife on the right, the bread 
on the left) and how one should lift food to the mouth by means of a fork, 
rather than fingers (it was considered ‘uncivilised’ to put food into one’s 
mouth with fingers, even from one’s own plate—a rule that had little to 
do with the danger of illness and more to do with being seen in society 
with dirty fingers) (Elias 1978: 126). An important part of the spread of 
courtly manners to the broader populace in the early eighteenth century 
was drinking to the health of guests: 
It is civil and decent for a prince to drink first to the health of those he is 
entertaining, and then to offer them the same glass or goblet usually filled 
with the same wine … nor is it a lack of politeness in them to drink from 
the same glass, but a mark of candour and friendship. (93)
These manners and rules of comportment communicated distinction, 
refinement and social civility. It seems to have been relatively common 
for sea captains, such as Arthur Phillip and James Cook, to selectively 
invite certain ‘natives’ or chiefs to dine with them on board their vessels or 
onshore.13 In Tonga, a chief joined Cook for a dinner of fish and a glass of 
wine (Salmond 2003: 217). In Tahiti in 1773, Cook invited local chiefs 
Tu and To’ofa to take dinner on board his ship. Tu, who had already learned 
European manners, showed To’ofa how to use a knife and fork, and how 
to salt his meat and drink wine from a glass (248). Similarly, at Sydney 
Cove, Governor Phillip invited Aboriginal ‘chiefs’ to dine with him at 
his house: Arabanoo was first in December 1788; a year later, Bennelong 
12  Despite an overall lack of rights for women in Europe, the status of women was considered an 
indicator of social development; it is significant, then, that diarists of colonial Australia frequently 
referred to the downtrodden position of Indigenous women (Gascoigne 2002: 149). 
13  Although James Cook was brought up as a Quaker, he evidently had no qualms about offering 
strong alcoholic drinks to the indigenous people he encountered on his travels, including children. 
In 1773, he gave three glasses of wine to a sulking 14-year-old Maori boy, making him very drunk 
(Salmond 2003: 187).
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and Colbee were invited.14 By then, the distinction between savagery and 
civilisation had become entrenched in the thinking of European colonists. 
In inviting Bennelong and Colbee to dine with them, the English hoped 
that their ‘dinner-table diplomacy’ would serve as a civilising influence, 
facilitating peaceful dealings with the ‘natives’ (McIntyre 2008: 39.6). 
It seems likely that there were mixed motives behind some of these 
invitations—especially considering that the Aboriginal ‘guests’ had 
been taken into the settlement by force. The invitations were intended 
to facilitate good relations and to demonstrate the superior customs of 
English society; however, they were also designed to test the alacrity with 
which Aboriginal people could learn such manners and habits and thus, 
ultimately, be amenable to assimilation and civilisation. When Aboriginal 
guests observed and mimicked English manners, it pleased their hosts. 
Arabanoo, for example, reportedly used his cup and saucer ‘well’ when 
taking tea with the governor (Hunter 1968: 132). King was surprised 
and pleased that Bennelong was so polite, imitating all the actions and 
gestures of every person in the governor’s family, ‘bowing, drinking 
healths, returning thanks, etc. with the most scrupulous attention’; this 
was considered remarkable, especially given the ‘state of nature he has been 
brought up in’ (Hunter 1968: 405). The English dressed him in trousers 
and a red woollen cloth jacket. An initiated Wanghal man, Bennelong 
(Woollewarre) not only accepted Phillip’s hospitality, he also formed 
a  relationship with the Englishman, sometimes calling him Been-en-aa 
(‘father’), perhaps in an attempt to find a place for Phillip and his officers 
in the traditional kinship system (Smith 2001). As Isobel McBryde (2000) 
has pointed out, Governor Phillip and Bennelong needed each other to 
gain advantage and to ensure the survival of their respective groups, and 
they manoeuvred around each other to achieve this (254).
Introducing the ritual of raising glasses of wine to drink toasts to health 
was a key feature of such interchanges and was often mentioned by diarists. 
Toasting reached a peak of popularity in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries and drinking to the health of the King of England 
was the most common toast of the time. In Tahiti, for the observation 
of the Transit of Venus in 1769, Cook and Banks, celebrating the King’s 
14  On many occasions in the early colony, Aboriginal people refused to consume the food and 
drink offered to them. Arabanoo initially only drank water and refused bread and salt-meat; later he 
became an ‘avid’ drinker of tea. Bennelong’s wife, Barangaroo, refused to taste wine (Tench 1996: 96, 
Hunter 1968, cf. Baudin 1974: 305).
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birthday, invited Tupaia, the Polynesian navigator, and others, on board. 
Tupaia drank all the toasts to ‘Kihiargo’ (King George) and became 
enormously drunk (Salmond 2003: 80, cf. MacAndrew & Edgerton 1969: 
43).15 Another Tahitian, Mai, taken back to London on the Adventure in 
1774, showed his prowess with English customs by learning to ice skate 
and play chess; he also drank to the health of ‘King George!’ whenever 
toasts were proposed (Salmond 2003: 297). At Sydney Cove, wine was 
offered at Phillip’s dinners, but only Bennelong accepted the drink and 
learned to raise his glass and drink to the King—a process that he called 
‘daging’. George Barrington, in his ‘impartial and circumstantial narrative’ 
of life at Botany Bay, reported that Bennelong: 
Having observed, when at the governor’s house, his majesty’s health drank 
in the first glass after dinner, and had been taught to repeat the word 
before he drank his own glass, he imagined the liquor was called the king: 
and when he afterwards came to know that it was wine, yet he would 
frequently call it king. (Rickard 2001: 92)
Bennelong later realised that wine itself was not really called daging, but he 
continued to make a joke of his mistake and to refer to wine in that way, 
knowing it would provoke a response (Smith 2001, McIntyre 2008).16 
Bennelong was described at the time by diarists such as Watkin Tench and 
King as someone who drank socially and who held his liquor well; it was 
later that he either became or was labelled a ‘heavy drinker’ (Collins 1971, 
Kenny 1973, Smith 2001: 44).17 It is ironic that Bennelong was later 
stereotyped as the first Aboriginal drunk (Sydney Gazette 1813, Kenny 
1973): he should be remembered for the much more significant reason 
of being the first Aboriginal individual to have been taught Europe’s 
most important drinking ritual: the toast (Schivelbusch 1993: 169). 
Not only is it the oldest European drinking custom (dating to at least 
the sixth century), bearing magical and cultic associations, but it also 
communicated aspects of ‘civilising’ behaviour.18 Toasting acknowledged 
15  Although, on this occasion, Tupaia and the other Tahitians did accept wine and become 
intoxicated, it appears they disliked the experience and their distaste for alcohol lasted several years 
(MacAndrew & Edgerton 1969). 
16  In time, the term ‘daging’ (meaning alcohol) was taken up by Aboriginal people across a wide area 
of New South Wale (Troy 1994: 48). 
17  As it turned out, the civilising ‘project’ around Bennelong was a failure from the British point 
of view. In David Collins’s (1971, vol II: 134) last reference to Bennelong, he reported that by 1798 
Bennelong preferred the ‘rude and dangerous’ society of his own countrymen instead of living 
‘peaceably and pleasantly’ at the governor’s residence. 
18  For cultural variations in drinking customs and toasting styles, see Douglas (1987). See also 
Schivelbusch (1993). 
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and celebrated the sovereign as well as old and new lands and the countries 
of foreign guests—it remembered absent friends and it honoured, linked 
and integrated those present. A toast could seal a mutual pact and 
acknowledge mutual dependence. As Julie McIntyre (2012) points out, 
while Bennelong must have absorbed the power of meaning contained 
in the triumphal tone of the toasts, he would not have realised that, by 
toasting the King, the colonists were also toasting empire and thus the 
inexorable dispossession of the Indigenous people (42). 
Toasting punctuated meals and, because it was (and is) associated with 
the consumption of food, served to moderate, somewhat, the amount 
of alcohol consumed; however, it was certainly not always thus. In the 
early days of the colony of New South Wales, toasting was not inevitably 
associated with restraint. Every prisoner and all officers and private 
soldiers at Sydney Cove received a special ration with which to drink 
toasts to the King’s birthday in June 1788, as well as numerous other 
public toasts. On that occasion, Worgan (1978: 53), a surgeon on the First 
Fleet, reported that ‘Port, Lisbon, Madeira, Teneriff and good old English 
Porter’ went ‘merrily round in bumpers’.19 Fifty years after Bennelong’s 
experience, John Sweatman (1977), a diarist and clerk on HMS Bramble, 
noted that the toasts at formal dinners could be endless. He described 
one Sydney dinner of 80 people and five kinds of champagne at which 
an alderman sitting near him became ‘very cunnublified’ and had to be 
led away (65). While this kind of determined toasting slowly declined in 
popularity as the decades passed, diarists and other observers still thought 
it worth a mention (and clearly found it amusing) on the occasions when 
they came across an Aboriginal person being taught to toast, or going 
through the motions of a toast. Tom Petrie (1904), in his reminiscences 
of life in rural Queensland in the 1840s, described a settler inviting an 
Aboriginal man called Billy to come and have a glass of grog with him: 
Now Billy, hold the glass so, and say ‘Here’s good health, gentlemen’. 
The squatters all stood round, and Billy, who could not say ‘health’ took 
the glass, and this was his toast ‘Gentlemen, here you go to hell!’ Of 
course, this caused roars of laughter. (276) 
19  Bumper: a wine glass or other vessel filled to the brim. 
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In the western district of Victoria, an Aboriginal man, Corwhorong, who 
was known as Wilmot Abraham, appeared on drunkenness charges more 
than anyone else in the Warrnambool district. On one occasion, he used 
his supposedly patriotic toasting as a means of outwitting the magistrate:
Wilmot informed the bench with an indignant air that it had been the 
Queen’s birthday, and as a loyal person he had been drinking toasts to 
her health. The presiding magistrate could not withstand his confession 
of loyalty … Wilmot escaped with a caution. (Critchett 1998: 41)
In New Zealand, the Maori elite adopted the etiquette of European 
toasting with great sophistication. Marten Hutt (1999) proposed that the 
appropriation by Maori of European drinking customs, such as toasting 
leaders, showed that alcohol was being linked to political allegiances and 
alliances. At a Maori hui in the 1860s, each chief took turns to propose 
a toast. As he proposed a toast to the Queen, one asked that she should 
send ‘plenty of powder, plenty of rum, and may both be strong! And may 
she send and open a public house here’ (27). 
McIntyre (2008) has argued that teaching Bennelong and his small 
group of companions to drink wine during dinner in the first years of the 
colony was part of a considered strategy to persuade Aboriginal people to 
abandon ‘savagery’ and to test the potential for them to become ‘civilised’:
In terms of the practical scope of the project of ‘civilising’ the Aborigines 
by exposing them to ‘civilised’ British culture, it is significant that only 
the Aborigines who had particular acquaintance with the Governor and 
other officials took part in dining rituals at which wine was served. These 
Indigenous Australians were shaped as an elite, reflecting exclusiveness of 
the white elite. In assembling this intimate company Phillip and his men 
developed affection for the Aborigines they knew, but did not attempt to 
draw any others into the close circle of British authority in the colony. 
(39.10)
Wine itself was a marker of wealth and political power in late eighteenth-
century England, consumed as a traditional part of social gatherings 
for celebration, bereavement or companionship (39.3). Above all, wine 
(as opposed to spirits) was considered a civilising drink. In an eighteenth-
century form of drug substitution, wine was thought of as an antidote 
to the consumption of much stronger liquors that were the bane of the 
colony. Colonists believed that even the cultivation of wine grapes (and the 
practice of horticulture in general) would promote civility. Indeed, even 
the Australian countryside itself, encumbered with the ‘dreary eucalyptus’, 
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could be beautified and tamed by vineyards. In this idealised vision, the 
bush would eventually give way to the civilising industry of winegrowing 
that could employ many thousands of workers; the lower classes would be 
led away from drinking spirituous liquors through viticulture and wine 
consumption; and, once good quality light wines were freely available, 
people would surely begin to drink like the peoples of the Mediterranean 
(McIntyre 2011: 199). Colonists would then be ‘merry instead of mad’ 
and ‘animated instead of boisterous’ (Dingle 1980: 242). As long ago 
as 1776, Adam Smith, in his Enlightenment text The Wealth of Nations, 
extolled the so-called Mediterranean drinking style, perhaps making him 
the earliest in a long line of commentators to do so (McIntyre 2011).20 
Smith promulgated the idea that wine had the power to bring about 
sobriety in itself, declaring that the people of wine countries such as Spain 
and Italy were the soberest people in Europe. Possibly because he was an 
economist rather than a sociologist, he attributed the apparent sobriety of 
Spaniards and Italians to financial rather than social reasons. He believed 
that the cheapness and easy availability of wine in those countries was 
responsible for their relatively moderate consumption patterns, rather 
than the fact that alcohol (in the form of wine) was an accompaniment to 
food and consumed sociably. 
Learning by observation
Far from this idyllic bucolic fantasy of what might have been going on 
in parts of the Mediterranean, the settlers and convicts of New South 
Wales drank themselves literally to oblivion in several cases documented 
by the Lieutenant Governor of the colony, David Collins. In his journals, 
Collins noted that the superintendent of convicts drank half a gallon of 
Cape Brandy and died; that a marine died of an inflammatory complaint 
brought on by heavy drinking; that two women and a child drowned 
after the women had been drinking; a drummer’s wife expired in a fit 
of intoxication; and that two young men had a drinking competition 
20  The deregulation of liquor laws in Australian cities in recent years to allow for more small bars 
(e.g. in Sydney) has often been idealised and promoted as reproducing a ‘Mediterranean lifestyle’ and 
a concomitant (supposedly) trouble-free style of drinking. However, the idyllic archetype relates to 
a few cultures on one side of the Mediterranean, and even these do not escape the casualties of liver 
cirrhosis (Douglas 1987: 5, Room & Mäkelä 2000: 481, Blocker et al. 2003: 583). In the United 
Kingdom, a critic of new 24-hour licensing laws that aspired to mimic a European drinking culture, 
described them as a fantasy based on ‘too many Tuscan holidays’: longer hours would not mean more 
sensible drinking, just more drinking (Measham 2006: 259). 
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with raw spirits and one died on the spot (Collins 1971). From 1793, 
all convicts working for officers were paid partly in rum and by 1796 
illicit distillation was widely practised.21 By the 1820s, the drinking habits 
of the inhabitants of New South Wales had: 
Assumed certain distinctive characteristics. They were heavy spirit 
drinkers. Their average of around four gallons per head was four times 
greater than that of their countrymen in Britain … some colonists drank 
[wine] regularly and in significantly larger quantities than the British per 
capita average of a third of a gallon between 1800 and 1830. Beer however 
was only consumed in relatively small quantities. (Dingle 1980: 241)
The problem was not only how much people drank, but how they drank. 
By the 1820s, the Rocks district of Sydney had a population of 1,200, one-
quarter of which was Irish. Just as it had been in the pre-industrial setting 
of rural Britain, drinking was communal and collective, and it was very 
public; brawling and gambling were considered normal behaviours and 
disputes were settled in public, often in angry and violent confrontations 
(Karskens 1999: 56). Men from the ships binged on two months wages in 
two nights ashore at pubs like the Whaler’s Arms, named for its clientele; 
the same pattern was repeated by pastoral workers from the inland.22 
The Austrian naturalist and traveller, Baron Charles von Hugel (1994: 
43)), made a  number of acerbic comments about Sydney, its criminal 
population and the drinking habits of the English, when he visited there 
in 1833:
The only thing standing between the English and their rapid progress 
towards world domination is the fascination alcoholic beverages hold 
for them … A bottle of brandy or a bottle of claret compensate an 
Englishman for the absence of all other joys of life … But, among the 
lower orders, brandy [branntwein—spirits or brandy] is the supreme and 
ultimate object in life. 
Servants, the Irish and the lower orders in general were said to be particularly 
prone to a lack of restraint. According to Mrs Charles Meredith of Sydney, 
one could not leave wine or strong liquor of any kind accessible to one’s 
servants, as they would often be trundled home drunk on a handbarrow 
21  Distillation became legal in the colony in 1821. 
22  In 1958, Jeremy Beckett wrote that the recurrent bouts of wild drinking among Aboriginal men 
in outback New South Wales recalled the ‘benders’ of white itinerant labourers: ‘It is hard not to 
believe that the aborigines have modelled themselves on their white brethren’ (232).
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or ‘shouldered like a sack of potatoes’ (Meredith 1973: 163, Cunningham 
1966: 280). There were undoubtedly less extreme drinkers among the 
colonists too, but those with more restraint were drinking in private.
As they increasingly ventured into the settlement and came into contact 
with convicts and settlers, there were plenty of opportunities for Aboriginal 
people to witness the antics of people who became intoxicated in public. To 
begin with, supplies of alcohol and food had been precious and expensive 
and it is unlikely that much of either was freely given to Aboriginal people 
in or near Sydney Cove. In 1798, Collins observed that Aboriginal people 
were extremely robust, which he attributed to their ‘good habit of body’ 
and the fact that they were free from the use of spirituous liquors and 
the ‘luxuries of the table’ (Collins 1971, vol II: 134).23 However, supplies 
improved and English, French, Russian and other visiting mariners were 
soon bartering alcohol for artefacts,24 which meant that Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal people were mingling. The ‘woods’ around the settlement 
were increasingly populated by runaway convicts and vagabonds, and 
Collins (1971, vol I: 405) noted that several native teenage boys were 
living among the settlers in different districts. The 1830s marked the 
heaviest spirits-drinking period in Australian history. By then, Aboriginal 
people were washing out empty rum casks and drinking the mixture of 
rum and water, which they called ‘bull’; they were also drinking openly 
from bottles in the streets of Sydney. Scenes of staggering, ragged 
Aboriginal people were common enough to be depicted by artists of the 
day such as John Carmichael and Augustus Earle.25 In the years after the 
early experiments of teaching Bennelong and his cohort the social ritual 
of the toast, Aboriginal people were left to themselves to interpret the 
meaning of alcohol, and what happens after imbibing it. They ‘learned’ 
by looking around at the motley collection of Europeans and were often 
puzzled by what they saw.
23  With the Endeavour at Cooktown in July 1770, Joseph Banks (1963, vol II: 130) commented 
similarly that the Aboriginal people they met were ‘happy’, being unlike Europeans for whom strong 
liquors and tobacco had degenerated from luxuries into ‘necessaries’. 
24  In an early case of sly grog selling (in contravention of Governor Macquarie’s regulation against 
supplying natives with alcohol), one Russian navigator negotiated for ‘rarities’ (three spears, a shield 
and clubs) with two bottles of rum, ‘which showed their passion for drinking. As they would not 
otherwise have agreed to the barter described, I was obliged to satisfy their desire’ (Barratt 1981: 25). 
25  Earle’s lithograph, Natives of N.S. Wales as seen in the streets of Sydney (1830), depicts a partly 
clothed family group drinking ‘bull’ outside, apparently excluded from a licensed hotel frequented 
by Europeans. One woman holds a fish she has caught and another has decorated her hair with clay 




Aboriginal people’s exposure to the drinking behaviour of the English 
came to be seen fatalistically, as an unstoppable process: a mix of passive 
contamination and active modelling. The first German visitor to South 
Australia in the 1830s, Dr Hermann Koeler (2006: 76–7), lamented the 
inevitability of this process, seeing Aboriginal ‘alcoholism’ developing 
through a kind of social osmosis:
Only a few blacks who had been employed as rowers or for other kinds 
of assistance by the whalers in Encounter Bay, had already become 
accustomed to drinking, and in time the South Australians will presumably 
also become friends of spirits just like the Aborigines of New South Wales 
and on the whole almost all savages who come into constant contact 
with the English. For no civilized nation is more devoted to alcoholism 
than ‘Albion’s proud children’, and since the Ethiopian race, to which the 
South Australians belong … normally only imitate and adopt the vices 
which they perceive in their white neighbours, even without speaking 
of other contributing factors, alcoholism will soon begin to effect the 
physical decline of the Adelaide tribe.
In a similar vein, the Australian Temperance Magazine published the 
opinion that: 
Savages, as the New Hollanders for instance, resist it [alcohol] at first, 
and only learn its pernicious influence by obeying the imitative principle 
and partaking of it out of compliment to the European. Indeed, it may 
be doubted whether the earliest tasters of spirit were pleased with its 
penetrating odour, its pungent effect upon the palate, and the burning 
sensation it communicates to the throat and stomach: habit, and habit 
alone, can make it a pleasant beverage.26
The influence of observation, habit and ‘custom’ on drinking behaviour 
was  repeatedly stressed in early temperance tracts, which showed 
a  surprising awareness of the power of the social environment on 
everyone, not just Indigenous people. ‘From long habit and the power of 
association, the price of many men in New South Wales is a glass of rum’, 
observed the Australian Temperance Magazine, which also noted that it 
was ‘custom—daily custom—[that] brought the two powerful feelings 
of covetousness and appetite to bear upon grog’.27
26  Australian Temperance Magazine 1837, I(2):17.
27  Australian Temperance Magazine 1838, II(2):19.
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The practice of observing and imitating white men is described in an oral 
history account from far north Queensland that reveals how mystified 
Aboriginal people were by the drinking of whites. The story, translated 
from the Kuuk Thaayorre language, also described the introduction of 
alcohol in Cape York:
Long ago we didn’t know the taste of it but saw the whites drinking. None 
of us here went near it to actually swallow alcoholic drinks though others 
elsewhere did but we still kept our distance. When we saw stray men 
drinking here and there and commented ‘Oh yes, those men there, what 
are they gulping? Is it food? I’ll first go and have a look to see what they 
are swallowing!’
‘Whacko, there it is, finished!’ One man was roaming around and the 
whiteman said, ‘come on chaps, there’s plenty more of this liquor!’ … 
We were quite oblivious of alcoholic drinks. I was telling you about the 
whiteman’s drinking that he passed on to us. So he kept on drinking and 
still went back for more! (Foote and Hall 1995: 2)
Learning by observation is still cited by Aboriginal people as the means 
by which they were (and are) introduced to drinking; however, more 
recent accounts, such as those below, describe the powers of example and 
persuasion presented not by Europeans, but by other Aboriginal men. 
A woman from Yirrkala in northeast Arnhem Land described the visual 
effect of family members who were able to drink at a mining canteen:
One thing that I noticed at that time was they’d come home and they’d 
be drunk, but I remember them being really happy drunk. They used to 
make jokes, make us laugh … we’d say ‘hey, so and so is drunk, quick’, 
and then us kids would all run up to this man and he’d joke and do a 
lot of funny things that would make us laugh and we thought having 
nanitji28 to be funny, to make other people laugh, you know to be a good 
thing for them, we thought, at that time. But of course as the years went 
by they wanted more and more ... Seeing my brothers drinking … follow 
their footsteps, like watching movies getting ideas … ideas from family 
and relatives … I seen them and I start following. (Wearne 2001: 47–8)
28  This is the term used for alcohol among Yolngu; it is a loan word from the Makassar language.
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Pitjantjatjara-speaking men in South Australia made similar comments:
I came from college there and, hey, ‘that’s how they drinking!’ I was 
watching you know. I was sitting down, you know, just watching them. 
Men (they passed away now) they told me ‘hey, you want to get warm? 
Try this!’ Uwa, yes, it was really cold too and I bin try ‘em you know. First 
[time] I got really drunk. Yes, I couldn’t walk. I gotta crawl to the camp. 
I was really headache then. Boss of me then. I was drinking, drinking, 
drinking. (Young Mr May, in Brady 1995: 130) 
When you watch, you follow, you know? When somebody do things, see 
them and you follow their example. They drink—well, you drink too! 
You get in there with them, they share you, ‘hey, come on, come on here, 
drink, here!’ And you drink. That’s it. The grog get hold of you. And you 
drink, drink, drink. (Keith Peters, in Brady 1995: 137)
Fig. 1 Aboriginal Corroboree at Adelaide, 1885 
Source: Reproduced in Australasian Sketcher 29 June 1885, SLV Mp009675 
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Performing drunkenness
In the very early days of the colony, George Worgan (1978: 18) observed 
that Aboriginal people were ‘expert at the art of Mimickry, both in their 
Actions and in repeating many of our Phrases … the Sailors teach them 
to swear’. Russian expeditioners in Sydney observed Aboriginal people 
quarrelling and wife-beating and noted that ‘from the convicts they have 
acquired the expletives, curses, and oaths of the English rabble’ (Barratt 
1981: 38). We can conclude from such firsthand accounts that Aboriginal 
people were keen observers of the behaviour of colonists and settlers—
and that they took a great interest in the drunken comportment of these 
people. They learned the bodily and verbal manifestations of intoxication 
so well that not only did they know how they were supposed to act when 
drunk, but they were also able to accurately mimic and re-enact faux 
intoxication even when they were sober.
The visiting Quaker, temperance campaigner and social reformer, James 
Backhouse, also observed the ‘force of example’ set by European drinking 
and the imitative behaviour that followed. Backhouse (1843) described 
seeing Aboriginal people soaking empty sugar-bags29 in buckets of water, 
avidly drinking the sugary infusion and then, in an apt illustration 
of drunken comportment as learned behaviour, enacting pseudo-
intoxication:
The Blacks of Sydney reel after drinking the infusion of sugar-bags, 
and put on the appearance of intoxication so well, that it has generally 
been supposed, that the liquor really made them drunk. The following 
circumstances satisfied an acquaintance of ours, that this appearance of 
intoxication was feigned, and our own observation has confirmed this 
view. (327)
Backhouse went on to describe an Aboriginal man who, after drinking 
salty water (with no alcohol content) and having been told it was rum, 
began to throw his arms about and adopt a staggering gait, declaring 
that he was ‘murry [very] drunk like a gentleman’ (327). It is difficult 
to tell from such descriptions whether the Aboriginal men in question 
were mocking white men or trying to emulate them. In these instances of 
pseudo-intoxication, it was clearly more important to appear intoxicated 
than to actually be drunk. We can only guess at the reasons for this: 
29  Bags of fine sacking were used to store sugar and the term ‘sugar-bag’ later became incorporated 
into Aboriginal English to describe honey, especially honey from the native bee (JM Arthur 1996: 61).
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to cause amusement; to earn tips; to advertise the fact that the person is 
drunk and not responsible for his actions. Drunkenness is usually feigned 
to take advantage of the excuses that such behaviour can provide, but in 
these examples, the motive is not so clear. This is because the pretence was 
taking place at a cultural boundary, as Room (2001) has explained: 
In the context of interaction between people from very different cultures. 
At such boundaries, the expectations and attributions about drunken 
behaviour take on an added dimension: each side in the interaction has 
expectations, whether well-founded or not, about drunken comportment 
in the alien culture. Further, each side builds up some knowledge of what 
is expected of them by the other. (196)
Mac Marshall (1981) discussed anthropological field studies of pseudo-
intoxication and the ability of people to turn their drunken behaviour 
on and off in the context of the (supposedly) inevitably disinhibiting 
effects of ethanol on human beings. If drinkers can demonstrate a full 
range of culturally appropriate drunken behaviours (‘murry drunk like 
a gentleman’) whether drunk or not, then ‘sober up’ at a moment’s notice, 
he suggests that the disinhibiting effects are called into question. 
Aboriginal people’s mimicry of drunken comportment found its way into 
formal performance contexts in dance-music events that were publicly 
staged to settler audiences. In Adelaide in the mid-nineteenth century, 
such events evolved into a tradition of regular ‘corroborees’, as they were 
called, conducted for tourists in public spaces, such as parks and ovals, 
and drinking seems to have been a common theme (Parsons 1997). 
A newspaper story noted that the Aboriginal men of Gawler Town (north 
of Adelaide):
Have introduced English dialogue into their corroborees, and the 
following short one is a great favourite—A native, who staggering drunk, 
comes into the ring, and addressing himself to another who is supposed 
to re-present a licensed retailer, says, ‘Give me a pint of beer’, to which 
the other replies, ‘I shan’t—you’re drunk already’. A third black then says, 
with all the intonation of authority, ‘Send for policeman’ when chorus of 
voices gives exultingly, and with great vociferation, a sententious ‘put him 
in jail’ and, finally, young and old join in applauding the performance.30 
30  Moreton Bay Courier 16 January 1847: 4.
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In 1860, the citizens of Angaston in the Barossa Valley found a group 
of Aboriginal people from the Murray River encamped outside the 
town. The local newspaper noted approvingly that they were ‘well clad 
and well behaved’, and that they performed corroborees that included 
demonstrations of drills and marching. Another part of the performance 
included the ‘imitation (minus the liquor) of a whitefellows’ drinking party’ 
(emphasis added), in which performers asked each other: 
‘What will you take?’ and ‘what will you take?’ etc. ‘I’ll take a glass’ and 
‘I’ll take a nobbler’,31 concluding all with ‘hip, hip, hoorah!’32
Later in the nineteenth century, Aboriginal men from the Coorong and 
the Murray River performed corroborees on the Adelaide Oval. Some 
of these events were controversial, described by disapproving white 
observers as being a circus or a sham, inauthentic because of the cross-
cultural elements incorporated into the action. One article described such 
performances derisively as a ‘whitey-black corroboree’, because of the 
‘utilisation of appliances of civilisation in the display’.33 Nevertheless, in 
May 1885, 20,000 Adelaide citizens turned up to watch a dramatic night-
time corroboree lit by coloured lights, flaming torches and fireworks, in 
which semi-naked Aboriginal performers walked onto the oval singing 
God Save the Queen. After a kangaroo dance, they performed ‘a little 
satire on civilization’ that involved ‘liquoring up’ and a pantomime on 
intoxication—falling down, yelling and tumbling about (see Fig. 1). 
One account interpreted the performance as: 
Affecting to teach the whites the evils of intemperance … there can 
be little doubt that the second part of the program had both moral 
significance and a certain amount of irony. Evidently most of the 
Aborigines performing it belonged to a Blue Ribbon organisation and, 
having become abstainers, wanted to illustrate the principles they had 
adopted. (Whimpress, no date: 5)
Drunkenness was performed at temperance meetings as well, usually in 
the form of cautionary dramas on the evils of drink as a way of promoting 
sobriety. At the Point McLeay Mission (now Raukkan) in South Australia 
31  Nobbler: a small drink of beer, spirits or wine; a term first recorded in 1852 (Baker 1978: 228).
32  South Australian Register (Adelaide, SA) 26 October 1860: 3.
33  Australasian Sketcher 29 June 1885, 13(194): 99. Apart from performances at the Adelaide Oval, 
there were other public corroborees in Adelaide at this time, including one at the Kensington Oval 
(The Observer 6 June 1885: 30). I am grateful to Tom Gara for drawing my attention to these accounts.
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in 1888,34 Aboriginal members of a temperance group performed 
a number of recitations, dialogues and action scenes representing the evils 
resulting from the use of intoxicants for the benefit of visiting members of 
the Aborigines’ Friends’ Association (1888: 16). 
In 1924, Torres Strait Islander dancers were filmed re-enacting 
drunkenness. Frank Hurley’s film, Pearls and Savages, featured them 
wearing traditional dhari headdresses and grass skirts with trousers and 
rolling around feigning drunkenness while holding cups and bottles. 
Hurley’s inter-title read: ‘Dancers with bottles mimic the movement of 
drunk men’.35 Anthropologists Ronald and Catherine Berndt (1993) 
documented a ‘modern’ ceremony while they were doing fieldwork among 
the Yaraldi in South Australia in the 1940s. Their informant related how 
tempers flared easily when people were drinking, and how men simulated 
drunkenness in the ceremony by stumbling and waving empty bottles and 
singing songs about quarrels, tempers and how being ‘silly’ with drink 
caused them to ‘bring out stumbling words’ (219).
The content of these public, private or ceremonial performances of 
intoxication (involving stumbling, falling, waving arms and bottles, 
quarrelling and fighting) reveal that Aboriginal people not only learned 
and took on the Europeans’ ways of being drunk themselves, but also 
absorbed European beliefs about what alcohol does to people: that alcohol 
loosens the inhibitions that constrain and excuse bad behaviour; that it 
contributes to male bonding and allows for disinhibited sexuality and 
so on. Aboriginal observers could see that, when drunk, people usually 
became loud, abusive and feisty, vomited, walked unsteadily, sang and 
passed out.36 In a volume of detailed anthropological studies of drinking 
in Papua New Guinea, Marshall and colleagues (1982) showed how 
these beliefs and behaviours were taken on, largely unchanged, by Papua 
New Guineans, becoming merged with their local cultural perceptions 
of intoxication (cf. MacAndrew & Edgerton 1969).
34  The missionary at Point McLeay, George Taplin, was a strict teetotaller. There were regular 
temperance meetings and Aboriginal people were persuaded to ‘sign the pledge’.
35  Pearls and Savages (New York, 1924). The introduction to this film sequence shows Mer Island, 
where it was presumably filmed (National Film and Sound Archive ID 6810-0012). 
36  Burbank (1994: 63) described how children in East Arnhem Land (in the late 1980s) associated 
‘drunk’ with aggression while play-acting at drinking ‘beer’ from an empty lemonade bottle. 
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Although the Irish and English were the most persistent models for 
drinking and drunken comportment in Australia, they were not the 
earliest. In the north of the country, the first drinkers of strong liquors 
observed by the Yolngu and other coastal peoples were maritime visitors 
from Southeast Asia. These men (the ‘Macassans’) were bêche-de-
mer fishermen who sailed from Makassar, south Sulawesi, to northern 
Australian coasts between around 1720 and 1907. They arrived each year 
in December, usually beaching and setting up camp at the same locations 
where they processed their catches onshore, and staying for around four 
months until the monsoon winds turned around. These lengthy and 
regular stays required the negotiation of friendly relationships with local 
Aboriginal traditional owners. Along with other desirable items traded 
or presented to local people (such as cloth, rice, steel axes and tobacco), 
the Macassans brought a favoured and portable alcoholic drink: the 
distilled spirit arrack.37 Among most Aboriginal groups in contact with 
the Macassans, arrack came to be known by the borrowed term ‘nganitji’ 
(from the Macassan ‘anisi’, meaning ‘strong drink’), and the term is still 
in use in Arnhem Land today to describe alcohol in general. We know 
very little about the social contexts within which nganitji was consumed: 
exactly how much was imported; with whom, exactly, it was shared; 
what kind of behaviours the visitors might have exhibited; and whether 
these Southeast Asians consciously ‘inducted’ Aboriginal people into its 
use.38 However, given that a ‘drunken Macassan’ dance is still regularly 
performed in northeast Arnhem Land in the nganitji sequence of an 
ancestral song cycle, we do have some indication of its affect (Evans 1992, 
Brady 2008). In the dance, Aboriginal performers stagger around with 
empty soft drink bottles, miming the drinking of arrack—much as their 
counterparts had done on the Adelaide Oval in 1885.
In Australia, as settlement advanced, Aboriginal people soon began to 
confront contradictory information about how Europeans themselves 
interpreted alcohol. While most drank heartily, binged frequently (often 
until unconscious) and offered or forced strong spirits upon Aboriginal 
37  At home, the Macassans also consumed other fermented drinks, such as toddies and palm wine 
(sagueir); however, these did not travel as well as distilled spirits. Wallace (1989: 224) observed that 
although the Macassans were ‘nominal Mohammedans’ they were lax in their religious observances 
and consumed alcoholic drinks with gusto.
38  Oral histories of the Macassans provide conflicting accounts of their drinking behaviour as well 
as that of their Aboriginal hosts. Consequently, the historical reality is difficult to distinguish from 
the now heavily mythologised depictions of these Southeast Asian visitors (Warner 1957, Macknight 
1976, Searcy [1909] 1984, Hercus & Sutton 1986, Wallace 1989, Brady 2008: 12–14).
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people for amusement or enticement, others—the missionaries of the 
many Christian denominations, the temperance campaigners, and many 
ordinary ‘upright’ citizens—abstained, portrayed drinking alcohol as 
a sin and attempted to protect Aboriginal people from its worst excesses. 
As a result, there were numerous mixed messages about alcohol circulating 
in colonial Australia.
The fantasy of (re)learning how to drink
The historical examples discussed here have demonstrated that, in the 
early decades of colonisation, Aboriginal people adopted many of the 
drinking practices of the British, Irish and others, as well as taking on 
European beliefs about alcohol. Aboriginal people, in a sense, did ‘learn’ 
(as neophyte drinkers) from outsiders. However, the only example of 
a  formal induction into one aspect of the practice of drinking alcohol 
was when Governor Phillip taught Bennelong to raise his glass of wine in 
a toast in the earliest days of the colony. 
Once the period of ‘dinner-table diplomacy’ with Bennelong and his cohort 
came to an end, the colonial administration (and those that followed) 
seemed to abandon any rudimentary notion they might once have had of 
easing the Indigenous inhabitants into a sociable familiarity with alcohol, 
and instead resorted to legislation prohibiting its sale or supply to them. 
For most of the nineteenth and some of the twentieth century, Aboriginal 
people were banned from drinking in hotels39—the traditional focus of 
Australian drinking. Consequently, they were prevented from mixing with, 
and adapting to, what would later become an eclectic range of drinkers 
in relatively controlled licensed environments. They were also prevented 
from experiencing the changes in drinking behaviour that developed over 
time. Due to this race-based prohibition policy in Australia (and indeed 
in other British colonies), Indigenous people missed the opportunity for 
a long-term familiarisation process: they were denied the opportunity to 
experience the waves of change in patterns of consumption and attitudes 
to alcohol that affected the general population over the decades. 
39  Only Aboriginal people with exemption certificates issued for ‘good behaviour’ could drink in 
hotels. In rural New South Wales, Beckett (1958) found that many Aboriginal people who would be 
eligible for exemption did not bother to apply. They drank fortified wine, rum and methylated spirits 
and consumed them rapidly: ‘Once bought, the bottle is never safe until it is emptied, so … behind 
a fence, perhaps, or under some hedge, it is gulped down as quickly as possible’ (225).
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There have been many rises and falls in consumption. The law was 
effective in keeping people out of hotels, but it did not prevent 
them from obtaining  and drinking alcohol surreptitiously. After 
conducting anthropological fieldwork in inland New South Wales in the 
1950s—a period of mostly illicit consumption of alcohol by Aboriginal 
people—Jeremy Beckett (1958), commenting on the widespread drinking 
and drunkenness among Aboriginal men, argued that:
It is not enough to regard this sort of behaviour as merely a social 
aberration or a symptom of spiritual emptyness [sic]; among aboriginal 
men it has become institutionalised; it is a central value in their lives, 
to which they will adhere in the teeth of strong pressure. (223)
It is both ironic and unfortunate that, by the time Aboriginal prohibition 
began to be repealed in Australia (i.e. mainly during the 1960s), the 
influence of the temperance movement was on the wane and consumption 
in the general Australian population was reaching levels at least as high 
as those of the gold rush era of the 1850s. The six o’clock swill was one 
of the vestiges of the temperance movement that had kept closing time 
to the early evening. Per capita consumption increased by 20 per cent 
between 1969 and 1975, which was a dramatic shift in drinking practices 
(Drew 1977: 80). Sales of sweet wine—the drink favoured by Aboriginal 
drinkers—grew by 40 per cent between 1970 and 1981 and alcohol 
availability generally increased (Room 1988: 418). In another unhappy 
coincidence, the era in which Indigenous people were finally able to drink 
legally also marked the beginning of the decline of the hotel as the prime 
focus for Australians’ drinking. Rather than hotels—places where sociable 
drinking and some basic rules of comportment could be fostered—this 
period was characterised by the growth of the bottle shop and the drive-in 
liquor store, and the increasing popularity of cheaper packaged alcohol 
that made it easier for drinking to take place in unregulated spaces.40 The 
liberalisation of liquor laws in the 1960s meant that bottle shops could 
now sell single bottles of alcohol for consumption off premises, whereas 
previously bottle shops had had ‘gallon licences’ in which the minimum 
takeaway purchase was 12 large bottles. This marked the real beginning 
of takeaway alcohol sales. Hard on the heels of changes to bottle shop 
licences, the alcohol industry introduced innovations such as the beer can 
40  Another influence on Australian drinking patterns and the decline of the hotel was the advent of 
random breath testing that commenced in Victoria in 1976 but was not fully operational in all states 
and territories until the early 1980s.The liberalisation of liquor laws in the 1960s extended opening 
hours, including Sunday trading for hotels, bowling and golf clubs. 
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(in 1962), the ring-pull can and, later, rip-top stubbies of beer, which 
increased sales of this bottle size by 90 per cent (Welborn 1987). In the 
1970s, Australia invented the wine cask, a silver wine bladder encased in 
a cardboard box. Since the wine did not go off, casks became the stock 
item of the takeaway trade for home or outdoor consumption (Stockwell 
& Crosbie 2001). For reasons of cheapness and convenience, takeaway 
cask wine became the drink of choice for Aboriginal drinkers (see Fig. 21). 
In the few decades during which Indigenous people were able to, and 
chose to, drink on licensed premises—that is, the brief period from the 
end of restrictions until the proliferation of takeaway alcohol—progressive 
thinkers of the time viewed hotels as settings that facilitated a form of 
social learning and social contact between the races. The psychologist 
Norelle Lickiss (1971), whose work is largely forgotten, believed that 
the public drinking house served a number of functions for Aboriginal 
people. She nominated its value as a social centre: a communication centre 
(for people who were often mobile); a place for tension discharge and 
stress release; and as an agency for integration ‘with non-Aborigines in 
similar socio-economic circumstances’ (214). Hotels provided the setting 
within which Aboriginal people could moderate their consumption of 
alcohol, ‘enjoying the social benefits of drinking without trying to get 
drunk’, according to rural medical practitioner Max Kamien (1975: 295, 
Lickiss 1971). In the 1950s, before the laws were changed, Aboriginal 
men protested that if they were allowed into hotels they would drink 
beer at the normal rate, as whites did. Beckett (1958) thought there 
was some force to this argument, particularly if those in question were 
anxious to conform to ‘white drinking conventions’ (226). However, he 
found that older, more hardened, drinkers preferred wine and rum, and 
he heard that when a couple of hotels had briefly opened their doors to 
Aboriginal people, their drunken and disorderly behaviour had become 
‘quite intolerable’. 
Drinking off premises, relatively unencumbered and unrestrained, is now 
so entrenched in many regions that drinking on premises in licensed venues 
is atypical. In 2007, when restrictions were placed on the licence of the 
Crossing Inn in the largely Aboriginal town of Fitzroy Crossing (Western 
Australia), drinkers were no longer able to buy full-strength takeaway 
alcohol from their hotel, and instead were compelled to purchase full-
strength drinks for on-premises consumption only. The manager reported 
that many of his Aboriginal customers had never drunk in bars before 
and did not know that they were not allowed to become intoxicated in 
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licensed premises. They had no idea of bar rules and became aggressive 
when refused further service (Henderson-Yates et al. 2008, appendix 
VIII: 109). 
Behavioural studies of drinking
The idea that people could be ‘taught’ to drink moderately reached 
its zenith in the 1960s and 1970s. In the post–World War II period, 
alcohol researchers and psychologists in the United States and the United 
Kingdom developed a critique of the disease concept of alcoholism that 
opened the way for a new conceptualisation of drinking problems as being 
fundamentally behavioural in nature: that drinking to excess was a disorder 
of behaviour over which control could be exercised (Cook 2007: 37, 
McCambridge 2011: 567). Once this new science of drinking problems 
took hold, it made way for a host of different approaches and treatments 
to be trialled, including social-learning models, brief interventions and 
controlled drinking. Researchers began to try to understand and inculcate 
varieties of self-control over alcohol consumption: perhaps people with 
damaging drinking habits could be (re)taught how to drink after all?
An influential research program in the United States produced dozens 
of research papers examining different cultural styles of drinking (e.g. 
Jewish, Italian, Irish, Mormon and Protestant). By examining ‘positive’ 
examples of drinking styles (e.g. Jewish and Italian) as well as ‘negative’ 
ones (e.g. Irish and Mormon) the purpose of these studies, as directed by 
the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies, was to design ways to train Protestant 
Americans to drink more sensibly. This tradition of research was continued 
by Dr Morris Chafetz who, in 1970, became the influential first director 
of the United States National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. 
Chafetz believed that beverage alcohol should be presented as a normal 
part of life—the Mediterranean approach—rather than as an alluringly 
illicit substance, and that this would encourage responsible drinking. In 
1971, in a submission to Congress, he observed that in societies with a 
low incidence of alcoholism, the beverage was sipped slowly, consumed 
with food and taken in the company of others in relaxing and comfortable 
circumstances. In these cultures, intoxication was abhorred (Chafetz & 
Demone 1962, Room 1976, Room & Mäkelä 2000).41 In an attempt 
41  The idea that a society’s drinking norms explains, at least in part, its rates of drinking problems 
is now widely accepted; however, at the time, the adoption of this position was a rare example of the 
influence of sociological thought on public policy, as Room (1976: 1048) pointed out.
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to both mimic and inculcate this integration of drinking into everyday 
life, Chafetz proposed that schools should teach children how to drink 
responsibly by providing them with heavily diluted sherry. Believing that 
alcohol was here to stay, he argued that people must learn to develop 
a healthy attitude towards it.42 
In keeping with the hypothesis that even problem drinkers could be 
taught better habits of drinking, and with clinical psychologists exerting 
a growing influence on alcoholism treatment research, studies turned 
to ways of teaching controlled drinking to people who were alcoholics, 
including those who had been hospitalised. Reports that some diagnosed 
alcoholics could return successfully to a limited drinking pattern threatened 
the prevailing dictum that abstinence was the only treatment for such 
individuals. These findings, which also challenged the disease hypothesis, 
were vigorously debated, primarily because the ‘disease’ of alcoholism 
was thought to be characterised by a loss of control, while the emergent 
research was showing that, under some circumstances, alcoholics were 
able to exert control (Thom 1999, Cook 2007, McCambridge 2011). 
English psychologist Jim Orford recalled angry reactions to his suggestion 
in the late 1960s that alcoholic drinking was a learned behaviour and that 
people could perhaps learn to drink less harmfully (Thom 1999: 144). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, aversion therapy, including electrical aversion 
(electric shock administration) and chemical aversion (the use of nausea-
inducing drugs), was used within the armamentarium of behavioural 
approaches to alcoholism (Mills et al. 1971). Less confronting behavioural 
studies looked at gulping and sipping behaviour and typical intake, 
and experimented with training in self-regulation, social modelling, 
supervised drinking and teaching and practising how to drink (Collins 
& Marlatt 1981, Strickler et al. 1976, 1981). Other studies compared 
different approaches to drinking, including direct instruction in how to 
drink moderately, practising target behaviours and requiring subjects to 
observe a model. Using insights from social-learning theory, these were 
often referred to as ‘learning approaches’ to alcohol abuse. While much 
of the research into learning approaches was based in the United States 
or United Kingdom, similar studies were undertaken in Australia (Thom 
1999: 144). It is intriguing to ponder the extent to which the behavioural 
research studies prompted by Chafetz and his colleagues in the United 
42  As an indication of Chafetz’s influence, his obituary noted that he changed the view of alcoholism 
in the United States (New York Times 21 October 2011). 
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States filtered through to influence Australia’s ‘post-prohibition’ era 
in general, and the post-prohibition era for Indigenous Australians in 
particular. In 1969, for example, a Sydney-based doctoral student began 
a project to see whether he could train drinkers to discriminate their 
own blood alcohol concentrations—that is, to teach people to monitor 
their own levels of intoxication. He later wrote what was described as 
a ‘watershed’ study into trials of controlled drinking (Caddy & Lovibond 
1976, cf. McLean 1987, Thom 1999: 145). A British clinical psychologist 
who later moved to Sydney to become director of Australia’s National 
Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, Nick Heather, was a leading figure in 
the controlled drinking debate in this country. He argued that problem 
drinking is better regarded as a learned behavioural disorder than 
a disease (Heather & Robertson 1989). The behavioural social-learning 
studies and interventions conducted within and beyond Australia were 
relevant to helping people diagnosed as dependent on alcohol. They 
were not necessarily relevant to the task of teaching responsible alcohol 
consumption to those who had little or no previous exposure to alcohol. 
Nonetheless, such studies permeated the Aboriginal policy environment 
and influenced approaches to improving the lives of Aboriginal people. 
Unlike the United States, which had a nationwide constitutional ban 
on alcohol from 1920 to 1933 that prompted individuals such as Alma 
Whitaker to advocate the importance of learning to drink, Australia never 
had total prohibition for all its citizens. Only a few regions of Australia, 
such as the Chaffey brothers’ irrigation colony near Renmark, voted under 
local option laws to be dry. With prohibitions on the consumption and 
possession of alcohol, the discrete reserves and mission settlements where 
many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people lived were all ‘dry’ for 
most of the nineteenth and part of the twentieth centuries. Recognising 
the new era of civil rights, and aware that the prohibition era for Aboriginal 
people was really over, in 1963, Aboriginal activist Kath Walker told the 
prime minister that Aboriginal people were going to have to ‘learn to live 
with alcohol, the white man’s poison’ (Bandler 1989: 98). Over the next 
10 years, the idea that Aboriginal people should learn to drink responsibly 
began to take off, as government agencies and their proxies, the missions, 
started to put the idea into practice. Governments and mission authorities 
were agreed that once prohibition laws in the states and the Northern 
Territory were repealed, some protection against the potentially disastrous 
consequences of the sudden and unrestricted availability of alcohol was 
going to be necessary for Aboriginal people. The  solution appeared to 
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be a graduated approach to availability, combined with some form of 
instruction or education in ‘learning to drink’—ideas that led to many 
experiments in several remote missions and settlements in which alcohol 
was made available. Initially, these trials took the form of beer rations 
being distributed a few times a week, often under the control of an 
Aboriginal council; some ration systems developed into canteens or clubs 
with a degree of Aboriginal governance (see Chapter 3). However, other 
than making alcohol available in small amounts through beer rations 
or canteens, there were no attempts to implement the social-learning 
techniques tried elsewhere, such as direct instruction, supervised drinking 
and learning to self-monitor. Further, at the time of repeal,43 it seems that 
there were few, if any, health education programs for Indigenous people 
focused on the strength, contents and risks of alcohol. 
Sociologist of alcohol Robin Room urged caution about optimistic plans 
for engineering change in drinking habits, and not just in minority 
or indigenous populations. While moving towards a ‘continental’ or 
‘Mediterranean’ culture of sociable drinking has long been a dream for 
English-speaking societies with bingeing problems, such as Australia and 
Britain, this fantasy has run up against the ‘stubborn realities’ of cultures 
that attach value to intoxication.44 Cultural norms and the interactions 
of everyday life possess their own dynamics and can generate pressures 
towards heavy drinking and determined drunkenness (Room & Mäkelä 
2000: 476, Measham 2006, Ormerod & Wiltshire 2009). The societies 
and subcultures in which heavy drinking is normative value this style 
of drinking positively, ensuring ‘that learning to drink heavily will be 
transmitted from generation to generation’ (Kunitz & Levy 2000: 173). 
Once established, such norms are difficult to shift. As Room (1982: 448) 
observed, cultural change comes slowly and unpredictably, particularly 
if someone is trying to engineer it from outside. 
43  Northern Territory Aboriginal people ceased to be labelled ‘wards’ in 1964. This change brought 
restrictions on their civil rights, including the right to possess and consume alcohol, to an end.
44  Continental southern Europe is made up of predominantly wine-consuming countries where 
wine is usually drunk with meals and usually in moderate amounts, although, as Room and Mäkelä 
(2000) have cautioned, one should be sceptical about the idealisation of drinking in these countries. 
Northern European countries, including Scandinavia and the United Kingdom, can be typified as 
beer- or spirits-drinking societies, as they have different consumption traditions to those further 
south. Prior to the introduction of the potato, beer was a major source of nourishment for central and 
northern Europe, with ‘beer soup’ being consumed for breakfast (Schivelbusch 1993: 22). However, 
even this north–south distinction is becoming blurred, as wine consumption increases in northern 
Europe and beer consumption rises in Mediterranean countries (Hupkens et al. 1993).
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A seductive—but elusive—goal
The idea that people could be formally taught good habits of drinking, 
and that these would replace bad habits, has been a recurrent theme over 
many decades. It is a seductive idea, especially in cultures imbued with 
a  strong belief in human perfectibility, such as American, British and 
Nordic cultures.45 However, to say that drinking alcohol is, or can be, 
learned, perhaps by using the ‘instructive information’ of which Whitaker 
wrote in her etiquette manual, or through the use of staged, pretend 
bars set up in the alcoholics’ wards of hospitals,46 seems to present the 
idea rather too neatly. It is ‘redolent of knowledge gravely imparted and 
respectfully received’, as Justin Willis (2002: 9) rather tartly put it. The 
process of learning, of course, is far more indirect, chaotic and ad hoc than 
one might think. Even the social-learning researchers were uncomfortably 
aware that people are influenced indirectly and contagiously by those 
around them. They found, for example, that research subjects who were 
exposed to heavy drinkers drank more than subjects who were exposed to 
light drinkers (Collins & Marlatt 1981)—that is, that low-risk, normal 
drinkers, increase their consumption if they drink with ‘pretend’ heavy 
drinkers; and that people who drink in groups tend to adjust the pace 
of their drinking to the fastest drinker among the group (Watson & 
Sobell 1982, Heath 2000, Ormerod & Wiltshire 2009). Social-learning 
researchers noted that it was difficult for subjects to maintain moderation 
after treatment when they were re-exposed to the same environments and 
the same reinforcing stimuli that had influenced them in the first place 
(Strickler et al. 1976). These research studies, including ethnographic 
observational studies, reinforce what common sense tells us about 
drinking: that people ‘learn’, or are influenced informally, by how those 
around them are drinking.
The idea that Indigenous drinking patterns were learned from Europeans 
on the frontier has been criticised as presenting a static view of Indigenous 
patterns of behaviour, as if, once adopted, such patterns were incapable 
of change (Saggers & Gray 1998: 78).47 There is undoubtedly some truth 
in this critique. While many other variables influence drinking behaviour, 
45  Robin Room, pers comm, 6 March 2013.
46  For example, in the 1970s, seven-week training sessions for ‘excessive drinkers’ were conducted 
in a simulated bar in the Psychiatry Department of the Baltimore City Hospital (Strickler et al. 1976).
47  Kunitz and Levy (1974), writing of changing ideas about alcohol use among the Navajo in the 




and while there have been some changes, there has also been considerable 
persistence in longstanding patterns of consumption that tend towards 
episodic heavy drinking.48 Jeffery Stead (1980) argued that the patterns of 
alcohol use apparent in the late 1970s varied between different Aboriginal 
groups depending on their historical circumstances, exposure to different 
policies, contact with Europeans and individual social and cultural 
organisation. Serving as a reminder of the importance of the setting or 
context in which alcohol use is learned, Stephen Kunitz and Jerrold Levy’s 
(Kunitz et al. 1971, Kunitz & Levy 1994) groundbreaking long-term 
research revealed significant differences in drinking patterns and disease 
outcomes between the neighbouring Navajo and Hopi peoples of Arizona. 
Both these Native American groups learned alcohol use in the nineteenth 
century by observing Anglo-American frontiersmen, but their established 
cultural values influenced their adoption of the colonists’ drinking styles. 
The Navajo drank overtly in flamboyant binges, whereas the few Hopi 
who drank did so in a covert and clandestine way to avoid being ostracised 
by other Hopi. The two groups lived close to each other and were socio-
economically similar, but their different approaches to drinking alcohol 
resulted in different patterns of morbidity and mortality. Comparing 
them demonstrates the significance of different styles of drinking as a 
determinant of health and illness. 
Australian data on Aboriginal drinking styles are not disaggregated by 
locality. Therefore, a comparative study of Aboriginal Australians is 
not feasible, but it is plausible to conclude that the effects of alcohol 
consumption will vary according to learned styles of consumption. 
Historically, and still today, there are few accounts of sensible alcohol 
use by Aboriginal people, perhaps because it is not thought worthy of 
reporting (cf. Broome 2005: 25). Nevertheless, we know that there has 
been change in the choice of drinks. Devoted Aboriginal drinkers in 
rural and remote areas have largely moved on from drinking fortified 
wine (port) from flagons or bottles as they did in the 1960s and 1970s; 
now they prefer sweet wines such as moselle or ‘fruity lexia’ drunk from 
casks, or spirits and pre-mixed drinks in cans. In 2000, Kunitz and Levy 
(2000: 159) reported that among the Navajo Indians of Arizona and New 
Mexico there had been a shift from fortified wine to beer. After 30 years of 
48  Unfortunately, irregular, episodic heavy drinking is one of the most damaging ways of consuming 
alcohol: it is associated with coronary heart disease, stroke and diabetes. These diseases are exceptions 
to the usual dose–response relationship between the volume of alcohol consumption and the burden 
of disease (Room et al. 2005: 520).
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research among the Navajo, they also found signs that, despite consistent 
peer pressure to drink, drinking behaviour was potentially moderating, 
as implied by declines in mortality and amounts of alcohol consumed. 
In 1994, they had noted milder drinking styles among Navajos living 
permanently off-reservation (Kunitz & Levy 1994). Kunitz and Levy 
(2000: 159) hypothesised that:
It may be due to increasing exposure to a variety of different, and more 
moderate, drinking styles, although our data are not really adequate to 
deal with this issue … the shift from wine to beer is important as a marker 
of a profound change in tastes and, we believe, as an indication of the 
penetration of the Navajo economy and culture by the advertisers’ art and 
the tastes of the larger regional population. 
Despite the scepticism expressed by some commentators about the rather 
too orderly implications of the idea of a formalised process of learning 
how to drink (and re-learning how to drink differently), the idea persists 
that people can be taught to drink in a different way. Certainly, Aboriginal 
people themselves believe that they learned their (mostly bad) habits 
of drinking by observation—initially by watching Europeans’ public 
drinking behaviour and, later, by seeing and following the behaviour of 
their own family members. Further, in Australia as elsewhere, Indigenous 
people still express a wistful desire for someone to ‘teach’ them how to 
drink and often lament the fact that Europeans never inducted them into 
the proper use of alcohol. In 1972, John Lame Deer, a Sioux medicine 
man, wrote with grim humour:
Those clever white men always try to teach us poor, dumb Indians 
something new. I sure wish they’d teach us how to drink. When you buy a 
camera or a tape recorder, it always comes with a little booklet which tells 
you how to use it, but when they brought us the white man’s whisky, they 
forgot the instruction book. This has caused us no end of trouble. (Lame 
Deer & Erdoes 1972: 71)
In the 1980s, another Native American account compared ‘Indian 
drinking’ to white men’s drinking with a similar message:
‘See, a white man could sit around, drink with a cup’—he mimed drinking 
tea, little finger in the air—‘go for maybe four to five hours. White man 
enjoys it and don’t get quite as intoxicated. You give a quart to one of 
our guys, he drinks it up, chugs it down, jus’ like he used to when it was 
illegal. Never learned how to drink’. (Lincoln & Slagle 1987: 26)
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Although many white Australians drink to excess,49 Aboriginal people 
compare their own drinking unfavourably to the drinking practices of 
settler Australians, and they express the view that their people should 
learn to drink like the white man.50 For example, at Yirrkala in northeast 
Arnhem Land, soon after the repeal of restrictions on consumption 
in 1964, Yolngu objected to the licensing of a hotel and bottle shop 
only a  few kilometres from their community. With the failure of their 
objection, and realising that community members would now go to town 
to drink, the Yirrkala Village Council said that ‘Aborigines should learn 
to drink, like the wise white citizens drink—not too much’. Council 
member Roy Marika suggested that Yolngu could have a wet canteen as 
a way of avoiding trouble, ‘spoiling manikay [clan songs], hurting women 
and children, and [training] Yolngu to drink sensibly’.51
The idea—the aspiration—that people can set aside habitual drinking 
customs of excess and learn to ‘carry their drink like gentlemen’ still has 
traction 80 years after Whitaker’s missive on polite drinking. Politicians 
still yearn for the ‘Mediterranean style’ of drinking to become the norm 
in Australian cities. Aboriginal people in remote communities continue 
to grapple with the dilemmas of alcohol availability, pressures to revoke 
restrictions and policy options that allow for limited, controlled access. 
Faced with seemingly endless uproar around alcohol availability and 
alcohol-related trouble, Aboriginal community leaders—even those who 
usually support strict controls and dry communities—sometimes relent 
and once again invoke the desire that people should learn to do better. 
In 2014, Noel Pearson was reported as suggesting that: 
If there is a model that can encourage responsible drinking then I think 
it is worth trialling. The ideal position is that we don’t have alcohol in 
Aboriginal communities because alcohol and the strong kinship don’t 
mix, they drink until there is nothing left. But if Indigenous communities 
insist that they have the same rights as other Australians to have a drink, 
then they have to learn to drink responsibly like the Greek people, the 
Chinese people, the whitefellas. (cited by M McKenna 2014: 5)
49  A 2016 poll of Australian attitudes and behaviours around alcohol found that 37 per cent of 
drinkers (more than 4 million people) drink to get drunk (FARE 2016).
50  See Brady (1995) for further examples of Aboriginal men comparing their drinking to that 
of white Australians.
51  Notes from Yirrkala Village Council meeting, 14 October 1970, courtesy of Dr Nancy Williams. 
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The Gothenburg system, 
monopolies and the 
community good
In late Victorian Britain, social and temperance reformers initiated 
a  lively debate about how to encourage civilised drinking and dissuade 
intoxication through the dual mechanisms of improving the ambience 
and the serving practices of the public house: the pub. Community or 
municipal ownership of licensed hotels was one strategy for doing this, 
together with ‘disinterested’—rather than profit-driven—management. 
This style of ownership, known colloquially as the Gothenburg system, 
was put into practice in parts of Britain and in Sweden. In the 1890s, these 
ideas filtered through to influence developments in Australia, particularly 
South Australia, where, over several decades, 12 community-owned hotels 
were established in rural towns as a way of benefiting the community and 
improving amenities. These hotels (nine of which are still trading under 
community ownership today), distributed a portion of their profits for 
the good of the community and the betterment of the town. They also 
aimed to discourage heavy drinking by providing a family atmosphere 
with access to food and non-alcoholic beverages.
The Gothenburg system provides a useful analytical lens through which 
developments in the Indigenous domain in Australia can be considered. 
Commencing in the 1970s with financial assistance from newly constituted 
business-oriented government agencies such as the ADC, several 
Indigenous community-based associations purchased licensed hotels. 
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They hoped to achieve many of the same aims as their non-Indigenous 
counterparts: to reform drinking premises, control excess and direct 
profits to community needs. These ideas influenced the policy climate 
that allowed licensed social clubs and canteens to be opened in remote 
Indigenous communities. In the case of the narcotic drug kava, used 
in some Aboriginal communities in northeast Arnhem Land, regulated 
access and a monopoly over sales was seen as preferable to prohibition. 
Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century arguments for and against the 
principles underlying Gothenburg-style hotels, and the debates between 
citizens, abolitionists and publicans, provide a foretaste of the political 
and community agitation that accompanied Indigenous forays into social 
and commercial liquor enterprises in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s.
The ‘Scandinavian plan’
The notion that excessive drinking could be moderated by removing the 
commercially driven profit motive from alcohol sales and replacing it 
with a softer, community-benefiting rationale, seems to have originated in 
Scandinavia in the mid-nineteenth century. The idea gave birth to a liquor-
control model that came to be associated with the city of Gothenburg.
Gothenburg was Sweden’s second city: a commercial town and seaport 
that suffered deep poverty and increasing degradation under the ‘blight 
and curse’ of the drink traffic (Pitman 1877: 220). Despite being a well-
educated town with a system of compulsory education and philanthropic 
schools for poor children, it had a culture of extreme spree drinking of 
spirits. Sweden had a strong temperance tradition; however, rather than 
opting for prohibition, as had other Scandinavian countries, Gothenburg 
chose to experiment with restrictive alcohol-control measures that had 
been tried in the smaller town of Falun (Room 1993: 173). The guiding 
principle of the system was to disconnect the sale of alcohol from the 
profit motive, thereby reducing the pressured selling that led to excess 
consumption and intoxication. The system proposed ownership of 
licensed premises by a semi-private trust that regulated the sale of spirits 
on philanthropic principles. The shopkeeper selling strong liquor was 
restricted to taking only 5 per cent profit, with the municipality, county 
and state dividing any additional profit (Brown 1972, Blocker et al. 
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2003: 603). Licensed outlets were to be run by ‘disinterested’ and salaried 
managers who had no pecuniary interest in pushing sales of alcohol. 
As one supporter explained:
The secret of most of the mischief now worked by the [liquor] trade is 
that the monopoly of the sale of liquor is connected with private interests 
… The brewer, the distiller, the publican, the shareholder, are all deeply 
interested in promoting the sale of liquor. (Wilson 1894: 7) 
Eliminating the stimulus of personal gain from a legitimate commercial 
activity was a revolutionary idea. It was based on the belief that the 
‘drink traffic’, as it was called, was so abnormal that it should be treated 
differently to other kinds of trading activity (Pitman 1877: 223).1 The 
system was originally targeted at working-class restaurants in Sweden, but 
it also provided for municipal ownership of taverns and was later extended 
to shops providing off-premise sales of spirits. Spirits such as brännvin, 
a type of vodka distilled from potatoes and grains, were the most damaging 
drinks, while ale and beer were considered barely intoxicating at all. 
Apart from civilising the drinking act and minimising social disruptions 
related to drinking, the system aimed to improve standards in licensing, 
make alcohol subject to local control and cut out any political influence 
on the trade (Room 1993). The authorities could control the licences 
and minimise drunkenness while the community shareholders received 
a return on capital, with any surplus going to the municipal coffers.2 
In 1865, a charter was granted by the Swedish Government and a bolag 
(company) was formed with the following objectives: 
• to reduce the number of public houses
• to improve their condition as to light, ventilation, cleanliness
• to make public houses eating houses where warm, cooked food was 
available at moderate prices
• to refuse sale of spirits on credit or pledge
1  The sentiment that alcohol differs significantly from other consumables and trade items was 
reiterated 116 years later when a major World Health Organization–sponsored study was given the 
name Alcohol: No Ordinary Commodity (Babor et al. 2003). 
2  In Bergen, Norway (where the system started in 1877), the beneficiaries of the company’s profits 
included the orchestra of the Christiana theatre, the Young Men’s Association, civic plantings, fountains, 
the Society for Homeless Youth and the Country Housekeeping Society (Gould 1893: 190).
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• to employ as managers respectable persons who should derive no profit 
from the sale of spirits, but should be entitled to profits from the sale 
of food and other refreshments, including malt liquors
• to secure strict supervision of all public houses by inspectors of their 
own, in addition to the police
• to pay to the town treasury all the net profits of sales of spirits. (Pitman 
1877: 223)
Similar monopoly companies established in Scandinavia mandated other 
rules, such as not selling to those intoxicated or underage, and some 
employed their own police detectives to monitor breaches on premises. 
Most of these principles are recognisable within modern alcohol-control 
policies as harm-reduction strategies; indeed, since the nineteenth 
century, strong evidence has accumulated that government monopolies 
on the manufacture, supply and sale of alcohol tend to result in reduced 
harm. Seven countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development now permit a state-owned monopoly at 
some stage in the alcohol production and sale cycle. According to a 2005 
review of regulations: 
Unlike private suppliers with a strong profit motive, a state-owned 
monopoly can pursue other objectives including restricting the volume and 
availability of what it supplies. Rather than seek to innovate and expand 
the number of markets, a state-owned liquor monopoly has no incentive 
to, for example, introduce alcohol milk products or alcohol-caffeine 
mixes or to advertise heavily. On the contrary, it can price discriminate to 
suppress demand for most popular items and those appealing to high risk 
drinkers especially. The benefits to health outcomes from this approach 
would need to be balanced against the economic loss that will result from 
monopoly. (Marsden Jacob Associates 2005: 38; cf. Babor et al. 2003)
What became known as the ‘Scandinavian plan’ was vigorously debated 
and implemented to varying degrees in the United Kingdom (Wilson 
1894, Brown 1972), the United States (Pitman 1877, Gould 1893, 
Gordon 1911, Room 1993) and Australia (Malins 1899, Butler 1899). 
The United States Commissioner of Labor was interested enough to 
send a statistician, ERL Gould, to Scandinavia to investigate and collect 
data on the system. Gould (1893) subsequently compiled an impressive 
and positive overview that included data on intoxication, alcohol-
related symptoms and deaths and rates of refusals of entry to premises, 
and reported a notable decline in drunkenness. He concluded:
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That the system is perfect no-one will be sanguine enough to maintain; 
but that it represents the best means which have yet been devised for the 
control of the liquor traffic where licensing is permitted … few who … 
have studied its operation would be bold enough to deny. (243)3
In the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, the Scandinavian 
plan had two main groups of opponents: brewers and ‘licensed victuallers’ 
versus ardent teetotallers. The latter group comprised people ‘who do not 
think a reform is worth having while they can dream of abolition’ (Wilson 
1894: 14). As it turned out, the Gothenburg system never became 
a national policy in Sweden. However, in 1917, the country endorsed an 
alcohol policy featuring two measures, the first of which carried through 
the idea that the profit motive should be eliminated in the alcohol 
trade. The second measure aimed to control an individual’s purchases 
of alcohol through a system of ration books. Temperance boards with 
local knowledge made decisions based on social and moral behavioural 
standards about whether individuals could obtain ration books that gave 
them access to alcohol (Blocker et al. 2003: 605, Room 2012). Similar 
controls have operated in some Aboriginal communities in Australia: in 
the Northern Territory, for example, permit committees made up of local 
people (the equivalent of the ‘temperance boards’) made decisions about 
whether individuals were fit to hold permits to obtain alcohol. 
‘Gothenburg’ in Britain
Like the United States, Britain was intrigued by the Swedish system 
because it offered a middle way through the policy deadlock between 
two warring factions: the reforming restrictionists and the teetotal 
prohibitionists (Greenaway 2003: 71, 1998). The Swedish system 
represented a form of liquor control that was grounded in acceptance of 
the use of alcohol; however, by controlling where and how alcohol was 
sold, ‘sought to structure and influence the use so as to limit the social 
and health harm from drinking’ (Room 2004: 330). Britain had debated 
3  Several American states implemented versions of the Gothenburg system in the 1890s as a better 
alternative to prohibition, but the movement ultimately succumbed to the activities of the Anti-
Saloon League and the advent of National Prohibition in 1920. Following the repeal of prohibition 
in 1933 (and concerned to avoid old evils), American investigators recommended regulation policies 
for the states, proposing a state monopoly for distribution and retail package sales or, alternatively, the 
development of state-based licensing systems. Most states adopted licensing systems, but 17 instituted 
some form of monopoly. These have lasted remarkably well; only two American states have since 
ended their retail distribution monopolies (Room 1993, Cook 2007: 2).
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the system since the 1870s, and politicians, temperance advocates and 
interested citizens had visited Scandinavia to see it for themselves; these 
individuals helped to disseminate knowledge about the ‘Scandinavian 
plan’.4 Politicians who travelled to Gothenburg for a firsthand assessment 
included Liberal member Joseph Chamberlain.5 Once a supporter of 
prohibition, Chamberlain had come to believe that access to alcohol was 
both ‘socially necessary and morally correct, while abstinence was counter 
to all facts’ (Brown 1972: 34).6
Permutations of the Gothenburg system thrived in Britain some years 
later when philanthropist, temperance advocate and Quaker capitalist 
Joseph Rowntree7 took up, and later refined, some of its underlying 
principles. Rowntree and his associate, Arthur Sherwell, linked the need 
for licensing reform with solutions to the poverty associated with urban 
industrial expansion. They attributed excessive drinking to two factors: 
first, the monotonous lives of working people and lack of ‘rational 
recreation’ that might offer them an alternative to drink; and second, the 
push for profits by the liquor trade. Rowntree and Sherwell saw money 
raised from the trade in liquor as compensation money. They believed 
that liquor should be sold by publicans who were ‘disinterested’ in profits, 
and that social reform should include the provision of civic amenities 
that acted as counterattractions to the pub (Gutzke 1989, Greenaway 
1998, 2003: 70). The idea of disinterested management represented an 
early example of what we now call corporate social responsibility (Talbot 
2015). Across Britain, semi-philanthropic public house trusts were 
4  For example, enlightened theologian James Wilson preached a sermon in the north of England 
on ‘Temperance Sunday’, 18 November 1894, in which he extolled the virtues of the Scandinavian 
plan (Wilson 1894).
5  Chamberlain (1836–1914) was a Unitarian—a social reformer but not a socialist. He was the 
father of future British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.
6  In the 1870s, Britain’s Liberal party had a strong prohibitionist bloc and was closely linked with 
the United Kingdom Alliance, a teetotalism society. Conversely, the Tories were supported by the 
publicans (Brown 1972: 31). The liquor industry comprised powerful and unscrupulous businessmen 
who intimidated cabinet ministers and other members of parliament, magistrates and town councils, 
and were seen as being politically corrupting (Gutzke 1989: 52). 
7  Joseph Rowntree (1836–1925) was a Quaker, businessman and philanthropist. There are many 
charitable trusts in the United Kingdom that bear his name, such as the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
which supports innovative and policy-oriented research, including research into temperance issues 
(cf. Berridge 2005, Cadbury 2010).
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formed to acquire, and then improve, licensed pubs by implementing 
disinterested management practices: there were 60 in Scotland, usually in 
mining communities.8
The People’s Refreshment Houses Association (PRHA), founded in 
1896, was the most successful of these schemes. Shares were offered to 
the public who were eligible for a dividend of not more than 5 per cent. 
Surplus profit went to public utilities and officers of the PRHA were 
elected. Member-run public houses provided temperance drinks and food 
as well as beer (Rowntree & Sherwell 1903, Greenaway 1998, Burnett 
1999: 132). Public houses belonging to the PRHA were mostly small 
village inns, some of which were described in Rowntree and Sherwell’s 
1903 publication on British Gothenburg experiments. A typical inn in 
Somerset had a monopoly on local trade and sold the full range of liquor, 
but had small off-premises sales, gave no credit and had no advertising 
of alcoholic beverages anywhere on the premises. Instead, there were 
conspicuous advertisements for tea, coffee and temperance drinks and 
a ready supply of food. The manager was paid a fixed salary and received 
most of the profit made on the sale of food, mineral waters, cigarettes 
and tobacco, but not alcohol. If the manager thought a drinker had had 
enough, they pre-empted harm by putting their finger up as a warning 
sign that they would refuse further service (Rowntree & Sherwell 1903: 
23). Another description of trust house hotels emphasised the food and 
counterattractions available. Instead of a large bar dominated by rows 
of bottles, the saloon was taken up with ‘sociable tables’ where people 
consumed pea, lentil and barley soups. In Northumberland, The Grey 
Arms reportedly also sold a new item—fried potato chips ‘for which 
a  considerable demand seems probable’. The hotel had a lawn outside, 
a reading room and a billiard room. Another public house was run by 
a village council and its profits provided for a community nurse, an 
ambulance wagon and entertainment hall (West Gippsland Gazette, 
14 April 1903: 5).
8  In Prestonpans, East Lothian, Scotland, there is a hotel known as the Prestoungrange 
Gothenburg, or ‘The Goth’, that still runs on the Gothenburg principle. It was created in 1901 
by a private trust known as the East of Scotland Public House Trust. The Trust was set up by eight 
investors sympathetic to temperance ideals who wanted to take the profiteering out of selling alcohol 
while promoting the sale of food. Its profits are gifted to the Prestoungrange Arts Festival. There is 
also a ‘Goth’ hotel in Armadale, West Lothian (Armadale Public House Society 2001, Prestoungrange 
2004).There has recently been a revival of cooperative hotels in Britain, as villages ‘save’ their local 
pubs by buying them (Jones 2017: 13). 
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The benign imagery associated with the trust house scheme provoked 
some lampooning at the time, epitomised in a satirical poem ‘The Bishop 
and the Scandinavian plan’.9 In it, a Bishop invites a customer into the 
‘sweetest little parlour, on the Scandinavian plan’ and explains that ‘the 
House is carried on with most benevolent intent/And on Temperance 
Societies the profits are all spent’:
Yes! I cannot put it clearer, in explaining our intent,
It is to benefit mankind—and pocket five per cent.
So please walk into my parlour, and be drinking all you can,
You will find it very pleasant on the Scandinavian plan …
The Scandinavian plan, my boys! The Scandinavian plan!
By far the strangest thing there’s been since first the world began!
Despite this mockery, there was support from the Fabian Society for 
community-run public houses. George Bernard Shaw, a well-known 
Fabian, joined one of the PRHA’s and, in 1901, the 4th Earl Grey became 
chairman of the largest of the trust associations (Warner 2006, Room 
2004). If pubs could not be abolished, then they should be improved:
British Gothenburgers wanted to reform the pub, not destroy it; broaden 
its patrons, not make it synonymous with plebeian culture; introduce 
middle-class values in behavior and speech, not ostracize drinkers; and 
above all imbue it with respectability, not cast it out as reprehensible. 
(Gutzke 2007: 238)
Gutzke saw Gothenburgers as progressives who championed order, 
discipline, cultural uplift and the influence of the environment on drinking 
behaviour; were intent on diminishing drunkenness by improving the 
physical and interpersonal settings in which alcohol was consumed; and 
hoped for the ‘civilizing influence of the upper and middle classes’. By the 
turn of the century, there was widespread acceptance of the trust principle in 
Britain. This was largely because the ‘public house is recognized as a public 
necessity, and that therefore it is desirable to convert it from a mere drinking 
bar into something resembling, as much as possible, a well-conducted club’ 
(Smyth [1904] 2013: 249). As we shall see, these ideas—that drinking 
could be ‘civilised’ both by altering the physical and social environment in 
which it took place and by allowing respectable citizens to contribute to the 
management of hotels—began to appear in Australia as well. 
9  The Bishop referred to in this ditty was the Bishop of Chester, United Kingdom, who launched 
the PRHA, a trust designed to run pubs based on the Scandinavian Gothenburg system (International 
Order of Good Templars 1890, Rowntree & Sherwell 1903, Gutzke 1994).
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Gothenburg ideas arrive in South Australia
The Gothenburg system—in the form of community ownership of 
hotels—was especially influential in South Australia. The principles 
of moderated alcohol sales, citizen participation in hotel governance and 
the quarantining of profits for the betterment of the community, had great 
appeal in South Australia because respectable immigrants, not convicts, 
had settled there. Many of these immigrants had favoured non-conformist 
Christianity. The colony of South Australia soon developed a reputation 
for self-help and communal agricultural settlement, especially along the 
Murray River (Whitelock 1985, Casson & Hirst 1988). These underlying 
factors combined to support community ownership of hotels in Renmark 
in the 1890s. 
The town of Renmark was part of a pioneering irrigation colony established 
in 1887 on the Murray River by two Canadian irrigators, the brothers 
George and WB Chaffey. Both were teetotallers. The South Australian 
Government gave the Chaffey brothers the right to use 100,000 ha of land 
north of the river to establish an irrigation system with private capital, 
which enabled them to establish a colony of like-minded people. The 
Chaffey brothers and local residents wanted the Renmark area to be dry 
and advertised it to prospective settlers accordingly. In 1891, the South 
Australian Licensed Victuallers Act was amended to allow the Chaffey 
brothers’ colony to be dry; the Victorian Government made a similar 
ruling for the Chaffey’s nearby colony at Mildura, which was also set up 
as a temperance colony. Ironically, the irrigation systems initiated by the 
Chaffey brothers made extensive plantings of vines possible, resulting in 
the eventual production of wine and brandy in the region, along with 
dried and fresh fruits.10 Renmark and Mildura (and many other towns, 
particularly in Victoria) already had unlicensed ‘temperance hotels’ that 
offered board and lodging, but no alcohol. Influenced by the temperance 
movement, such hotels were often coffee palaces with grandiose facades 
and fittings designed to compete with the taverns (Room 1988).11 Their 
popularity declined over the years as residents agitated for licensed 
10  In 1911, Dr WT Angove and his sons created the first winery and distillery in the upper Murray 
at Renmark (Jones 1994: 287). After World War I, blocks of land in the region became part of the 
scheme to repatriate returned servicemen; they often grew dried fruit. 
11  The best known of these temperance hotels in Victoria is the Windsor Hotel, Melbourne. 
In 1886, it was known as the Grand Coffee Palace and sold no alcohol for 10 years until a successful 
application was made to remove the prohibition in 1897.
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premises, which is what occurred in Renmark and Mildura.12 After 
several years, Renmark’s form of local prohibition was deemed a failure 
because it was not possible to stop sly grog from flowing into the area: 
paddle steamers unloaded kegs of beer that were broached where they 
lay, creating ‘a club under every ti-tree’ (Johnson 1997: 8). The road from 
the temperance colony of Mildura to the nearest source of alcohol at 
Wentworth was delineated by a trail of bottles (Lapthorne 1947). 
In June 1895, with a story headlined ‘A hotel wanted’, the editor of the 
Renmark Pioneer, Chris Ashwell, triggered debate about the need to 
deal with this sly grog trade. Although temperance principles had been 
appropriate in the early days of the settlement, the population was larger 
now and Ashwell asked why residents of Renmark should ‘be deprived of 
privileges enjoyed by other communities of similar population?’ He had 
heard about the Gothenburg system that was already being debated in 
nearby Mildura:
The sister settlement of Mildura has been at various times strongly agitated 
on this question, and last year an informal vote13 was taken on the subject, 
resulting in a very large majority voting for the establishment of houses 
on somewhat the same system as that known as the Gothenburgh [sic] … 
[We] may advocate a like scheme for Renmark without laying ourselves 
open to the charge of running counter to temperance principles.14 
Ashwell believed that Renmark would be a municipality one day, and that 
it could form a trust to have sole control over the sale of spirits and employ 
a manager who would have no interest in pushing the sale of drink, the 
net profit of which could be devoted to improving the settlement’s roads. 
Over the following weeks, arguments for and against the establishment of 
a licensed hotel were printed in the newspaper. Many of these would be 
familiar to Australians today (particularly those who live in the Northern 
Territory). Temperance advocates objected to Ashwell’s idea, describing it 
as a weak alternative to prohibition. The local Methodist pastor, Reverend 
12  The Grand Hotel at Mildura (originally the coffee palace) was fully licensed in 1919 along with 
three clubs, which helped to ‘minimize the sly grog traffic which had been rife for so many years’ 
(Lapthorne 1947: 18–19). 
13  The results of this informal vote in Mildura in 1894 were as follows: continuing the existing 
system, 9; an ordinary hotel system, 77; Gothenburg system, 284; total prohibition, 15 (South 
Australian Register 1 August 1894: 5).
14  Editorial, Renmark Pioneer 15 June 1895: 2. Despite the earlier vote in favour of a Gothenburg 
hotel in Mildura, it never eventuated. Dissenting voices questioned the ‘extravagance’ of the claims 
made for the Gothenburg system and argued that having such a hotel would simply introduce an 
extra bar into the town. 
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W Corly Butler, insisted that it would be foolish to reverse the existing 
‘dry’ status of the land, but his argument was countered by another 
correspondent who stated that:
It is a well-known fact that there is far less drunkenness in a township 
with a well conducted hotel, under the careful supervision of the police, 
than when it is prohibited, and instead of being done openly is carried on 
to a far greater extent by those who are unwilling to be coerced and will 
therefore keep it in their own houses. (Renmark Pioneer 1895: 4)
Further, it was argued that if a man could get an occasional drink 
at  reasonable hours ‘he would be much less likely to make a beast of 
himself ’.15 
A Renmark Local Progress Committee (RLPC) was formed to pursue 
the community hotel idea, and the South Australian Licensed Victuallers 
Act was amended to allow a publican’s licence to be granted specifically 
for a community-run business, provided a majority of local householders 
signed a petition requesting it. There was a counter petition, but the vote 
was carried. Despite his misgivings, Butler signed the RLPC’s petition, 
believing that anything would be better than sly grog and hoping that 
the system would ‘prove a restraint on the drink traffic’ (Butler 1899: 3). 
The RLPC approached Mrs Jane Meissner (who had owned the town’s 
temperance hotel since 1892) to see if she would sell her business, which she 
agreed to do. A local station-owner provided the funds and, in March 1897, 
Mrs Meissner was appointed manager of the licensed Renmark Community 
Hotel, the only legitimate liquor outlet in an otherwise dry district covering 
several thousand square kilometres of South Australia (The  Argus 1922, 
Young & Secker 1984: 574, Johnson 1997): the sly grog shops reportedly 
closed immediately. The nearest settlement was the communal agricultural 
village of Lyrup, 20 km away, where the only alcohol allowed was a supply 
of medicinal brandy that was kept under lock and key by the doctor 
(Jones 1994). The Renmark Community Hotel claimed at the time, and 
has claimed since, to be the first community hotel in the British Empire 
(Renmark Community Hotel, no date, Johnson 1997).
It was decided that the hotel licence should be held by an elected committee 
of five community members, all of whom had to be approved landholders 
resident in Renmark. No member of the committee could have an interest 
in any retail business associated with the sale of alcohol, other than the 
15 Renmark Pioneer 29 June 1895: 2.
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produce of their own vineyard. The first chairman of the committee was 
an Anglican clergyman. In keeping with Gothenburg principles, the hotel 
manager was to be paid a regular salary to eliminate any inducement to 
‘push’ sales. After expenses had been paid, the hotel profits were to be used 
for the cultural and general betterment of the settlement of Renmark—
that is, ‘in the promotion or encouragement of literature, science, or art or 
for charitable or benevolent purposes or otherwise as the Committee shall 
decide and the Honorable the Treasurer shall approve’ (Johnson 1997: 14). 
Critics of the Renmark Gothenburg
Notwithstanding the positive outcomes that would soon be claimed 
for the Renmark Community Hotel, it, and the system it represented, 
were not without detractors. Although Butler had signed the petition 
supporting the hotel’s establishment, in the months following its opening, 
he became a critic of the way it was operating. He believed the system 
‘was as baneful as the ordinary licensed house’. Although it had killed off 
the sly grog trade, he argued that:
The service of drink in [the Renmark Hotel] was under no more 
restraint than in any respectable hotel in Perth, and that for a small and 
impoverished community the drink bill was very high. (Butler 1899: 3)
Butler was adamant that the community-owned hotel at Renmark did 
nothing more to lessen drunkenness than any ordinary hotel would have 
done. He may well have been right, but in view of the fact that most of 
the hotel’s customers had been used to drinking sly grog, in the open, with 
no constraints other than the limits to supply, it is hardly surprising that 
drinking styles did not change overnight. At least 13 sly grog shops had 
been operating for a population of around 1000, and these drinkers—many 
of whom were itinerant agricultural workers—had yet to be habituated to 
the behaviours expected of them when drinking on legitimately licensed 
premises. More than 100 years later, a similar crisis of comportment occurred 
in the Western Australian town of Fitzroy Crossing when Aboriginal 
drinkers, who had been used to drinking takeaway alcohol in the open air, 
were suddenly forced by new regulations to change their drinking style and 
drink on (rather than off) premises; this episode is discussed in Chapter 7.
Another critic was an English Wesleyan, Joseph Malins (1844–1926), 
who visited Australia on a round-the-world mission for the Order of 
Good Templars, a teetotal society. Two years after the opening of the 
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Renmark Community Hotel, he spoke in Melbourne at the Collins Street 
Independent Church. By this time, Malins, like many others, had visited 
Norway and Sweden to see for himself their liquor-control systems at 
work. While he agreed that the Gothenburg bolag had reduced the number 
of public houses and the hours of sale in their premises, he pointed out 
that other drinking houses, not under the immediate control of the bolag, 
continued to open until late; this, of course, is always a problem when 
restrictions only target some outlets. Malins also questioned whether 
paying a manager a salary instead of a commission on sales of spirits was 
really enough to make them ‘disinterested’. He believed that the apparent 
drop in drunkenness charges was due to changed policing practices rather 
than changed drinking practices, and claimed that the city of Gothenburg 
was more inebriated than Aberdeen in Scotland or Cardiff in Wales. 
His final, acerbic comment (aimed specifically at Rowntree and Sherwell’s 
trust house scheme in Britain), was that:
When Jews open pork shops, and vegetarians open butcher’s shops then 
teetotallers may run public houses, or elect others to run them. All true 
Temperance men want power granted to the people to deal with the 
traffic, not to embark in it. (Malins 1899: 6, original emphasis)




Despite this and other criticisms, the Renmark Community Hotel 
continued to flourish. In 1922, it was reported that the hotel manager 
made every attempt to encourage sobriety; that there had been no reported 
breaches of licensing laws; and, on the basis of population, that the figures 
for drunkenness were lower in Renmark than in any other part of the 
state (The Argus 1922). The hotel announced good profits that year and 
£20,000 were devoted to extensions. Two years later, the hotel hoped for 
£10,000 a year for distribution to the township. At that time, the hotel 
had 70 rooms, dining for 120 people and a staff of 35; plans were in place 
for a new bar with marble floors, blackwood furnishings, modern pumps 
and ice chests. In 1936, an art deco three-storey frontage was built that 
can still be seen today.
Debate over community-owned hotels
As word spread among towns along the Murray River, interest in 
establishing community hotels moved elsewhere in South Australia and 
extended into Victoria and New South Wales. The story of Renmark’s 
success was reiterated and promulgated as a model that other towns should 
follow. In the decades after the Renmark Community Hotel opened its 
doors, newspapers across Australia and New Zealand published largely 
positive articles about the Gothenburg system, sometimes referred to as 
the ‘Earl Grey system’.16 It was described as an admirable scheme: 
Every [public] house has a well-furnished tea-room, and nearly every one 
has a tea-garden in which customers can enjoy themselves rationally in the 
company of their wives and children. This is the true line of temperance 
reform. Offer a man something better than the privilege of getting 
fuddled, and nine times out of ten he will gladly take it.17
Inspired by Renmark, Waikerie (originally a communal village settlement 
on the Murray River) established its own community hotel in 1912. 
In the 1930s, several nearby towns followed suit, voting in favour of 
16  ‘English drink question. The Earl Grey system’, West Gippsland Gazette 14 April 1903: 5; 
‘Earl Grey’s Trust “Pub”’, Northern Territory Times and Gazette 2 July 1914: 8; ‘Growing interest in 
community hotels’, Recorder (Port Pirie) 5 January 1939: 1. The New Zealand Herald carried a story 
titled ‘The Gothenburg system in Australia: Successful introduction in Renmark’ on 12 May 1898: 6. 
17  Northern Territory Times and Gazette 2 July 1914: 8. Similar optimistic visions accompanied 
early suggestions for licensed clubs in remote Aboriginal communities in which drinking facilities 
were intended to stress family gatherings, the provision of soft drinks and food and counterattractions 
such as pool and darts (Leary et al. 1975).
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local monopolies and for the restriction of other liquor licences in their 
districts. Barmera opened a community hotel in 1932, and Berri opened 
one in 1937. The community at Loxton applied for a licence in 1934 
and, in 1946, the Loxton Hotel finally became community-owned. 
This meant that five neighbouring towns, connected physically by the 
Murray River and linked philosophically through their shared history of 
the temperance-oriented irrigation colony, now had community-owned 
hotels.18 Several small towns in South Australia opened community hotels 
in subsequent years: Nuriootpa in the Barossa Valley bought its hotel in 
1937; in the far west, Ceduna citizens bought their hotel in 1949; Kimba 
residents followed suit in 1951; and the hotel at Streaky Bay became 
community owned in 1965. All these hotels were to be managed for the 
residents, with profits devoted to public purposes in the area (Young & 
Secker 1984).
Map 1 Past and present community hotels in South Australia, 1897–2015
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University
In other locations, politicians, aldermen and prominent citizens advocated 
for community hotels in preference to privately owned establishments. 
Their reasons were threefold. First, there was concern about the perceived 
18  In South Australia, the Community Hotels (Incorporation) Act, 1938 [No. 2407] made this 
proliferation possible. The Act validated the incorporation of several of these hotels under an earlier one, 
the Associations Incorporation Act 1929–35, dspace.flinders.edu.au/jspui/handle/2328/24937.
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growing influence of the liquor industry because of its donations to 
political parties: community ownership was seen as a way of countering 
this unwanted trend. In 1939, discussing the possibility of a community 
hotel in Port Pirie, local dignitaries spoke of the profitability of the 
liquor trade and the immense sums that were being poured into political 
propaganda by liquor interests:
It should be an offence to demand from hotelkeepers a contribution 
to any fund or to include an amount in the wholesale price of liquor 
which would be contributed by the breweries to such a fund. It is said by 
hotelkeepers that amounts from such funds are distributed for political 
purposes to assist the candidature of certain persons at elections. In order 
that we may ultimately be freed from the thraldom of brewers I suggest 
that the hotels should be owned by the community and not made the 
vehicles of private gain.19 (Recorder [Port Pirie] 1939: 1)
Second, these prominent citizens were supporters of moderation and were 
in favour of the harm-reduction qualities that would ideally be embedded 
in such hotels. Under the Gothenburg system, one alderman stated, credit 
was given to a hotel ‘not for the quantity of liquor it sold, but for the 
moderation of its sales and the sobriety of its patrons’. Third, and most 
importantly, the local variation on the Gothenburg system appealed to 
politicians, local councillors and civic-minded citizens because of its 
revenue-raising capability. Local and state politicians were interested in 
community hotels because they provided a substantial stream of locally 
generated income that could be devoted to local needs. The community-
owned Renmark establishment had become well known in South Australia, 
not just for the ‘high standard of accommodation and service it offers’, 
but for the ‘huge sums it has earned for expenditure on town beautification 
and other civil purposes’ (Recorder [Port Pirie] 1939: 1, emphasis added). 
As community groups in towns in New South Wales and Victoria began 
to agitate for policy changes that would make such hotels possible, their 
lobbying caught the attention of temperance activists and organisations 
such as the WCTU. Taking a hard line rather than a reformist position, 
these organisations were thoroughly opposed to the idea of community 
licences. As part of their campaign against community hotels, they argued 
19  It is worth pointing out that liquor industry representatives still curry favour with politicians. 
According to the Australian Electoral Commission, in 2012–13, the Australian Hotels Association 
(representing hoteliers nationally) was the largest political donor in the country, with most of its 
donations being directed to the Liberal party (d’Abbs 2014: 21). 
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that good people were being led away by ‘specious arguments’ (Wilson 
1946: 1). In 1946, remarks from the Temperance Alliance questioning 
the supposed successes of the Renmark Community Hotel were broadcast 
by a Sydney radio station. The speaker suggested that community 
ownership encouraged a ‘mob spirit’, which encouraged more drinking, 
and that donations to charity, which amounted to a small percentage of 
overall profits, allowed the hotel and the liquor trade to acquire a ‘false 
respectability’. Temperance activists publicised details of the Renmark 
Community Hotel’s revenue, which showed that, although a record 
profit of £12,000 had been made in 1944–45, of which £3,000 had 
been distributed to local causes, £43,752 had been spent on alcohol in 
the hotel’s bars to secure this amount. The speaker accused the Renmark 
Community Hotel of donating to Christian organisations to ‘buy off’ the 
temperance cause, and claimed that donations were made in expectation 
of favours to come. Similarly, a WCTU pamphlet published in 1945 
made use of detailed sales data from the Renmark Community Hotel to 
demolish its claims of generosity, observing that such gifts were merely 
‘a salve to the consciences of the promoters and the public, blinding them 
to the deterioration which takes place in the lives of their most regular 
customers’ (McCorkindale 1945: 1).
The supposed success of ‘disinterested management’ was also questioned 
by the WCTU. It pointed out, somewhat sardonically, that there were 
no records of a community hotel manager being commended for 
reporting a decrease in bar trade. On the contrary, increased sales led to 
the manager being congratulated, commended and even paid a bonus 
in some instances. The author of the 1945 WCTU pamphlet, Isobel 
McCorkindale (1885–1971), was a Scottish-born activist who organised 
campaigns against liquor licences and extended opening hours. A great 
promoter of fruit juice, she was known for her use of scientific rather 
than emotive arguments against alcohol.20 Her pamphlet warned against 
making community-owned hotels part of any ‘community centre’ set up 
for the benefit of a neighbourhood. She concluded, perceptively, that:
20  McCorkindale reported on the Carlisle scheme of state ownership in the United Kingdom, 
which began during World War I as a means of controlling liquor sales and thus safeguarding 
workers and the war effort in an industrialised area of naval bases, dockyards and munitions factories. 
Managers reported redesigned pubs with better facilities, sales of food and non-intoxicants and the 
elimination of private interests in liquor sales (Shadwell 1923). However, McCorkindale claimed that 
there had been no reduction in consumption as a result. 
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The effect of alcohol is just the same on the individual whether it is 
sold over a bar owned by a private individuals [sic] or one in which the 
community is interested. There is something about the liquor traffic 
which does not fit in with an effort requiring goodwill and selflessness. 
(McCorkindale 1945: 4)
Many temperance activists were women. Their arguments foreshadowed 
a  campaign by Aboriginal women who objected to the proposed 
establishment of a community-owned club in Alice Springs nearly 
50 years later. Like their white counterparts in the WCTU, the Aboriginal 
women held to an abolitionist position that was intolerant of the notion 
of  ‘social’ moderate drinking. While they acknowledged the good 
intentions of those who supported the club, they argued that even if it 
were owned and run by Aboriginal interests for Aboriginal customers, 
it would still amount to an additional liquor licence in a town already 
awash in alcohol. The rise and demise of the Alice Springs club is discussed 
in Chapter 5.
Fig. 3 WCTU Offices, Hutt Street, Adelaide
Source: M Brady
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Compromising the Gothenburg vision?
The South Australian community hotels experienced their heyday in the 
first half of the twentieth century, after which some of their monopoly 
status came to an end. Increasingly subject to competition, they were 
placed under greater pressure to increase sales to maintain viability, as 
predicted by their temperance critics. Three of the original 12 community-
owned premises in South Australia went broke and their leases were sold 
to commercial operators.21 Community hotels became more exposed to 
competition after legislation was introduced in 1967 abolishing their 
monopoly in towns such as Renmark, Berri and Barmera. Young and 
Secker,22 in their 1984 review of the South Australian Liquor Act, described 
Section 105, which allowed for restriction on the number of licences in 
Riverland communities, as ‘anachronistic’. The government’s decision to 
repeal Section 105 was the final defeat of temperance thinking in the old 
irrigation colony towns. Subsequently, townspeople who wanted to limit 
the number of hotels in their district would have to convince a central 
licensing authority of the merits of their position (Young & Secker 1984: 
575).23 Although monopolies still exist today, they are somewhat tenuous. 
As one hotel manager interviewed for this study (in 2015) explained: 
‘If our hotel was not a monopoly, we would have no choice but to sell 
aggressively, spend more on marketing [and] happy hours, as the hotel 
must survive. This would be contradictory to the community’.
Depending on their location, most community-owned hotels in South 
Australia must now compete with other alcohol outlets to varying degrees. 
The original Gothenburg-style principles that animated such hotels have 
been sacrificed and compromises made. Bearing out the criticisms and fears 
of temperance activists such as McCorkindale, commercial considerations 
now appear to be paramount. In Ceduna, for example, while the stated 
purpose of community ownership of the hotel echoes some of the 
original Gothenburg principles—such as no private individual receiving 
monetary benefit from the profits—other Gothenburg principles—
21  The nine remaining community-owned hotels in South Australia are in Barmera, Berri, Ceduna, 
Lameroo, Loxton, Nuriootpa, Parndana, Renmark and Waikerie. The three that have sold their leases 
are Cummins, Kimba and Streaky Bay. 
22  At the time of the review, Andrew Secker was a public servant: he later became the Liquor 
Licensing Commissioner for South Australia. 
23  In their review of South Australia’s liquor licensing laws, Young and Secker (1984: 21) promoted 
what they believed was ‘cautious liberalisation’. Contrary to considerable research evidence, they were 
of the view that liberalising trading hours and increasing the number of liquor outlets would neither 
significantly increase consumption, nor make alcohol-related diseases worse. 
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such as reducing harm by controlling alcohol sales—are not explicitly 
addressed. The hotel aims to be as profitable as possible so as to return 
profits to the local community and develop facilities to attract tourism 
and create job opportunities.24 Improvements to the hotel itself have been 
made possible by the hotel’s substantial income from its takeaway bottle 
shop and poker machines, both of which have arguably had negative 
effects on the community. In 1973, when the town’s first drive-in bottle 
shop opened, the hotel’s annual turnover ‘rocketed’ to $396,000; the 
drive-in facility boosted bottle sales by 75 per cent. Over the years, many 
Aboriginal people from Yalata (200 km west) purchased bulk supplies of 
alcohol, mostly fortified wine, from the bottle shop. In 1999, the hotel 
celebrated its 50th anniversary by replacing the existing modest drive-in 
with an enormous structure that dominated (and still dominates) a major 
intersection in the town. By purchasing liquor in larger quantities, the new 
facility could sell at lower prices (Trewartha 1999: 55, Brady et al. 2003). 
Several years earlier, in 1994, the hotel had introduced poker machines. 
Used enthusiastically by local Aboriginal people, these became a major 
source of revenue for the hotel.25 While the revenue from poker machines 
contributes to the hotel’s ability to make community distributions, the 
cost is high, particularly for Aboriginal people who comprise nearly 
25 per cent of the population in Ceduna’s Local Government Area. Poker 
machines draw resources from these extremely disadvantaged people, 
many of whom live in remote communities.
South Australian rural towns took on the spirit, if not the detail, of the 
ideas of disinterested management and municipal control that typified 
the Gothenburg system.26 Although only the hotel at Renmark explicitly 
described itself as Gothenburg-style, it was this hotel that popularised 
the system and prompted the diffusion of community ownership. What 
caught the eye of other towns was the potential of profit distribution; as 
time passed, the distribution of monies became the paramount interest. 
24  This was stated on the hotel’s website, accessed 10 November 2014, cedunahotel.com.au/history.
25  In 1998, an Aboriginal community 200  km away from Ceduna successfully objected to 
an application for a gaming machine licence from a nearby roadhouse. The Liquor and Gaming 
Commissioner agreed with the community’s lawyer that the people could ‘ill afford’ to gamble on 
poker machines, and that such machines had the potential to drain a substantial amount of money 
from already poor communities and to increase violence.
26  Despite the compromises that have modified the original idealistic goals for community hotels 
in South Australia, community-owned enterprises continue to engage with local residents in ways 
that normal commercially run premises do not. They publicly state they are community owned, 
display lists and photographs of board members, support local charities, provide local employment 
and training, engage in harm-reduction strategies and nurture their local customers and communities.
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The community hotels idea was diffused among neighbouring towns: some 
were linked by shared identities as river towns or irrigation communities; 
some had shared histories of self-help and local cooperative enterprise; 
others had Lutheran origins and leanings towards alcohol regulation 
rather than outright prohibition. The notion of community ownership 
was also borne along on a wave of optimism about temperance and liquor 
reform and the potential to ‘civilise’ drinkers and drinking: in some cases, 
it was an integral part of the creation of towns or garden cities that were 
designed to enhance the wellbeing of citizens.
Fig. 4 Window at the Vine Inn, Nuriootpa
Source: M Brady
The community hotels of South Australia and the Gothenburg system 
that inspired them juggled inherently paradoxical goals and principles. 
The hotels and the Gothenburg system were mechanisms designed to 
build-up assets ‘in trust’, as it were, for the benefit of citizens. However, 
such assets and benefits were simultaneously responsible for—or at 
least morally implicated in—any negative effects of the socially volatile 
commodity involved: alcohol. This paradox was highlighted in later 
decades when several Aboriginal communities (and the government 
agencies that advised them), began to take an interest in buying licensed 
hotels and establishing Indigenous community boards of management.27 
27  The first hotel purchased by Aboriginal interests was the Finke Hotel, Northern Territory, 
in 1975—a purchase made possible by the federal Minister for Aboriginal Affairs. 
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In the case of hotels owned by Indigenous interests, the paradoxical goals 
and moral dilemmas were intensified because of the unrelenting social 
hazards of alcohol for Aboriginal people. 
Indigenous economic development agencies
Indigenous groups were interested in the idea of community ownership for 
a number of complex reasons. Like the politicians, aldermen and citizens 
who supported the Gothenburg system, Indigenous groups and several 
of their advisory agencies were attracted to the notion of ‘keeping the 
money in the community’. They liked the idea of profits benefiting locals 
(rather than income from alcohol sales going to commercial businesses or 
breweries), and they used this argument to support both Indigenous hotel 
purchases and licensed social clubs in remote Indigenous communities. 
Like the Gothenburgers, they eschewed prohibition and were interested 
in reforming—rather than abolishing—the pub. Indigenous communities 
also wanted greater local control over alcohol sales, as this would enable 
them to bypass tortuous negotiations with reluctant publicans and 
licensing authorities. Finally, righteous justice motivated the purchases of 
hotels that had humiliated Aboriginal people by excluding them; this is 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
In the early 1970s, self-determination policies facilitated the legal 
incorporation of regional Aboriginal communities, lands trusts and 
advisory councils. This built on earlier efforts to inspire Aboriginal ‘self-
help’ organisations, proprietary companies and cooperatives. Public 
policy at this time was increasingly constituting Aboriginal leaders, elders 
and councillors as Indigenous ‘trustees’ who ostensibly took the place of 
the state (Smith 2002) in supervising other Aboriginal people. In 1976, 
a new Commonwealth Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act provided 
for the constitution of Aboriginal councils and for the incorporation of 
Aboriginal associations as vehicles of development and empowerment 
(Rowse 2015). This development, together with the creation of quasi-
government agencies that provided structured funding programs for 
economic development, allowed Aboriginal associations and an emerging 
Aboriginal cadre of leaders28 to obtain funds for hotel purchases and 
28  Such leadership, it should be pointed out, was almost entirely male; indeed, some organisations, 
such as Land Councils, explicitly excluded Aboriginal women, arguing that land was ‘men’s business’. 
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other business enterprises. Unlike the non-Indigenous towns mentioned 
earlier, whose citizens were able to raise bank loans, mortgage businesses, 
or contribute private resources to buy their local hotels, impecunious 
Indigenous groups sought loans or grant monies from Indigenous-specific 
economic development agencies, such as the ADC and its successors. 
The Indigenous groups that received such monies were expected to abide 
by the policies and investment strategies of the funding bodies. 
The ADC was established as a statutory corporation in 1980. Through its 
housing loans, business programs, small business loans and a community 
enterprise development scheme, it had the general aim of furthering 
goals for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people that were broadly 
defined as economic and social (Commonwealth of Australia 1989a: 7, 
WS Arthur 1996). In a sense, the ADC operated as a means of stimulating 
what we would now call ‘social enterprise’: economic activities with social 
goals (Defourny & Nyssens 2006, 2010). In view of later developments, 
the articulation of social goals (as well as economic ones) in the ADC’s 
founding objectives is significant. The ADC was intended to assist 
Aboriginal people to engage in business enterprises, including non-profit 
enterprises that provided facilities for social purposes. In keeping with 
its social and economic goals, the ADC’s investment policy was broad—
perhaps too broad. Its investments included housing companies, pastoral 
properties, a theatre company, tourist accommodation, an indoor cricket 
centre, cattle stations and a shopping centre in Alice Springs. It also funded 
the purchase of several licensed public hotels by Aboriginal community 
associations. Some of the ADC’s investments had mixed success or were 
outright failures.29 There were examples of administrative weaknesses and 
poor decision-making, such as the purchase of several Kimberley cattle 
stations that had been left in poor condition by their previous European 
owners.30 As a result, in 1988, the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, 
Gerry Hand, began to clamp down on the ADC and a no-confidence 
motion was passed against its chair, Shirley MacPherson.31 Eight ADC 
commissioners were sacked (Guest 1988: 1). Tough questions were asked 
about the ADC at a Senate Estimates Committee, particularly about the 
role of Charles Perkins, and an Audit Office investigation was ordered 
29  One notable failure was the purchase of the Oasis Hotel in Walgett (see Chapter 6).
30  This criticism was made by Fitzroy Valley Aboriginal people who believed that the ADC had 
been ‘ripped off’ when it made the cattle station purchases (Marshall 1988). 
31  Shirley MacPherson was made chair of the ADC in 1986; she resigned in 1989. She was followed 
by Lois O’Donoghue who presided until the end of the ADC in February 1990.
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into several of the ADC’s investments (Australian Audit Office 1989). 
Despite some legitimate concerns, it is extraordinary that the Audit Office 
criticised what it called the ADC’s ‘undue emphasis’ on social goals, such 
as promoting employment and creating social facilities. In May 1989, 
Minister Hand demanded that the ADC focus on the commercial 
viability of funded projects. Legislation governing the ADC was tightened 
with the addition of a clause preventing it from using monies from the 
general fund for business enterprises unless the ADC was satisfied that 
the enterprise would be commercially successful (Pratt & Bennett 2004). 
However, in light of subsequent developments, it is significant that the 
minister did not oblige the ADC to avoid commercial investment that 
was detrimental to the community.
Somewhat surprisingly, the ADC did not have a specific policy on alcohol. 
No particular safeguards were built into the loans or enterprise development 
grants used for the purchases of hotels—such as, for example, a proviso 
that an alcohol-related business should balance commercial viability with 
the expectation that it would cause no harm. However, the ADC did 
make an official comment on alcohol advertising. In July 1983, the ADC 
released a document entitled ‘Views of the commissioners on alcohol 
related problems and the advertising of alcoholic beverages’ that focused 
on concerns about the promotion of alcohol and over-glamorisation of 
drinking in advertising and the absence of health warnings.32 The ADC 
made several perceptive recommendations, including the need for 
a comprehensive collation of statistical data on alcohol abuse problems in 
each state and territory, and an analysis of the relative costs and benefits 
of alcohol production, promotion, sales and the problems associated with 
its abuse (ADC 1983: 35). While acknowledging that the ADC was not 
primarily concerned with providing welfare services, the commissioners 
nevertheless felt that ‘they would be seriously remiss if they were to ignore 
the problems associated with alcohol abuse’. The commissioners made it 
clear that they were ‘well aware of and most concerned by the ravaging 
effects these have on Aboriginal people’ (ADC 1983: 3). Yet, these 
concerns did not prevent the ADC from playing an integral role in the 
32  Charles Perkins was particularly incensed about alcohol advertising. In 1985, Perkins and Bob 
Huddleston (an Aboriginal man who worked on alcohol issues for the Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs [DAA]) started a committee against alcohol advertising and placed advertisements in the 
press calling for restrictions on media advertising of alcohol (cf. The Australian 20 December 1985: 
5). Their campaign, which did not specifically mention Aboriginal people, was targeted at the entire 
population. 
59
2. THE GOTHENBURG SySTEM, MONOPOLIES AND THE COMMUNITy GOOD
purchase of three public hotels and one club with a primarily Aboriginal 
clientele—decisions that were enthusiastically supported by Charles 
Perkins (1936–2000), chair of the ADC from 1980 to 1984.33
The ADC and the Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) were superseded 
and amalgamated within a new organisation, the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), in 1990. ATSIC took over the ADC’s 
functions, such as loans for housing and commercial businesses, that had had 
both economic and social objectives. The ATSIC Act created the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commercial Development Corporation (CDC).34 
The CDC’s primary function was ‘to engage in commercial and financial 
activities’ under strictly commercial lines; it was designed to sharpen the 
focus on economic self-sufficiency and economic development. Rather 
than facilitating social enterprises, the CDC described itself as advancing 
Indigenous ‘economic interests’; it stressed ‘sound business principles’ and 
emphasised the importance of helping Indigenous people to ‘break free from 
the web of dependency’ (WS Arthur 1996).35 However, from the perspective 
of many Aboriginal people, much of the business activity supported by the 
CDC was oriented towards the accumulation and distribution of social 
capital. As Martin (1995) observed (using examples from Cape York), no 
provision was made for targeting financial profit, nor was any provision 
made for monitoring the social impact of business enterprises. It appeared 
that the social goals and community development orientation that had been 
written into the ADC’s original brief had, by 1990, disappeared under a 
renewed emphasis on accountability and profit-making. 
The CDC was replaced by Indigenous Business Australia (IBA) in 2001. 
The IBA’s investment policy continued to stress commercial and financial 
activities. In 2001, for example, the IBA purchased a 42.86 per cent share 
in the Crossing Inn at Fitzroy Crossing, Western Australia, evidently 
believing that it would be a solid commercial investment. As discussed 
in Chapter 7, it was indeed a solid commercial investment, but the hotel 
was also directly implicated in widespread alcohol-related harm, which 
caused the IBA and local Indigenous shareholders considerable public 
embarrassment.
33  ADC funds were used to purchase the Oasis Hotel, Walgett (1983); the Transcontinental 
Hotel, Oodnadatta (1986); the Woden Town Club, Canberra (1988); and the Crossing Inn, Fitzroy 
Crossing (1988). See Chapter 6.
34  The passage of the original ATSIC legislation introduced by the Hawke Labor Government was 
delayed because the opposition, led by John Howard, had strong objections to the notion of ATSIC, 





Kava is another example of a mood-altering substance whose sale was 
controlled by a government-sanctioned, Aboriginal-owned business. Like 
the Gothenburg system, a monopoly was established to regulate, rather 
than abolish, sales of kava, and the profits from the monopoly were used 
to finance projects for the benefit of the community. 
Fig. 5 Kava packet, Ganybu Wholesalers, Yirrkala, 2005
Source: M Brady
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Made from the root of Piper methysticum, the psychoactive narcotic drug, 
kava, was introduced in the 1980s from the Pacific to several northern 
coastal Aboriginal communities. Aboriginal men visiting Fiji experienced 
the kava ceremony and, impressed by its tranquillising properties, saw 
kava as an antidote to the trouble that seemed to accompany alcohol; they 
asked for supplies to be made available. With the help of Uniting Church 
ministers, some of whom were of Pacific Islander descent and used kava 
themselves, the practice of drinking kava spread across east Arnhem 
Land communities. In Fiji, kava consumption was apparently benign 
and socially integrative (Lebot et al. 1992, Katz 1993). By contrast, its 
enthusiastic take-up by men, women and children in Arnhem Land, 
together with the relative absence of any drinking rules or learned self-
control strategies, resulted in heavy consumption. Its popularity caused 
controversy about its health effects, prompting expressions of concern 
by Northern Territory health authorities (Alexander 1985, Cawte 1988, 
Gregory & Cawte 1988, Matthews et al. 1988, d’Abbs 1995, Clough et 
al. 2000, Clough & Jones 2004). The federal and territory governments’ 
policy approaches to managing kava were indecisive, swinging wildly from 
tolerance and harm reduction to total prohibition. After originally taking 
a laissez-faire approach, the Northern Territory Health Department ran 
a health education campaign urging caution; it gave advice on hygiene, 
warned pregnant women not to drink kava and reminded people that 
kava was ‘not part of Aboriginal ceremonies’ (Northern Territory Aboriginal 
News 1989: 9). The trade in kava eventually prompted intense criticism of 
the Uniting Church, whose employees were accused of ‘profiteering’ from 
kava sales (Cawte 1988, d’Abbs 1995). In 1998, the Northern Territory 
parliament passed a Kava Management Act that created licensed kava 
areas, strictly regulated the supply and possession of kava and introduced 
fines for ‘trafficable’ quantities of the drug (Territory Health Services, 
no date). 
An Aboriginal organisation, Laynhapuy Homelands Association Inc. 
(LHA), became the sole licensed wholesaler and distributor of kava for 
the Northern Territory. Member-owned, the LHA had a board of 12 
Yolngu members and represented 16 Yolngu clans living in 19 homeland 
centres across northeast Arnhem Land (LHA 2008). Its kava distribution 
company, Ganybu Wholesalers, bought supplies from a Fijian company 
and sold to licensed retailers in six Aboriginal communities who were able 
to onsell to residents at a limit of 400 g per week per person.36 The retailers 
36  100 g bags of powdered kava sold for $15 (Ric Norton, pers comm, 19 August 2005). 
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were in communities that had, of their own volition, banned alcohol 
and made a conscious choice to request the sale of licensed kava instead. 
Profits raised by individual communities’ kava sales were intended to be 
used for community development as well as for the mitigation of any 
negative health effects stemming from heavy kava use. One community 
used kava funds to help rehabilitate a cattle station and abattoir to create 
employment. Kava sales also provided the homelands resource agency, 
based at Yirrkala, with a valuable stream of rare discretionary income that 
was independent of government and could be used to support decentralised 
homeland communities. The LHA used the income to fund a ranger 
program and ranger station; a boat; housing improvements; health escort 
travel assistance for local people who travelled to hospital in Darwin; 
and donations to schools, sports and the night patrol. It also planned 
a number of civil works, such as a cyclone shelter and women’s centre, 
and the purchase of tractors, generators, fencing, repairs and furniture. 
The LHA estimated that, after costs, the kava proceeds available for use 
for community benefit added up to around $900,000 per annum. With 
its members, directors, staff and families drinking kava to varying degrees, 
it was in the LHA’s interests to stay abreast of claims and counterclaims 
about kava’s health effects. It commissioned independent reviews of the 
medical literature that found the health risks to be minor, especially when 
compared with those associated with alcohol.
Monopoly trading displaced the black market to a certain extent, but the 
Kava Management Act did not entirely prevent illegal trading (LHA 2008: 
22).37 Seizures of illegal quantities of kava, agitation by Northern Territory 
politicians and an interventionist federal minister for Indigenous Affairs, 
culminated in 2007 in the federal government cancelling the kava import 
licence.38 Without warning, all commercial importation of kava for 
social use was prohibited, bringing a precipitous end to the monopoly 
on sales held by the LHA. Thereafter, kava could be imported only for 
the personal–cultural use of people of South Pacific Islander descent. 
The LHA launched a spirited defence of kava consumption and its kava 
wholesale business, enumerating the many projects that were dependent 
on it and citing the lack of evidence of any serious health effects related to 
kava use. At the time, the community council at Yirrkala had $600,000 
37  For example, it was reported that police from Tennant Creek seized 500 kg of kava, with a street 
value of $200,000, from a motorist travelling from Queensland (Tennant Times 2000: 3).
38  The ban on the commercial importation and licensing of kava was implemented by the 
Australian Government as part of the Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER) in 2007.
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worth of community projects that were dependent for their completion 
on kava proceeds and the LHA had numerous projects in train that were 
also reliant on kava monies (LHA 2008: 23). 
Fig. 6 Kava Licence Area sign, Yirrkala, 2005
Source: M Brady
There is no doubt that untied funds provided by the sale of kava enabled 
activities that benefited the community; the funds were well managed and 
the licensing and controlled distribution of kava through the Aboriginal-
run monopoly over sales mitigated the black market in kava. Observers 
report that, since the ban on legal importation and distribution, millions 
of dollars have disappeared directly from the communities into the pockets 
of illegal Pacific Island traffickers. Seizures of illicit kava by the Substance 
Abuse Intelligence Desk doubled between 2009 and 2010 (Putt 2011). 
At a time when communities were also getting less financial support from 
government, the loss of kava income devastated their capacity to build 
infrastructure and provide jobs (Morphy 2008, Botsman 2015). By its 
own admission, the member-owned LHA was dependent on the kava 
business for a substantial part of its activities. This had been one of the 
criticisms voiced by temperance advocates against the fundraising capacity 
of community hotels: that town councils would become habituated 
TEACHING 'PROPER' DRINkING?
64
to raising funds through sales of alcohol and morally compromised 
as a result. Despite being less problematic than alcohol, kava is, after all, 
a narcotic drug. 
Unlike in parts of Sweden, there has never been a government-franchised 
monopoly alcohol supply system in Australia; although, as discussed here, 
kava was briefly a monopoly and there were (and still are) a handful of 
examples of municipal or community ownership of premises in both 
the Indigenous and non-Indigenous domains. In South Australia, where 
they proliferated, the interest of politicians and citizens in community-
owned hotels often narrowed over time to their ability to raise revenue 
for local needs, rather than their supposed harm-reduction and alcohol-
control functions. Indeed, with the demise of the old irrigation colonies’ 
regional alcohol monopolies and with the rise of a competitive and less 
regulated liquor trade, revenue raising has become the more important 
goal. South Australia today has the highest per capita number of liquor 
licences of any Australian state or territory, and the rate of increase of 
licensed premises has been six times the rate of increase in population 
(Social Development Committee of the South Australian Parliament 
2014: 44). To remain commercially viable, and to have enough profits to 
share with the community that supports them, the remaining community 
hotels have had to sacrifice some of their original ideals.
The Swedish bolag, and other Gothenburg-style strategies governing 
alcohol sales, had built-in social and public health objectives, such as 
making public houses eating houses, employing respectable managers 
who derived no profit from alcohol sales and securing strict supervision 
of all public houses (Pitman 1877). As mentioned, these were an early 
manifestation of the notion of corporate social responsibility. By contrast, 
the Indigenous agencies—such as the ADC and IBA—that made it 
possible for Indigenous communities to purchase hotels were only 
briefly guided by social concerns and lacked the caveats governing the 
Swedish bolag. Harm reduction was not even mentioned in their policy 
statements, and they ignored the glaring moral hazards associated with 
alcohol sales. By making economic viability such a high priority,39 and by 
excluding safeguards against social or community harms deriving from 
alcohol sales, the Indigenous development and investment agencies failed 
39  Arguably, these Indigenous statutory bodies—while under pressure from government audit 
offices to tighten their financial conduct—should have been able to create a balance between 
investment policies that were commercially robust and socially responsible.
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in their duty of care to their Indigenous clients. Their policies prioritised 
the accumulation of Indigenous assets via business plans that were 
indifferent to social objectives. Particularly in the case of the Crossing 
Inn at Fitzroy Crossing, the commercially driven policies pursued by 
Indigenous economic agencies actively undermined policies that were 
aimed at harm reduction, sabotaging earlier ambitions for the hotel to 
impart moderate drinking habits. Such a trajectory runs counter to the 
principles that underpinned the Gothenburg system and its descendants, 
the community-owned hotels.
Among the remaining non-Indigenous community hotels in small rural 
towns, several are under financial stress with ongoing problems of staffing 
and management. While ‘keeping the money in the community’ has been 
a guiding principle for them, it may have had unintended consequences. 
In the 1930s, when towns were debating whether to create community 
hotels, a Methodist minister in Port Pirie presciently warned of the 
implicit danger of local bodies becoming dependent on the proceeds from 
hotel profits: he thought that community boards might not necessarily 
be altruistic in their distribution of revenue (Recorder [Port Pirie] 1939: 
1). His comments touch on the dilemmas that were inherent in these 
enterprises from the start, and with which community hotels, whether 





The role of beer canteens 
and licensed clubs
The establishment of beer canteens and social clubs in remote Indigenous 
communities was a direct consequence of the aspiration to teach 
‘civilised’—or, in more modern parlance, moderate—drinking. Providing 
rationed amounts of alcohol was seen by many in government as a way 
to ease inexperienced Indigenous drinkers into familiarity with alcohol, 
while also helping more experienced drinkers to abandon the undesirable 
patterns of consumption acquired both before and after the repeal 
of prohibitions affecting them.1
Equality and the embrace of citizenship demanded that Aboriginal people 
should fit in and take their place in society, including at the hotel bar 
alongside average Australians. The leading idea was that Aboriginal people 
should be introduced to alcohol and taught to drink in a ‘civilised’ manner: 
a step along the road to integration, so that ‘they’ would learn to drink 
(and be) like ‘us’. It was an idea in keeping with the thinking of civil 
rights activists and progressives of the time, and was also in line with the 
expressed desire of numerous Aboriginal leaders that their people should 
(somehow) learn to control wild drinking.
1  This chapter expands on material published by the author as a discussion paper in 2014.
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Of course, some Aboriginal people already had drinking rights: these were 
mostly individuals of mixed descent who, by reaching certain behavioural 
‘standards’ (such as ‘adopting the habits of civilised life’2), had been 
exempted from the provisions of the various state and territory laws that 
prohibited alcohol possession and consumption—a status certified by an 
exemption certificate, otherwise known as a ‘dog tag’. As Charles Rowley 
pointed out, such exemptions were reminiscent of French colonial practices 
that employed the concept of the évolué; in Australia, exemptions were 
granted to assimilated people who, although of ‘native’ origin, had proved 
themselves to be civilised and therefore eligible for full civil rights (Rowley 
1970: 357).3 Perhaps the clubs would help the previously non-exempt 
Aboriginal people to become évolués too? The idea that Aboriginal people 
should learn to drink like Australians who drank moderately was, arguably, 
an ‘assimilationist’ one, involving the internalisation of Western middle-
class notions of individual responsibility and inner discipline. However, 
the idea that Aboriginal people should be able to exercise local control, 
shape rules and design a physical and social environment in which this 
moderation was likely to happen represents ‘self-determination’.4 In this 
respect, ‘civilising’ drinking was an assimilationist project that, with the 
advent of the idea of local control over clubs, spilled over into the era of 
self-determination and blurred the boundaries between the two.
Overall, it appears that broad sections of both the Indigenous and non-
Indigenous polity believed that the provision of on-site alcohol facilities 
under the control of local people who implemented strict limits or rations 
was the best way to ‘teach’ proper drinking. Yet, the provision of canteens 
was by no means an Australia-wide phenomenon. Such drinking facilities 
only appeared in any organised way in the Northern Territory, South 
Australia and Queensland. Similar ideas were circulating at around the 
same time in Papua New Guinea, which, until 1975, was under Australian 
administration. Like Indigenous Australians, the people of Papua New 
Guinea had learned about drunkenness by observing hard-drinking 
colonial officers and traders, most of whom were Australian. It became 
legal for Papua New Guineans to purchase and consume alcohol in 
2  This wording is from the Natives (Citizenship Rights) Act 1944 (WA) (Chesterman 2005:125).
3  The term évolué, literally meaning a ‘developed’ or ‘evolved’ person, derives from the French 
colonial era. It was employed to describe natives who had assimilated and accepted European values 
and patterns of behaviour.
4  Thanks to Tim Rowse for making this point.
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1962.5 Prompted by rural men’s disruptive behaviour in town hotels and 
a rise in motor vehicle accidents, provincial governments in the newly 
independent country decided to promote village clubs as an experiment 
in managing alcohol consumption in rural areas. It was hoped traditional 
social controls would swing into action and community leaders would 
intervene if there was violence. The clubs were envisaged as places where 
people could learn to drink in an environment that was comfortable 
for family members of both sexes, and in a manner that was based on 
an idealised version of the drinking habits of expatriates (Sexton 1982: 
112). However, as was the case in Australian Indigenous communities in 
ensuing years, these hopes were found to be overly optimistic.
A sudden transition to drinking rights
Both Aboriginal people and white sympathisers campaigned for formal 
equal rights, including the right to drink liquor. In 1962, Joe McGinness, 
president of the Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement, argued 
that such rights were ‘important inasmuch as they at least recognise that 
Aborigines and Islanders are human beings’ (Chesterman 2005: 25). 
In New South Wales, the Aboriginal-Australian Fellowship lobbied hard 
for prohibition to be repealed, arguing that the section of the Aborigines 
Protection Act (NSW) that prohibited the sale and supply of alcohol 
subjected Aboriginal people to ‘unwarranted humiliation and segregation’. 
Research by prominent Melbourne barrister Elizabeth Eggleston (1976), 
exposed the inherently discriminatory nature of Australia’s liquor laws, 
the enthusiasm with which police used such laws as a means of harassing 
Aboriginal people, and the abject failure of restrictions to prevent 
Aboriginal people from getting hold of alcohol. Yet, for many white 
sympathisers, the repeal of restrictions on Aboriginal drinking presented 
an ethical and moral dilemma. The people for whom this was most 
difficult were progressively minded Christians and temperance advocates. 
Such advocates supported equal rights in all areas of life for Aboriginal 
citizens and, aware that these would inevitably include the right to drink, 
feared the consequences. Dr Charles Duguid, founder of Ernabella 
Presbyterian mission, and his wife Phyllis Duguid, a prominent member 
5  The Australian administration thus made the sale and consumption of alcohol legal in Papua 




of the WCTU, were conflicted about the right to drink for Aboriginal 
people. In 1960, Phyllis Duguid, who did not drink herself, reported to 
the WCTU National Convention:
The whole question of the Aborigine and his right to consume liquor is 
a difficult one. In our desire to protect these people against havoc caused 
by alcohol, we sometimes run the risk of making them regard alcohol 
as a special privilege to be attained. Unhappily many do think of the 
right to consume alcohol as an inseparable part of citizenship. Alcohol 
education would make an important contribution towards the solution 
of the problem.6 
Mrs Duguid’s wish for ‘alcohol education’ was echoed by others. In 1961, 
a Northern Territory Missions-Administration Conference agreed that 
before there were any changes to the law, a public education campaign 
should be conducted, disseminating information on the dangers of 
alcohol and the advantages of temperance. The conference thought that 
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) might be able to help in this endeavour 
(Symons et al. 1963). However, apart from sporadic efforts by charitable 
bodies such as the WCTU and other Christian organisations, it seems 
that no formal or official public education campaigns were mounted by 
government prior to the repeal of prohibition for Aboriginal people.7
When it eventually happened, state by state, the transition from prohibition 
to drinking rights occurred precipitously, taking many people by surprise. 
The repeal in South Australia in 1965, for example, was described as being 
total prohibition one day, complete freedom the next. The premier was 
accused of acting impetuously, having consulted with neither Aboriginal 
people nor the state Department of Aboriginal Affairs (Hansen 1972). 
The rapid liberalisation, it was stated, had had a ‘profoundly demoralising 
effect’ on Aboriginal people who, had they been asked, would have 
requested a gradual transition period ‘with the first step being the provision 
of drinking facilities on the various reserves’ (Hansen 1972: 6, emphasis 
added). On Queensland Aboriginal reserves, restrictions on supply and 
consumption continued until 1971 when, suddenly and disastrously, 
a government official was empowered to establish a beer canteen in each 
community (Fitzgerald 2001).
6  WCTU Minute Book SRG 186/1/8 1935–40, State Library of South Australia.
7  Gary Stoll (Finke River Mission, Hermannsburg) said, ‘nobody knew what was going to hit 
them, that it would be such a big problem and that the graves would open up’ (Finnane 1997: 5).
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Fig. 7 ‘What’s in a glass?’ WCTU pamphlet c. 1950
Source: Woman’s Christian Temperance Union
Promoting the idea of canteens and clubs
While rural and urban Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
could act on their newly acquired right to drink by going into hotels 
and drinking alongside whites, in more remote areas, access to legitimate 
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outlets was difficult. Aboriginal residents of bush communities did not 
commonly frequent public hotels, and they were less familiar with alcohol 
than their rural and urban counterparts. Beyond the discrete and relatively 
protected boundaries of missions and settlements, the availability of 
liquor had increased with the advent of off-licence and drive-in bottle 
shops. These made takeaway alcohol easier to access8 and posed a threat 
to inexperienced drinkers. In some regions, public opinion (in the form 
of non-Aboriginal townsfolk) had already broached the idea of Aboriginal 
people having their own beer canteens in their communities. These would 
not only keep Aboriginal people out of town, they would also allow for 
the development of ‘civilised’ drinking. This was suggested as early as 
1954 in the Northern Territory when the citizens of Alice Springs and 
readers of the local newspaper were asked, in an informal opinion poll, 
what could be done about drunken ‘natives’:
While on the one hand, we found a lot of people who believe ever increasing 
vigilance should be taken to see that natives do not get drink at all, we 
found others who favour the establishment of canteens at settlements so 
that aborigines can become used to civilised drinking. The exponents of 
the latter theory claim that a beer with a reduced alcoholic content could 
be sold to natives in these canteens and claim that the present troubles 
arise because men with no alcohol in their blood at all suddenly get hold 
of a bottle of wine.9 (Centralian Advocate 26 March 1954: 9)
Ted Evans, head of the Native Affairs Branch (later the Welfare Branch) in 
Alice Springs, believed that the best way to solve the ‘rotgut’ wine problem 
in the town, was to dispense low-alcohol beer from wet canteens on all 
settlements, and to teach Aboriginal people how to cope with alcohol 
correctly. Notwithstanding the outcome of the Centralian Advocate’s 
opinion poll, he was widely criticised for this suggestion.10 In 1961, 
the Missions-Administration Conference discussed the advantages and 
disadvantages of removing the restrictions on alcohol: with considerable 
foresight, a subcommittee proposed the introduction of a local option 
system for communities because ‘well-controlled wet canteens may be 
needed on certain settlements’ (Symons et al. 1963).11 
8  The first drive-in bottle shop in Australia opened at Largs Bay, Adelaide, in 1953. 
9  Twenty years later, in 1975, the anthropologist Jeff Collmann (1988: 50) reported that, following 
an alleged rape in Alice Springs, there had been renewed calls for wet canteens away from the town. 
10  As reported by Reg Harris in Alice Springs News 2 July 1997: 3.
11  GJ Symonds (Uniting Church), P Albrecht (Lutheran Church) and JPM Long (Welfare Branch) 
were members of the subcommittee. 
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There was soon support for the idea at higher levels of government. 
Following the 1967 Referendum, the Council for Aboriginal Affairs 
(CAA) was established as an advisory body operating out of the newly 
established Office of Aboriginal Affairs located within the Prime Minister’s 
Department. The three member body—Dr HC ‘Nugget’ Coombs, 
Professor WEH Stanner and Barrie Dexter—encouraged the government 
to abandon many of the programs and assumptions of assimilation and 
to emphasise the right of Aboriginal people to decide their own futures 
(Long 1992: 160). The Whitlam (1972–75) and Fraser (1975–83) 
governments introduced legislation that enabled Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islanders to make choices; thereafter, encouraging Indigenous 
Australians to take responsibility became the pre-eminent theme of 
government, non-government and mission authorities. The new emphasis 
on community decision-making extended to decisions about alcohol, and 
both governments and mission authorities believed that communities 
should discuss the ‘dry’ or ‘wet’ status of their settlements (DAA 1974, 
1976: 22, Fletcher 1992).
The CAA strongly supported the idea of local wet canteens. Indeed, 
according to Dexter, the very idea that communities might have alcohol 
supplied to them in moderation at local canteens originated from the 
CAA.12 The CAA was aware that bootleggers were grog running into some 
communities and that Aboriginal people were setting up vigilante groups 
to try to prevent this. It was of the view that, rather than protecting 
Aboriginal people, ‘they had to learn to handle alcohol themselves’.13 
Although its work was undervalued (and sometimes undermined) by John 
Gorton, the prime minister who succeeded Harold Holt, the CAA was 
highly influential in Aboriginal policy until it was disbanded in 1976.14
12  The CAA believed that liquor should be available under controlled conditions on reserves and 
Dexter advised the minister of this in 1970. This advice was in the context of failed Aboriginal 
objections to the licensing of the Walkabout Hotel, which was within the reserve at Nhulunbuy 
and only a short distance from Yirrkala mission (Dexter 2015: 150). However, as noted, the idea of 
canteens had already been floated informally in Alice Springs.
13  Dexter, pers comm, 25 November 2005.
14  Gorton supported entrepreneurship for Aboriginal people, but not special rights (Dexter, pers 
comm, 25 November 2005). 
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On the ground in the Northern Territory, where the federal government 
had particular influence, policy was mobilised by patrol officers and 
officers of the Welfare Branch.15 Many of these government representatives 
were critical of prohibition and supportive of the idea of wet canteens: 
some even ‘pushed’ the idea, according to church workers from several 
different regions.16 John Harris (1998: 294) of the Church Missionary 
Society (CMS) remarked that ‘under the Welfare Branch’ alcohol became 
freely available in some communities. Reverend Bill Edwards of Ernabella 
Mission reported that government officers who visited the community 
were ‘free drinkers’ themselves, implying that there was a degree of self-
interest in their support for wet canteens. The anticipated merits of wet 
canteens were certainly the subject of many discussions within government 
offices as settlement superintendents grappled with the problems posed 
by Aboriginal people from remote communities seeking opportunities 
to drink at rural hotels, and ending up having road accidents or facing 
criminal charges. 
In South Australia, there was strong pressure from the state office of the 
DAA for one or more wet canteens to be established on what was then the 
dry North West Reserve, now the Aṉangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara 
Lands. A departmental file note from 1969 explained the dilemma:
I am certain the time is rapidly approaching when the ‘liquor era’ will 
begin in the N.W.R. [North West Reserve] area. And also I am certain 
the majority of the people will drink liquor. The alternative before us is 
to act in time by providing at least some education or to try and shut the 
door after the horse has bolted. For example, the West Coast area17 … 
The provision of a wet canteen is not saying that the people shall drink. 
It is providing the means by which those who desire to drink or at least 
experiment, may do so under reasonable circumstances.18
15  The patrol officer service ended in 1974, and the Welfare Branch became the Welfare Division 
of the Northern Territory Administration. Later, many former patrol officers joined the federal DAA 
as public servants (Long 1992). 
16  Reverend Jim Downing of the Uniting Church asserted that patrol officers, members of the 
Welfare Branch and later DAA officers, and mission superintendents, all pushed for canteens. Father 
John Leary of the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart Mission (MSC) at Melville Island, Daly River 
Mission and Wadeye, identified specific government officers as having promoted alcohol availability in 
the communities (interviews with author). 
17  The author was referring to the recently licensed beer canteen at Yalata community on the far 
west coast of South Australia.
18  D Busbridge, Assistant Director DAA, 6/1/69. GRS 6624/1/P, DAA520/68. South Australian 
State Records (original emphasis).
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The superintendent of the North West Reserve was also in favour of 
the controlled availability of liquor there: he argued that a proposed 
recreational centre at Amata should include a bar where Aboriginal 
people, who he referred to, rather significantly, as évolués, might drink.19 
In the context of an increase in Aboriginal drunkenness in towns such 
as Alice Spring, formal government inquiries (rather than simply local 
field officers or departmental staffers) began to recommend that alcohol 
should be made available in Aboriginal settlements. The Northern 
Territory Legislative Council conducted a Board of Inquiry into the sale 
and consumption of liquor in 1973. This was prompted by the Territory’s 
weak liquor ordinance, which was allowing licensees to get away with poor-
serving practices, resulting in ‘scenes of drunkenness and degradation in 
and around the hotels, streets and creek beds … far worse than anything 
expected’ (Centralian Advocate 1973: 1).20 The inquiry, which declared 
that Territorians (in general) were Australia’s biggest drunks and roundly 
condemned poor drinking facilities and the irresponsible behaviour of 
licensees, primarily addressed Aboriginal drinking. It recommended the 
establishment of social clubs for Aboriginal people, and advised that these 
should not be confined to settlements or missions: ‘fringe dwellers’ around 
towns such as Darwin and Alice Springs needed to be assisted to establish 
clubs. Summing-up contemporary explanations, the inquiry identified 
four underlying causes of Aboriginal drinking problems: 
a. Their different stage of cultural development [and] influence of their 
traditional life in which alcohol played no part.
b. The lack in their culture of in-built sanctions for the control of 
alcohol usage [and] their being caught up in rapid social change and 
subsequent social disorganization.
c. Their lack of awareness of the harmful effects of drinking to excess 
[and] their lack of education in domestic budgeting and proper use 
of money.
d. Their excessive expenditure of [sic] intoxicating liquor and the poor 
conditions under which they consume intoxicating liquor. (Centralian 
Advocate 16 August 1973: 2)
19  The superintendent of the North West Reserve, David Hope, used the term évolué (Hope to 
director DAA 25/10/68. GRS 6624/1/P, DAA520/68. South Australian State Records). Jeremy 
Beckett (1958) used the same term when referring to mixed descent Aboriginal people in western 
New South Wales (234).
20  The inquiry was called for by Bernie Kilgariff, member for Alice Springs in the Northern 
Territory Legislative Council. It was chaired by PR Adams QC. 
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The idea of Aboriginal people’s choice over the liquor status of communities 
was coming into play. This was articulated by Eggleston (1976: 261) who 
argued that granting licences to Aboriginal missions or institutions on 
reserves:
Might be preferable to making liquor on reserves completely uncontrolled, 
particularly if it rests on a system of local option. A referendum should be 
held on each Aboriginal institution to see whether the resident Aborigines 
want the continuation of a ‘dry’ reserve, or the establishment of a ‘wet 
canteen’ or the abandonment of all controls on the entry of liquor. 
Aboriginal people’s choice on the issue of alcohol control was endorsed by 
the Commonwealth House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Aboriginal Affairs (HRSCAA) inquiry into alcohol problems in 1977.21 
Many, though not all submissions, took a laissez-faire and generally ‘wet’ 
perspective on access to alcohol: one Aboriginal man from One Arm 
Point in Western Australia argued that every Aboriginal settlement should 
have a licence (Brady 2004: 59, Commonwealth of Australia 1977). The 
HRSCAA reiterated the idea that clubs would facilitate ‘sensible’ drinking:
Should an Aboriginal community decide to allow alcohol to be brought 
into the community the Committee believes that a licensed club or beer 
canteen should hold the only liquor licence within that community … 
A properly established and supervised club or beer canteen complying with 
the law relating to drinking and drunkenness and concerned with the well-
being of its members presents the most practical method of encouraging 
sensible drinking patterns. (Commonwealth of Australia 1977: 48–9)
There would, of course, have to be guidelines, arrangements for legal 
responsibility and supervision, limited opening hours, rigid enforcement, 
the sale of nutritious food, sales of beer only and penalties for breaches. 
It was not clear who would ‘properly establish’ and supervise the clubs, 
what entity would hold the licence nor how best to ensure that the 
clubs would be ‘concerned’ about the wellbeing of members. While the 
HRSCAA believed that there was no reason why the clubs or beer canteens 
should not be run as commercial ventures, it had no advice about who 
should benefit from any profits so derived or who should decide on their 
distribution. It was assumed that if Aboriginal community organisations 
were allowed to control the outlets themselves, people would (somehow) 
come to terms with alcohol and moderate drinking would develop more 
or less automatically.
21  For more detail about this inquiry, see Brady (2004: 58–67).
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A few years after the HRSCAA reported on alcohol problems, the 
Northern Territory initiated a new Liquor Act 1981 that established 
a  Liquor Commission as a statutory body that had flexible powers to 
hear public objections to the granting of licences, and that could involve 
local governments, including Aboriginal community councils, in liquor 
decisions. Since their formation, Aboriginal reserves in the Northern 
Territory had all been ‘dry’, but the Liquor Act made dry areas an option 
for Aboriginal communities: they now had to make a deliberate choice in 
the matter. The Liquor Commission toured the communities to hear their 
views. Communities that so desired could legitimately open community-
controlled clubs with liquor served for consumption on the premises. 
The Northern Territory’s Drug and Alcohol Bureau noted that:
The Aboriginal councils concerned hope [in this way] to be able to avoid 
the potentially damaging effects of liquor in their areas while at the same 
time providing an opportunity for those people who wish to drink to do 
so in more-or-less convivial, well controlled circumstances. (Larkins & 
McDonald 1984: 61)
The influence of the missions
Across the world, Protestant and Catholic churches have long taken 
different approaches to alcohol consumption; these different approaches 
were reflected in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities 
that began as missions. The temperance movement developed from 
Protestantism, but there were wide variations in thinking between 
denominations. English Protestants were initially not as strict as Dutch 
ones, and Anglican ecclesiastical vineyards were once widespread. 
In America, it was Methodists and Quakers who spearheaded the Anti-
Saloon Leagues, while in Sweden, Magnus Huss, the son of a Lutheran 
pastor, coined the expression alcoholism (Sournia 1990). By contrast, the 
Catholic Church tended to be more tolerant about alcohol. At the end 
of the nineteenth century, for example, Catholics believed drunkenness 
merely ‘offended’ the Creator, while priests celebrated communion by 
drinking wine. Indeed, Rome’s insistence on the use of wine explains 
one of the major differences between Protestant and Catholic approaches 
to alcohol (Sournia 1990: 136, cf. Raftery 1987). These differing 
historical and doctrinal positions undoubtedly influenced how mission 
organisations operating in Aboriginal reserves reacted to the dilemma of 
alcohol availability in the self-determination period. The introduction 
of self-determination policies from 1973 onwards marked the beginning 
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of the end of the era of Christian missions in Australia; however, missions 
were still influential contributors to the debate over wet canteens. Their 
guiding doctrinal principles and underlying philosophies were important 
in determining whether a community resisted or acceded to the pressure 
to instigate clubs. Pressure was exerted, both overtly and covertly, by 
members of the Welfare Branch and other government staff; the number 
of official inquiries, consultations and questioning of communities also 
served to exert pressure by drawing attention to the issue. 
In the Northern Territory, the Aboriginal population had, in effect, been 
portioned out between the Catholic, Methodist (Methodist Overseas 
Mission), Congregational, Anglican, CMS and Lutheran mission 
societies. There were also Presbyterians, Baptists and non-denominational 
missionary societies, such as the United Aborigines Mission (UAM) 
and the Australian Inland Mission, which were strongly influenced by 
nineteenth-century American revivalism. As their respective missions 
developed, they each took different approaches to alcohol (see Table 1). 
Most mission organisations began to question and debate their protective 
role in the Indigenous arena during the 1960s, in the process, re-
positioning themselves on matters of Aboriginal self-determination, land 
rights and the liquor question (Downing 1988, Harris 1998, Albrecht 
2002). The CMS had been discussing a phased withdrawal from the 
training and social welfare aspects of its role in the Northern Territory 
since 1964. When the federal government’s policy of self-determination 
was announced in 1973, the CMS was ‘well on the way to divesting itself 
from positions of authority and control’ (Harris 1998: 94). In 1974, the 
United Church in North Australia (UCNA)22 held an inquiry into its own 
operations and future entitled Free to Decide, by which the UCNA meant 
that Aboriginal people were ‘free to decide’ their own futures. It saw 
itself as a ‘liberating mission’ facilitating the Aboriginal decision-making 
process (UCNA 1974). Consequently, the UCNA took an equivocal and 
non-aligned position on alcohol availability, believing that it had the right 
to oppose alcohol consumption only among its own church members.23 
In a submission to the Northern Territory Board of Inquiry into liquor 
laws, Reverend Jim Downing24 wrote: 
22  The UCNA was a cooperative venture between the Presbyterian, Methodist and Congregational 
churches. The Methodist Overseas Mission joined the UCNA in 1972. The Uniting Church in 
Australia was formed in 1977. 
23  See the UCNA’s submission to the House of Representatives inquiry into the present conditions 
of the Yirrkala People (1974).
24  Downing (1926–2009) was a Uniting Church minister, social worker and moderator of the 
Northern Synod of the Uniting Church.
79
3. THE ROLE Of BEER CANTEENS AND LICENSED CLUBS
Several statements have been made to the effect that wet canteens are 
a good thing and should be provided for all settlements. In some 
situations and under some circumstances they may be a good thing, but 
the statements still indicate that we Europeans know what is best for all 
Aboriginal communities. We continue to ignore the people’s plea for help 
to control the effects of alcohol on their communities.25 
In fact, the UCNA was opposed to the introduction of intoxicating 
liquors to Aboriginal communities unless the communities themselves 
desired a canteen or beer ration (Symons 1974).26 It allowed the principle 
of supporting community decision-making to override its deeply held 
fears about proposals to make alcohol available in communities. 
Fig. 8 Lutheran Church of the Good Shepherd, Yalata, 2015
Source: M Brady
25  Submission to the Northern Territory Committee of Inquiry on the Sale and Consumption 
of Intoxicating Liquor March 1973.
26  Jim Downing, interview, 16 August 2004. 
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The Lutherans generally took a tolerant approach towards alcohol and 
rejected prohibition (as had the Anglican synod in the 1920s). The 
Lutheran doctrine of the ‘two kingdoms’ distinguished between religious 
and political questions and, although they recognised the gravity of 
alcohol abuse, Lutherans declined to take a religious stance on it (Raftery 
1987). The first mission organisation to obtain a licence to sell alcohol 
on an Aboriginal reserve was a Lutheran one—at Yalata, South Australia, 
in 1968.27 Subsequently, a church member explained that the Lutheran 
Church was:
Not against drinking rights for Aborigines … the sensible and correct 
approach ought to have been provision of drinking facilities on the reserves 
and missions so that Aborigines could enjoy the same conveniences as 
those enjoyed by citizens in our cities and country towns—drinking 
facilities right in their own communities. (Hansen 1969: 52)
The church should provide such facilities, ‘and through precept and 
example demonstrate that rational drinking is compatible with responsible 
living, and within the demands of God and State’ (Hansen 1972: 7). 
Concerned about models of deviant behaviour, Hansen warned that 
mission staff with drinking problems would not be tolerated. At the Finke 
River Mission, also known as Hermannsburg, the Lutheran Reverend 
Paul Albrecht used wine in communion because grape juice did not fit 
with the church’s understanding of the practice of communion.28 The 
mission, which took a positive approach to alcohol, instigated a short-
lived experimental wet canteen for Aboriginal residents in 1972: it was 
not successful and was later regretted (Albrecht 2002: 45).29 
By contrast, the Methodist and Presbyterian missions were opposed to 
the idea of providing even rationed amounts of alcohol and most of 
these communities have remained officially dry to this day.30 At Oenpelli 
Mission, now Gunbalanya, the Anglican CMS was opposed to alcohol 
(it had also been opposed to the distribution of tobacco rations in 
the  1940s) (Harris 1998: 272–83). Alcohol was not ever permitted at 
27  This was possible once a section of the Licensing Act 1967–73 (SA) authorised ‘wet canteens’ on 
Reserves (Eggleston 1976: 219). 
28  Paul Albrecht, interview, 20 April 2005. 
29  This was noted in correspondence to me from Bill Edwards (10 August 2004). 
30  There were exceptions to this overall tendency, such as at Mornington Island, where the 
Presbyterian mission instigated a beer ration in 1973 and opened a canteen in 1976. The community 
had a growing problem with alcohol and the minister, Reverend Doug Belcher, personally favoured 
the idea of a canteen (Bill Edwards, pers comm, 10 August 2004, McKnight 2002).
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the Presbyterian mission at Ernabella, now Pukatja, and mission staff and 
Aboriginal residents all took the position that the mission should remain 
dry. Mission superintendent, Reverend Bill Edwards, thought that most of 
the staff at Ernabella came from abstinence or temperance backgrounds, 
which probably influenced this policy. He recalled that, in 1971–72, the 
idea of wet canteens was floated by government departments as a way 
of teaching Aboriginal people ‘to drink socially’. 
The debate over licensed clubs took a decisive turn in 1975 when a fact-
finding committee was commissioned by the Australian Government to 
examine the causes and effects of alcoholism among Aboriginal people. 
As it happened, the team members were all associated with the Catholic 
Church through the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart Mission (MSC) 
at Port Keats, now Wadeye (Leary et al. 1975). The Leary report, which 
strongly endorsed the idea that providing beer to Aboriginal people in 
community-based clubs would encourage both good behaviour and 
moderation in consumption, led to the establishment of the Murrinh Patha 
Social Club.31 The club’s rise and demise is described in Chapter 4. Two 
more clubs associated with the MSC opened in Tiwi Island communities. 
Clubs were also established at the Catholic communities of Daly River 
(Nauiyu), Pirlingimpi (Melville Island), Wurakuwu (Bathurst Island) and 
Santa Teresa in central Australia. It is notable that five of the eight licensed 
clubs that still exist today in Northern Territory Aboriginal communities 
were previously Catholic missions. In two of these, the same Catholic 
brother was responsible for obtaining their liquor licences; somewhat 
ironically, he also set up the local AA groups.32 Father John Leary, who 
ministered at several of these missions, later recalled: ‘In the beginning 
I had the idea you could teach … civilised drinking, two or three cans, 
enough … My bishop thought assimilation was the way that people had to 
learn’.33
31  There were many other recommendations in the Leary report, and much of it was progressive. 
For example, the authors demonstrated an awareness of the influence of the contextual and contingent 
nature of much Aboriginal drinking, and the social and economic ‘setting’ within which Aboriginal 
people drank. They proposed that Aboriginal people suffered from a kind of ‘environmental 
alcoholism’. 
32  Brother Andy Howley instigated beer rations at Nguiu on Bathurst Island as well as at the Sacred 
Heart mission at Port Keats (Walsh 2005, Brady fieldnotes). He also travelled to the United States 
to investigate culturally relevant alcohol treatment approaches and instigated dry-out programs and 
AA-style support groups in some communities.
33  Father John Leary, interview, 16 August 2004 (emphasis added). 
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Angurugu X Anglican CMS
Bamyili (Barunga) X Club –
Beswick X Club –
Daguragu/kalkarinji X Baptist
Daly River X Club Catholic
Gapuwiyak X UCNA
Galiwin’ku X Methodist 
UCNA





Maningrida X Methodist 
UCNA
Milingimbi X Methodist 
UCNA
Minjilang X Methodist 
UCNA
Ngukurr X Anglican CMS
Nguiu (Tiwi) X Club Catholic
Numbulwar X Anglican CMS
Oenpelli 
Gunbalanya
X Club Anglican CMS
Peppimenarti X Catholic
Port keats X Club Catholic









Docker River X Lutheran
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Haasts Bluff X Lutheran
Hermannsburg X Lutheran
kintore X Lutheran
Lake Nash X –
Lajamanu X Baptist
Papunya X Lutheran







*Not necessarily an actual mission establishment
Source: Author’s data
Over the years, there were further experiments with beer rations and 
rudimentary canteens in many communities in the Northern Territory. 
By 1988, there were six on-premises licensed clubs in Aboriginal 
communities.34 In mid-2007, there were eight clubs licensed for on-
premises consumption and two licensed for off-premises sales only.35 
By 2013, there were still eight on-premises licensed facilities in discrete 
Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory.36 In South Australia, 
the only licensed canteen in an Aboriginal community was at Yalata 
Lutheran Mission; it opened in 1969 and closed in 1981. Significantly, 
the closure of disastrous clubs, such as those at Santa Teresa and Yalata, 
did not prevent people, usually outsiders, from suggesting that they be 
reinstated.
In Queensland, it was government rather than mission action that 
prompted the establishment of ‘canteens’, as they were referred to in that 
state. Following the establishment of Aboriginal councils on settlements 
34  These were at Daly River, Port Keats, Pularumpi, Bathurst Island, Milikapiti (Melville Island) 
and Gunbalanya (Oenpelli).
35  These were at Daly River, Nguiu and Wurankuwu (Bathurst Island), Milikapiti, Pirlangimpi 
(Melville Island), Gunbalanya, Kalkaringi and Peppimenarti. Beswick and Barunga had off-licences.




and missions in 1971, beer could be sold in communities under restrictive 
licensing conditions. Subsequently, canteens were opened at Aurukun, 
Bamaga, Injinoo, Kowanyama, Lockhart River, Napranum, Pormpuraaw, 
Mornington Island, Palm Island, Woorabinda, Cherbourg and Yarrabah. 
Most of the mainland canteens and taverns were closed down as a result 
of Justice Tony Fitzgerald’s report in 2001 and later decisions made by 
the Queensland Government aimed at reducing extraordinary levels of 
alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harm.37 Only three canteens still 
exist (Koori Mail 2013: 12). In the Torres Strait, Saibai, Erub and Mer 
have licensed community clubs.38
Mixed motivations for clubs
Public opinion and official statements reveal an uneasy and contradictory 
mix of underlying motivations for these licensed facilities, especially in 
the early years of their development. In some cases, whether a community 
applied for a liquor licence depended on the religious denomination of 
the relevant mission settlement, or the attitude of a particularly influential 
missionary or superintendent. In other cases, there were contributing local 
circumstances prompting the decision, such as the desire to circumvent 
a worrisome takeaway liquor outlet nearby. Rudimentary voting occurred 
in some instances; community meetings were held that often resulted in 
sizeable pockets of disgruntled residents, usually women, feeling that their 
views had not been heard. While there were always residents, sometimes 
even a majority, in favour of having a club, substantial numbers were also 
always opposed—and women made up the bulk of non-drinkers. However, 
until the mid-1980s, Aboriginal women were not represented on councils 
and were usually left out of discussions about alcohol availability, both 
in the communities and in consultations with the Liquor Commission 
(East Arnhem Health Workers 1978).
37  See volume 2 of the Cape York Justice Study (Fitzgerald 2001: 50–1) where Fitzgerald notes the 
conflict of interest borne by community councils’ profiteering from sales of alcohol at canteens for 
which the council is the licensee. Legislation passed by the Queensland Labor Government in 2008 
prohibited any local community council from operating and profiting from canteens; this resulted 
in the closure of most canteens, as they were unable to find alternative suitable private licensees. 
The legislation banned all councils from owning a licence, not just those in Indigenous communities.
38  As at October 2017.
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Stimulating sociable drinking
Fig. 9 Membership signs at Gunbalanya Club, 2013
Source: M Brady
The 1975 Leary report encapsulated the aspiration—the hope—for 
the adoption of more moderate, sociable drinking styles in Aboriginal 
communities. In some quarters, there were hopes that the clubs might form 
part of larger community centres that would counsel problem drinkers; 
in this way, ‘the Aborigines themselves [would] have a responsibility as 
regards the education and rehabilitation of the problem members of 
their community’.39 Clubs were espoused as the antidote to a variety of 
evils—uncontrolled access to takeaway liquor, drink driving and drunken 
misbehaviour on the streets of rural towns—and as agents in the process 
of learning better drinking habits. It was not only Aboriginal people 
who were thought to benefit from the controlled drinking environment 
provided by clubs: investigating the effect of increased mining activity 




and influx of European mineworkers in Arnhem Land, the Fox Report40 
recommended that clubs rather than hotels be established.41 As recently as 
2008, prominent Territorian Ted Egan, previously of the Welfare Branch 
and later the Administrator of the Northern Territory, proposed that off-
premises drinking should be banned throughout the Northern Territory, 
and that licensed premises such as bars and hotels should all be (re)licensed 
as clubs, where people signed in as members—‘punched the bundy’—and 
were subject to the clubs’ rules, regulations and conventions. 
Control over Aboriginal movement
Early arguments put forward by outsiders in favour of clubs reveal an 
underlying desire to control Aboriginal people, not just their alcohol 
consumption. In colonial times, the practice of rationing food and tobacco 
replaced violence as a mode of government, largely because it was found 
to be more successful at rendering intercultural relationships peaceful and 
predictable. As a result, rationing carries with it a history of control over 
Aboriginal lives, as Tim Rowse documented in White Flour, White Power 
(1998). During the assimilation era, Aboriginal people began to orient 
their lives, at least in part, around the receipt of European goods such 
as flour, tea, sugar and tobacco; beer rations in missions and settlements 
functioned in much the same way, encouraging people to remain ‘tethered’ 
to the mission and dissuading them from ranging further afield. 
Older Aboriginal people, particularly women, were positive about the fact 
that clubs would control the mobility of their husbands and sons: they 
often supported proposals for clubs in the hope that they would keep the 
men and boys at home, divert drinkers from nearby or distant outlets and 
lessen the risk of car accidents. It was also hoped that clubs would put an 
end to dangerous drinking camps and groups of people drinking in the 
scrub or the ‘long grass’ in towns. 
40  Also known as the Ranger Inquiry, the Fox Report (1977) led by Justice Fox, influenced the 
subsequent development of uranium mining at Nabarlek and Ranger in the Northern Territory and 
Olympic Dam in South Australia. 
41  This was a plan for the regional population as a whole, not just the Indigenous population. 
A licensed club was established in the mining town of Jabiru as a result of these recommendations; 
however, its history has been marked by repeated attempts to sell takeaway liquor and become, in 
effect, a hotel (d’Abbs & Jones 1996).
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However, it is noteworthy that the most vociferous supporters of licensed 
clubs in bush communities were often the white citizens and mayors 
of towns such as Ceduna, Alice Springs and Katherine that have large 
Aboriginal populations in their hinterland. Non-Aboriginal town-based 
residents and politicians have been keen to dissuade Aboriginal people 
from visiting towns (because of their capacity to drink and make trouble), 
preferring instead that they be ‘out of sight, out of mind’ (d’Abbs 1998). 
In 1997, there were a rash of calls for wet canteens covering a  wide 
geographical area. In April that year, the Northern Territory Liquor 
Commissioner, Peter Allen, announced that ‘drunks wandering the 
streets with takeaway liquor could no longer be tolerated’. Wet canteens 
and clubs, he claimed, were an ‘option that cannot be ignored’.42 The 
Territory’s Chief Minister stated publicly that he wanted an end to 
‘dry’ communities. The pressure for clubs spread across the region, with 
communities pointedly being asked, yet again, to vote on whether they 
wanted to have licensed outlets. Two Territorians with long-term mission 
and community experience, were outraged. They argued that, by failing to 
appreciate and understand past failures, those who were pushing for wet 
canteens, including the politicians, were ‘not doing their homework’.43 
Nevertheless, in 2011, the Alice Springs deputy mayor again called 
for wet canteens in bush communities, places where ‘the family can sit 
down and have a meal together, and have a beer together’.44 In May that 
year, numerous Territory politicians called on the federal minister for 
Indigenous Affairs to allow for wet canteens to be established, specifically 
to stop problem drinkers from ‘drifting’ into Alice Springs (Murdoch 
& Skelton 2011). 
Over the years, town-based Aboriginal organisations have also joined the 
debate over clubs. In the early 1980s, the Central Australian Aboriginal 
Legal Aid Service, based at Alice Springs, called for wet canteens to be 
established out bush (Collmann 1988: 50). In 1982, the Alice Springs 
town camper’s representative body, known as Tangentyere Council, 
wrote to communities in the catchment area asking them to consider 
having canteens to reduce the drinking problem in town (O’Connor 
1983). In doing so, Tangentyere was trying to protect the interests of its 
constituents in town camps who were dealing with drunken visitors from 
the bush. 
42  Centralian Advocate 18 April 1997: 1.
43  These were Pastor Paul Albrecht and Gary Stoll. Alice Springs News 4(42) 1997: 3.
44  ABC News 14 January 2011. 
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In South Australia, one Lutheran commentator took the control idea even 
further, advocating drinking facilities in Aboriginal settlements as the 
means by which church authorities could retain ‘absolute control’ (Hansen 
1972: 7, cf. Brady & Palmer 1984).45 In the context of statements such as 
these, it is salutary, and not entirely irrelevant, to remember that during 
the apartheid era in South Africa, the native affairs bureaucracy provided 
segregated beer halls for black mine labourers. The authorities saw beer 
halls as a means of bringing the leisure activities of the black population 
under state scrutiny and control. By providing beer-halls, South African 
authorities hoped ‘to remove African alcohol consumption from white 
view, and thus create at least the illusion of order’ (Ambler & Crush 1992: 
19, La Housse 1992).
To raise revenue
One widespread motivation for the establishment of clubs in Aboriginal 
communities in the Northern Territory was to keep cash circulating in the 
communities, rather than losing it to publicans in town; the linked option 
of devoting profits to local causes was also attractive. This reasoning 
continues to be heard in arguments in favour of establishing clubs, and 
retaining them once established, today.
In Queensland, in the 1970s, the rationale for clubs was clear. There 
were no aspirations for the clubs to teach civilised drinking; instead, the 
clubs—appropriately referred to as ‘canteens’—were instigated as a means 
of raising revenue. The Bjelke-Petersen Government actively and overtly 
promoted beer canteens as a way of generating revenue for community 
councils and shires to pay for local services (Martin 1993, McKnight 
2002, Moran 2013). The sudden availability of alcohol in previously 
dry communities caused turmoil. In the beginning, the income spent on 
alcohol consumption was lost to communities because the profits from 
liquor sales ‘streamed into departmental coffers through the Welfare Fund’ 
(Kidd 1997: 302). Later, club takings became a source of substantial 
and highly valued ‘untied’ monies that local community–government 
councils could use at their discretion. The desire for profitability acted as 
a natural brake on any moves to curb sales as a harm-reduction measure. 
The commercial imperative for local (Aboriginal) government councils 
45  This thinking was revisited in 2008 in light of government plans for large Aboriginal 
communities to become ‘growth towns’ with provision for ‘normal’ commercial enterprises such as 
licensed restaurants and clubs (Northern Territory Licensing Commission 2009: 8).
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to maximise sales was so strong in Queensland, and the conflict of 
interest so great, that the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommended—and the state 
government agreed—that their right to sell alcohol and profit from the 
sales should be removed. Fitzgerald (2001) recommended that clubs be 
run by completely separate, private interests46 and that local government 
councils be provided with compensation (cf. Martin 1998).47
Enacting rights to drink
While there were some less benevolent motivations on the part of interest 
groups, there were also mixed motivations for the establishment of clubs 
within Aboriginal communities themselves. Some Northern Territory 
communities with existing clubs demonstrated complex reasons for 
wanting not only to maintain their clubs, but to make them more appealing. 
Clubs were seen as recognising the ‘rights’ of drinkers; conversely, they 
were viewed as bargaining tools that placated the drinking members of 
a community by ‘giving them something’. For example, in a discussion in 
2005 over the potential loosening of conditions of an existing community 
licence, one community member stated: 
Grog is a big problem here. We are slaves to all you drunken mob … There’s 
a lot of domestic violence and underage drinking. But we can’t deny the 
drinkers’ rights too. We gotta give them something too. Otherwise we 
should tell them to go to [nearest town]. We gotta balance their rights. 
Give them their rights too, all you sober people. So the community’s 
got to support the drinking men … I’m starting to live with this grog 
problem. Balance it out, sober and drunken man. All these grog men say 
they agree as long as we give them something here so they stay and work. 
We can’t frighten them by making them go to [the nearest town].48
46  Naturally enough, Fitzgerald’s recommendations were immediately disputed by local councils. 
For example, at Bamaga, the council said that their community should not be included in the plans 
as ‘it is a peaceful community with a well controlled canteen’ (Torres News 3–9 May 2002: 1). 
47  Following Fitzgerald, the Queensland Government insisted on transferring liquor licences away 
from community councils and shires to community-based boards, with canteen profits to be audited 
separately under strict new licensing conditions (Queensland Government 2002, Dalley 2012, 
Moran 2013). In 2008, the government went further, in effect closing down most canteens and clubs 
in Aboriginal communities. McKnight (2002: 211) pointed out that regional bodies or local boards 
would still see people struggling for political clout and the accoutrements of political power. 
48  Excerpt from a Northern Territory Licensing Commission hearing regarding an application for 
a restricted area in the Maranboy district (5 May 2005: 17).
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Similar comments were made elsewhere:
We have this problem. How can we manage it in some way? Got to be 
realistic. They love their alcohol. If you cut off their alcohol it will drive it 
underground. They’re not going to say ‘oh, I’ll just stop drinking’, they’ll 
just live like a homeless person to get a charge. I never drank. I see the 
impact it has.49
The social, cultural and political outcomes
Despite aspirational rhetoric about the ability of clubs to teach ‘civilised’ 
drinking, no one had any idea how to put this into practice. There was 
no systematic policy process guiding the rollout or management of 
clubs in Aboriginal communities; no in-house policy advice or training. 
Nor were there networks to link club managers, licensing agencies and 
health departments with health professionals and clinical psychologists. 
In Chapter 1, I mentioned that, during the 1960s and 1970s, researchers 
in Australia and overseas were examining behavioural psychology and 
social-learning models of drinking, training alcoholics to sip slowly 
and self-monitor, helping drinkers to monitor their levels of intoxication 
and providing lessons in alcohol and its effects. However, there is no 
evidence that any targeted program such as this found its way to the 
clubs in Aboriginal communities. The most that was offered was general 
information about alcohol and its effects.50 
Misconstruing the learning model
When the clubs were first established, and for most of the years to follow, 
Aboriginal people were (somehow) expected to adopt moderate drinking 
habits simply by being provided with a limited number of cans of beer. 
This narrow interpretation of the proper ‘setting’ for alcohol consumption 
was not enough to inculcate a habitually moderated intake. In the ‘drug, 
set and setting’ formula designed by Norman Zinberg (1984) as a way 
of understanding drug-related behaviours, setting refers to more than 
49  Brady fieldnotes, March 2013. 
50  In the 1990s, the Northern Territory Living with Alcohol (LWA) program staff who visited 
communities to discuss safer drinking options would visit the community club if there was one, but 
there were no structured educational interventions in the clubs. Twenty years after the first clubs were 
opened, LWA published a useful guide to ‘creating safer drinking environments’ (Hunter & Clarence 
1996).
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environmental or physical settings. It also refers to the social context, or 
social setting, in which information is transmitted in numerous formal and 
informal ways. Setting is not static. Crucially, Zinberg’s notion of setting 
interacts with the nature of the drug and the ‘set’ of the individual—their 
socialisation, personality and attitudes. In the case of Aboriginal drinkers, 
these elements often combined to value inebriation over moderation. 
The clubs provided a physical setting within which regulated sales would 
naturally limit the amount people could drink. However, they could 
not (at least in their early versions) influence an individual’s ‘set’—their 
pre-existing positive values associated with drinking to excess. There 
is no evidence that Aboriginal people who drank in clubs learned and 
internalised a restrained pattern of consumption that they practised when 
drinking elsewhere. Indeed, the evidence is quite to the contrary (Brady & 
Palmer 1984, d’Abbs 1987).
In a sense, the level of naivety on the part of mission and government 
authorities is surprising. By the time of the first clubs, anthropologists 
in Australia were publishing detailed ethnographies that described how, 
for many Aboriginal people, the goal of drinking was about achieving 
a particular kind of sociality around inebriation, rather than moderation. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Jeremy Beckett (1965) demonstrated that 
vigorous drinking was highly valued among Aboriginal men in outback 
New South Wales towns. He observed that there were numerous social 
disadvantages in not drinking heavily, as men who failed to drink in 
the expected manner led ‘a more restricted social life’ (43). Later, Basil 
Sansom (1977, 1980) characterised the Darwin fringe camps as ‘free 
grogging communities’ (51) in which people unapologetically lived ‘longa 
grog’ (44) and aimed to become roaringly and helplessly drunk. Rory 
O’Connor (1984: 175) observed in the early 1980s that people in Alice 
Springs were ‘clinging tenaciously’ to heavy-drinking patterns that led to 
disease, injury, loss and family breakdown. 
The notion that providing rations of alcohol alone would ‘teach’ moderate 
drinking also failed to take account of the interpersonal social setting—
that is, the powerful influence of social modelling and the associated 
idea that people conform generally to what their fellows are doing. 
O’Connor (1984) referred to the ‘contingent’ drunkenness of Aboriginal 
people living in Alice Springs town camps; he argued that any loss of 
control over the amount of alcohol consumed resided in the group, not 
the individual. Dismissing accepted individualised notions of alcoholism, 
O’Connor (1984) represented problem drinking as group dependence 
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or contingent drunkenness—a style of drinking that depended for its 
existence upon the correct physical and social environment. The Alice 
Springs town camps provided the ideal physical and social environment 
for heavy drinking. O’Connor argued that even if problem drinkers 
attended treatment programs or group therapy, they would inevitably 
conform to the influence of the group and re-adopt its behaviour on their 
return. His position was borne out by d’Abbs (1987), who found that the 
communities whose residents had the highest rate of protective custodies 
for intoxication in Darwin were the communities with licensed clubs at 
home. In other words, people who may have drunk moderately at clubs 
in their own communities were not doing so in Darwin: whatever they may 
have ‘learned’ was not being carried forward into another environment.
The clubs were trying to mould socially embedded behaviours, values 
and relationships into something else; instead, they created a self-selected 
group of consociates and peers who shared largely similar desires for the 
drinking experience and who were now consuming alcohol together, 
within settings that were atypical and, in effect, racially segregated. Rather 
than clubs moulding drinkers, drinkers were moulding the clubs to suit 
their own purposes. In a club environment, most drinkers share the same 
goal: namely, how to accomplish the desired heightened mood with 
a limited amount of alcohol and within a limited time frame. This has, in 
effect, created a remote Aboriginal community version of the Australian 
six o’clock swill. As one club manager put it, they are ‘on a mission’ to 
get drunk. Everyone knows when closing time is (in some clubs it is 
announced by an industrial-style siren). Achieving the desired heightened 
mood is managed in several ways: by drinking ‘quick way’—that is, 
drinking the last beer really quickly to get a charge before leaving; saving 
up drinks until just before closing time; or waiting until the last minute to 
buy drinks (Dalley 2012). In some locations, drinkers invent subterfuges 
or gamble with drinks or drink tokens to accumulate more than their 
allowance of beer cans. 
For around two decades or more, most of the clubs bore no resemblance 
to the places imagined by Leary and many government officials: they 
had no ‘proper facilities for drinking’ or ‘family atmosphere’. At Yalata, 
for example, although the canteen had been intended to interrupt grog 
running from the nearest town and to ‘help people to drink beer in 
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a controlled and sensible way’,51 the facility comprised a large hall with 
a concrete floor and iron roof, a counter across one end, a concrete apron 
at the front and outside toilets. A team of psychologists from Adelaide 
University who studied the canteen observed, drily, that it could in no 
way be considered ‘comparable to the pub on the corner’ (Penny 1979: 4, 
original emphasis). Ten years after the canteen was licensed, a DAA report 
stated categorically: 
There is no evidence of developing ‘civilised’ drinking habits. 
The customers drain their cans rapidly and then give the appearance of 
being left lost and wondering about what to do next … A shallow survey 
of the scene would indicate that the beer rationing scheme has little to 
commend it and in fact could be harmful. (Cooke 1978: 12)
There was no evidence that providing beer at the Yalata canteen had 
decreased the consumption of port, which was purchased from a roadhouse 
60 km away, and the DAA noted that non-drinkers had no difficulty in 
obtaining a ration of beer, which they promptly gave to others. The beer 
ration was further sabotaged by drinking men who convened games of 
two-up outside the canteen using their beer cans as betting chips, a regular 
event witnessed by myself and a colleague in 1981 (Brady & Palmer 1984). 
As we wrote then, the beer ration merely whetted the appetites of those 
who wanted stronger drinks. Yalata canteen drinkers then proceeded to 
commission local drivers of private cars (known colloquially as ‘taxis’) 
to make trips to other sources of alcohol in town.
Learning ‘civilised’ drinking was not possible in Queensland either, 
because, like Yalata, for many years, the canteens in Aboriginal 
communities simply sold open cans of beer in sheds without seats, food 
or social amenities. At Kowanyama, in 1973, the canteen was a window 
through which DAA officers handed out the daily ration of cans: two, 
then four and later six (Moran 2013). 
There are many examples of the abject failure of clubs in Aboriginal 
communities to inculcate moderation, especially in their early years. 
At Aurukun, in far north Queensland, the ration at the club in the 1980s 
was two jugs of beer per drinker, three nights a week. Since each jug 
contained 1.14 L of beer, this rationing practice effectively normalised 
and institutionalised the consumption of large amounts of alcohol. Under 
51  This was stated by Don Dunstan, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs in South Australia (SRG 186, 
Series 174–82, SLSA). 
TEACHING 'PROPER' DRINkING?
94
pressure from their male kin, members of the community council were 
persuaded to increase these amounts (Martin 1993). Some Queensland 
clubs had no limits at all, and figures from one community collected 
in 1982 showed that each drinker consumed an average of seven jugs 
per night (Commonwealth of Australia 1977, Fua & Lumsden 1984). 
At  Oenpelli, now Gunbalanya, the council objected to uncontrolled 
alcohol sales from a nearby store and successfully took over the licence, 
opening its own Sports and Social Club.52 In 1984, Sue Kesteven, one of 
a team of researchers engaged in a study of the impact of uranium mining 
in the region, reported that sales of beer were not being rationed at the 
Gunbalanya Sports and Social Club, and that there was open flouting 
of the dry area legislation. By 1996, the club was reported to be well 
managed, with better security, a pleasant beer garden, entertainment and 
a system of banning those who misbehaved. However, alcohol-related 
violence was not uncommon (d’Abbs & Jones 1996: 46).
Fig. 10 Beer garden at Gunbalanya Club, 2013
Source: M Brady
52  After failing to have the Border Store’s licence cancelled, the Gunbalanya Council bought the 
lease and allowed the store’s licence to lapse (Kesteven 1984: 193).
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In recent years, the rules have been tightened at all community-based 
clubs in the Northern Territory, primarily as a result of the intervention 
undertaken by the Australian Government in 2007 (Shaw et al. 2015).53 
Under new regulations, community clubs can only sell mid-strength or 
low-alcohol beer (3 per cent or less) in cans (not kegs); they can only open 
for four days a week and cannot make takeaway sales; and they must make 
hot food available. These regulations were targeted at curbing what had 
been, in some instances, lax serving practices and increasingly laissez-faire 
attitudes. For the most part, the eight existing Northern Territory clubs 
have made genuine efforts (often under duress) to implement safer service 
and to try to inculcate moderation and sociable drinking practices. 
For a particular type of drinker in remote communities, twenty-first-
century clubs provide a sociable venue where Aboriginal men and women, 
as well as non-Aboriginal staff and visitors, can relax with a few mid-
strength beers and have something to eat before going home at around 
7  or 8  pm. Troublemakers are banned for varying periods of time, 
plentiful signage lists the rules of behaviour, food (of varying quality) 
is available, there is music, television and pool tables, and some clubs 
provide free bottled water as people leave. Children are not allowed to 
enter; instead, they peer through the wire netting surrounding open-
air beer gardens, observing everything and waiting for their parents 
to emerge. For determined drinkers, the club is never enough. Recent 
regulatory changes away from ‘heavy’ drinks (i.e. those with high alcohol 
content) to lower alcohol content beers, have inevitably prompted these 
drinkers to go elsewhere. This is the price of implementing strict limits 
on sales and trying to provide a moderation-inducing environment; all 
clubs have lost some customers and income from sales since the 2007 
restrictions were imposed.
The vulnerable nature of Aboriginal authority
It is not difficult to suggest reasons why clubs in Aboriginal communities 
largely failed to achieve ascribed goals. One reason was an overly 
optimistic expectation that local people would be able to manage the 
53  In October 2007, as part of the NTER, the Australian Government implemented restrictions 
that applied to all social clubs in remote Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory. 
In Queensland, governance arrangements for the clubs and ‘taverns’ of Cape York were dramatically 
altered following the Cape York Justice Study that documented widespread binge drinking, poor 
management of community licences and rampant alcohol-related violence (Fitzgerald 2001).
TEACHING 'PROPER' DRINkING?
96
clubs and enforce the rules, and that they would do so in a disinterested 
manner with the welfare of the community at heart. As with the village 
clubs in Papua New Guinea, it was assumed that if clubs were located in 
Aboriginal communities, Aboriginal traditional social controls, enforced 
by elders, would reinforce rules of behaviour and help to uphold the agreed 
in-house policies, thus contributing to the overall project of socialising 
drinkers into moderate consumption. However, by the time the first clubs 
were opened, anthropologists, as well as documenting the values attached 
to heavy drinking and intoxication, had noted the absence of individuals 
with clearly defined legislative functions in Aboriginal communities, and 
had commented on the widespread belief that ordinary men had neither 
the right nor the authority to make rules that others must follow (Meggitt 
1975, Myers 1979). There was also the matter of whose land a club stood 
on and, as a corollary, who had authority over misbehaviour on that 
land (Downing 1988). Experienced missionaries expressed doubt about 
the extent of Aboriginal authority over interpersonal disputes and social 
disorder; church workers, such as Paul Albrecht (2002: 39), wrote of the 
‘authority vacuum’ that lay between Indigenous cultural authority figures 
and the civic roles of councils or local governments. Perhaps the most 
thoughtful consideration of this matter was provided by Charles Rowley 
(1970) who questioned the common assumption that Aboriginal people 
had a physiological inability to resist alcohol. Challenging the often-
repeated view that Aboriginal society did not develop its own controls to 
deal with alcohol because there was no ‘law’ about alcohol in ‘traditional’ 
Aboriginal culture, he argued that:
Aborigines suffered the worst effects of alcohol, not only because it 
offered to individuals temporary escape from what seemed a pointless 
existence but also because of the vulnerability and nature of authority in 
Aboriginal society. That there was no ‘law’ about alcohol was an initial 
cause of vulnerability, no doubt, but the fact does not in itself explain why 
Aboriginal society did not develop controls to deal with it … There were, 
of course, as the anthropologists have shown, social controls in each group 
and … leadership … exerted by the men of high training and status. But 
social controls of a traditional nature are especially vulnerable when the 
whole basis of the tradition is in question; even more so when, as in this 
case, it has been wrecked by rapid depopulation, loss of control of the 
land, and the obvious disregard of indigenous religious assumptions by 
the newcomers … and probably the first use of alcohol had the effect it 
has continued to have of reducing the great man to an object of ridicule; 
and of giving to the doubting and tentatively dissident youth courage to 
defy him. (30–1)
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There appeared to be a degree of ignorance among policymakers about 
the limited range of Aboriginal authority, and little acknowledgment or 
understanding of the entirely socially normative ethic of non-interference 
that exists within Aboriginal society, resulting in a high tolerance of the 
(mis)behaviour of others (Brady 2004: 60). As well as misconstruing the 
nature of authority, government, welfare and some mission authorities 
assumed, incorrectly, that even small communities would be cohesive 
enough to manage the clubs, determine what constituted alcohol-related 
harm and create strategies for reducing it (Gray 1996: 409). In reality, 
there was little frank debate at community meetings and people generally 
offered poor solutions to problems.54
Clubs that initially seemed to operate in the intended manner soon 
increased the allowable ration, causing the system to deteriorate rapidly: 
several clubs were halted abruptly. Rudimentary clubs and beer rations 
came and went in several locations. At Hermannsburg, for example, in 
the 1970s, a newly inaugurated Aboriginal council issued two cans of 
beer on three or four occasions per week, which worked well. However, 
Aboriginal elders were unable to enforce the rules. Bowing to pressure 
from kin, more and more cans were distributed and, within a year, the 
missionaries—having reached the conclusion that the idea of moderation 
made little sense to Aboriginal people—called a halt to proceedings.55 
Sue Kesteven (1984: 201–2) wrote perceptively about the difficulties of 
community control over alcohol sales and demands for special favours: 
This constant pressure from Aboriginal people for waiving of rules in 
each particular case is one of the main drawbacks to finding a congenial, 
enforceable set of rules which suits the entire population. Those in favour 
of drink seem to thwart the intentions of rules that they themselves may 
set up when sober or when not in need of alcohol. Until they come to 
terms with their contradictions, and the implications of continued 
heavy drinking, this problem will not be solved except by the imposition 
of strictly applied rules, policed by non-Aborigines. 
Even when the rules for ‘civilised’ drinking are made by the community 
itself, the group pressure to waive such rules is strong. As Kesteven’s 
research demonstrated, such problems are associated with social 
expectations and norms embedded within Aboriginal sociality and, as 
54  Council members at Yalata, for example, railed at drinkers while being grog-runners themselves; 
drinking camps (often without water, shade or access to help) were frequently suggested as solutions 
to noisy drinking in the community. 
55  Paul Albrecht, interview, 20 April 2005. 
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such, are not necessarily solvable through regulatory mechanisms. Senior 
men and women in a community are often unwilling to intervene and, 
if they do, their attempts to deal with ration-rorting or drunken behaviour 
often have little effect. Indeed, as illustrated in the case of Wadeye and its 
drinking club in the late 1980s, discussed in the next chapter, it would 
take a serious alcohol-related crisis or tragedy to trigger decisive leadership, 
and group acquiescence in that leadership.56 
Power, money, largesse
As beer rationing systems became institutionalised into canteens, and the 
canteens were transformed into clubs (some of which became extremely 
lucrative), it became apparent that there had been a failure to consider 
the corrupting implications of the potentially large income that would 
be generated by sales of beer. The Aboriginal associations, non-Aboriginal 
managers or local community councils running clubs soon found that 
they could make significant profits from the sale of alcohol. Local discord 
over the proper distribution of funds notwithstanding, the money-making 
capacity of the clubs transformed them into powerful (some would say 
the most powerful) economic and political institutions within Aboriginal 
communities (Martin 1993, d’Abbs 1998, McKnight 2002). In some 
cases, this power came to be concentrated in the hands of one individual—
the club manager—or else a very small group of Aboriginal people, who 
could both receive and confer favours. In 1998, d’Abbs observed that the 
high income generated by some clubs created a concentration of power 
and problems of governance; that there was little scrutiny by community 
members; and that numerous social and political difficulties were caused 
by one person (or a small group) having a virtual monopoly of control 
over a highly valued resource (682). Echoing the historical arguments 
between temperance advocates and community-owned licensed premises, 
d’Abbs noted that a community’s economy could become alcohol-driven, 
with club profits representing ‘untied’ grants, and that clubs could create 
a symbiotic relationship in which drinkers became dependent on the club 
(for their social life and entertainment) and the club became dependent 
on high levels of consumption (for its continued economic prosperity). 
56  Yalata Community Council only took decisive action against alcohol after the death of five 
community members in 1991 (Brady et al. 2003).
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Temperance advocates in previous decades had voiced warnings about 
how alcohol profits could be used by community-owned hotels to ‘buy 
off’ critics and earn themselves a false respectability. By donating to 
community causes (such as charter aircraft, swimming pools, playground 
equipment, sports jerseys and facilities, and covering the cost of funerals) 
community leaders, the governing committees of clubs and the (non-
Aboriginal) managers who run them, have done just that, thereby making 
themselves (somewhat) immune to criticism. Insofar as the ‘business’ of 
the clubs allowed for the emergence of a stratum of community leaders 
with access to a stream of money that they could dispose of without being 
accountable to any outsiders, these developments were arguably aligned 
with self-determination.57 At Kowanyama in Queensland, for example, 
the council directed most of its $1 million canteen profit to a mothers and 
babies centre, women’s shelter, school bus, after-hours security for nurses, 
and ranger and outstation program (Moran 2013): who could complain 
about that? However, these same councils in Queensland communities are 
also responsible for the peace, order and welfare of their populations, thus 
creating clear and irresolvable conflicts of interest and principle (Martin 
1998: 4, Fitzgerald 2001: 42).58 David McKnight (2002: 115) observed 
that whether or not the canteen on Mornington Island used its profits for 
‘good works’, they were obtained at a horrendous social cost, and that the 
canteen itself often threatened community wellbeing.59 
A convenient tool for politicians
An analysis of the history of the policies that underpinned the 
establishment of licensed clubs shows that there has been a major shift 
away from the original ideas about their role in habituating people to 
moderate drinking. During recent elections in the Northern Territory and 
Queensland, some politicians promised to re-examine and to liberalise 
alcohol availability through clubs.60 Such proposals are invariably fed by 
57  Thanks to Tim Rowse for making this point.
58  At Yarrabah, in 2002, the council chairman said that the pub (the club) was the only enterprise 
they had; it made $200,000 a year, all of which was channelled into housing maintenance and 
employment opportunities (Hodge & Emerson 2002: 3). 
59  Mac Marshall and colleagues (1982: 456) suggested that similar problems in Papua New Guinea 
could be avoided by making provincial liquor licences government owned and removing the profit 
motive. 
60  This happened during the election in 2012. (See Courier Mail 2013.)
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‘moral panic’.61 An outbreak of (white) citizen outrage over a particular 
incident, or surge of Aboriginal visitors to a regional town, prompts the 
suggestion that Aboriginal people from communities would be less likely 
to come to town if they could drink in their home communities. Mayors 
of regional towns, town councillors, politicians or the police (often a newly 
arrived officer), propose wet canteens or clubs for those communities 
as the ‘perfect’ solution to public drinking and drunkenness among 
Aboriginal people. A spike of policy interest leads to a surge of public 
commentary and media interest and renewed political pressure for clubs 
to be established in communities. Coroners investigating alcohol-related 
deaths in remote areas become involved, receiving submissions from local 
interest groups that include recommendations for clubs. Free  to make 
wide-ranging policy recommendations and politically loaded observations 
in their reports, some coroners conclude that wet canteens might solve the 
problem,62 others warn against them as disastrous.63 
Fig. 11 Warnkurr Club Rules, 2013
Source: M Brady
61  The phrase ‘moral panic’ was coined by deviance sociologist Stanley Cohen (1972, cf. Goode 
& Ben-Yehuda 1994). 
62  This was the case when W Donald, Northern Territory Coroner, investigated five separate 
Aboriginal deaths near an outback takeaway liquor outlet in 1997. 
63  See Coroner’s Court of South Australia (2011).
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Local political struggles
Early in their history, the clubs provided the opportunity for a different 
kind of localised political struggle. Depriving individuals of access to 
a community’s club has proved to be a powerful means of social control, and 
this power can be wielded by various groups, including local community 
councils, club committees and individual managers, the police, and 
other bodies within communities. The ability to ban individuals for poor 
behaviour can be a useful tool with which to attempt to condition better 
drinking practices; clubs can ‘bar off’ people for spitting, abuse, failing to 
leave the premises and for drunkenness. As long ago as 1980, drunkenness 
at the Leichhardt River canteen was punished under such rules put in 
place by the police. 
Clubs often display long lists of names of people who have been banned 
and the length of the ban: some people are banned for life. Clubs also 
display lists of the behaviours that will result in banning (e.g. abusing 
staff or fighting). This enables drinkers to object if they feel they have 
been banned for no good reason: ‘banned for cold blood’.64 In most cases, 
the lists of proscribed behaviours are compiled by community members 
who sit on club committees and the manager. Some bans, or threats 
of bans, are beyond what might be considered reasonable in any other 
licensed premises: to some they seem overly authoritarian. Some clubs 
have become a de facto community policeman, pressuring community 
members to fulfil civic responsibilities. For example, a plumber in one 
community who was tired of children tampering with his building site, 
displayed a sign that read: ‘Keep Out! Children found on this site parent’s 
will be banned from the Club’ (Shaw et al. 2015: 121).
Exasperated by parental neglect, community members often suggest 
that other community members be ‘barred off’ the club for neglecting 
their children, or not sending them to school. In other cases, family 
members may approach a club manager and ask for a miscreant to be 
banned until he or she has made the necessary reparations for an offence. 
A club manager may approach the community’s health staff and ask for 
the names of perpetrators of an assault, or the names of pregnant women, 
to ban them from the club. Needless to say, such requests are usually 
politely refused. 
64  ‘Banned for cold blood’ = banned for no good reason.
TEACHING 'PROPER' DRINkING?
102
In the absence of an existing ‘traditional’ authority that might extend to 
personal misbehaviour, the display of lists of ‘banned behaviours’, the fact 
that they frequently extend into the realm of personal conduct, and the 
alacrity with which Aboriginal people themselves propose deprivation of 
access to the club as a form of social control, represent a new form of 
Indigenous authority that has evolved under ‘self-determination’. Beyond 
reasonable behaviour at the club itself, the lists reveal a desire on the 
part of community members and club committees for there to be some 
degree of order and civic responsibility in the community more broadly. 
The existence of the lists also suggests the degree of impotence felt by the 
civic-minded majority when trying to persuade their fellows to behave 
better, to send their children to school and to feed and provide for them 
(Myers 1979, Brady 1992, Purtill 2017).
The unresolved challenges of clubs
The debate about licensed social clubs in remote communities is unlikely 
to be resolved, as arguments for and against them appeal to politically 
significant constituencies. National inquiries have documented the 
concerns and controversies surrounding clubs, and researchers, including 
myself, have analysed comparative data on the injuries sustained in 
communities with and without clubs; the effect of clubs on health and 
wellbeing in general; and their effect on people’s cash expenditure, 
especially the diversion of funds away from food and other necessities 
(Brady & Palmer 1984, Langton et al. 1991, Martin 1993, d’Abbs et al. 
1994, d’Abbs & Jones 1996, Gladman et al. 1997, Hoy et al. 1997, d’Abbs 
1998, Shaw et al. 2015). Before concluding this discussion about efforts 
to ‘teach’ moderate drinking by means of rationing, canteens and clubs, 
it is important to mention some of the less obvious—more ontological—
implications of this somewhat compromised project.
Tethering
Irrespective of how many regulations and harm-reduction measures 
are in place, or how ‘good’ a club might be, one psychosocial outcome 
of clubs is that Aboriginal people living in communities with licensed 
clubs become ‘tethered’ to them. The concept of tethering derives from 
archaeology, where it is used to describe how the movements of ancient 
megafauna were tied to and bounded by the resource-rich riparian 
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corridors, or circuits, that provided their food and water (Smith 2013: 
66). By putting a brake on the movements and interests of people, and 
confining them to the area that provides the desired resource, social clubs 
act as metaphorical tethering mechanisms.65 In the past, the provision of 
food rations and water supplies by government to dispossessed Aboriginal 
groups performed this role (Rowse 1998, Brady 1999). Now, beer clubs 
fulfil one of their intended goals—keeping people at home and protecting 
them from the dangers of drunk driving and uncontrolled takeaway 
alcohol—through tethering. However, this creates another, somewhat less 
desirable, outcome. 
Clubs bring about a narrowing of focus and contribute a sense of 
confinement to life in communities (cf. Purtill 2017: 230). Clubs (and 
drinking itself ) become the centre of people’s lives—the focus of attention 
to the exclusion of other activities and social and cultural engagements, 
so that people’s thoughts seem to revolve exclusively around beer. 
Observing the relationship between the people of Mornington Island and 
their canteen, David McKnight (2002: 109) commented that in their 
‘continuous hunt for beer almost everything else becomes secondary’. 
Ten years later, anthropologist Cameo Dalley (2012: 151) wrote about 
the same community and how people structured their lives around the 
licensed outlet there: 
The limited opening hours constrained the amount of time available to 
consume alcohol, which in turn contributed to the formation of a daily 
routine for some Aboriginal people structured around its operating times. 
During 2007, this routine began before the 4 pm opening time with those 
working for the local Mornington Shire Council.
To be ready by 4 pm, shire workers made sure their tasks were completed 
well before ‘knock-off’ at 3 pm. Finishing at 3 pm enabled drinkers to go 
home to prepare for their visit to the club, have a shower and get changed. 
Most customers made an effort to look clean and neat, sometimes 
borrowing clothes from kin (Dalley 2012: 151). This kind of planning 
ahead, taking into account of club opening times, affects people’s contact 
with the land. People will abandon trips into the bush, fishing and hunting 
expeditions—even overnight stays to map sites on the land—to hurry 
back and be at the club when it opens. If the club, for whatever reason, 
is closed, this alters daily life dramatically. When, following the federal 
65  I am grateful to Dr Peter Murray for making this analogy and drawing it to my attention.
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government’s intervention in 2007, the Northern Territory clubs were 
instructed to close for two days each week, community members reported 
that they had a ‘holiday from grog’ on those days: some went fishing; 
others ‘rested their brains’ (as one person put it); and some men went 
shopping and prepared food for their wives—all apparently remarkable 
activities.66 Such comments from community members imply that they 
experienced a kind of relief from the usual obsessive focus on the club 
with its mixture of pleasures and pains. 
Separatism
Most of the effects of tethering—curtailing and inhibiting people’s 
interests and providing an obsessive preoccupation—are largely 
subliminal. Alongside these, the clubs are also effectively racially 
segregated, becoming Aboriginal domains. In achieving their goals of 
providing safer, controlled and sociable drinking environments, clubs 
are atypical in their social composition. No white Australian community 
workers drank at the ‘canteens’ when they were first introduced.67 Despite 
becoming slightly more salubrious and less segregated in some places over 
time, Aboriginal clubs continue to be qualitatively different environments 
from other clubs or public hotels. In a public hotel or a town-based sport’s 
club, an Aboriginal drinker might mingle with a range of other people 
and experience different drinking behaviours and settings for drinking 
and eating (and, perhaps, be subject to more stringent regulation).68 This 
point was made in the 1960s by an objector to the licensing of a beer 
canteen at Yalata, who predicted that the canteen would have the effect of 
forcing Aboriginal people away from the hotels ‘where they are equal with 
the white man and where they are learning to drink sensibly’.69
66  Brady fieldnotes, February 2013.
67  This has changed in recent years; non-Indigenous staff members and visitors now frequently 
patronise the clubs. In an intuitive acknowledgement of the notion of modelling ‘good’ drinking 
behaviour, some of these non-Indigenous patrons consciously ‘set an example’ by drinking moderately 
and not becoming intoxicated (Dalley 2012: 164, Brady fieldnotes, 2013). 
68  This is not to deny that some hotel bars—such as ‘animal bars’—frequented by Aboriginal 
people in rural Australia are nasty, dark, unsafe and subject to sometimes brutal security. Sansom 
(1980) refers to the ‘thong bars’ of Darwin: hotel bars where improper feet were those in thong 
sandals rather than shoes. As Sansom pointed out, Aboriginal ‘fringe’ dwellers drank thong-side, not 
shoe-side (180).
69  The objection came from a Methodist minister, Reverend Oates. State Library of South Australia, 
SRG 186 Series 174–82.
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Papua New Guinea faced similar dilemmas in the 1980s when there was 
government pressure to expand the number of drinking clubs in the (often 
remote) villages. Well-informed policy researchers and alcohol policy 
experts cautioned against such a proliferation and recommended that:
It is far better to maintain a limited number of readily accessible public 
houses that can be inspected at least once a month, easily policed when 
problems occur, and kept physically separate from village areas where 
drinking may have a bad effect on women and children and disrupt other 
aspects of village life. (Marshall 1982: 456)
In Australia, the clubs in communities have always been atypical venues; 
they are neither proper ‘membership’ clubs like those of the towns 
(servicemen’s clubs, RSL clubs, bowls clubs and sport’s clubs—which 
often have extensive dining rooms), nor are they pubs. Unlike rural towns 
with clubs and pubs, for decades, the missions and communities had 
minimal or no policing, no safe place for the intoxicated and no hospitals 
(only primary care clinics) to deal with alcohol-related injuries. Aboriginal 
clubs are remotely located, in communities that are isolated from normal 
monitoring and checks and balances; in the early years, they were run by 
inexperienced staff. For all these reasons, they were cut off from changes 
taking place elsewhere: they were left behind. When the liquor laws in 
Australia were liberalised and deregulated in the 1960s, people believed 
that the drinking environment—the physical setting—was important. 
With the extension of licensed service hours, hotels began to change their 
layout and facilities; the long bars that had been built to accommodate 
the pressure of six o’clock swill drinkers gave way to smaller bars with 
adequate seating. ‘Vertical’ drinking70 was known to produce excessive 
consumption, as was crowding: were these basic principles ever applied 
to the canteens and clubs in Aboriginal communities? The answer is 
no—or, more correctly, not until recently. Yet, even if clubs in Aboriginal 
communities now have good policies in place—even if they manage the 
drinking environment well—they remain strangely anomalous venues, 
more akin to the drinking facilities provided for remote mining camps, 
with their tethered and skewed clientele, than anything else. 
Australia has only recently begun to implement ‘civilising’ and harm-
reducing strategies in Indigenous community clubs. The process remains 
ad hoc and has met with strenuous resistance at times. It is regrettable that 
70  Vertical drinking (standing up) arose from a lack of seating; it encouraged greater amounts 
of alcohol to be consumed and thus was targeted by pub reformers (Talbot 2015: 29).
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clubs were allowed to operate for so many years without these strategies 
in place. Arguably, this strategic and policy error has set back progress on 
the daunting task of encouraging change in the culture of drinking. As the 
Northern Territory Licensing Commission (2009: 7) chair thoughtfully 
observed: 
In the longer term there will need to be a focus on developing more cogent 
and appropriate policies in relation to safer, more orderly and supervised 
alcohol consumption for many of the [town] residents and visitors … 
Greater efforts therefore need to be made to improve drinking practices 
of those whose consumption and exposure to the use of alcohol is ‘at the 
margin’ … Better drinking habits will occur with regulation combined 
with harm minimisation education, with the key aim of reducing binge 
drinking and fostering socialised and more temperate consumption.
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The wrecking of the Murrinh Patha 
Social Club: A case study
During the 1950s and 1960s, many of the mature-aged Aboriginal men 
from Port Keats, or Wadeye as it is now known, worked on cattle stations 
between Timber Creek and Kununurra. When they were away from home, 
Aboriginal people drank freely in towns; however, such drinking was not 
permitted in their home communities. Aboriginal reserves had remained 
‘dry’ since their formation, even though in 1964, the right to drink had 
been granted to individuals off reserves in the Northern Territory. By the 
late 1970s, it was clear that men from missions and other communities 
were travelling elsewhere to buy alcohol; this prompted some women from 
Wadeye to support the idea of local availability to ‘keep the men at home’ 
(HRSCAA 1976: 669). Wadeye, the site of the Catholic Mission of Our 
Lady of the Sacred Heart, became one of the first Aboriginal communities 
in the Northern Territory to experiment with a licensed ‘social club’.
The development of the club
The decision to apply for a licence to establish a club at the mission was 
based on the idea that Aboriginal people would learn to drink ‘properly’ if 
the amount of alcohol was controlled and the physical environment was 
appropriate. It was not a contradictory notion that a Catholic mission in 
charge of an Aboriginal settlement should allow drinking; the Catholic 
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Church and its missions were largely liberal-minded in their approach to 
the use of alcohol (Sournia 1990). The Catholic priests and brothers at 
Wadeye drank alcohol themselves in the Presbytery. 
Fig. 12 Statue of Virgin Mary at the old Mission site, Wadeye
Source: M Brady
Apart from the desire of some community members to have a club, the 
decision was influenced by a report, published in 1975, that was written 
by a team of researchers who were all Catholic. Three of the authors, Father 
John Leary, Father Patrick Dodson and Luke Bunduk, were intimately 
associated with the Sacred Heart mission at Wadeye: Leary was the mission 
superintendent over two periods; Dodson, recently ordained, was posted 
to Wadeye to become Leary’s curate (Keeffe 2003); and Bunduk1 was an 
Aboriginal man of the landowning Kardu Diminin clan at Wadeye who 
later became president of the Kardu Numida Council.2 Another team 
member, Bernie Tipiloura, a Tiwi Islander, was also a Catholic.
1  Bunduk took the place of an earlier team member, Bernie Tipiloura. 
2  The Kardu Numida (meaning ‘one people’ in Murrinh Patha) Council was incorporated in 1978 
to be the administrative body for the community once the Catholic mission ceased to perform this role. 
Between 1992 and 2000, the Kardu Numida Council entered a phase of administrative and financial 
restructuring to resolve the mixture of inappropriate governance arrangements and inadequate financial 
support that had developed in the context of a rapidly growing population (Desmarchelier 2001: 41). 
109
4. THE WRECkING Of THE MURRINH PATHA SOCIAL CLUB
The research was commissioned by an intergovernmental committee 
and the research team was tasked with investigating the causes, effects 
and amelioration of alcohol problems among Aboriginal Australians. 
The  first inquiry of its kind in Australia, the team toured the country 
in a kombivan, visiting rehabilitation centres and interviewing people in 
parks and bars. Their report was decisively anti-prohibitionist:
History has shown that prohibition does not work. Isolation does not 
safeguard prohibition, it simply puts off the day. We must face reality and 
human nature and the fact that sooner or later alcohol will come into the 
lives of these people. Aborigines (and everyone else) if they want to drink 
and retain their dignity and identity must acquire the ability of being able 
to control their drinking, otherwise it will be their destruction. To help 
gain this control there must be:
a. a realistic educational programme on alcohol.
b. provision of proper facilities that help towards the formation of good 
drinking habits. (Leary et al. 1975: 5)
The authors proposed that in tribal areas and ‘self-contained’ communities, 
licensed clubs would suit residents, and they made suggestions for the 
type of licensed premises they had in mind: it should have pleasant 
surroundings, music and entertainment, good food, soft drinks, provision 
for families, and rules and encouragements for good behaviour on open 
display—all designed to ‘create pride in something good’. The authors 
envisaged that such a club might also be a place where people with 
drinking problems could be detected and helped: an optimistic suggestion 
that reflects something of the idealism of the era. The emphasis given to 
the idea of learning moderation suggests that some members of the team 
were aware of the thinking of the time about social-learning models:
Much attention must be given to the formation of proper facilities for 
drinking. The learning process for drinking among Aborigines has been 
a sad one. Prohibition taught them to drink as much as possible, in the 
shortest possible time, in the worst possible surroundings. Lack of funds 
got them on to cheap fortified wines, the quickest way to achieve results. 
They so frequently continued [sic] their education in drinking with 
destitute alcoholic Europeans, or being encouraged to drink to excess by 
Europeans with ulterior motives. Drinking, we have been told, is a learnt 
process. Let us change the teachers. (Leary et al. 1975: 27)
The Leary report provided momentum for the mission at Wadeye to 
make a successful application for a liquor licence. In the late 1970s, 
what became known as the Murrinh Patha Social Club was inaugurated. 
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It aimed to provide a safe drinking environment where people could learn 
to drink responsibly, and to ensure that they spent their money within 
the community. Building on the Leary report’s recommendations, three 
members of the Catholic clergy at Wadeye were instrumental in getting 
the club started: Father John Shallvey, Brother Andy Howley and Brother 
Kinnane.3 Leary, interviewed many years later, explained the decision: 
In their society they never had alcohol and because of this they never 
developed ways and means of handling it. So when we had Port Keats 
we started the first club there. In the beginning I had the idea you could 
teach them civilised drinking, two or three cans—enough. But mostly if 
you had a big supply, the whole lot went.4 
At the time, alcohol was available elsewhere in the region. At the 
Peppimenarti store,5 91 km away, Aboriginal people could buy a case of 
beer at any time, provided it was not consumed near the town during 
working hours (Stanley 1985: 80). Wadeye people could also obtain 
alcohol at the Fairweather Hotel on the northern side of the Daly River 
crossing, 189 km north of Wadeye; in the wet season, they often swam 
across the crocodile-infested waters to reach the pub. 
The drinkers
Once the mission gained a liquor licence, the initial arrangement was 
simply to enable people to buy two cans of takeaway beer from a store: 
several outstations were also permitted to sell alcohol to residents.6 
Subsequently, the club was established in a recreation hall at Wadeye. 
In the early years, the club seems to have worked well; there was music and 
entertainment, and grassy shaded areas and outside tables, as envisaged. 
Behaviour at the club was governed by a complex series of rules set by the 
(Aboriginal) management committee, and misbehaviour was promptly 
dealt with according to the committee’s cultural guidelines. There was 
3  Xavier Desmarchelier, pers comm, 11 January 2013. In the early 1980s, Brother Howley also 
applied for a liquor licence for Nguiu on Bathurst Island, which was also a Catholic mission (Walsh 
2005: 68).
4  John Leary, pers comm, 16 August 2004.
5  Peppimenarti, a cattle station of about 200 Aboriginal people associated with Daly River 
mission, was run by Harry Wilson. Daly River Mission also had its own Nauiyu Nambiyu Beer Club, 
which had two drinking sessions a day, rationed at three cans for men and two for women. Profits 
were directed to a social development fund (Stanley 1985: 68).
6  Bill Ivory (pers comm, 6 May 2015) recalls drinking with John Chula and family at Yeddairt 
in 1978 at a bush bar they had constructed on the outstation. The beer was supplied by the Catholic 
mission and was consumed in a ‘convivial and friendly’ environment. 
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a four- or six-can limit on full-strength beers, and drinkers bought the 
requisite number of tokens to exchange for beer.7 Women sat on the 
grass and quietly played cards for beer tokens. The club was a social hub: 
it was open six days a week, Monday to Friday between 5 and 7  pm, 
and on Saturdays between 4.30 and 7 pm. Takeaways were available to 
permit holders from 3–4 pm. It was said to be ‘a good place, the whole 
community, black and white went there. [The first manager] was good, 
no humbugging’.8 Another Aboriginal patron commented:
Phil S was the first manager, a good one. It was well run with snacks and 
music in the early 80s. At first it was all cash, then Phil S had the idea 
of tokens [four tokens each person] … They tried light beer … no-one 
liked it.9 
There were many responsible drinkers at Wadeye; older people arrived 
dressed in their best and people enjoyed being able to have a few beers 
without having to leave the community. 
The club was financially viable and contributed socially and financially to 
the community. As was the case in other communities, the revenue from 
the club was the only untied income available in Wadeye; it provided 
funds that could be spent on local needs free from government control. 
To utilise the club’s ‘facilities’ (a euphemism for purchasing beer, as 
there were no other facilities, such as food, water or security, until later), 
a person had to become a ‘member’ (at no cost). Young people turning 
18 were often coerced by family members to sign up for membership 
(even though most 18 year olds did not drink), as a way of providing 
more beer to family members, usually their fathers. The club became 
‘the epicentre of everyone’s lives’, as one observer put it. However, it soon 
varied between being a great asset and being a great problem. The drinking 
adversely affected the singing and performance of ceremony, which was 
of great concern to many senior men.10 Over time, there were changes 
in management and management policies, resulting in a decline in the 
7  The limits changed from time to time. By 1987, the limit was six cans per person. One 
informant remembered one resourceful young man who made counterfeit tokens by punching holes 
in a saucepan: ‘We had to have a meeting about that’, commented Anthony Dooling.
8  Mark Crocombe, pers comm, 14 July 2009.
9  Bill Ivory, pers comm, 14 July 2009.
10  Kim Barber, pers comm, 5 March 2014. Thanks to Kim Barber and Xavier Desmarchelier for 
these descriptions of the club and its patrons. 
TEACHING 'PROPER' DRINkING?
112
scrutiny of alcohol distribution and undermining of the various rationing 
systems; drinkers started swapping cans and some non-drinking women 
gave their allowance to their husbands, leading to violence. 
The club was controlled by a management committee or board (all men, 
all drinkers, some of them dependent drinkers), who instructed the 
manager in the rules of engaging with local people. The manager and 
management committee were thus enmeshed in a close reciprocal alliance, 
aspects of which probably did not always comply with the Liquor Act. 
One Aboriginal community member recalled later that:
The board of six or seven drinking people and the club manager—they 
were confused, ‘brainwashed’ people. They were supposed to have a four-
can limit but used to bring wives, grandmothers [to use their allowance]. 
Aboriginal people worked there.11 
The committee was responsible for selecting six local men (not women) 
to fill the highly desirable jobs at the club; selection was based on family 
and cultural preferences. Once everyone had gone home after the club 
closed at 7  pm, these men could stay on and consume their six cans 
of beer without being importuned by family members. Other perks 
for employees included cash advances, charter flights to Darwin and 
attendance (all expenses paid) at the annual Northern Territory Football 
League grand finals. 
Meanwhile, the customers played cards and gambled with beer tokens.12 
As anthropologists have observed in relation to other settings, alcohol 
at Wadeye became a form of legal tender, and the club was the place 
where business was conducted (cf. Sansom 1980, Brady & Palmer 1984, 
Collmann 1988).13 Groups of men reached agreements about who would 
accumulate more beers through what were known as ‘sixpack clubs’; 
members took turns to drink three cans only, giving the rest to another 
person to enable that person to get ‘full drunk’.14 These arrangements 
became part of a ‘hidden world’ in which social, cultural and financial 
debts were accrued and repaid. If nothing else, these strategies demonstrate 
how determined many individuals were to drink to inebriation. At the 
11  WP, interview, 14 July 2009.
12  Carol Watson, pers comm, 16 August 2009. Watson was in Wadeye conducting interviews for 
a major Northern Territory drug and alcohol use survey (Watson et al. 1988).
13  Xavier Desmarchelier, pers comm, 11 January 2013.
14  This was documented in a letter from Kardu Numida Council to the Liquor Commission 
written in September 1995.
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time, apart from drinking on premises at the club, hundreds of people 
at Wadeye also held liquor permits that allowed them to drink alcohol at 
home (Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies 1984: 214).15
Fig. 13 Sound shell at Murrinh Patha Social Club, Wadeye, 2009
Source: M Brady
The non-drinkers
While the club was always well attended, Wadeye also had a significant 
non-drinking population, which included individuals who had given up 
alcohol after having been heavy drinkers. These people were encouraged 
and supported by an active AA-style group that had been set up by one 
of the mission brothers, Andrew Howley (who had also applied for the 
liquor licence). Howley had received a travelling scholarship to the United 
States to investigate sobriety groups and American Indian approaches to 
alcohol abuse. On his return, he visited the Holyoake Institute in Perth 
and was impressed by its approach to counselling and training using 
15  In 1984, the number was 374 permits at Wadeye: some of these permits were held by white staff.
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a ‘family disease’ treatment model for addiction.16 He subsequently 
initiated Alcohol Awareness and Family Recovery (AAFR) programs in 
Darwin and Wadeye, the principles of which were based on the Holyoake 
model. This model promoted the idea that the families of alcoholics were 
‘co-dependents’ whose actions inadvertently enabled drinkers to keep 
drinking: for example, by sending money to support drinkers, taking over 
essential roles neglected by drinkers and by making excuses for them.17 
According to the Holyoake model, welfare and other agencies were 
‘enablers’; they provided money that enabled families to survive while 
breadwinners drank away the primary income. Aboriginal legal services 
were implicated too, for by providing legal advice in alcohol-related cases, 
they protected drinkers from experiencing the full consequences of their 
actions (d’Abbs 1990: 21). The Holyoake model advised that, to counter 
what amounted to tacit support for drinkers, families needed to show 
‘tough love’ to dependent drinkers, and not ‘cover up’ for them by lying 
on their behalf, paying their bills or providing for them, since all of these 
things allowed alcoholics to deny and escape from their problems. 
Apart from the AAFR group at Wadeye, the Catholic brothers and nuns 
and committed local Aboriginal men, George Cumaiyi and Cyril Ninnal, 
also ran a residential rehabilitation program near Daly River at Five 
Mile.18 This supported families dealing with alcohol abuse and provided 
a referral service and a focus for local self-help groups using the AA and 
Al-Anon Family Group models. An evaluation of the program at Five Mile 
found that attendance had a modest but real effect on drinking behaviour 
(d’Abbs 1990: 5). Between 1987 and 1989, more than 100 Wadeye 
family members attended the alcohol awareness courses at Five Mile 
or Darwin (d’Abbs 1990: 40). In fact, more than half of all admissions 
to the Five Mile AAFR program were drawn from either Wadeye or 
Nguiu on Bathurst Island. Notably, both communities had licensed 
clubs. The AAFR program at Wadeye was incorporated later as Makura 
16  Holyoake, in turn, was influenced by the United States Minnesota-based Hazelden Institute’s 
philosophy and methods, using the idea of addiction as a chemical dependency. Howley took Wadeye 
men Cyril Ninnal and William Parmbuk to the United States to attend the 55th AA–Al Anon 
International Convention (Williams 1990). See Chenhall (2007) for a detailed ethnography of the 
operation of an AA-based Aboriginal residential treatment program.
17  The term ‘co-dependency’ has been contested, with one professor of psychology stating that it 
had been expanded way beyond its useful role to encompass virtually the entire population (Lisansky-
Gomberg 1989: 120).
18  Five Mile ran from the late 1980s to early 2000s. Its program was based on the family disease 
concept linked to the 12-step model that is used by many Canadian First Nations treatment programs, 
as well as Holyoake in Perth. 
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Wunthay,19 a support and alcohol-education group that drew together 
a strong core of non-drinkers, women and other community members 
concerned about alcohol. It was this group at Wadeye, combined with 
ideas about ‘tough love’, that triggered the action that was taken against 
the club. 
The group met at the Presbytery; a key figure was Freddie Cumaiyi, 
a  senior man who had lived through his own personal struggles with 
alcohol as well as those of his family. William Parmbuk, a key player in 
the demise of the club, was also in the group. He spoke of his perceptions 
of drinking:20 
I never drank. My mum was an influence: she told me, ‘it will kill you’. 
I grew up where I saw different areas like Darwin, Katherine, Kununurra, 
where I saw my people affected by grog, in the long grass. I never tasted 
it. Straight from school I was a health worker. A teacher and her partner 
worked in the health clinic and I learned from there how alcohol affect 
your life—I see people with domestic violence, family being sad. The club 
was operating while I grew up. In the 80s men would go up to the club 
and there was some violence, family around, break-in, smashing church 
window because of the last night [the night before]. Next morning a fight 
would be on. I saw that for 12 months or more and I felt sad and I joined 
AA, I wanted to learn from other men how it affected. I listened to them 
all. There were six or seven men in the group started by Brother Andy 
Howley and Freddie … I was only teenager. It started with two men 
sitting under a tree, talking about their life as a sober person.21 
Membership of Makura Wunthay was made up of people drawn from 
across the many different clans at Wadeye. As was (and is) the case in many 
Aboriginal communities, there was a major split between the drinkers and 
the non-drinkers: Wadeye was polarised. As it grew, Makura Wunthay came 
to represent the only alternative (and wholly Indigenous) perspective on 
alcohol that could pose any kind of challenge to the dominance of the club 
committee, which was composed entirely of drinkers. Non-drinkers did 
not consider it appropriate to sit on the committee; for example, when 
19  Makura Wunthay (Murrinh Patha language): makura = ‘no water (beer)’; wunthay = ‘restriction’ 
(‘don’t drink’ or ‘good water’). 
20  The non-standard, vernacular style of Aboriginal English has not been edited or corrected 
throughout the book.
21  William Parmbuk, interview, 14 July 2009.
TEACHING 'PROPER' DRINkING?
116
two committee members decided to stop drinking, they resigned from their 
positions. As a result, there were no non-drinking representatives on the 
committee.22
Social unrest and the club
Notwithstanding the efforts of the non-drinkers, the late 1980s saw 
increased alcohol consumption associated with the club and a build-
up of social unrest. The club’s licence was suspended on 26 occasions 
over a nine-year period—signalling what turned out to be a tumultuous 
history.23
Misbehaviour at the club was dealt with swiftly and according to the 
cultural guidelines established by the management committee; however, 
once the club closed at 7 pm, the committee’s authority ended and its 
members had no desire to take responsibility for antisocial behaviour 
enacted beyond the club’s boundary. This job fell to the two police officers 
stationed at Wadeye. The high incidence of crime at Wadeye was almost 
exclusively related to the consumption of alcohol at the club (Tangentyere 
Council 1991: 91, note 2). In July 1988, five months before the wrecking 
of the club, there was a fatal stabbing (both the perpetrator and victim 
had been drinking at the club and the victim was unarmed). The Supreme 
Court judge who presided over this manslaughter case characterised the 
community as being in a state of domestic conflict; he referred to clan 
conflict, general social upheaval, widespread aimlessness, drunkenness, 
unemployment and a lack of effective leadership and governance.24 
Hostilities were so strong after the stabbing that the perpetrator had to be 
flown out of Wadeye for his own safety. 
There was increasingly vocal opposition to grog in the wake of this 
incident: Aboriginal residents recalled, ‘we felt like its killing our people. 
A lot of medical evacuations then’; and, ‘[it’s] killing our culture’. Several 
community members reported that, late in 1988, the community was 
‘on a knife edge’; ‘things got worse and worse’. When the council tried 
to ban a number of young troublemakers from the club, their family 
22  Xavier Desmarchelier, pers comm, 11 January 2013.
23  Colin McDonald, interview, ABC Radio 6 December 1989.
24  Angel J, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, The Queen v Phillip Daniel Berida, 5 April 
1990; see also Madigan 1988: 1.
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members, instead of supporting 
such a ban in the interests of 
the community, confronted the 
council and demanded to know 
why their sons had been banned. 
In October, the Northern Territory 
News (1988) reported rioting 
at Wadeye: gunshots were fired 
in the main street and brawls 
took place involving 200 people. 
Police reinforcements were sent 
in and 12 men were  arrested. 
The club was closed for a  week. 
In the six months between July 
and December, monthly police 
returns showed that there were 56 
arrests or summonses for offences 
at Wadeye (Legislative Assembly 
of the Northern Territory 1991: 
167). People were afraid to venture 
out at night, as many youths were 
armed with knives; health workers 
were frightened to go to the clinic 
without an escort. At times, up to 
30 women and children sought 
overnight refuge at the Presbytery 
and convent.25 School attendance 
was low, and there were numerous 
break-ins and property damage 
to the school, clinic, store, 
private houses and vehicles. The 
unrest culminated in an act of 
unprecedented civil disobedience: 
25  Xavier Desmarchelier, pers comm.
26  Several interviewees stated: ‘There was trouble with drink! They knocked all the louvres out 
of the church!’; ‘Young fellas smashed and stole cars, breaking windows in church’. 
a group of young men broke the 
windows of the church.26 This act 
served as the trigger, finally, for 
decisive community action. 
Fig. 14 Carrie Nation Lecture 
Poster, c. 1901




On the afternoon of Saturday 3 December 1988—in a scene that rivalled 
the activities of the saloon-smashing activist, Carrie Nation, whose Anti-
Saloon League campaigners ‘hatcheted’ bars and liquor stores in the United 
States27—a group of Aboriginal non-drinkers assembled outside the club, 
wielding axes and star pickets. They stormed onto the club premises and 
proceeded to demolish its interior. The Wadeye club smashers were led 
by Freddie Cumaiyi of the Rak Kubiyirr clan,28 who wore a ceremonial 
red naga29 and carried a shovel-nosed spear and a woomera. The group 
was soon joined by a large number of other participants who smashed 
the fittings and equipment inside the club, while 200 people reportedly 
stood outside cheering. The club’s attackers asked the attending police 
to keep away while the destruction took place, and they agreed; no one 
was injured. It was an unprecedented, dramatic and well-orchestrated 
intervention.
27  In the early twentieth century, Carrie Nation famously carried a small axe (a hatchet) with which 
she and her followers smashed up liquor supplies and saloons in actions she called ‘hatchetations’; 
they often stormed into bars singing hymns (Cook 2007). Nation was particularly outraged by the 
effect of drunkenness on women and children. 
28  Freddie Cumaiyi (1926–89). The Rak Kubiyirr clan owns land adjoining the area of Wadeye. 
29  Naga = loin cloth or waist cloth usually of red cotton. In the early twentieth century, a fabric 
known as ‘turkey-red’ was often distributed to Aboriginal people in payment for work (cf. Searcy 
[1909] 1984: 81). 
30  Like Freddie Cumaiyi, William Parmbuk was not a member of the landowning clan. 
I interviewed Parmbuk and others at Wadeye in July 2009. He was then 43 years old and a member 
of NORFORCE (an Australian Army Reserve regiment engaged in surveillance and reconnaissance). 
He ran the army cadet unit. 
In 2009, I collected accounts of the incident from many participants or 
observers who, while they agreed on the overall sequence of events, varied 
on some of the detail. William Parmbuk, aged 22 at the time of the attack, 
was one of the protagonists. He gave the following account:30
In 1988 we destroyed the club. We had a meeting; at the meeting [were] 
seven men and some women. Old Freddie Cumaiyi—an ex-drinker and 
part of the AA group [said]: ‘This thing’s killing us, separating families, 
everyone sad’. We decided on Saturday afternoon, when the club open. 
We stopped in front of the club. I had a fighting stick. Club manager 
came to open the gate. I stopped him and said ‘We’re gonna bash your 
club’. He didn’t believe! Inside my body was boiling anger, outside I was 
happy. Old Freddie [was] painted up, with a spear, wearing a red naga. 
He said, ‘smash it!’ I fired a 303 into the lock of the steel door and then we 
started to destroy whatever the club owned. We used axes. I had an axe as 
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well. I was saying ‘I’m going to smash you’. I made a hundred holes in the 
club-owned boat! The police came and I stopped them. I said, ‘We want 
to destroy this club—come back and arrest me later’. We destroyed 
everything: TV, boat, big TV screen, smashed VB cans with star picket. 
I drove a tractor! Big crowd came around. Word went round quick, then 
whole community got involved, helped to smash it. All the women and 
kids, young men. 
The following accounts come from various Aboriginal community 
members:
Young fellas smashed and stole cars, breaking windows in church. They 
[other, non-drinkers] thought the problem might be coming from the 
club. So G with a 6.5 rifle shot the lock [of the club], smashed the fence 
with Hilux [Toyota]. Some women were involved. When they entered the 
club everyone stood back and the AA people came rushing in. Freddie had 
an axe and a shovel nose spear and a naga. The old man had got wild with 
drinkers who belt their wives and kids.31 
I was there when Freddie smashed the club. I was still at home, but people 
were lining up for ticket [beer token]. That old man, Freddie, was in a red 
naga and a shovel spear. People had been drinking and getting violent. 
Men with tickets were already inside the club, they pulled back against the 
fence and everyone, kids and women too, everybody was there [attacking 
the club]. Freddie said [he was] feeling sorry for women and children, 
kids were hungry, women get family payment for food and husbands take 
that money for themselves, kids went to school hungry. Freddie spoke 
in language.32 
There was trouble with drink, they knocked all the louvres out of the 
church. Old Freddie got wild. He got all the non-drinkers. I was still 
drinking [in 1988], I gave up early June 1989, but I was in there. I didn’t 
see what was happening. In the afternoon we were waiting for 5 pm to 
open, soon as we got back we see big mob all round club. We thought it 
was fighting going on, but it was all getting beers. They knocked all the 
fence out. Nobody got angry; they helped themselves to beer. Opened the 
door where the beer locked in, got fence out, threw beer out.33 
They had a meeting before all this [the wrecking of the club] to discuss it, 
because women wanted the non-drinkers to be safe. The club wasn’t quite 
open; people were waiting to go in. Freddie [was] worried that women 
31  RC, son of Freddie Cumaiyi.
32  SB, previously a Makura Wunthay worker.
33  AD, of Wentek Nganayi outstation. 
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were frightened of their husbands. Every night women get frightened 
of their husband. When we saw Freddie painted up, he was very angry, 
‘mad’. With rocks and axes they all smashed the cans. ‘Come and get your 
last drink!’ they called out. They drove a Hilux into the fence, and pulled 
the beer down.34
Non-Aboriginal residents also witnessed the event. One recalled: 
I heard two shots of a rifle and blokes racing past. People flashing past! 
Straight to the club! The manager turned up and the non-drinkers said 
‘no, mate. We won’t hurt you’ … George Cumaiyi fired the shots. They 
damaged the office, broke into the walls; there was a grader running 
around. It was a community statement.35 
Leary’s associate, Xavier Desmarchelier,36 was also there that day. 
He remembered how:
After months of increasing violence, at about 4.30 pm on December 3 
there was a shotgun blast that came from the club area. At that time such 
blasts were not unusual within the community however they normally 
occurred after club hours. I went down to the club. There were about 20 
people outside the club fence. On the inside of the fence facing the club 
doors stood Freddie Cumaiyi in ceremonial attire—nagga, body paint 
and wommerra [sic]. Freddie was directing the group of people outside 
the fence who proceeded to break down the fence with chains, ropes and 
vehicles. Once inside the fence these people went to the main door of the 
club and smashed it open with crow bars and axes. Meanwhile a crowd 
outside the club was growing. I spoke with Freddie indicating that perhaps 
there was another way. He said: ‘This is our way, this is the only way left 
to us’ … [T]he main door to the club had been smashed open and access 
to the coolrooms had been obtained. Cartons of beer were being brought 
outside where non-drinkers (men, women and children) broke open the 
cartons and begun smashing cans of beer on the concrete and against the 
brick wall. There was cheering from people outside the fence as cans were 
smashed … However not only cartons of beer were targeted. Those inside 
the club began smashing the interior—pool tables, fans, chairs, counters 
etc. Nothing was left standing. Meanwhile outside the club members were 
focused on the cartons of beer that were being piled on the concrete. They 
34  Group discussion with ND, GJ and JJ. 
35  Mark Crocombe, historian at the Wadeye Knowledge Centre, 14 July 2009.
36  Xavier Desmarchelier, 11 January 2013. In 1988, Desmarchelier was helping Leary to establish 
an Indigenous leadership centre at Daly River; he now works with Jesuit Social Services. 
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entered the club and began breaking them open to drink. This was the 
beginning of the free for all and then the behaviour that has been referred 
to often as ‘the riot’.
According to a Catholic Sister who was also there that day:
They were sick and tired of trouble from grog, bringing in non-drinkers 
to the club who got grog. Once it closed, there was chaos and noise 
until midnight. The community was in a big split between drinkers and 
non-drinkers. The lead-up to the 1988 smashing was the clinic … and 
the church was perpetually getting smashed. The club had been badly 
managed. [On the day], the drinkers were at the club at 5  pm. The 
non-drinkers were having their AA group. ‘We will smash everything’ 
Freddie said, ‘We won’t hurt anyone’. They told the police they were 
going to do it.37 
Dr Elizabeth Moore, District Medical Officer, recalled that: ‘Freddie had 
said at a council meeting that “any more trouble at the club, we’ll smash it 
down”. And they did! Pushed fences, knocked out walls, poured out grog. 
They did $300,000 worth of damage’.38
Press reports were accompanied by sensational headlines: ‘Aftermath of 
a rampage. Families flee riot’ (Jackson 1988: 1); ‘Port Keats in alcoholic 
turmoil’; ‘Beer at centre of NT riot’ (Cooke 1988: 1). However, all 
eyewitness accounts concur that it was a well-planned, premeditated 
action that involved no violence against people, only property; that the 
police were informed; and that key people peacefully gave themselves up 
to police afterwards. Desmarchelier stated that:
As an eyewitness to the actual event the one word I would not use to 
describe [it] would be a riot. Freddie provided directions to his people as 
to what actions to do; they looked to Freddie for direction; at all times 
Freddie was in control of what was happening. No person was hurt. 
The target was the club premises and the beer.
Another commentator described the atmosphere as being like a midnight 
feast at boarding school, with people helping themselves to the cartons of 
beer liberated from the club. The ‘free grog’ was taken by drinkers to the 
community living areas and there was heavy drinking over the next few 
days; however, according to witnesses, there were no inter-group fights 
or injuries. 
37  Catholic sister, Yvonne, 14 July 2009.
38  Dr Elizabeth Moore, District Medical Officer, 12 October 2009. 
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Fig. 15 ‘Aftermath of a rampage’
Source: Northern Territory News Monday 5 December 1988
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The aftermath
A few days later, a group of 10 Aboriginal health workers at the local 
health centre clarified their position in relation to the wrecking of the club 
in two letters to the Liquor Commission. In the first letter, they explained 
why they supported the actions of the protestors:
To the NT Liquor Commissioner, 6/12/88
Dear Sir
Our reasons are
People causing trouble at our Health Centre
Always damaging our Hospital vehicles and windows
Childrens get sick from hunger because of the father and some mother’s 
are spending money on grog. The childs ‘Road to Health’ chart always on 
the red line. Because there’s not enough food.
When someone is hurt and taken down to the Health Centre, people 
come around here and starting getting mad at the Clinic and at the health 
workers, and swearing and all that. Every night they come around here for 
medicine when its not the right time.
Some mothers don’t bring their babies at the right time, [but] wait for their 
husbands to come out of the club, and bring the sick baby to the clinic. 
And husband starts to get mad at us and cause of troubles. When they 
enter the clinic door husband starts to talk rough talk. So we the health 
workers [get frightened], shaking and droping everything. Sometimes 
we in a hurry we might give them wrong medicine and we might kill 
someone and get into big trouble. Drunk people write dirty words on our 
health centre and vehicles.
If the club reopens again we’ll do the same thing again smash up everything, 
and that’s our promise. Because of the grog lots of our people are getting 
sicker and sicker, high blood pressure, diabetes and liver damage.
Signed: Aboriginal health workers
Phillipine Parmbuk, Stephanie Berida, Annunciata Dartinga, Lillian 
Tcherna, Ethelreda Dartinga, Sabina Parmbuk, Philomena Crocombe, 
Therese Nemarluk, Agnes Tchemjairi, Lucia Ngarri.39
39  I have photocopies of these letters in my possession.
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The health workers who signed the letter were all Aboriginal women with 
close connections to the Catholic nuns; they had been brought up in the 
dormitory system at the mission and had worked for many years in the old 
mission hospital. All became senior spokespersons in their groups as they 
grew older.40 Disturbed by talk of reopening the club, the women wrote a 
further letter on 20 December. The second letter stated that, following the 
club’s closure, illegal grog had been flown into one of the outstations and, 
as a result, a Wadeye truck had rolled, injuring eight people, two of whom 
had had to go to hospital. The women wrote:
Some people say they want the club open at Port Keats because they don’t 
want the men to go away to Darwin or Kununurra drinking because they 
might get killed. Well there has been more men killed at Port Keats from 
the grog than away from Port Keats … We think grog should be stopped 
forever. From the health workers at Port Keats.
Two of the club’s attackers, William Parmbuk (aged 23) and Maurice 
Mullumbuk (aged 25), were charged with illegal entry and criminal 
damage. The case was heard in Darwin by Senior Magistrate Alistair 
McGregor in October 1989. Parmbuk and Mullumbuk were defended by 
solicitor Colin McDonald.41 By then, Freddie Cumaiyi, the senior man 
who had led the action against the club had died. Freddie’s son, George 
Cumaiyi, told the court that his father had warned the community: ‘If the 
church, school and hospital keep getting damaged, then we will damage 
your place [the club]. That was the warning the old man made’.42 The 
District Medical Officer gave evidence that health conditions, including 
alcohol-related injuries and child malnutrition, had improved significantly 
in the months since the club had closed. The magistrate drily observed 
that the social club at Wadeye could more accurately be described as the 
‘antisocial club’, as it had contributed to a drastic deterioration in the 
quality of life at Wadeye, which now endured alcohol-related trauma and 
chronic bad health due to considerable and sustained high alcohol intake. 
McGregor heard evidence that the club took around $72,000 a month: 
money, he observed, that was probably derived from social security 
payments. 
40  Three of the signatories were of the same clan (Rak Kubiyirr) as Freddie Cumaiyi (Bill Ivory, pers 
comm).
41  McDonald is now a QC.
42  The following quotations are drawn from transcripts of ABC radio broadcasts at the time 
(tape supplied by Colin McDonald and Jonathan Hunyor, 8 September 2010). 
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The magistrate dismissed the charges against Parmbuk and Mullumbuk. 
He dealt with the element of riot by stating that the men had right of 
entry to the premises, and found only the damages charge to be proved. 
McGregor had no doubt that both men were guilty of this offence, but 
he accepted that their motives were honourable. Rather than a case of 
violence, it was a case of restoring peace. Despite acknowledging the 
risk of precedent that might extend to other communities, McGregor 
ordered that no convictions be recorded and the men were released. 
This unprecedented decision provoked a welter of media coverage.43 
McDonald, Parmbuk and Mullumbuk’s lawyer, told ABC radio that:
It was a social revolution in the true sense of the word, however it was 
a disciplined revolution where the ground rules were no-one was to get 
hurt and in fact no-one was hurt. And it’s interesting in this case that the 
two charges dealing with the element of riot were withdrawn because the 
Crown could not find, amongst 500 persons present, one person who was 
afraid. The evidence was that people were cheering and celebrating the 
destruction of this source of evil in their midst.44 
Twenty years later, Parmbuk described the court hearing and the dismissal 
of the charges:
I had a good lawyer, Colin McDonald. We had back-up from doctor, 
visiting doctor. In the magistrate [court] Alistair McGregor—I was a bit 
nervous—he said, ‘Stand up William! William! You are like Rajiv Gandhi! 
I will accept what you have done for the sake of the community. I now 
drop this charge. You may go’. Before that he asked me: ‘If the Club 
reopen again, would you do it again?’ and I said ‘Yes. It’s not for me it’s 
for the sake of the community’. 
Perhaps inevitably, the closure of the club meant that those who wanted 
to drink alcohol, including some senior men, left Wadeye, sometimes for 
extended periods. One consequence of this was that council meetings no 
longer had the ratification of several key people. Another consequence 
was an increase in the number of intoxicated people on the road, which 
resulted in several deaths.45 Unfortunately and coincidentally, the road 
from Wadeye to Daly River had been upgraded that year, meaning that 
43  ‘Club wreckers who “saved people from alcohol” freed’, The Australian 7 December 1989: 
4; ‘Port Keats: charges proved, no conviction’, Northern Territory News 24 October 1989: 5; ABC 
Darwin radio news broadcasts December 1989.
44  ABC News Radio Darwin 6 December 1989.
45  However, as the second letter from the health workers stated, there had been deaths at Wadeye 
itself because of alcohol-related violence.
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vehicles could travel faster than previously. Sly grogging increased as men 
grouped together to charter planes from Kununurra to fly alcohol into 
some of the outstations. ‘Family money’ was also depleted. These side 
effects of the club’s closure naturally led to grumblings, with some in the 
community questioning Freddie Cumaiyi’s ‘right’ to have brought about 
the club’s demise. 
Fig. 16 Remains of the Murrinh Patha Social Club, 2009
Source: M Brady
Reopening the club
Only three days after the wrecking of the club, Liquor Commission 
representatives from Darwin visited Wadeye and held meetings with the 
community about whether the club should be reopened. Clearly, there 
was pressure to do so (as evidenced by the follow-up letter from the health 
workers): in fact, there was so much pressure that the secretary of the 
Northern Territory Department of Health and Community Services 
wrote to the Commission advising it to take a ‘hands-off’ approach—
rather than continually asking the community when it wanted the licence 
to be recommenced (Tangentyere Council 1991: 93, note 5). 
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In the early 1990s, the club reopened and closed on several occasions. 
In March 1995, the reopened club was attacked, culminating in a large 
brawl; the Licensing Commission became involved and the club was closed 
and the manager sacked. In September 1995, Kardu Numida Council at 
Wadeye made a determined effort to reform the way the club operated. 
They approached the Liquor Commission to reopen it, this time under 
a new name: the Kardu Numida Social Club. Changing the name of the 
club was significant. Its former name, Murrinh Patha, represented only 
one of the many different language groups living at Wadeye and in the 
surrounding area, and other groups felt disenfranchised—‘living in their 
shadow’. Renaming the club Kardu Numida, meaning ‘one people’, 
appealed those who sought unity in the community. A letter to the Liquor 
Commission, signed by the council’s president and executive officer, 
laid out a new policy that contained a number of changes and a more 
formal code of discipline than previously.46 The club committee was to be 
composed of members of the Kardu Numida Council, and the manager 
or licensee was to be employed by the council (rather than the club being 
a separate entity, as previously). 
The council’s plan for the ‘new’ club made no allusion to the notion 
of learning to drink in moderation, as had been the case in the 1970s. 
However, it did suggest that light beer should cost less at the club, to make 
it more attractive to drinkers, and that a proper cafe be opened, rather 
than a ‘greasy spoon’. The council and elders stressed their intention to 
eradicate the ‘sixpack clubs’ that allowed chosen individuals to drink 
large numbers of cans. In terms of policing the club, the plan stated that 
council members and elders would take an active role, and that a group of 
respected persons from different tribal groups wearing armbands would 
police the discipline of members during trading hours. The proposal also 
explicitly addressed the issue of revenue from the sale of alcohol. Whereas 
in previous years, club profits had been ploughed back into the club 
itself, ignoring the interests of the ‘large number of teetotal members of 
the community’ and providing benefit only to its patrons (the drinking 
population), the council stated that under its new plan, the club would 
be valuable as a means of directing thousands of dollars into the local 
economy. Specifically, under the new policy, the council planned: ‘to use 
46  Letter to the Liquor Commission signed by the Kardu Numida Council executive officer 
(Boniface Perdjert, a senior member of the landowning Diminin clan) and president (Leon Melpi) 
reporting on a council meeting at Wadeye on 8 September 1995.
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the earning power of all commercial ventures at Wadeye to construct an 
Olympic size swimming pool, upgrade housing and allocate funds to 
government initiated work training schemes’.
In September 1995, the Liquor Commission agreed that the club could 
reopen. It gave Aboriginal women at Wadeye 10 days to look at the new 
rules and make changes, if desired. Presumably they did not object, 
because a licence was issued to the newly incorporated Kardu Numida 
Social Club Ltd. that allowed for opening hours from 5 to 7 pm Monday 
to Friday, and from 4 to 7 pm on Saturday (or 8 pm, depending on the 
football season).47 The licence specified that four 375 mL cans could be 
sold per person, and that any proposal to change the limit would require 
a full report on social behaviour. Purchasing on behalf of another person 
was prohibited. The licence listed the rules of behaviour that had been 
drawn up by the council, including that anyone apprehended for an 
alcohol-related offence in Wadeye would be automatically suspended 
from the club for six months; women were not allowed to buy beer during 
pregnancy and for three months after giving birth; and there was to be a 
women-only area, designed to prevent men from taking beer from their 
wives or girlfriends. 
These strategies constituted a determined attempt by all involved to 
make the club into the sort of drinking environment originally envisaged 
by Leary and his co-authors in 1975. The proposal coincided with the 
Northern Territory’s Living with Alcohol (LWA) program, an ambitious 
prevention and education scheme funded by a small levy on alcoholic 
beverages that (as its title suggests) stressed the need for Territorians to 
accept and manage alcohol with moderation. The LWA program offered 
to help at Wadeye by training club staff and by giving the council ideas on 
safe management of clubs, drawn from a handbook then in preparation 
(Hunter & Clarence 1996). The Northern Territory’s Chief Minister, who 
took a personal interest in the program, and the program’s director were 
both supportive of sensible drinking policies for Aboriginal social clubs.48 
The optimism accompanying these planned safeguards to governance 
and social control was short-lived. As it turned out, the Kardu Numida 
Council collapsed around this time—a result of its inability to respond to 
47  Licence Number 80801358, Kardu Numida Social Club Ltd., 21 September 1995, Nominee 
Stanley Robert Gibson. 
48  Dr Shirley Hendy, pers comm , 13 August 2009.
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the needs of the rapidly growing town (Desmarchelier 2001)—ushering 
in a long search for a more appropriate community governing structure. 
Soon after its rebranding and reopening in September 1995, the club 
closed again due to drunken brawls; customers had been receiving more 
than their four-can limit. In December, only three weeks after yet another 
reopening, young men broke into the club in the early hours of the 
morning and stole between 800 and 1,200 cartons of beer. A violent brawl 
erupted involving spears, boomerangs and firearms (Alcorn 1995): health 
clinic staff were evacuated and other community service providers were 
nervous. The chair of the Liquor Commission, John Maley, suspended 
the social club licence indefinitely and, despite sporadic calls for it to be 
reopened, the club remained closed.49 Following this final closure, police 
reported a surge of public drunkenness in Darwin, which they attributed 
to Wadeye drinkers away from home.50 In an extraordinary reaction to 
this development, the Assistant Commissioner of Police suggested that 
an Aboriginal licensed club should be developed in Darwin (Bane 1996). 
Analysing the events
Numerous historical, social and cultural factors contributed to the 
difficulties faced by the people of Wadeye as they tried to inaugurate and 
sustain a social club that was based, ostensibly, on the idea of ‘learning to 
drink’ in a manageable way. ‘Learning to drink’ might have been the goal 
articulated by the Leary team, and by the Catholic brothers who applied 
for the licence, but it was not (necessarily) the goal of the bulk of Wadeye 
drinkers. Learning new ways to drink was always going to be challenging 
at Wadeye.
Social and demographic factors
The Port Keats–Wadeye region was known to be socially volatile. Although 
the Indigenous inhabitants had had friendly encounters with Macassan 
trepang fishermen in the eighteenth century (Hercus & Sutton 1986: 47), 
early European commentators, such as Alfred Searcy and WEH Stanner, 
49  In April 1998, Wadeye council proposed yet another new liquor licence of some kind, a plan 
supported by the Liquor Commission registrar, David Rice. However, this never eventuated (Northern 
Territory News 1998).
50  It is difficult to establish the reliability of the claim that the ‘surge’ of public drunkenness in 
Darwin was caused by Wadeye people rather than drinkers from anywhere else.
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described them as fearless, ‘ferocious’ and hostile to interlopers.51 With 
six Indigenous language groups and 20 different clan estates in a region 
rich in natural food resources, battles and raids between the various 
language groups were not uncommon (Taylor 2004). The original Port 
Keats mission was founded in 1935. In 1939, it moved to Wadeye, a few 
kilometres away on the land of a Murrinh Patha-speaking people, the Yek 
Diminin. As happened elsewhere, the mission attracted Aboriginal people 
from a wide region, concentrating them, over a relatively short-time span 
(around 70 years), into one densely settled area. Although ceremonially 
allied, these groups had always been spatially dispersed.52 Hence, relations 
between the different groups were often fraught. To lessen conflict and 
keep the peace, the first missionary introduced a rotation system in which 
only half the ‘outside’ groups could be in the community at any one time 
(Falkenberg 1962: 18). This demonstrates the extent to which Wadeye 
was, and still is, a complex community. Composed of a mixture of large 
and small clan groups, all of whom have affiliations requiring them to 
make compromises and to negotiate social arrangement and interactions 
with each other (Ivory 2009: 79), there were fractious social relationships 
to be managed at Wadeye long before the arrival of alcohol. 
A dramatic expansion in the population complicated matters. There was 
a steady rise in population in the post-mission, self-management era. 
During the 1980s, there were an average of 50 births per annum. In 1985, 
when the community made its rather sudden transition from governance 
by the Catholic mission to self-management under the Kardu Numida 
Council, the population was estimated to be 1,156. By the mid-1990s, 
when the council collapsed, the population was estimated to be nearly 
2,000 people (Taylor 2004). Not only had the population grown, but the 
ratio of young to old people had increased dramatically.53 Stanner had 
warned of the implications of the growth of a youthful population for 
social disadvantage at Wadeye back in the 1960s; however, as John Taylor 
(2008: 217) observed, his prescient advice about increasing disadvantage 
went unheeded by government.
51  The coastal area is dotted with tamarind trees planted by these visitors from Sulawesi.
52  In 2010, Wadeye had an estimated population of up to 2,500 people (Taylor 2010: 3).
53  This shift to a youthful population has continued due to improvements in child survival, a high 
fertility rate and high adult mortality: around half the population is now aged less than 18 (Taylor 
2010: 10).
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This meant that, at the time of the last concerted effort to open a viable 
social club in 1995, the older generation in the community were 
confronted by a crisis of authority and leadership. As Taylor’s (2004, 
2010) work on the demography of the region has shown, the considerable 
population momentum and rise in the number of youths and young 
adults overwhelmed community institutions such as the Kardu Numida 
Council. The weakening of customary means of community control, 
usually enacted by senior men and women, further complicating the 
situation (Desmarchelier 2001). From around 1987 onwards, youth 
gangs, or ‘mobs’, who named themselves after heavy metal bands and 
adopted their iconography, proliferated at Wadeye (cf. Brady 1992, 
Mansfield 2013: 154).54 These pressures, and the demographic imbalance 
between young and old, created two colliding forces: a burgeoning youth 
sub-culture that included young men whose behaviour was antisocial (e.g. 
smashing the church windows), and who frequented the club and were 
unresponsive to adult remonstrations; and older people, such as Freddie 
Cumaiyi, who were able to invoke the necessary authority to recruit and 
direct participants in the risky plan to wreck the club. 
Legitimising intervention
It is neither common nor culturally acceptable for Aboriginal people 
(even senior people) to intervene as directly in the affairs of others as 
did Freddie Cumaiyi and his companions on the occasion of the club-
wrecking. Numerous social scientists working in Aboriginal communities, 
including myself, have documented a distinct reluctance to interfere in 
other people’s business, criticise their behaviour or attempt to persuade 
them to do something they do not wish to do—such as stop drinking or 
sniffing petrol (Myers 1979, Sansom 1980, Brady 1992, 2004). People 
resist being bossed around and have a strong sense of personal autonomy. 
The prevailing feeling, as David McKnight (2002: 206) observed, is that 
if someone wants to get drunk, they have the right to do so, and no one 
can stop them. This makes the action taken by Freddie Cumaiyi and the 
‘AA people’ even more extraordinary.
54  At Wadeye, the upsurge in metal ‘mobs’ coincided with the arrival of television and broadcasts 
of the music video program Rage (Mansfield 2013).
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Although he was a senior man, Cumaiyi was not a member of the Kardu 
Diminin clan that owned the land on which the community, and the 
club, was located.55 Arguably, in orchestrating the wrecking of the club, 
he was acting beyond the limits of his authority. Therefore, he had to 
strategically demonstrate that his actions had legitimacy. There were 
several events that provided him with sufficient justification for his action, 
but these still had to be socially and culturally sanctioned and legitimised. 
Cumaiyi had repeatedly and publicly expressed anxiety about the safety 
of women and children in the community: these were incontestable 
concerns that provided him with a socially acceptable justification for the 
action that he and others took. Expressing concern about the health and 
safety of children, especially, was unchallengeable, even by the drinkers or 
those in opposition to Cumaiyi’s position. It is significant that the health 
workers’ letters to the Liquor Commission also focused primarily on the 
effect of drinking on children. 
As mentioned, the breaking of the church windows by drunks seems to 
have been the decisive insult that provided the final trigger for action 
to be taken. The assault on the church building was both actual and 
symbolic: it  constituted a physical assault on a building that had been 
constructed by community members and it also represented an attack on 
the (Catholic) spiritual practice and values that permeated the lives of the 
older generation. For these reasons, it was a critical incident. Coming after 
a downward spiral of violence, unrest and homicide, it provided Cumaiyi 
and the non-drinkers with a recognisable excuse for action. In attacking 
the club, Cumaiyi and the members of the alcohol awareness group 
were inspired by the ‘tough love’ they had learned about in meetings: 
they were  literally performing tough love through their actions, which 
demonstrated that they would no longer play the role of ‘enablers’ or 
‘co-dependents’ in their relationships with drinkers. 
Further legitimising his right to intervene in other people’s business in 
this way, Cumaiyi reminded onlookers that he was a ceremonial man: 
a  senior Law man held in high regard for his ceremonial involvement. 
He  deliberately arrayed his body with signifiers of seniority and 
ceremonial significance: he wore body paint and a red loincloth (the naga) 
and he carried traditional weapons. In short, he created a performance. 
At Wadeye, the red naga is worn primarily for men’s ceremonies, although 
55  However, Freddie’s mother’s country was located at a site called Wentek Nganayi, now an 
outstation, which was the location of the original Port Keats mission in 1935.
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it is also worn at public dance performances.56 Some observers recalled 
that Cumaiyi carried an axe and a woomera—the latter signified that 
he was a senior leader of a clan group. Significantly, the main weapon 
he carried was a shovel-nosed spear. The shovel spear, as opposed to the 
lighter, three-pronged ‘wire’ spear, is a serious weapon. Sometimes as 
‘much as ten feet long’, it was the main hunting and fighting weapon:
It is bamboo-shafted and has a lanceolate blade laboriously rubbed down 
from iron fence-droppers or heavy-gauge roofing … its efficacy is a 
function of the strength of the thrower’s arm, aided of course by his skill. 
(Stanner 1979: 75)
It was the spear with which Wadeye people had settled their differences in 
the past, and it still carries authority today. In wielding this spear, Cumaiyi 
effectively communicated his intention to fight, or at least to make a very 
strong statement. The spear demonstrated that he meant business.
The wrecking of the club showed that the community had reached 
a tipping point. The behaviour of young men had pushed others in the 
population beyond their customary level of tolerance. Like many other 
Aboriginal communities with alcohol in their midst, Wadeye residents 
had long tolerated high levels of disruption, sleeplessness, violence and 
abuse, dealing with it through unconfrontational and indirect means. 
Thus, intra- and inter-community factors (which included the long 
history of disparate and fractious groups, the rapid population rise, the 
number of young people and their unrestrained behaviour, and the fragile 
local government) contributed to the decline in standards at the club and 
to high levels of social unrest and fearfulness in the community.
Management and regulation issues
Apart from social volatility, there were other, proximate influences on the 
club’s fortunes and stability that led to its demise, such as the quality of 
various managers. In conversations about the club, Wadeye people often 
referred to the role of club managers; many volunteered the names of 
managers who they thought did a ‘good job’ as opposed to poor managers 
who put profits before people—‘more grog, more profit’. The wrecking of 
the club in 1988 occurred during the time of a profit-oriented manager. 
56  The red naga, or loincloth, is worn by Aboriginal people in many top end NT communities for 
ceremonial and public dance performances. The term ‘naga’ was documented in 1879 as being the 
Woolner language term for ‘clothing, covering’.
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In  1995, at the time of the attempted rearrangement of the club’s 
governance structure, several interviewees recalled a well-liked manager, 
referred to here as ‘GD’:
[We] had pool tables when it was GD. He used to make sure boys only 
came once for their 4 cans. GD was best manager, he made a stage for 
band, had funds to go to the church and school, he helped them. When 
I used to work for GD, if people tried to get a second round, it wasn’t 
fair, they would ban them and put their name on the board. There was 
a committee [the speaker was a member] met every fortnight to see how 
much money in there, how much they paid for barge [bringing supplies]. 
[It was] his own idea. He reckon, ‘it’s all your money, from the people’. 
Other than undertaking the necessary checks required under the Liquor 
Act to ensure that a candidate was a ‘fit and proper person’ for the job, 
it seems that neither the Liquor Commission nor any other agency 
assisted the community to hire appropriate managers by advising them 
of the qualities to look for. The job of managing the club at Wadeye—
indeed, managing any club in a remote Aboriginal community—arguably 
required much more than simply being a fit and proper person. 
Clubs in Aboriginal communities are unusually demanding liquor 
licences to manage. They are often located in geographically isolated areas, 
which makes normal monitoring and inspections by authorised bodies 
more difficult. Wadeye is situated on the edge of coastal mangroves, 
320 km southwest of Darwin, and is accessible by rough roads for only 
six months of the year. The club manager at Wadeye had to navigate 
competing pressures and interest groups within the community, and liaise 
with the local Aboriginal council (his employers) and the management 
committee of the club, while dealing firmly with a highly contentious and 
volatile commodity: alcohol. Making decisions about the revenue from 
alcohol sales, including the extent to which revenue could be sacrificed 
to minimise alcohol-related harms—matters that required a high degree 
of integrity and nerve—gave the club manager considerable power and 
influence. Liquor Commission policy and outreach did not extend to 
giving ‘troubleshooting’ advice on how to negotiate these local, social and 
cultural aspects of licensing in an Aboriginal setting. As far as the day-to-
day matters of club management and operation went, the community was 
on its own. It did not always choose wisely.
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Regulation issues were the responsibility of the Territory’s Liquor 
Commission. The fact that a significant segment of the community 
had to resort to ‘self-help’ to deal with the club, reflected badly on the 
Commission.57 Despite the accumulation of warning signs at Wadeye 
(i.e. violence, social unrest, homicide and the selection of inappropriate 
club managers), in the years and months prior to the wrecking, the only 
strategy brought to bear by the Liquor Commission was the relatively 
crude mechanism of closing the club, which it did periodically. According 
to Tangentyere Council (1991), the actions of the Liquor Commission 
revealed its ‘indifference to the community’s alcohol problems’. With its 
narrow concentration on administrative detail, the Liquor Commission 
represented a ‘regime that was really remote from the lives of [the] people’ 
(91, 94). Media representatives covering the Darwin court hearings in 
1989 asked pointed questions about the Liquor Commission’s role in 
the decline in standards at the Wadeye club, suggesting that the court 
case would bring ‘new attention’ to the Commission. One reporter asked 
McDonald whether he thought the Commission had been ‘a little bit too 
easy going in keeping the Wadeye licence going?’58 The solicitor replied 
that, while it was easy to criticise the Liquor Commission, it faced a huge 
problem:
Over nine years there were 26 suspensions of the licence. And in that time 
a person’s hoped that things would get better. The track record is that it 
didn’t. There were homicides, there were brawls, huge ugly and violent 
incidents. Finally, a large group of people said we’ve had enough, we can’t 
take this anymore and took it upon themselves to close the club peaceably 
but effectively and I think the Liquor Commission really has got to think, 
‘now what do we do? Is the social evil caused by this club so great that 
we should contemplate a different course, or simply as the people said, 
we want the club closed down for ever?’
Throughout much of the period in question, the relationship between 
the Liquor Commission and Aboriginal communities (in general) 
was characterised by a ‘lack of effective communication and ongoing 
consultation’ (Race Discrimination Commissioner 1995: 54). In the years 
between 1986 and 1989, the Commission made numerous controversial 
57  After the trial of the club wreckers, one of the acquitted men urged other communities to follow 
their example and destroy their drinking clubs, implying that the situation in other communities’ 
licensed outlets was also less than ideal (transcripts of ABC radio broadcasts 6 December 1989, 
Tangentyere Council 1991: 92). 
58  ABC News Radio Darwin 6 December 1989. Transcribed from taped interviews provided 
by Colin McDonald and Jonathan Hunyor.
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decisions that were perceived as unduly favourable to the liquor industry 
(Race Discrimination Commissioner 1995: 49).59 Adding to its poor 
image, the chair of the Liquor Commission resisted suggestions that there 
should be greater Aboriginal representation on the Commission (Race 
Discrimination Commissioner 1995: 51).60
Apart from highlighting the inadequate responses of the Liquor 
Commission, the rise and fall of the Murrinh Patha Social Club provides 
some salutary lessons for the well-meaning Catholic fathers, brothers and 
nuns of the Mission of the Sacred Heart at Wadeye, as well as for the 
various branches of government dealing with health, alcohol management 
and liquor regulation. The history of the club demonstrates that good 
intentions and agreed upon rules of behaviour are not enough to influence 
what happens outside club hours and beyond club boundaries, especially 
in a fractious community in which interpersonal violence has become 
normalised, and community members have limited powers of persuasion 
over the behaviour of fellow residents. 
Grassroots activism
Notwithstanding a culturally embedded ethic of non-interference in, 
and tolerance of, other people’s activities and freedoms, an accumulation 
of traumatic incidents or ‘spark factors’ may serve as a catalyst, pushing 
people beyond their limits (May et al. 1993, Edwards et al. 2000). 
The orchestrated attack on the club at Wadeye is a vivid example. 
The incident happened at the beginning of series of community 
mobilisations—mostly led by Aboriginal women—that took the form 
of public demonstrations outside liquor outlets, petitions and marches 
against grog. Beginning in the late 1980s as a truly grassroots movement, 
and gathering momentum in the 1990s, Aboriginal community 
59  Controversial decisions under Liquor Commission Chair KG Rae included the granting of 
a bottle shop licence to the Gap Hotel in Alice Springs in 1986, despite numerous objections from the 
community; in 1989, the Commission renewed the Curtin Springs takeaway licence (near Uluru), 
in the face of a barrage of objections. The hearing was later the subject of a Northern Territory 
Supreme Court appeal, after which the Commission’s decision was reviewed (Race Discrimination 
Commissioner 1995: 45, note 181). In March 1989, the Commission, under Rae, granted a takeaway 
licence for Erldunda roadhouse, despite evidence from numerous witnesses of the enormous alcohol-
related problems faced by Aboriginal communities in that region of central Australia (Centralian 
Advocate 23 March 1989).
60  Tangentyere Council suggested that the Liquor Commission should appoint one person with 
Aboriginal health expertise and have some Aboriginal advisory committees (Westman 1989). 
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activism around alcohol abuse can be likened to an Aboriginal 
women’s  temperance movement (see Chapter 5 for a fuller discussion). 
Women’s participation in the attack on the Murrinh Patha Club served 
to embolden Aboriginal  women elsewhere. On Bathurst (one of the 
Tiwi Islands), Aboriginal women began to agitate against drunken 
behaviour in December 1988. At the request of the mother’s club there 
and the Nguiu Council, the Liquor Commission cancelled all personal 
permits to possess alcohol on Bathurst Island, making it illegal to drink 
anywhere other than at the Nguiu Club (O’Loughlin 1988). When it 
became apparent that this strategy was not working, Aboriginal women 
on Bathurst Island threatened to close down the club, citing ‘big trouble’ 
there, fighting, drunkenness and the continued service of intoxicated 
people (Bonner 1989: 3). Bathurst Island and Wadeye shared close 
associations and communication networks: both were (former) Catholic 
missions and Aboriginal residents and Catholic brothers frequently moved 
between the two locations.61 The diffusion of direct action ideas against 
drinkers was, therefore, not surprising. 
Eighteen months after the Wadeye club attack, in July 1990, several 
hundred women from Pitjantjatjara communities on the South Australia 
– Northern Territory border, marched on a remote roadhouse at Curtin 
Springs, made speeches in opposition to its liquor licence and presented a 
letter to the Liquor Commission calling for restrictions on sales of takeaway 
alcohol. Their activism continued for several years until restrictions were 
eventually achieved. The three Aboriginal women leading the action 
were aware of what had happened at Wadeye, and were inspired by the 
active role taken by female health workers and members of the AA group 
there.62 In March 1993, Aboriginal women from Hermannsburg travelled 
to Alice Springs to demonstrate against the granting of a liquor licence 
at a delicatessen. This relatively small action was followed by a  highly 
publicised and much bigger ‘march against grog’ in Alice Springs, which 
involved hundreds of Aboriginal men, women and children from five 
remote communities (Northern Territory News 1993: 6, Brady 2004: 84). 
Like Freddie Cumaiyi, these women expressed fears about the future of 
their children and grandchildren, thereby deploying culturally acceptable 
reasons to justify their interventionist stance. These events are explored 
more fully in the next chapter. 
61  Brother Howley and Father Leary spent time at both missions.
62  These leaders were Tjikalyi Colin, Nora Ward and Mantatjara Wilson (Maggie Kavanagh, pers 
comm, 26 September 2014). 
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The ruins of the Murrinh Patha Social Club still stand today, inscribed 
with identifying tags and graffiti of the different gangs that are prevalent 
in the community, primarily the Judas Priests and the Evil Warriors. Many 
Wadeye residents travel to the club at Peppimenarti to drink: others travel 
further afield to obtain grog; some drinkers have road accidents, and some 
die as a result. People at Wadeye continue to debate whether to have a club 
again. In 2009, one of Freddie Cumaiyi’s descendants observed:
Don’t reckon we’ll have a club again. Lot of trouble. It’s better this way. 
Young boys—trouble. Bonnie [Boniface Perdjert] was talking about 




1  Tyeweretye = ‘getting together’ or ‘people being together’. This information comes from Betty 
Pearce, then a key member of Tangentyere Council (pers comm, 8 August 2008). 
The rise and fall of the Tyeweretye 
Club: A case study
While most of the lobbying, political and otherwise, for Aboriginal 
people to have their own licensed canteens or clubs envisaged facilities 
in remote bush communities—‘out of sight, out of mind’—some people 
proposed town-based social clubs designed for, and owned by, Aboriginal 
people. One was the Woden Town Club in Canberra, which catered 
largely for Aboriginal public servants (see Chapter 6). Another was the 
Tyeweretye Club, a licensed premise south of Alice Springs that opened in 
1993 and closed in 2005. ‘Tyeweretye’ in Western Arrernte means ‘people 
being together’.1 The Tyeweretye Club polarised opinion in the town 
and beyond, affecting Aboriginal groups, their representative bodies, the 
Northern Territory Government and the Liquor Commission. Arguments 
for and against its explicit strategy of ‘teaching’ moderate drinking lasted 
for more than a decade.
Lobbying for a club in Alice Springs
The idea for an Aboriginal club in Alice Springs was first floated in 1975 
by Aboriginal men who were interviewed as part of a study of alcohol use 
sponsored by the Regional Council for Social Development. The report’s 
title, 40 gallons a head, referred to the author, Liz Wauchope’s (1975) 
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estimate that the population of the southern region of the Northern 
Territory consumed 40.9  gal of beer, per person, every year—almost 
twice as much as any other heavy-drinking community for which data 
were available (3). Wauchope made this estimate before it became possible 
to calculate alcohol consumption using the percentage of pure alcohol 
in drinks.2 Questionnaires were circulated to residents of Alice Springs, 
and 300 randomly selected households were interviewed with the help 
of a young Aboriginal field officer from the Aboriginal Medical Centre, 
Geoffrey Shaw.3 At the time, there were approximately 20 Aboriginal 
‘fringe camps’ on the outskirts of town, with people living in shanties, 
tents and humpies; 30 of these residents were also interviewed for the 
study—mostly young Aboriginal men, all of whom were drinkers. The 
young men spoke of the social pressures to drink, their personal problems, 
bad living conditions and the fact that they had no viable employment or 
entertainment as alternatives to drinking; they were especially concerned 
about the drinking of methylated spirits in the camps. They thought 
they should have better living conditions and, perhaps surprisingly, they 
believed that there should be fewer liquor outlets and more control over 
sales. Asked what would help them to stop or better control their drinking 
(all but one said they wished to do this), Wauchope noted that:
Most replied that there is a need for an Aboriginal club with pleasant facilities 
where they can be among friends in a relaxed environment. Opinion was 
divided as to whether this should be licensed or not. Most believed that 
meaningful employment, particularly out bush, would lessen alcohol 
consumption. (14, emphasis added) 
The following year, the HRSCAA was asked by the Minister 
for  Aboriginal  Affairs, Ian Viner, to examine the effect of alcohol on 
Aboriginal  communities. Chaired by Philip Ruddock, the HRSCAA 
conducted hearings throughout the country in 1976 and 1977, and 
received submissions from interested parties. The Central Australian 
Aboriginal Congress (CAAC), a new community-controlled health 
service based in Alice Springs, sent in a lengthy and detailed submission. 
Written by its senior medical officer, Dr Trevor Cutter, the CAAC’s (1976) 
submission also raised the issue of a social club:
2  The Regional Council for Social Development was chaired by Mr EA Robertson, Labor Senator 
for the Northern Territory, 1975–87. The study was prompted by community concerns over alcohol 
abuse and the decriminalisation of public drunkenness: as of 21 October 1975, intoxicated people 
could be taken into protective custody without charge.
3  Twenty years later, Geoff Shaw became the general manager of Tangentyere Council, representing 
Aboriginal residents of Alice Springs.
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One of the most urgent needs within Alice Springs is the development of 
an effective and social club where Aboriginal People can meet and socialize 
utilizing alcohol as a social cohesive factor rather than an obstructive one. 
At present, Aboriginal People are forced to use one Hotel in Alice Springs 
(the Alice Springs Hotel); this is the only hotel which provides a service 
to tribal Aboriginal people. Other Hotels due to mainly dress regulations 
provides alcohol only to whites and urban Aboriginal People. This social 
club could be effectively developed linking to the Football and other 
sporting bodies which could provide meals and family activities. It would 
develop an important educative role and provide some cohesion to the 
Aboriginal communities … Whites generally are fully housed, live within 
urban Alice Springs and Tennant Creek, have motor vehicles and have 
a large number of clubs and hotels that they can drink within. Aboriginal 
People having only one Hotel4 and the river bed and having to come to 
town to drink. (1196–97, emphasis added)
At that time in Alice Springs, there were 51 licensed outlets: 17 stores, 
which included supermarkets, 16 restaurants or private hotels, seven 
clubs, eight liquor merchants and three public hotels (Wauchope 
1975: 3). Notwithstanding the number of licensed outlets, it was a time 
when Aboriginal people were often served from ‘dog windows’ at the rear 
of premises (Commonwealth of Australia 1977, Hansard, 4 June 1976: 
1289). Aboriginal people were excluded from many on-licensed premises 
by dress regulations: ‘the blacker your skin the tidier you have to be’, one 
Aboriginal man explained (Harold Furber, cited in Simmons 1988: 6). 
This restricted access to on-licensed premises was one cause of the 
uncontrolled consumption of takeaway alcohol, which was increasingly 
accessible in hotel bottle shops and supermarkets. 
Nothing came of these early suggestions for a town club until the 1980s, 
when another Aboriginal organisation, Tangentyere Council, began to 
push for the establishment of such a facility. With responsibility for, 
and representation from, residents of the town camps, Tangentyere took 
the initiative on a growing public drinking problem in Alice Springs by 
commissioning several research reports. By the early 1980s, Alice Springs 
was becoming something of a tourist town, and keeping drunks away from 
the public eye was an ongoing concern of the civic authorities. Despite the 
advent of the Northern Territory’s ‘Two Kilometre Law’ in 1982, which 
4  There was also the Riverside Hotel, licensed in 1959 (now known as the Todd Tavern). It had 
a bar, known as the ‘Snake pit’, which was gradually abandoned by non-Aboriginal drinkers, and 
became predominantly an Aboriginal bar. The licensee eventually took all the furniture away because 
the chairs were used in fights (Brady fieldnotes).
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made public drinking illegal within 2  km of a licensed establishment, 
unconstrained drinking in the open, and in the town camps, was 
a significant problem. The law was a clever government strategy designed 
to covertly target Aboriginal drinking by imposing spatial, rather than 
racial, constraints (d’Abbs 2012). One researcher counted 17 open-air 
drinking spots around Alice Springs, excluding the riverbeds; in a single 
weekend, over 180 Aboriginal people used the dry Todd River for social 
drinking (Simmons 1988: 7). The Two Kilometre Law drove Aboriginal 
drinkers into the town camps, causing ‘severe repercussions’ (Buckell 
1986: 9) for the residents there. The law provoked an ‘unprecedented 
period of violence’ (O’Connor 1983: 8), as non-drinkers now had to deal 
with increased numbers of drunks and associated problems of domestic 
violence. Bill Ferguson, a non-Aboriginal man who was a town camp 
resident and who later became the manager of the Tyeweretye Club, 
witnessed the poverty and drunkenness provoked by the Two Kilometre 
Law. He recalled that violence in the camps was ‘terrible, houses would 
be knocked down as quick as built, women bashed. No-one was game to 
go to the camps’.5
In 1983, Tangentyere Council convened a subcommittee to oppose the 
Two Kilometre Law, which grew into the Tangentyere Liquor Committee, 
a grassroots planning hub on alcohol issues in Alice Springs and the town 
camps.6 The Liquor Committee7 concentrated its efforts on two strategies: 
it opposed applications for new takeaway liquor licences, especially those 
associated with food outlets and shops (Lyon 1990), and took up the idea 
of having Aboriginal-controlled venues for drinking. As Buckell (1986: 9) 
observed:
Drinking was not going to disappear, and the establishment of many 
strong Aboriginal organisations in town during the 1970s … had given 
people an opportunity to organise. These organisations also encouraged 
a sense too, perhaps for the first time in living memory, of something to 
fight for in the battle against grog abuse.
5  Bill Ferguson, pers comm, 6 August 2008.
6  Tangentyere Council supported grassroots initiatives such as ‘Grog Forums’, local alcohol 
workers, an alcohol planning unit and a Social Behaviour Project designed to improve rules of 
behaviour for visitors to town camps.
7  The Tangentyere Liquor Committee had representatives from each of the town camps and 
included Eli Rabuntja (Chairman of Tangentyere Council), Doug Abbott (President of Congress), 
Tony Booth, Doug Walker, Bill Ferguson and Sue Craig.
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The Tangentyere Liquor Committee’s main concern was the absence of:
Retail bar outlets at which [Aboriginal people] can drink legally and 
harmoniously in Alice Springs … Aboriginal people are not accepted 
in hotels or the clubs in town and therefore everything possible should 
be done to give them facilities where they can socialise together in an 
environment that they can control. (Hungerfords 1986: 4)
In 1986, the Stuart Arms Hotel was demolished to make way for 
a shopping complex, depriving Aboriginal drinkers of a popular drinking 
spot; its corner bar was affectionately nicknamed the ‘burri bar’8 (Buckell 
1986). Tangentyere Council used the occasion to publicise its concern 
that, without controlled drinking venues, there was little hope of making 
inroads into alcohol abuse. Aboriginal social clubs, they said, ‘would 
be places not only for drinkers, but for all the family, with wet and dry 
bars, recreation facilities, health, transport and social support services’ 
(Ferguson 1986: 9). The Liquor Committee proposed the establishment 
of Aboriginal-controlled social clubs ‘where “safe” drinking patterns can 
be developed and modelled for younger people’ (Simmons 1988: 18, 
Coughlan 1991). The proposal was designed to create ‘healthier, socially 
acceptable drinking patterns in the Aboriginal community’ (Tangentyere 
Council 1991: 95). Tangentyere Council became the driving force behind 
what was to be a long struggle to establish an urban Aboriginal club. 
The process coincided with widespread polarised debate in the Northern 
Territory about alcohol and Aboriginal people, and the emergence of 
a grassroots anti-grog movement.
Plans and consultations
With the help of academic researchers, Tangentyere Council used clinical 
research literature on ‘social learning’ and ‘controlled drinking’ to support 
its case, much as the research team led by John Leary had done in 1975 
(Leary et al. 1975: 27) (see Chapter 4). While acknowledging that 
there were problems in using clubs as a means of educating people into 
better drinking styles, Tangentyere Council (1991: 95) cited behavioural 
research on changing dependent drinkers into social drinkers. One of the 
references they cited questioned earlier positive findings that alcoholics 
had learned to engage in moderate or controlled drinking (Pendery et al. 
8  Burri = ‘brother’ or ‘friend’.
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1982), and while most of the studies reported on behaviour modification 
during treatment, none demonstrated that a licensed venue could bring 
about lasting change to drinking styles. However, Tangentyere Council 
argued a subtler point: that Aboriginal ownership and control of the outlet 
would, in itself, change people’s drinking behaviour. They explained:
We are expected to drink it and we are expected to die from it, but we 
are not expected to have agency in it. I am not advocating the wholesale 
selling of alcohol to Aboriginal people by Aboriginal people, but that 
is what is happening from the broader community and we do not have 
any agency whatsoever in the liquor side of things. I think what I am 
saying is that we need agency. Having agency, we can bring about control 
… Learning to associate alcohol with food is something that has never 
been tried. Learning to use alcohol in an environment in which you own 
and control it or it is owned and controlled by other Aboriginal people 
is something that has never been tried. (Tilmouth 2001: 436)
Geoff Shaw, general manager of Tangentyere Council for over 20 years, 
framed owning the club in political terms: ‘The Club is about Aboriginals 
making their own way through life, it’s for people to find comfort drinking 
with their own people. Self determination requires self management’ 
(Northern Territory Liquor Commission 1997: 12).
The original (optimistic and over-complicated) plan was for four 
licensed clubs located in different parts of Alice Springs (north, south, 
east and west) that would cater to different language or social groups 
(i.e. Pitjantjatjara, eastern and western Arrernte and Warlpiri). Initially, 
two clubs were to be built (the North Club and the South Club), to be 
followed by two more at a later stage. With this in mind, the official name 
of the incorporated body was ‘Tyweretye Clubs’, and its constitution 
stated that it aimed to establish, operate and maintain ‘licensed social 
clubs at which Aboriginal people may consume alcohol in a controlled 
environment’. The organisation was ‘always of the opinion that there 
should be more than one club in and around Alice Springs’ (Ferguson 
2003: 88). One prominent Aboriginal woman stated:
We decided the best thing was for four clubs, east, west, north and south. 
So that people would have ownership. If [it’s] not ours, [there’s] no 
respect. The east and northeast mob didn’t get on with the Warlpiri mob.
145
5. THE RISE AND fALL Of THE TyEWERETyE CLUB
An Aboriginal man reiterated this, stressing that when people drink they 
like to choose their drinking companions: 
North side people, you can’t even come through the Gap!9 Couldn’t even 
trust to come through the Gap! People would think ‘[I will] stay here, 
where I can look after myself ’. You get the feel of the town, the feel of the 
grog, so you stay here, drink with mates, stay with their [own] crew, can’t 
go somewhere else. (Tony Booth, pers comm, May 2009)
Reinforcing the desire for more than one club as a way of minimising 
trouble, several local people (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) spoke about 
changes to hotels in the town in the 1970s and 1980s, which they felt had 
exacerbated conflict within the Aboriginal community. Hotels in Alice 
Springs had been, in some respects, more welcoming to Aboriginal people 
back in the 1960s: in those days, there were lax dress requirements, larger 
bars, beer gardens and ‘plenty room’ to move around; Aboriginal people 
could reconnoitre, see who was there and whether there were people to 
avoid. Tony Booth, an Aboriginal man who worked at the Central 
Australian Aboriginal Alcohol Planning Unit (CAAAPU), recalled:
When they started off in ‘64 [when drinking rights came in] they 
[Aboriginal people] had a pub, big rooms, food, plenty room. Pub had a 
beer garden too. Them two, Stuart and ‘Underdowns’ [The Hotel Alice] 
they had a beer garden.10 Stuart Arms had different saloon bars. Not many 
people in pub then, 10 here, 10 there, different mob, moving around, 
changing round the pub. Now it’s closed in. You might not want to meet 
up with someone [you could choose where you drank and who with in 
those early days compared with now]. 
While proposing four clubs ‘raised the eyebrows of bureaucrats’ (Buckell 
1986: 9), some commentators stated, candidly, that the idea ‘was to have 
four clubs where different language groups could go without running into 
each other’ (Tilmouth 2001):
The Clubs must reflect traditional Aboriginal identity, and provide suitable 
places for the separate language groups … They must firstly attract drinkers 
who are in the creek beds and on the camps, and secondly encourage them 
to seek alternatives to binge drinking. The Liquor Committee believes 
this can only happen if the structure and organisation of the Clubs reflects 
and supports traditional systems of authority. (Buckell 1986: 9)
9  Heavitree Gap is known as the entrance to Alice Springs from the south; it is named after a gap 
in the McDonnell Ranges. It is an Arrernte site. 
10  The Hotel Alice had a big square yard at the back dubbed ‘Madison Square Gardens’ because 
of all the fights that took place there (Dick Kimber, pers comm, 1 August 2008).
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The Liquor Committee consulted widely. It hired accounting firm KMG 
Hungerfords to prepare an operational and financial proposal for the 
clubs. KMG, which had its own club and hotel management services 
unit, advised Tangentyere Council on the staffing levels and costs involved 
in training Aboriginal staff in hospitality, literacy and numeracy, and 
provided advice on issues of alcohol abuse and rehabilitation.11 KMG 
staff spent a week in Alice Springs meeting with Tangentyere Council 
representatives and assessing the financial viability of the clubs. Based 
on the population of Aboriginal people in Alice Springs and surrounds, 
they estimated that approximately 1650 people would use the clubs on 
a regular basis. The consultants estimated (over optimistically, as it turned 
out) that a pricing structure like that of other clubs would yield a 45 per 
cent gross profit.12 They also estimated that income from poker machines 
could be in the vicinity of $72,000 per annum.13 Overall, their report was 
positive. They concluded: 
Based on a suitable level of support from funding bodies, a continuation 
of the energetic support and initiatives from senior members of the 
Aboriginal community, and an acceptance by the general body of local 
Aboriginal people, the clubs: should be largely self-funding; and will 
provide a tangible opportunity for the community to address several 
social difficulties in a sensible concerned manner. (Hungerfords 1986: 18)
Tangentyere Council approached potential funding bodies, interested 
government agencies, the police and the Alice Springs Town Council 
(Buckell 1986), and received support from influential bodies including the 
DAA, the ADC and the Northern Territory Department of Community 
Development. A Northern Territory Legislative Assembly (1991) inquiry 
into the use and abuse of alcohol was supportive, as was the Northern 
Territory Government’s LWA program. Initiated in 1991, LWA was 
a progressive and bold public health strategy directed at reducing alcohol-
related harm in the Northern Territory; it was personally supported by 
the Northern Territory Chief Minister, and answered directly to him.14 
11  This was to be provided by the Gillen House School of Tourism and Hospitality, part of the 
Central Australian Community College.
12  The KMG report priced drinks at other clubs in Alice Springs, such as the Verdi Club and 
sporting clubs, and it listed the membership fees charged by other clubs in Alice Springs at the time. 
13  The inclusion of poker machines in the club appears to have been uncontested at this time. 
14  LWA was originally funded through a levy on alcohol products containing more than 3 per cent 
alcohol, which raised millions of dollars. However, in 1997, the High Court disallowed the states and 
territories from raising revenue in such a manner and the LWA program had to develop alternative 
funding mechanisms. LWA has since lapsed (National Drug Research Institute and Lewin Fordham 
Group 1999).
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LWA focused on changing drinking styles—reining in and transforming 
the big-drinking Territory culture to a less damaging drinking style: 
the Tyweretye Club fitted with this aim. Chief Minister Marshall 
Perron and Dr Shirley Hendy, Director of LWA, offered in-principle 
support for Aboriginal social clubs, provided their conditions benefited 
communities.15 Both sides of politics supported the Tyeweretye Club.16 
The deputy commissioner of police and the Aboriginal health service in 
Alice Springs were also supportive, as were several prominent Aboriginal 
people including, Geoff Shaw, Lutheran pastor Eli Rubuntja, Pat Turner 
and Betty Pearce. Charles Perkins, an advocate of Aboriginal-owned 
licensed clubs, gave early assistance to the Tangentyere Liquor Committee 
in the form of a DAA grant to help with consultations.17 
Fig. 17 ‘Drink Less for Your Family’, Living with Alcohol banner
Source: M Brady
15  Dr Shirley Hendy, pers comm, 13 August 2009.
16  On the Labor side, local members Neil Bell, Peter Toyne and Brian Ede were supportive, as was 
Dr Richard Lim, the CLP member for the electorate of Greatorex, which is where the club was 
eventually located. 
17  Brady fieldnotes, Bill Ferguson, pers comm, 6 August 2008. 
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However, the harm-reduction model was unpopular among advocates 
of abstinence, such as Aboriginal sobriety groups, supporters of AA 
and some Aboriginal women’s groups. Believers in abstinence usually 
reject the notion that ‘alcoholics’ can ever learn to drink in moderation 
(cf. Brady 2004: 69–73), and some opposition to the club was ferocious. 
Unusually, the Liquor Commission,18 then chaired by Kelvin Rae, was 
opposed to the club. Prominent Aboriginal ATSIC commissioner Alison 
Hunt also spoke out against the club, as did Alison Anderson, chair of 
Papunya Council, and Aboriginal actor and activist Rosalie Kunoth-
Monks. Some Aboriginal women from town camps on the south side 
of town also objected. The Alice Springs Town Council was against the 
club.19 By far the most organised opposition to the idea of a licensed 
Aboriginal club in Alice Springs came from Aboriginal women beyond 
Alice Springs: the Ngaanyatjarra, Pitjantjatjara, Yankunytjatjara (NPY) 
Women’s Council, and the women of other regional communities, such 
as Hermannsburg. In an unlikely alliance, the NPY Women’s Council and 
the Liquor Commission managed to prevent the Tyeweretye Club from 
obtaining a liquor licence for over two years.
The Northern Territory Country Liberal Party (CLP), then in government, 
supported the club. Hoping that it would help to minimise violence and 
alcohol problems in Alice Springs (Bottral 1990: 3), it granted Tangentyere 
Council 5 ha of relatively rural land, south of the town through Heavitree 
Gap and near the Little Sisters town camp. The site was Tangentyere’s 
third choice (out of 16 potential sites); in the end, only one club was 
built, with a $250,000 loan from the ADC (which was later taken over 
by ATSIC).
The struggle to get licensed
The Tyeweretye Club submitted its first application for a licence to sell 
the full range of liquor in August 1990. Three months later, the Liquor 
Commission refused the application, citing the objections of respondents 
who had had negative experiences of community clubs (Tangentyere 
Council 1991: 95).20 By this time, the club had been built and was open, 
18  Then known as the Liquor, Racing and Gaming Commission.
19  The Alice Springs Town Council, at the time and since, has supported ‘canteens’ and clubs for 
Aboriginal people, but only if they are in bush communities, away from the town.
20  Racing, Gaming and Liquor Commission, Northern Territory, Liquor Division, Tyeweretye 
Club Incorporated Public Hearing, 21–23 August 1990.
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but was only selling non-alcoholic drinks, prompting the headline: ‘Pub 
with no beer offers hope’—which referred to the manager’s ambitions for 
educating future customers towards moderate drinking (Simper 1991: 4).
In May 1991, a second application was submitted to the Liquor 
Commission, this time for a beer-only licence.21 Ten months later, this 
application was also rejected, the Liquor Commission stating that it was 
concerned about the club’s financial capacity. However, the decision 
was also influenced by opposition to the club voiced by Aboriginal women 
from remote communities in central Australia. These objectors thought it 
wrong for Aboriginal people to ‘involve themselves in the sale of liquor 
to other Aboriginals’, as they might perceive that ‘it is quite in order for 
liquor to be consumed to varying levels of intoxication because it is being 
supplied by Aboriginals’ (Northern Territory Liquor Commission 1997: 2, 
emphasis added). The Liquor Commission determined that, even though 
these objectors lived some distance from Alice Springs, they were part of 
the ‘community’ whose views needed to be considered, and it concluded 
that the ‘needs and wishes’ of the community were unfavourable to the 
club licence. Having previously ignored the needs and wishes—and 
consistent petitioning—of these traditional women over the issue of 
roadside takeaway licences, the Liquor Commission was perverse in 
taking account of their views on this occasion. 
In a submission to a Race Discrimination Commission inquiry, Tangentyere 
Council mounted a spirited attack on the Liquor Commission’s rejection 
of its application for an on-premises licence. Seeking to demonstrate the 
Liquor Commission’s mishandling of Aboriginal alcohol-management 
issues, it cited three recent examples: indifference to the growing problems 
of the Murrinh Patha Social Club at Wadeye (described in Chapter 4); 
unresponsiveness to proposals put forward by the Imanpa – Mt Ebenezer 
community (to establish a community club, to upgrade policing and to 
resist takeaway applications from local outlets); and current rejection of the 
Tyeweretye Club’s licence application. This rejection, Tangentyere Council 
claimed, exposed the Liquor Commission’s preference for ‘mediating 
judicial combat rather than contributing to a major project in alcohol 
rehabilitation’. Tangentyere Council asserted that, when turning down 
the licence application, the Liquor Commission had made no attempt 
to discuss the merits of the club’s educational influence (i.e. in teaching 
21  Supporters of this application included Geoffrey Shaw of Tangentyere Council, the police, a local 
MLA and Elliott Johnson QC, head of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody.
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moderation); it had not investigated how the club dovetailed with other 
local programs and strategies; and had not considered the needs of fully 
employed Aboriginal people, some with tertiary qualifications, who had 
no ‘congenial and non-racist’ place to drink, or the needs of ‘controlled’ 
drinkers who wished to avoid the predations of their drunken relatives 
(Tangentyere Council 1991: 96).
Later, after thoughtfully analysing the Liquor Commission’s policy, 
Tangentyere Council appealed the Liquor Commission’s decision in 
the Northern Territory Supreme Court. Their appeal was successful. 
In March 1992, Justice Sally Thomas quashed the Commission’s decision 
to refuse the licence, stating that the Liquor Commission had presented 
no evidence to back up its claim that the club lacked financial skills. 
She found that the views of Aboriginal women in remote communities 
were not shared by residents in Alice Springs,22 and argued that the 
‘community’ whose views mattered most was the community of people 
living or working within the township of Alice Springs (Northern 
Territory Liquor Commission 1997: 3). In a further rebuke, the Race 
Discrimination Commissioner commented that the Liquor Commission’s 
earlier ‘unreasonable’ objection to the club was potentially discriminatory 
(Race Discrimination Commissioner 1995: 34). In 1993, the Chief 
Minister dismissed the incumbent Liquor Commissioner.23 In March that 
year, the Liquor Commission—with different members, a new mission 
statement and policy direction, and new chairman—reconsidered the 
second application and granted the Tyeweretye Club a beer-only licence.
Putting in-house strategies in place
To allow time to conduct induction workshops, the Tyeweretye Club 
refrained from selling beer for six months after the licence was granted. 
The workshops sought to educate board members, most of whom were 
drinkers, about the rules of the Liquor Act as they applied to drinking 
on licensed premises. According to club manager Bill Ferguson, board 
members had been ignorant of the law, and of the expectations of 
behaviour on licensed premises. Ferguson recalled that some club 
members were shocked to discover that patrons who were clearly drunk 
22  Centralian Advocate 30 March 1995: 3.
23  Kelvin Rae was removed; Marshall Perron appointed John Maley to the position in March 1993 
(Centralian Advocate 1993b: 3).
151
5. THE RISE AND fALL Of THE TyEWERETyE CLUB
could not be served more alcohol. This had not been their experience 
in other licensed premises, and many had only ever consumed takeaway 
alcohol in the scrub around Alice Springs.24 Ferguson recalled how the 
rules and regulations of the club were translated into different languages 
and played over loudspeakers in the club ‘so people could learn’. The club 
also advertised its rules on local television. Having had minimal formal 
education, and no training in responsible service or management, 
Ferguson learned the rules by reading the Liquor Act: ‘I had to use my 
head’, he said. 
The club’s constitution was unequivocal (if rather ambitious) about its 
aims, which were to alleviate the effects of social disadvantage, deprivation 
and cultural loss by:
Establishing, operating and maintaining [licensed] Aboriginal social 
clubs at which Aboriginal people may consume alcohol in a controlled 
environment, enhanced by the provision of ancillary services … designed 
to promote a more enlightened attitude to the issue of alcohol and 
Aboriginal people and/or to mitigate the social damage occasioned by 
alcohol abuse in the Alice Springs community and surrounding areas of 
Central Australia. (Tyeweretye Constitution 1999: 3)
Club management put in place a number of policies designed to moderate 
people’s intake and create a pleasant social environment. Food was always 
available, and there were self-service barbecues for people to cook meat 
purchased from the club. There was a mini-mart where people could 
exchange food vouchers,25 and people could buy frozen kangaroo tails 
and pre-packed meats. Groups of women and children often came early 
for breakfast, and there was no pressure on people to drink alcohol. The 
dress rules were not too strict and bare feet were allowed; this was different 
from other clubs and hotels, where, as one customer explained, you had to 
‘dress up like white people’.26 There was a comfortable grassed area outside 
the club, a bandstand and beer garden, a pool table and jukebox, and 
bingo games and raffles. There were six poker machines, but these were 
24  The Tyeweretye Club continued to hold ‘educational’ meetings with its members; for example, in 
1998, there were sessions about the operation of the Two Kilometre Law at which it was discovered that 
the majority of members were unaware that drinking within 2 km of a liquor outlet was unlawful: ‘How 
far was 2 km?’ The Two Kilometre Law had been in force since 1982 (Tangentyere Council 1998). 
25  Tangentyere Council had its own form of voluntary income management in which people signed 
on through Centrelink for a food voucher system. The system was put in place over 25 years ago by 
senior town camp residents. www.tangentyere.org.au/services/finance/food_voucher/ [accessed 29 
July 2014].
26  Jackie Okai’s evidence (Northern Territory Liquor Commission 1997: 9). 
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rarely used and were eventually sold. Initially, the licence allowed for sales 
of beer only, and beers were sold in opened cans. The club encouraged 
people to drink light beer (which was half the price of ‘heavy’ beer). Club 
policy was to close on big entertainment days in Alice Springs, such as the 
Camel Cup or the Rodeo, as these events had their own special short-term 
licences. Friday night was band night; on these nights, the club would 
close at 3 pm to allow a four-hour break before the concert. Tickets cost 
$10 and between 250 and 300 people usually attended. The club made 
valiant efforts to prevent trouble among its clientele; on band nights, for 
example, only low-alcohol beer was sold from 9 pm until midnight. One 
staff member reported:
If a donnybrooks27 started up in the congregation in the club, they’d sort 
it out. We had concerts and had security at the gate with Aboriginal men 
and women security. We had one incident (a stabbing) outside the club 
in ten years.28
Another staff member recalled:
There was a music stage, invited bands to come and play, not to make 
money but to give people what they couldn’t get in town. But a rag-tag 
mob tried to get in and made trouble outside the gates and the media 
got onto it. At one time we employed three full-time properly accredited 
security people to take weapons off people and they removed any drunk 
and disorderly.29
Club members signed in at the front gate, and security workers would 
search people for alcohol and weapons. This was evidently required, as 
sometimes women tried to enter the club with cask bladders in their bras, 
and men with injuries tried to hide bottles in their plaster casts. Ferguson 
could remember only one incident on a Friday night when the police 
were called; however, the police and the night patrol were frequently 
called to attend to disputes among people gathered outside the club. 
Strict adherence to the liquor regulations (in the form of refusing service 
to and evicting intoxicated people) often created problems at the gate, 
partly because many drinkers had not been socialised into the behaviours 
expected of them, and did not understand why they were being refused 
service. This level of ignorance was a reflection (and indictment) of the 
serving practices that Aboriginal people had become accustomed to at 
27  ‘Donnybrooks’ = brawl, fracas.
28  Bill Ferguson, pers comm, 6 August 2008.
29  Gordon Fawcett, pers comm, 7 August 2008.
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the few remaining Alice Springs bars frequented by Aboriginal people, 
particularly the (insultingly named) ‘animal bar’ at the Riverside Tavern, 
which evidently rarely enforced the law.
Fig. 18 Tyeweretye Clubs billboard
Source: M Brady
The challenges of running the club
The manager, a non-Aboriginal man, ran the bar with the help of a barman, 
a position that, for many years, was held by a Maori man. Non-Aboriginal 
club officials reported that it was impossible for Aboriginal men to work 
behind the bar; predictably, they found it difficult when their relations 
demanded free grog. The manager kept a close eye on supplies and the 
till. Nevertheless, as with all such ventures, critics suggested that the rules 
were occasionally bent, as the manager ‘didn’t know how to say “no”’, and 
committee members were ‘bought off’ with alcohol.
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The Tyeweretye Club had to deal with challenges and social issues that 
lay beyond, as well as on, its premises. An ongoing and difficult problem 
to manage concerned the habit many club patrons had of walking on, 
or across, a railway line that, unfortunately, was located near the club’s 
front entrance. After several deaths involving freight trains, the national 
rail authority was forced to come up with better warning systems in 
consultation with Tangentyere Council. Another challenge was the 
press of people attracted to the general area of the club on band nights, 
who brought takeaway supplies, purchased elsewhere, to drink on the 
vacant land near the club. This allowed people to be part of the ‘action’ 
without entering the premises. Among those who entered the club were 
some who left their children waiting outside in parked vehicles. The club 
acted as a magnet to Aboriginal people who had nowhere else to go, and 
the manager frequently had to call the police and the Tangentyere night 
patrol:30
[He] often rings ambulances for people outside the front of the Club, but 
ambulances have only very occasionally attended for persons inside the 
Club, for cases of medical emergencies … people outside the Club on a 
Friday night organise their own liquor supplies. Each Saturday morning 
[the manager] cleans up rubbish from outside the Club premises … [That 
Saturday] he picked up ninety empty wine casks, together with many 
empty bottles of spirits. (Northern Territory Liquor Commission 1997: 6)
Data from the Alice Springs sobering-up shelter showed that, while people 
were picked up intoxicated from the club area, the numbers were small in 
comparison to the number of people brought to the shelter who had been 
picked up from the Todd River bed (Gaff et al. 1997).
Despite all the social activities (e.g. band nights and barbeques), by 1997 
(just four years after it was licensed), the club’s alcohol trade was in decline, 
primarily because of competition presented by cheap takeaways, and the 
easing of restrictions on sales of 4 L wine casks. By the late 1990s, the 
club averaged around 30 customers a day, with trading usually confined 
to two hours in the morning: around lunchtime, most drinkers left for the 
takeaway outlets.31 
30  The sources for this information include Peter Toyne (Minister for Central Australia in the 
1990s); Chris McIntyre (Licensing and Regulation, Liquor Commission); Bill Ferguson (club 
manager); and Gordon Fawcett (club accountant).
31  The three takeaway outlets mentioned were the Heavitree Gap Hotel store, Piggly Wiggly 
(licensed supermarket) and BP (licensed roadhouse) (Northern Territory Liquor Commission 1997).
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The Tyeweretye Club suffered the unintended effects of a series of genuine 
attempts to ameliorate the high levels of alcohol-related harm in the town. 
Trial periods of reduced trading hours and experiments in the types of 
alcohol sold negatively affected the club, as Bill Ferguson (2003: 87) 
explained:
The Northern Territory Liquor Commission introduced restrictive 
trading hours for take-away outlets, Clubs and Hotels. The only alcohol 
sales permitted on licensed premises were light beer from 10  am and 
full-strength beer from 11.30 am. Our experiences have shown that this 
was not a real success. The patrons only waited around playing pool and 
watching television until 11.30 am when full beer sales were permitted. 
The experience of the Tyeweretye is that an organisation without take-
away facilities has only a ‘True Trading Time’ of 11.30 am to 1.45 pm. 
There is a mass exodus from 1.30 pm onwards to the licensed take-away 
facilities.
In an attempt to stem this flow and improve the club’s viability, 
management applied for a variation to the licence to allow sales of the 
full range of alcoholic drinks, not just beer, and Sunday trading. They 
hoped that if patrons had a choice of drinks, they would stay longer. 
Despite open discussion of the clubs’ travails at the licence-variation 
hearing, the Liquor Commission accepted the ‘sociological rationale’ 
for the application. It heard evidence that the club had proved itself 
capable of controlling drinking; that it was a viable alternative to sitting 
in the riverbed with takeaway Coolibah;32 and that Sunday trading would 
‘lessen … the swilling congregation’ at the two takeaway outlets open 
in town (Northern Territory Liquor Commission 1997: 25). The club’s 
‘only real problem’ was the crowd of people who gathered outside the 
gates on Friday nights. In March 1997, the Liquor Commission granted 
the licence variation along with a trial period of extended trading hours 
on Sundays from 10  am to 6  pm. Customers welcomed the change, 
stating ‘now we got a real pub’; a few club members switched to spirits, 
with young women drinking pre-mixed spirits (also known as alco-pops 
or UDLs).33 
32  Coolibah = a popular cheap white cask wine.
33  It is worth noting that the type of liquor one drinks can be a key component of social identity 
and a source of prestige—or debasement (Collmann 1988, Sansom 1980). 
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Not only cheap takeaways threatened the club’s viability: other commercial 
outlets also actively poached the club’s customers. One hotel34 in the 
vicinity of the Tyeweretye Club opened a new bar that was overtly designed 
to attract an Aboriginal clientele. Another hotel, which had previously 
been unwelcoming to Aboriginal customers, changed ownership, and the 
new management drew Tyeweretye’s customers away by giving out stubby 
coolers, hats and putting on barbecues. The hotel also had a TAB, Sky 
and takeaways, all of which were attractive to Aboriginal customers; it 
even copied the Tyeweretye Club’s idea of having Aboriginal bands play 
on premises. Local politician Peter Toyne, a supporter of the Tyeweretye 
Club from the beginning, described this competition as a ‘grog war’ 
(Chlanda 1998).
With the Tyeweretye Club doing no better in terms of customers and 
revenue, despite having a full range of alcohol on sale, in desperation, 
the club decided to apply for a takeaway licence in 1998; predictably, the 
move caused a furore. Tangentyere Council, the organisation that had 
sponsored the club, had objected to all new takeaway licences in Alice 
Springs as a matter of policy and principle over the previous 15 years. The 
club itself had argued that, by providing a particular social and cultural 
environment together with community-instigated rules of conduct for 
drinking on licensed premises, it was creating something special, not 
just another booze outlet to add to the already crowded market in Alice 
Springs. Club proponents had successfully used these arguments to fend 
off considerable opposition from women’s groups and the abstinence 
treatment lobby. The commercial argument, that providing takeaway sales 
would enable the club to survive, was not enough; the club’s application 
for a takeaway licence sparked a ‘political war of words’. Prominent 
politicians, spokespersons and organisations, both Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal, took sides and voiced their opinions. In favour of the takeaway 
application were Labor politicians Maggie Hickey and Peter Toyne, who 
said that it would allow the club to compete with other liquor outlets for 
business, and that it was a necessary part of the future viability of the club 
(Centralian Advocate 1998a: 2, 1998b: 5). Toyne knew that the club owed 
$250,000 to ATSIC, which was not disposed to forgive the loan. 
34  The Queen of the Desert Hotel.
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The Alice Springs Town Council opposed the licence application. 
The mayor was against another takeaway licence in the town; if the club 
was in financial difficulties, he argued that it should approach ATSIC or 
LWA for help. As a health provider, the CAAC (or Congress) formally 
objected to the application, arguing that a takeaway licence would 
adversely affect women and children, cause more deaths, and contravene 
the club’s philosophy as well as its goal of educating the Aboriginal 
community in responsible drinking (Centralian Advocate 1998c: 8). 
The club applied for a takeaway licence again in February 1999, but the 
hearing was abandoned when objectors discovered that the club’s own 
constitution barred it from holding a licence to sell packaged alcohol 
(Kuilboer 1999: 13). The club suffered a loss of moral credibility in the 
eyes of its supporters; its repeated attempts to obtain a takeaway licence to 
save it financially—indeed, for the whole project to survive—was the final 
straw for those who had wavered in their support for the club. In April 
2005, the club’s licence was suspended, and in 2010, it was cancelled 
(Department of Justice 2010).
Analysing the demise of the club
The club’s manager and key proponent, Bill Ferguson, explained the 
club’s demise in a few simple words: ‘there was too much opposition’. 
There is no doubt that the club was highly contentious, but it was also 
more than this. The club crystallised and brought to a head a long-term 
ideological split that had begun to form in the 1970s35 between drinkers 
and non-drinkers in the Aboriginal community—the wets and the drys: 
between those who thought it was possible to ‘live with alcohol’ and those 
who were convinced that complete sobriety was the only route. More 
than individual diversity accounted for the differences of opinion among 
Aboriginal people; Aboriginal people’s positioning on these matters 
determined the organisations they worked for, the strategies and policies 
those organisations supported, and their attitudes to the entire Northern 
Territory Government and its programs and initiatives, such as the 
LWA program.
35  See Aboriginal submissions to the House of Representatives inquiry into Aboriginal alcohol 




Members of the Tangentyere Liquor Committee started to pull in 
different directions quite early on. The committee had originally 
comprised a mix of drinkers and non-drinkers, and these individuals 
became increasingly at odds with one another. In 1989, a non-drinking 
member of the committee, Doug Abbott, started the first Aboriginal 
Alcoholics Anonymous (AAA) group. This group grew into CAAAPU, 
an abstinence-oriented community-controlled residential treatment 
program (Lyon 1990: 110, Rowse 1996).36 Conversely, the chair of the 
committee, Bill Ferguson, was the person who became the club’s manager. 
Ferguson was a drinker; he was also experienced in the running of hotels, 
having previously managed the Finke Hotel. One non-drinking member 
described the committee’s split: 
We started together … Bill pulled away from us. They tried to get people 
teach ‘em how to drink. Can’t teach people to drink! Can’t be both ways 
same time. How can we counsel anyone when you still drinking? … 
I break off from there [to work at CAAAPU]. A tug of war. Trying to 
pull this way to keep sober and Bill pulling the other way to keep them 
drunk!37
A Tangentyere Council spokesperson tried to deflate the significance 
of this ideological split, stating:
Our organisation was the founding organisation for two models. 
The CAAAPU model is a total abstinence model. That came from the 
Tangentyere alcohol committee. The other option we have is to learn to 
live with alcohol so, out of that alcohol committee, came the formation 
of an Aboriginal social club called the Tyeweretye Club. (Tilmouth 
2001: 17)
36  This informal group was renamed Aboriginal Alcohol Awareness (AAA) after the official 
Alcoholics Anonymous organisation objected to the original name. AAA was originally supportive 
of moderation messages, but later toughened its position to promote abstention. On CAAAPU see 
Rowse 1996. 
37  Brady fieldnotes, 6 May 2009. Indeed, Tangentyere Council (1991) pushed for the club and it 
continued to support the AAA group (28). As Paul Spicer (1997) pointed out with respect to Native 
Americans, this epitomises the profound ambivalence within Aboriginal thinking about drinking. 
He wrote that Native American drinkers do not exemplify one opinion about drinking: ‘Instead, 
their attitude is a product of the tension between two mutually incompatible positions: those that 
favour alcohol use and those that condemn it’ (317). They recognise that alcohol can be used to 
demonstrate the core cultural values of sharing and relating with kin, but they also vilify it as an alien 
and degrading influence.
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This division created defensiveness on both sides, especially between the 
AAA people, who eventually became counsellors at CAAAPU, and the 
individuals associated with the club. When CAAAPU workers visited 
the club to see what was going on—what sort of place it was—they 
encountered resistance: they felt that club staff were uninterested in 
providing CAAAPU contact information to customers. There is no doubt 
that, rightly or wrongly, the club became associated with the Northern 
Territory Government’s sensible drinking campaign: the LWA program. 
In fact, proponents of the club sometimes seemed to have adopted the 
program’s slogan. One stated: 
You can’t get rid of grog. You gotta learn to live with grog. If we can learn 
those things, we can learn to live with alcohol, no reason why not. 
Similarly, another supporter of the club remarked: 
Teaching people to live with alcohol was the main objective [of the club]. 
There was a split in views between the ‘no alcohol’ people and the ‘Living 
with Alcohol’ type of thinking’. (emphasis added)
The fact that the Northern Territory Government’s LWA program 
supported the club merely reinforced the negative attitudes of those who 
believed that moderate consumption was neither possible, nor desirable 
for Aboriginal people.38 Even the Race Discrimination Commissioner 
(1995: 33) cautioned that the policy of moderation espoused by the 
LWA program ‘should not be imposed indiscriminately on all Aboriginal 
communities’. In truth, LWA stressed that there were drinking choices 
available to Aboriginal people other than being either a (heavy) ‘drinker’ 
or an abstinent ‘non-drinker’.
In the region as a whole, the pro-abstinence, anti-moderation position was 
boosted between 1991 and 1993 by the arrival in Alice Springs of First 
Nations abstinence-oriented alcohol-treatment activists from Canada. 
Several of these charismatic indigenous treatment entrepreneurs spoke 
at conferences, networked with Aboriginal organisations and lobbied 
government officials, stressing the need for sobriety, supporting AA-style 
approaches and condemning harm-reduction policies (Brady 2004, Rowse 
38  Such thinking is prevalent among Native Americans who often also assert that there is no way 
their people could drink ‘like a Whiteman’ in a moderate way (Spicer 1997: 307). 
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1996). The arrival of the Canadians reinforced the existing divergence of 
views about the nature of drinking problems and the best way to manage 
them; there is no doubt that they contributed to opposition to the club. 
Fig. 19 ‘These people are drinking safe amounts of grog’
Source: Living with Alcohol responsible drinking resource from northeast Arnhem Land
In addition to these stresses (i.e. internal fissures, growing antipathy 
towards the LWA program and the arrival of the Canadians), the club 
faced opposition from a new Aboriginal women’s temperance movement 
in Alice Springs. Women demonstrated in public to protest the 
uncontrolled sales of takeaway alcohol and the devastating effects alcohol 
was having on their families, and they campaigned vigorously against the 
opening of any further outlets for liquor.39 The movement, which had 
begun in bush communities, had been gathering momentum over several 
years. It commenced in 1988, when women of the Pitjantjatjara region 
southwest of Alice Springs objected to the renewal of a takeaway licence 
for the Curtin Springs Roadhouse, which sold alcohol to Aboriginal 
39  The Northern Territory, at the time, had more liquor outlets per capita than any other state or 
territory in Australia, and Alice Springs had 37 per cent more liquor outlets per capita than the rest 
of the Northern Territory, 19 of which had takeaway licences (Coughlan 1991: 151). 
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people returning to bush communities.40 In July 1990, with no progress 
on their complaints, the women marched and demonstrated outside the 
roadhouse. In mid-1990, there was a large, and much publicised, ‘walk 
against grog’ through the streets of Alice Springs, involving hundreds of 
Pitjantjatjara, Warlpiri and Arrernte people from five remote communities. 
Organised largely by prominent local woman Rosalie Kunoth-Monks, 
contingents of traditional women walked bare-breasted, ‘painted up’ and 
wearing feather and hair-string headbands (Schulz 1990: 3). Although 
Kunoth-Monks was reported as saying that this ‘declaration of war on 
grog’ was aimed at visitors from the bush who came to town to drink and 
lived in the riverbed, she was known to oppose the Tyeweretye Club; the 
march took place within months of the club’s first licence application. 
In March 1993—in the same month as the Liquor Commission was 
reconsidering the Tyeweretye Club’s licence application—30 women from 
Hermannsburg marched on a delicatessen in Alice Springs in opposition 
to its licence. When they heard that the Tyeweretye Club had been 
granted a licence, several Hermannsburg women41 picketed the venue to 
show their displeasure: 
We are very, very sad about the grog problems. The Tyeweretye Club will 
mean trouble for our families. It will bring death … We want grog shops 
to stop selling alcohol to Aborigines but now they have opened a club 
especially to sell grog to Aboriginal people. It is wrong … and a waste of 
Government money and Aboriginal land. (Tondorf 1993a: 2) 
Bill Ferguson invited the women in for a tour of the premises and 
answered their questions. One month later, on 23 April 1993, Aboriginal 
women from Hermannsburg, Papunya and Yuendumu held another big 
anti-grog march through the streets of Alice Springs.42 Like members of the 
WCTU in the nineteenth century, the Aboriginal women placed banner-
holding children (‘No grog in delis’ and ‘Save our people. No grog’) at 
the head of their demonstration. The anti-grog campaigners were joined 
40  The objections to Curtin Springs were heard before Kelvin Rae (Chairman of the Liquor 
Commission), 22–24 November 1988 and 14–16 February 1989 in Alice Springs. Objectors were 
Maggie Kavanagh, the Pitjantjatjara Council Inc. and Mutitjulu Community Inc. The objections 
were overcharging, failure to follow an informal agreement and selling to people travelling to dry 
communities. They were dismissed as being ‘marginal’, ‘hearsay’ and because of uncertainty over the 
definition of ‘the needs and wishes of the community’. It took nine years of complaints, lobbying 
and a coronial inquest into five deaths before an agreement was reached for trials of restrictions on 
takeaway sales in 1997. 
41  The Hermannsburg women were led by Mavis Malbunka.
42  This march was organised by Koorine Williams from Hermannsburg. 
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by women from the Yuendumu night patrol (Tondorf 1993b: 3). This 
mobilisation against alcohol in the form of pickets and marches was, in 
effect, an uprising by Aboriginal women asserting their right to speak 
out about domestic violence, alcohol-related homicides and the welfare of 
their children and future generations (McGrath 1993).43 Such a level of 
ferment over alcohol was unprecedented and, to some extent, incidental 
to plans for the Tyeweretye Club. However, some supporters of the club 
believed that anti-grog campaigners had been responsible for quashing the 
original plan for four Aboriginal clubs. Certainly, after the grog marches 
had taken place, several previously supportive agencies and organisations 
‘washed their hands’ of the club. As the club’s accountant explained: 
‘The anti-grog movement came in and they dropped us like a hot potato’.
Fig. 20 Women Against Alcohol march, Alice Springs, 1990
Source: S Strike
43  Nineteenth-century WCTU members, members of the United States Anti-Saloon League and 
evangelical reformers all used the effect of drinking on women and children as ammunition in their 
campaigns, as did the Aboriginal women of central Australia (Grimshaw 1999).
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The meaning of drinking
Another huge difficulty for the club was that it tried to tackle an inherently 
wicked and probably insoluble problem: changing the drinking styles of 
people who were thoroughly unversed in drinking on licensed premises 
and whose normal practice was to aim for intoxication. For some 
Aboriginal people, drinking to intoxication was an expression of personal 
power: for others, it was simply normative and had become habitual 
(Collmann 1979, cf. Room 1992).
A country-club style hotel–casino opened in Alice Springs in 1981. 
Redeveloped as Lasseter’s Casino in 1986, this glitzy venue (rather than 
the Tyeweretye Club) attracted many middle-class Aboriginal locals. In 
making a case for the club’s establishment, Tangentyere Council had 
argued that tertiary educated and employed Aboriginal residents needed 
a ‘non-racist’ setting in which to drink; however, the bulk of drinkers the 
club hoped to attract were people who had spent a lifetime drinking in 
the open, in the Todd River or the town camps. Before they switched to 
cask wine, many of these people were port, sweet sherry and methylated 
spirits drinkers. Anthropologist Jeff Collmann lived in a town camp 
in the 1970s; he observed that most town camp people drank ‘what is 
often considered (even by Northern Territory standards) an extraordinary 
amount of liquor’ (1979: 209, 1988).44 In the 1980s, the camps were 
largely violent, insular and lawless places without regular police patrols, 
despite the fact that residents included some non-drinkers and others 
whose drinking varied along a continuum from regular (moderate) to 
heavy (bingeing) (Collmann 1979, O’Connor 1983: 5, Jane Lloyd, pers 
comm).45 Tyeweretye Club patrons who came from the south-side camps, 
near the club, were primarily made up of desert people (i.e. Luritja, 
Pitjantjatjara and Warlpiri) who had had relatively little exposure to, or 
experience of, alcohol (Stead 1980). They had not worked in the pastoral 
industry that, for some Aboriginal people, provided their (relatively 
controlled) introduction to alcohol. Their experience of drinking on 
licensed premises was confined to one or two rough, usually segregated, 
bars at roadside inns or in Alice Springs hotels.
44  Even when the club was operating, the Alice Springs police reported that they took 13,000 people 
a year into protective custody who were intoxicated in public, and that the extent of public drunkenness 
was beyond their capacity and function (Northern Territory Liquor Commission 1997: 21).
45  The Tangentyere Liquor Committee would have liked to declare the town camps as dry areas 
under existing Northern Territory Dry Area legislation, but this was thought to be ‘too hard’ because 
of the impossibility of policing such an arrangement (Ferguson 2003: 86). Town camps were 
eventually declared dry under the NTER provisions in 2007.
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Fig. 21 Empty wine casks and liquor bottles (sold by one outlet) 
collected from drinking spots in the Todd River bed, 2012
Source: People’s Alcohol Action Coalition, Alice Springs
The Tyeweretye Club was at a distinct disadvantage. Like all on-licences, 
it was unable to compete with the off-licences that provided Aboriginal 
people with takeaway alcohol. More specifically, it was unable to fulfil the 
needs of Aboriginal people who placed a high social and cultural value 
on the exchanges and interchanges that were made possible by takeaway 
alcohol. The bulk nature of takeaway alcohol (in cans, bottles or casks) 
makes it a malleable commodity, allowing it to become a form of symbolic 
capital through which people make and remake their social world. This 
dense network of sociality and exchange is essential to people’s sense 
of self (Peterson 2013). As a fluid, liquor can be divided into different 
amounts and shared in different ways—from a communal cup, by the gift 
of a bottle, or a swig from a flagon or cask: something that is not so easily 
achieved when drinking at a club or bar. Local historian Dick Kimber, 
although he did not drink himself, used to sit with Aboriginal friends who 
were drinkers. He recalled: 
You’d get 20 ‘it makes you happy’ [was what they said]. You’d make the 
most of what you got.46 
46  Dick Kimber, pers comm, 1 August 2008.
165
5. THE RISE AND fALL Of THE TyEWERETyE CLUB
According to Collmann (1979), liquor was a form of credit for town 
campers: it involved the ‘entire social universe’ of the town camp in 
which he lived. Alcohol, like other commodities, has become part of 
what Peterson (2013) has termed ‘demand sharing’—that is, the pattern 
of informal sharing in which acting generously commonly takes place in 
response to demands. As well as being easily shared, takeaway alcohol 
allows for greater spatial flexibility, as drinkers can recruit and maintain 
their companions and co-drinkers and locate them spatially in the 
landscape in a manner that is not possible on licensed premises, no matter 
how extensive a beer garden might be (Sansom 1980, Brady 2010). 
Losing the competition war
While the Tyeweretye Club tried to enact some corporate social 
responsibility by serving low-alcohol beer and closing for a few hours on 
band nights, the other, more competitive commercial outlets, ignored 
such niceties, commonly engaging in unscrupulous sales tactics. Some 
of these were exposed in 1993 when the government was forced to 
amend the Liquor Act to curb happy hours that lasted longer than two 
hours; ban the selling of ‘buy-one get-one free’ drinks; prevent hoteliers 
from offering all the liquor a person could consume for a set fee; ban 
drinking competitions; and prevent hotels from providing ticketing 
or other discounting mechanisms. All these deplorable practices had 
become normal in Northern Territory hotels; when they were banned, 
the Hoteliers Association called the new regulations ‘bloody ridiculous’ 
(Centralian Advocate 1993a: 3). 
Meanwhile, the Tyeweretye Club’s light-beer initiatives were unsuccessful 
and unpopular; club members did not drink it, even though it cost half 
the price of full-strength beer. According to the Centralian Advocate (18 
April 1997: 3):
The club did all the right things: it sold beer only, had entertainment at 
the weekends, security guards, BBQs and meat plates, grassy areas, and 
Aboriginal ownership. But it slowly lost money and was forced to extend 
trading hours and sell wines and spirits. They had argued that it was better 
for people to drink in a controlled area rather than in public. 
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Ferguson spoke in similar terms about the club’s efforts to trial different 
opening hours:
We tried for one year opening from 4 pm to see if we could draw people 
in. But no-one came. By that time, they’d have [had] a fairly good fill. We 
got big numbers in the early days and they stayed longer, even though the 
bottle shops were open, but we realised we had to have a shut-down time, 
or else a drunken mess around me. So about 3 pm we had a shut down. 
But once people left, they’d never come back.47 
The availability of cheap takeaways, and the unashamedly profit-driven 
marketing strategies of nearby hotels, made the club unviable. This had 
been a danger from the beginning; the year the club opened, the Gapview 
Hotel drive-in bottle shop was selling 4 L casks of Kaiser Stuhl Riesling 
for $8.45, and a carton of Territory Bitter beer for $16.95 (Centralian 
Advocate 4 May 1993: 9). Customers abandoned the Tyeweretye Club 
en masse once the takeaway outlets opened at around midday or early 
afternoon. As mentioned, it was not just the lure of takeaway liquor that 
drew customers away; one nearby hotel put on live Aboriginal bands 
and  set up a bar overtly designed for Aboriginal drinkers to attract 
on-premises sales.
The club had not become embedded in people’s lives as a social and 
community centre—a regular drinking spot. Instead, the club became 
a venue for ‘pre-loading’. In a reversal of the widespread practice in which 
young urban (non-Aboriginal) Australians engage in pre-drinking at home 
prior to a night out clubbing, Aboriginal drinkers used the Tyeweretye 
Club to whet their appetites before heading off to the takeaway outlets, 
after which the ‘real’ drinking began (Wells et al. 2009, Brady 2010). 
A business or a social enterprise?
Originally, the club’s proponents and management committee had hoped 
that it would become a community hub, providing services, training 
programs and rehabilitation for drinkers. There were also plans for 
a sporting complex on the property. According to the manager, there were 
even hopes that income from the club could be used to:
Sponsor people to go to a better school or through Uni, but we never made 
enough to do that. Early days [we had] a turnover of $10,000 per week, 
then $2000. We had six pokies but didn’t make anything out of them.
47  Bill Ferguson, pers comm. 
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The poker machines that KMG thought would produce $70,000 a year 
were hardly used. This was probably because, rather than winning cash, 
poker-machine players won credits that could be redeemed at the shop 
with vouchers. Most mainstream clubs, such as RSL clubs or sporting 
clubs, would not survive without the income from poker machines.48 
The Tyeweretye Club’s income from food sales also dropped dramatically 
from 1997, because another Tangentyere Council business became the 
designated outlet for the exchange of food vouchers.49
The club’s accountant described Tyeweretye as a ‘mutual club’, in the sense 
that its profits were for the benefit of members as a whole; indeed, the club’s 
constitution stated that any profits would be applied ‘in promotion of its 
objectives’.50 The club was intended as a social enterprise, acting for the 
good of its constituents and members, rather than solely as a money-making 
enterprise, which is somewhat in the spirit of the community-owned, or 
Gothenburg-style, hotels discussed in earlier chapters. Yet, ATSIC expected 
the club to make enough money to repay its loan, and gave it little leeway. 
The accountants had optimistically predicted that the club would be self-
funding, but the reality was that without ongoing outside support, it 
struggled to survive. Once the club was built and furnished, it received no 
further financial support. According to the club’s accountant:
There were no subsidies. We had to stand on our own two feet. One 
million to build and equip it—as good a club as you’d get anywhere. We 
had $200,000 left as a loan that had to be repaid over the five-year lease 
time at 10 per cent interest. The loan was a ‘mortgage’ on the five-year 
lease. But we only had a five-year lease and limited sales. 
Running the club, and making it profitable while honouring its 
commitment to safe and moderate drinking, was a much more difficult 
proposition than had been anticipated by the sponsoring organisation, 
Tangentyere Council. Tangentyere had its own governance problems. 
Its periodic changes in direction and governance affected the club and 
diminished the level of both tangible and ideological support. The club’s 
manager and principals needed more professional guidance and better 
48  Chris McIntyre, Liquor Commission, pers comm, 8 August 2008.
49  Tangentyere Council bought a supermarket that included a liquor department, representing 
a reversal of its earlier policy on takeaway licences, and changing the arrangements for Tangentyere-
issued food vouchers.
50  The Constitution reads: ‘21.2. Profits, if any, and other income of Tyeweretye shall be applied 
in promotion of its objectives. Dividends shall not be paid to, nor profits, income or property of 
Tyeweretye be distributed amongst members. 21.3. No member shall be entitled to derive any profit, 
benefit of advantage from Tyeweretye which is not available to every member’.
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management training, but no government or non-government agency 
provided any follow-up support or advice, and none had the capacity to 
do so. The Liquor Commission dealt only with compliance issues; the 
government health department and the LWA program had limited practical 
involvement with the club. In a sense, uncertainty within government 
about whether the club was meant to be a business or a social enterprise 
(an exercise in alcohol harm reduction, or even health promotion), was 
a key factor in its demise. 
After defaulting on its start-up loan in 2005, the club closed its doors. 
The club needed to generate around $100,000 per year to survive; it was 
driven to make the controversial application for a takeaway licence purely 
out of economic need—it had no interest in having such a licence beyond 
a financial one. A local politician who believed in the club and wanted it 
to survive articulated what she saw as the key question:
The issues that have to be established by people are: do they believe that 
the Tyeweretye Club is a good thing, and has it delivered benefits for 
the community? In other words, was the situation worse in terms of the 
patterns of anti-social behaviour before it started. If we say yes to that, and 
certainly on the evidence I’ve been provided with I’ve been persuaded of 
that, then somehow or other we’ve got to ensure that the club survives. 
(Centralian Advocate 1998a: 2)
If the club had not been required by ATSIC to operate as a self-sufficient 
and successful business, and if it had received ongoing government 
support in the form of a subsidy—in recognition of its social benefit 
(assuming this could be demonstrated), or in anticipation of its future, 
long-term beneficial effect on drinking patterns—perhaps it could have 
survived (Christie & Young 2011). 
Only one club
Several Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal commentators believed that the 
Tyeweretye Club failed because it was only one, instead of being one 
of four, as originally planned. Betty Pearce commented, bluntly, that:
Just one club was plain stupid, better to have two or none at all! Warlpiri 
were always our natural enemies … The Hermannsburg and NPY51 mob all 
go there, and the town camps. Not many from Areyonga went [to the club].
51  NPY = in this sense refers to people from the Ngaanyatjarra, Pitjantjatjara and Yankunytjatjara 
lands straddling the South Australia – Northern Territory border, southwest of Alice Springs.
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Why was it so important to have more than one club? While most of Alice 
Springs’ Aboriginal residents identified as being of Arrernte ancestry, the 
town also had (and increasingly has) a diverse population of Indigenous 
people of different affiliations. As Ottosson (2014: 131) has pointed out, 
the town is the service hub for thousands of remote-living Aboriginal 
people from many different language groups: some stay for a few days, 
others stay for a few years, most usually live in a number of town camps. 
Those proposing four clubs pointed out that the town camps were largely 
composed of distinct Aboriginal communities based on language and 
ancestral connection to country or kin. The camps north of the Gap 
were primarily Arrernte. On the south side, near the club, there were four 
town camps (Little Sisters, Anthepe, Karnte and Ilparpa) and these camps 
produced some of the key players in the club’s fortunes. The southern 
town camps tended to be composed of Arrernte, Luritja, Pitjantjatjara and 
Warlpiri people. The original idea of having four licensed clubs, each one 
catering to different groups, reveals something of the local complexities of 
Aboriginal identity politics present in Alice Springs, in which categories 
of people mobilise and promote their own group, affiliation or family 
network to differentiate themselves, associate or distance themselves from 
certain others. As mentioned earlier, several older Aboriginal residents 
disliked changes to the layout of local hotel bars that gave them fewer 
strategies and less ‘room’ to avoid certain people while drinking. 
Two significant assumptions undergirded the proposal to establish 
four drinking clubs. First, Aboriginal people assumed that drinking 
would lead to trouble, inevitably bringing ‘drunken-changes-for-the-
worse’.52 Second, Aboriginal people expected that this trouble could be 
forestalled by stage-managing the social environment. Room (2001) 
has observed that, given cultural foreknowledge of intoxication’s role in 
violence, experienced drinkers will choose their drinking partners and 
venues carefully (MacAndrew & Edgerton 1969, Shore & Spicer 2004). 
As Basil Sansom (1980) has argued, grogging is inherently dangerous: to 
avoid trouble you drink with your own ‘crew—with people you trust, 
your mates’. This mechanism is mentioned in several ethnographies of 
drinking (Sansom 1980, Brady 1988, 2010). Thus, it was believed that 
having different clubs to cater for different language or other groups 
would solve the problem of alcohol-related violence, which was endemic 
52  Alcohol expectancy theory states that cognitions about drinking have been found to influence 
drinking behaviour; indeed, expectations about what will be the likely outcome of a situation have 
a profound effect on the actual outcome of events (see MacAndrew & Edgerton 1969, Blume et al. 
2003, Shore & Spicer 2004).
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in the town camps during the 1980s when the club was being planned. 
Rather than seeing violence in the town camps as ‘normal’, advocates of 
the four-club model rationalised such conflict as the preventable result of 
language groups mingling.53 Alternatively, it could be argued that fighting 
facilitated by intoxication is usually about the airing of grievances that are 
as likely to occur within immediate kin groups. Fighting also arises from 
sexual jealousy; when people are drunk, even the smallest gesture can be 
interpreted in a particular way, leading, sometimes, to deadly violence 
among intimate partners (Lloyd 2014). Rather than addressing the need 
to change the culture of drinking, and the easy resort to violence, people 
sidestepped these issues and instead focused on lobbying in support of 
different clubs for different groups. 
Having one club on the south side possibly reduced the customer base; some 
potential customers may have avoided drinking at the club because they 
did not want to mix with people from other language groups. Certainly, 
the customer base was nowhere near the 1,650 that had been predicted 
by the accountants from KMG. However, a number of knowledgeable 
participants in this project question this explanation for the club’s demise, 
pointing out that, in fact, people from all language groups patronised 
the club and mixed together, including those from north of the Gap. 
The supposed distinctions between residents of the town camps seem to 
have been exaggerated: in any case, they have become less marked over 
time. It is notable that, when a sobering-up shelter54 was being planned for 
Alice Springs in the mid-1980s, similar suggestions were made regarding 
the need for multiple facilities: people said that more than one shelter was 
needed to accommodate different groups. However, the manager of the 
relevant drug and alcohol organisation maintained that, with appropriate 
rules of behaviour, one shelter would suffice: it did.55 
Four clubs may have satisfied the needs or desires of individuals who, 
for various reasons, were promoting their own family networks, or 
avoiding others, or who wished to micro-manage their choice of drinking 
companions to pre-empt trouble. However, multiple clubs would have 
faced the same ruthless competition from commercial takeaway outlets 
and hotels keen to attract lucrative Aboriginal clientele. If one club was 
not financially viable, it is highly unlikely that four clubs could have 
survived without substantial ongoing external support.
53  Several anthropologists have noted this (Sansom 1980, Shore & Spicer 2004).
54  A sobering-up shelter is an overnight non-custodial refuge for intoxicated people.
55  Carol Watson, pers comm, May 2009. The Sobering-up Shelter was opened in 1986.
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Fig. 22 Alcohol restrictions sign, Todd River, 2009
Source: M Brady
There are, naturally, differences of opinion about whether the Tyeweretye 
Club was, or became, a place of moderate drinking. Many of the now 
middle-aged and older Aboriginal musicians who played at the club talk 
nostalgically about the diversity of people who went there; they also talk 
about the fighting, and recall that the levels of drinking and drunkenness 
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could be out of control.56 Some of those involved with the club over the 
12 years of its existence believe that it was successful, or partly successful, 
in modifying people’s drinking behaviour:
Bill had to really sort it out at first—it was a rough place, no way would 
a young woman go in there! People changed their behaviour dramatically. 
Half way through we started to see the change, we introduced food, had 
a half-time cook plus assistant, and a shop assistant …The Club tried to 
be an induction into community life, not just selling grog. It was living in 
a half way between what was ‘kosher’ in the town and what was ‘kosher’ 
in the bush. They learned—it was their place—rules to obey made by the 
club themselves [sic] ‘You will behave like this. If intoxicated automatically 
removed from premises’. Under club rules, you were removed, [whereas] 
the Liquor Act [only] says not to sell any more.57
Supporters of the club believe they were victims of their own success: that 
the Tyeweretye Club did all the hard work of teaching the ‘wild brumbies’ 
how to behave on licensed premises and that other hotels reaped the 
benefit, stealing away their customers. Ferguson believed that the club 
‘worked too well—people were let into the Gap Hotel because they knew 
how to behave now!’ In effect, the club was penalised for introducing its 
‘safe drinking’ policies, for trying to create a family venue and for placing 
limits on its sales practices and the type of alcohol it sold. These were 
controls that other, more business-oriented premises, chose to ignore. 
Betty Pearce reflected that: ‘[The club] started to help with responsible 
drinking … but [it’s] not much use now: alcohol is freely available 
everywhere!’58 The Tyeweretye Club failed where other licensed outlets 
succeeded because it had different goals from its competitors. Given 
a choice between maximising profits and not selling to people for short-
term profitability, the club placed its corporate social responsibility first.
After years of living in the town camps and participating in Tangentyere 
Council’s alcohol-management efforts, the manager of the defunct club 
believed that the only solution to Aboriginal problem drinking was 
to restrict takeaway sales to a few hours, starting late in the day, with 
no takeaway sales on Sundays. He was convinced that this would ‘result 
in people (who wanted to drink) being forced to drink on licensed 
premises in a safe and controlled environment’ (Ferguson 2003: 88). 
56  Åse Ottosson, pers comm, 30 July 2014. One local newspaper editor described the club as 
a ‘hapless experiment in social engineering’ (Chlanda 2006).
57  Gordon Fawcett (the club’ s accountant from 1994 to 2005), pers comm, 7 August 2008.
58  Betty Pearce, pers comm, 8 August 2008.
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Notwithstanding the research evidence of aggression and violence in 
and around bars and the rarity of prosecutions, Ferguson is undoubtedly 
right in believing that drinking on licensed premises, with at least some 
expectation of a basic standard of comportment, is preferable to drinking 
in uncontrolled public spaces (Brady 2010). 
Astonishingly, only four years after the Tyeweretye Club closed, the mayor 
of Alice Springs called for the establishment of a ‘controlled drinking 
venue’ for Aboriginal people from the town camps and bush settlements: 
a club (Richards 2009: 5). It is difficult to comprehend such extraordinary 
ignorance of the long local history of debate, research and lobbying on 
the subject of community-controlled drinking clubs for Aboriginal 
people in Alice Springs, not to mention the existence of the closed and 





1  The purchase of the hotel ($1.7  million) includes an accommodation complex (The West 
Australian 2014). The new owners plan to restore and reopen the hotel and provide industry and 
training opportunities for local Indigenous people. 
Indigenous communities 
buy hotels
Among the many damaging effects of the prohibition years, the bans on 
Aboriginal people drinking in hotels alongside other Australians were 
the most mortifying. When it became financially possible for Indigenous 
entities to buy hotels for themselves in the 1970s and 1980s, this history 
of exclusion was influential in the thinking of Aboriginal organisations 
and government bureaucrats. Eight hotels were purchased by, or on behalf 
of, Aboriginal community entities over roughly a 20-year period—the 
first was the Finke Hotel at Finke in the Northern Territory in 1975. 
This was followed by purchases of the Oasis Hotel at Walgett (1983), the 
Transcontinental at Oodnadatta (1986), Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse (1987), 
Woden Town Club, Canberra (1988), the Crossing Inn, Fitzroy Crossing 
(1989), Daly River Hotel Motel (late 1990s) and the Wayside Inn at 
Timber Creek (1999). The most recent purchase of a licensed hotel was 
in 2014, when the Ngarluma Aboriginal Corporation and the Ngarluma 
Yindjibarndi Foundation, both in the Pilbara region of Western Australia, 
purchased the Whim Creek Hotel between Roebourne and Port Hedland.1 
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Map 2 Public hotels owned or part owned by Indigenous entities, 
1975–2014
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University
Apart from these mostly rural, small-town pubs, in recent years, Aboriginal 
corporations have bought interests in several high-profile facilities that 
include the sale of alcohol, such as the Gagudju Lodge at Cooinda, and 
the Gagudju Crocodile Holiday Inn Motel, which are both in Kakadu 
National Park; the Dugong Beach Resort on Groote Eylandt; and the 
Ayers Rock Resort (Yulara) in central Australia. However, these hotels and 
lodges are primarily investment properties. Designed for tourists, they are 
focused on accommodation, and are intended neither to cater to local 
Aboriginal people nor to influence their drinking behaviour. By having 
management leaseback agreements and appointing large management 
companies for these properties, Indigenous associations have chosen to 
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distance themselves from the day-to-day issues of running them; they 
see these enterprises as revenue raising rather than as social enterprises 
(Simonsen 2006).
In contrast to these investment properties, the purchase of rural public 
hotels by Aboriginal bodies has been largely, though not entirely, an 
exercise in social enterprise. A social enterprise is a market-oriented 
economic activity that serves a social goal, although, as Defourny and 
Nyssens (2010) pointed out, the definition of a social enterprise varies 
between countries. Social enterprises are generally defined as businesses 
that have social aims, such as local employment; are usually based on 
a commitment to build local capacity; and are answerable to their members 
for their social and economic effect. Defourny and Nyssens (2006: 6) 
suggested five criteria that, ideally, characterise a social enterprise:
1. It has an explicit aim to benefit the community and promote a sense 
of social responsibility locally.
2. It is an initiative of a group of citizens.
3. The decision-making power is not based on capital ownership, but the 
‘one member one vote’ principle.
4. It has a participatory and representative structure.
5. It practices limited profit distribution, avoiding profit-maximising 
behaviour. 
Most of the Aboriginal-owned hotels have aimed to achieve some of 
these criteria and have achieved varying degrees of success. As well as 
developmental goals, hotel purchases by Indigenous groups have been 
driven by a desire to manage previously uncontrolled sales of alcohol, and 
as an alternative to having a local hotel run by a publican estranged from 
the Aboriginal community (who may not care about the damage his or her 
product does). It has been difficult to ascertain—in retrospect, mostly—
to what extent Indigenous-owned hotels have made enough profit to 
allow for distributions. In a departure from the ‘ideal’ characteristics 
proposed by Defourny and Nyssens, at least one Aboriginal-owned hotel 
has focused strongly on maximising profits. Both within and beyond the 
communities involved, all these hotel purchases have been controversial.
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Buying hotels: A response to discrimination
While Aboriginal groups have articulated a variety of social and economic 
goals for buying licensed premises, one underlying motive has been 
to overcome the humiliation of having been refused service in public 
hotels. A letter to Prime Minister John Curtin in 1943 from Mr Mullins 
of Deniliquin epitomised this feeling: 
To the Prime Minister Mr Curtin
Dear Sir
Could you give me any reason why I cannot get a drink of beer in any 
Hotel especially in the town I am now living Deniliquin NSW. I have 
been advised to state my case to you as soon as possible. Here is my case 
in full. My Father is a White man and my Mother is a very light half 
Caste as for my colour its hard for anyone to tell its only that they know 
my Mother is an half caste. I have served in the AIF [Australian Imperial 
Force] but was discharged with bad feet. Now that my feet are good I’m 
willing to serve again. But Mr Curtin do you think its fair that I should 
be treated this way. I have just received my Enrolment Form for Home 
Defence so you see I’m treated like a White man in every other way still 
I’m not allowed to enter an Hotel. I have been on the Electoral Roll for 
ten years and if Probition [sic] came in I would have to vote for something 
that I’m not receiving. I’m not in the habit of drinking around the town 
and making a fool of myself but I do like my pot the same as any other 
man it makes you very small to be refused a drink in front of your work 
mates. The Police have refused me still they don’t know the reason why. 
Mr Curtin I have one Brother a Prisoner of War in Italy as been for three 
yeares [sic] and another Brother in camp in Victoria so once again I will 
ask you do you think it is fair to me. I’m hoping you can do something 
in this affair. 
I am, Yours faithfully SA Mullins, 
94 George St. South Deniliquin NSW.2
To be excluded from hotel service was a crippling social disadvantage 
that drove people to buy inferior types of liquor at black market prices. 
Writing on race relations on the north coast of New South Wales in the 
1950s, Malcolm Calley (1957: 198) explained that: 
2  Letter dated 17 February 1943. Australian Archives A461 U/300/1. 
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Being unable to buy alcohol in any public house is a far more serious 
social disability than appears at first sight … The evening ‘session’ in 
the bar is the only occasion on which members of every stratum of the 
community meet on a footing of equality, to gossip, to conduct business 
and often to arrange and issue invitations to … social gatherings, sports 
meetings, functions … In any small country town the hotel is the hub 
around which the life of the district revolves. 
At around the same time, Jeremy Beckett (1958: 249) observed, succinctly, 
that the hotel was a ‘visible expression’ of Aboriginal people’s peculiar, 
underprivileged status. The pub was the locus of power in small towns. 
As Ann McGrath (1993: 109) noted: 
To enter [the pub] freely was a constant reminder of inequality. Only via 
the patronage of white men (or exempted men, if they dared risk it) could 
they obtain liquor. Removal of restrictions promised a status alongside 
white men. Access to alcohol meant access to power.
There was also the anomalous (and ridiculous) situation in which an 
Aboriginal person could legally drink in a hotel in one state and not in 
another. An Aboriginal taxi driver told Elizabeth Eggleston (1976: 218) 
that it was marvellous to be free to go into the pub in Darwin, but that 
when he was back in his home state of Western Australia, his status 
changed. Once drinking rights were gained, sitting down and drinking 
in a hotel was seen as recognition of equality and civil rights: for people 
living in the camps and shanty conditions of most town reserves—tin 
shacks and mud floors—the hotels were warm, dry and comfortable 
(Kamien 1978, Chesterman 2005). The granting of drinking rights did 
not eliminate all discrimination: for example, Indigenous ex-servicemen 
were still refused membership of RSL clubs. This was something that the 
Student Action for Aborigines’ (SAFA) ‘Freedom Riders’ campaigned 
against in New South Wales in the 1960s (Curthoys 2002).3 An Aboriginal 
man may have fought in the war or been fully employed in the post-war 
years, but he would still be refused service. Those who received service 
were often served in segregated areas of hotels via a side door. Even if 
they held exemption certificates, which, in most states, provided legal 
exemption from the provisions of the Aborigines Act, Aboriginal people 
3  Organised by students from the University of Sydney, the Freedom Ride toured country towns 
in northern New South Wales in February 1965; they picketed and campaigned against discrimination 
and segregation in swimming pools, rural hotels and RSL clubs.
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of mixed descent could still be refused service in hotels because white 
patrons would refuse to drink with them.4 Dress requirements were also 
used to keep Aboriginal people out. 
The patent unfairness of this situation was captured in the experiences of 
Aboriginal activist and politician Charles Perkins, whose personal history 
was marked by several alcohol-related incidents; however, he was not 
a drinker himself. In the 1950s, at a time when Perkins was becoming 
a  significant sportsperson (a footballer and a cricketer), he recalled 
being refused service of a soft drink in a Port Adelaide pub. The barman 
served him, grudgingly, through a side window while Perkins’s white 
cricket teammates drank inside (Perkins 1975: 56, Read 2001: 54–5). 
The humiliation of this incident lasted a lifetime. Perkins’s experiences as 
a member of the Freedom Ride in 1965 confirmed that Aboriginal people 
in outback New South Wales were experiencing similar humiliations.5 
He observed that:
They were not allowed in any of the hotels and they had to get their beer 
and were sold cheap plonk through the back windows at three times the 
price, through sly-grogging operations. (Perkins 1975: 76)
The Freedom Riders demonstrated outside hotels that discriminated 
against Aboriginal people; in doing so, they saw their role as ‘liberating’ 
hotels and clubs from the colour bar. Perkins described the Freedom 
Ride as a new idea and a new way of promoting a rapid change in racial 
attitudes in Australia: ‘I felt I might have been lacking courage in the face 
of this kind of prejudice’, he explained, ‘[so] I decided … to try and beat 
the system’ (56). 
One of the New South Wales towns targeted by the Freedom Ride was 
Walgett. After World War II, the town had initially welcomed back its 
Aboriginal servicemen at the RSL club; subsequently, they were banned 
from drinking there. The Freedom Riders arrived at Walgett 20 years 
later to find that publicans and the RSL were still discriminating against 
Aboriginal people; the Oasis Hotel had a sign on the door of the bar 
lounge that stated ‘Aborigines admitted only by invertation’ [sic]. The 
Freedom Riders, mostly students from the University of Sydney, picketed 
4  As mentioned in Chapter 3, these Acts were a complex mix of exemption and citizenship, with 
varying preconditions and criteria in each state (Chesterman 2005). 
5  Charles Perkins was president of SAFA; the Freedom Riders took their inspiration from the 
Reverend Martin Luther King. 
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the Walgett RSL club and were confronted by a crowd of angry white 
townspeople: heated debate and heckling ensued. Later that night, as 
they left the town, a local grazier’s son driving a Dodge truck forced the 
students’ bus to swerve off the road (Curthoys 2002). Aboriginal locals 
found the protest confronting: Ted Fields, a local Aboriginal man, recalled 
that discussing contentious issues, such as alcohol consumption and other 
sensitive racial issues, in public ‘scared the life out of us’ (Zagar 2000: 116). 
However, in the wake of the protest, New Dawn magazine6 reported that 
the Freedom Ride had brought about big changes in towns like Walgett 
and Moree: at the Oasis Hotel, Aboriginal and white people could be seen 
having a drink together, ‘purely out of friendship’ (New Dawn 1971: 1). 
Perkins continued his activism on his return to Sydney, staging a ‘drink-
in’ at the Burlington Hotel in Haymarket. He and a group of Aboriginal 
men and some Freedom Riders met for a drink there as an act of defiance. 
Their photograph was printed in the Sydney Morning Herald.7 
Considering this history of overt and covert discrimination against 
Indigenous people, it is hardly surprising that, with the advent of self-
determination policies and emphasis on employment and training, when 
government support became available, communities started talking 
about buying pubs themselves. It was believed that owning their own 
outlets would enable Indigenous groups to tackle racist practices, provide 
appropriate amenities and welcome Indigenous customers. As it turned 
out, Perkins was to play a pivotal role in this endeavour. After serving 
as deputy secretary of the DAA, he became inaugural chair of the ADC 
in 1980;8 he held this part-time position for four years before becoming 
an acting commissioner. From March 1984 to November 1988, he was 
secretary of the DAA. Undoubtedly influential, Perkins’s personal history 
and optimism drove his support for the purchase of hotels and clubs. 
Evidently, Perkins and other bureaucrats did not perceive any moral 
hazards in Aboriginal ownership of hotels. Owing to the deregulation 
trends of the 1980s, alcohol was already becoming more freely available 
in Australia. The thinking behind Aboriginal ownership was that these 
sales might as well be in Aboriginal hands, as this would remove the risk 
of racial discrimination at the point of sale, and enable an Aboriginal 
6  New Dawn was published by the New South Wales Aborigines Welfare Board.
7  Sydney Morning Herald 30 March 1965. 
8  The ADC had nine other commissioners, including Gatjil Djerrkura, deputy chairman, and Lois 
O’Donoghue, who later became chairperson of ATSIC.
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entity to reap the financial rewards, rather than an outsider. There was 
a strongly held view that Aboriginal drinking problems were historically 
determined—that they derived from past prohibition policies, and from 
past and present experiences of racism and discrimination in hotels and 
clubs. Surely, if Aboriginal people themselves owned the premises, this 
would help to prevent a kind of reactive alcohol abuse?
The idea of Aboriginal people buying into a hotel had been raised in 
1971, by Prime Minister John Gorton, who proposed that the Yirrkala 
Aboriginal community in northeast Arnhem Land buy a share in the new 
Walkabout Hotel in Nhulunbuy, a mining town on the Gove Peninsula.9 
However, given that the Yirrkala community had repeatedly, vociferously 
and unsuccessfully opposed the granting of a licence to the Walkabout 
Hotel, the CAA was ‘disgusted’ by the suggestion. Interpreted charitably, 
one could argue that perhaps the prime minister believed that owning 
a share would confer some control over sales to Yirrkala people.
Case studies
The Finke Hotel, Finke, Northern Territory
The first purchase of a licensed hotel by an Aboriginal group was in 1975 
at Finke in the Northern Territory. It was the only hotel in town. A siding 
on the railway line linking central Australia to the south, Finke had a small 
population that included several Torres Strait Islander railway employees 
as well as other gangers and Aboriginal people. The local pastoralists all 
drank at the Finke Hotel. Uniting Church worker, Margaret Bain, recalled 
the effect of excluding Aboriginal men: 
Many [Aboriginal] men from Finke were stockmen. When the muster was 
over, they’d be turned off—and the white men who’d been working with 
them, they’d go into the hotel and drink and the boss would go into the 
hotel, and the Aboriginal workers weren’t allowed in.10 They [Aboriginal 
men] thought that what men were doing had a kind of religious 
significance. It was like a ceremony, part of the cattle business. They could 
join in everything, except for that last part of the ceremony. They felt 
inferior, juvenile, if you know what I mean. They had done the ceremony 
9  B Dexter, pers comm, 2005.
10  Although Aboriginal people were not allowed to drink at the hotel, one or two local people were 
employed there as domestics; they received £3 a week plus food and clothing. 
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all the way until the ‘king hit’. They would have had a relationship [with 
another stockman] and all of a sudden that was chopped off. [After the 
law was changed] it was significant when they were allowed [to drink]—
it was more than an invitation—it was ‘be one of us’ sort of thing.11 
Jim Downing, another Uniting Church worker, agreed with Bain that 
when Aboriginal drinking rights came in ‘there was a push from people 
who thought that now they were citizens they should drink—people 
started to drink like the pastoralists did. [There were] tremendous 
brawls and injuries’.12 The Finke Hotel held a 24-hour licence and sold 
flagons of cheap wine. Heavy drinking among the Aboriginal population 
undermined work practices, and relations between Aboriginal people 
and police were said to be worsening in the township, where the only 
consistent employment was provided by a housing parts factory.
Change came with the innovative Whitlam Labor Government in 
1972: the  policy of self-determination was introduced and the DAA 
was established, with Perkins appointed assistant secretary. According to 
Bain, the idea to buy the Finke Hotel, which had been on the market for 
some time, came from two local Aboriginal men13 and Northern Territory 
politician Bernie Kilgariff.14 The ‘driving force’ behind the purchase seems 
to have been Kilgariff. He recalled how the two ‘old men’ asked him for a 
yarn about the hotel: 
‘That man at the hotel is a bad bugger, he is killing our people. We want 
to buy that hotel.’ They said: ‘you gotta go and get that money from that 
government man’ [Senator] Cavanagh. I knew him from South Australia. 
I went to see him and told him about the Aputula mob: ‘They want to 
buy this hotel’, He said, ‘you’re kidding’. ‘No, they want to bring it under 
control.’ He said, ‘all right you can have that money but you’ve got to be 
part of the board—when it all goes broke I’ll have you to blame’.15
11  M Bain, pers comm, 2004. Bain had visited Finke regularly with the supply truck that drove 
across from Ernabella Mission to collect supplies arriving by train; she eventually lived at Finke.
12  J Downing, pers comm, 2004.
13  One was Toby Ginger, a Pitjantjatjara man.
14  Kilgariff founded the CLP and became the first Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and 
Member for Alice Springs, later a Senator. Bill Ferguson described him as the ‘driving force’ behind 
the purchase of the Finke Hotel. Ferguson later became the manager of the Tyeweretye Club, Alice 
Springs (see Chapter 5) (pers comm, 6 August 2008).
15  Bernie Kilgariff, interview, Alice Springs, 8 August 2008.
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Letters were written to arrange the funds. Jim Cavanagh, Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs, agreed to the purchase: this was before the advent of the 
ADC.16 With a federal grant of $30,000, a holding deposit of $1,000 raised 
from the community’s own funds and Kilgariff’s support, the Aputula Social 
Club bought the Finke Hotel. Senator Cavanagh hoped that owning the pub 
would help Aboriginal elders at Finke to control the drinking problem, and 
also improve race relations in the town. He thought the plan had a ‘strong 
chance of achieving its goals providing certain strict conditions attached to 
the grant were met’.17 It is important to point out that this purchase took 
place in the period before Aboriginal groups and liquor licensing authorities 
began to negotiate in earnest about alcohol restrictions: subsequently, certain 
conditions of sale were either written into the licences held by individual 
premises or were informally agreed to by licensees. Arrangements such as 
these, which usually target takeaway sales, were not common prior to the 
1980s.18 For the Aboriginal community at Finke, buying the hotel was the 
only solution to the problem of unconstrained sales. Downing believed 
that, in the case of Finke, most aspirations for ownership cohered around 
the control over sales:
People said if they bought the pub, then they could control it. Bernie 
Kilgariff helped. It was the people’s idea to buy the pub there so they 
bought it, and said we won’t sell takeaway, we won’t sell takeaway to our 
blokes. The fellas would go off at lunchtime, so they restricted it to 
evenings only; it worked up to a point. 
It was unusual enough for the Daily Telegraph in Sydney to run a story 
on the hotel’s Aboriginal buyers, headlined ‘Blacks will buy the only pub 
in town’:
If you’re clean and decently dressed you’ll be welcome to a beer at the 
Finke Hotel, no matter what the color of your skin. The pub is the only 
watering hole in Finke, a tiny railway settlement about 321 km south of 
Alice Springs … The elder of the Aboriginal community saw the purchase 
of the hotel as a means of regulating … drinking. (Daily Telegraph 1975)
16  It is unclear whether Charles Perkins was involved in the Finke Hotel decision, although later 
he fully supported Aboriginal purchases of hotels. His relationship with Jim Cavanagh was fraught 
(Australian Dictionary of Biography 2007).
17  DAA (1975). Media release, JC/178, 1 May.
18  At the time, the Northern Territory had a Licensing Court presided over by a Licensing Magistrate. 
The Northern Territory Liquor Commission was established in 1979, along with a new Liquor Act that 
gave the Commission many flexible powers. In South Australia, the first restricted licence was issued 
in March 1981 to a hotel at Marla Bore in the far north of the state: at the request of the Aboriginal 
community, the sale of takeaway liquor is prohibited, except to lodgers or bona fide travellers. 
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A non-Aboriginal man from Alice Springs was hired as the manager, and 
a hotel management board, with eight Aboriginal community members, 
four non-Aboriginal members and two members of the Legislative 
Assembly of the Northern Territory, was established. The board’s first act 
was to ban off-premises sales of wine and spirits, resulting, reportedly, in 
a decline in hotel profits and a rise in store profits (Downing 1976: 1147). 
Four years later, the intensity of violence and the disruption of sleep and 
work had diminished, and any troublemakers were ‘disciplined’ by the 
Aboriginal council. 
Significantly, there had been no reference to the hotel becoming a source 
of locally generated funds or jobs once it was Aboriginal owned. Kilgariff 
recalled that there were no Aboriginal drinkers in the pub itself (in the early 
days at least); consequently, it appears that the purchase of the hotel was 
not associated with a campaign to teach ‘civilised’ drinking on premises. 
In 1979, Superintendent Symons of the South Australian police claimed 
that, although there was still intoxication and fighting at Finke (despite 
Aboriginal ownership of the hotel), the community was more settled; he 
used the Finke Hotel to support his argument in favour of extending the 
sale of beer at the Yalata community canteen.19 A local resident of Finke, 
Torres Strait Islander Harold Matasia, remembered things differently: 
there was too much fighting and ‘kids crying’ when the people owned the 
pub, he claimed.20 
In the long run, the Finke Hotel did not survive. When, in 1980, the 
railway line (the Ghan) linking Finke to the outside world was rerouted, 
and the road to another source of alcohol (at Kulgera) was improved, 
the manager of the Finke Hotel decided to let his stocks run down. 
The  community raised no objections and the hotel eventually closed. 
The original stone building was renovated and is now the Shire office.
The Oasis, Walgett, New South Wales
In 1983, nearly two decades after the Freedom Riders’ confrontation at 
Walgett, the ADC, with Perkins as chair, acquired the Oasis Hotel for 
around $450,000. The hotel was leased to Gamilarai Ltd, an Aboriginal 
community company instituted for the purpose of managing the hotel. 
19  HD Symons, South Australian Police to BJ Powell, Regional Director, DAA, Adelaide, 19 March 
1979, DAA files, South Australia.
20  D Nash, pers comm, 2009.
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Accounting firm Coopers and Lybrand recommended that the ADC 
purchase the nearby Imperial Hotel instead, as it had better trading results: 
also, its relationship with Tooheys Brewery meant that staff would be 
trained by brewery-sponsored supervisors (Commonwealth of Australia 
1989a: 21). However, owning the Imperial Hotel lacked the symbolic 
value of owning the Oasis; it is difficult not to assume that sweet, symbolic 
justice, motivated the purchase.
The ADC’s stated purpose in buying the Oasis was to provide employment 
and training for 12 Aboriginal staff and to enhance social and economic 
development (Commonwealth of Australia 1989a). There was vague talk 
of controlling sales, but this seemed an illogical rationale to some local 
Aboriginal people. Echoing the early arguments of temperance advocates 
against the establishment of community or ‘Gothenburg-style’ hotels, 
one Aboriginal town councillor in Walgett commented that he could not 
‘understand why they’d want to buy a hotel in Walgett … if you’re going 
to try and resolve the alcohol problem you wouldn’t go and buy a pub!’21 
Almost from the outset, there were problems of governance and 
management at the Oasis Hotel, with sales either not charged or 
undercharged, cash receipts not going into the till and stock being 
removed from the premises. There were eight different (non-Aboriginal) 
managers over a five-year period and the hotel lost around $10,000 per 
month. The Commonwealth Audit Office found that Aboriginal directors 
had interfered in the day-to-day running of the hotel—to the point of 
harassment of managers; had paid themselves unauthorised sitting fees; 
and had breached their statutory duties by failing to lodge company tax 
returns. The Audit Office rebuked the ADC, commenting that public 
funds of around $1 million dollars could have been spent ‘more carefully 
and productively’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1989a: 23). The Oasis 
Hotel continued to require financial assistance until it was sold to non-
Aboriginal interests.
The Transcontinental, Oodnadatta, South Australia
In 1986, the ADC was involved in another hotel purchase, this time at 
Oodnadatta in South Australia. Like Finke, Oodnadatta was an outback 
railway town that had provided limited employment for Aboriginal 
21  ABC Radio National, AM, transcript, 13 January 2000.
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people until it was bypassed by the railway in 1981. The town had 
a small population of between 100 and 200, more than half of which was 
Indigenous. Buying the hotel was the initiative of George and Maude 
Tongerie, a local Aboriginal couple who were qualified welfare workers. 
When the Department of Community Welfare withdrew from the 
town, George Tongerie became the community adviser, setting up a self-
help program of ‘outstanding enterprise’ (Mattingly 1988: 212).22 The 
Tongeries (both non-drinkers) conceived taking over the Transcontinental 
Hotel as an alcohol-control measure—a solution to the upsetting number 
of alcohol-related deaths in the town. The purchase seemed ‘all in God’s 
plan’, according to George Tongerie:
Well, Charlie Perkins was at a meeting at Port Augusta. But we didn’t 
know that. And we were at a meeting at the other end of the same 
building. And anyway, we came out of the meeting and bumped into 
Charlie Perkins, and of course we said, ‘Charlie, we don’t know what to 
do! [about the drinking]. They haven’t given us any funding, we haven’t 
got anything there we can start with … the only thing we can do is buy 
the hotel to have control’, and he said ‘well, how much do you want to 
buy the pub?’ and I told him, and he got his secretary to go and get his 
briefcase … He was secretary of the ADC. He’s like us, he was brought up 
in the camp, like us. So we bought the pub, we set up a board of directors, 
and Maude and I are still on it.23 
Perkins was an acting commissioner at the ADC at the time and secretary 
of the DAA.24 Whatever the truth of the matter, it is clear that the 
Tongeries believed that Perkins was the person who made the purchase 
happen. The Oodnadatta Aboriginal Housing Society, which had been 
a driving force behind local social improvements, was renamed Dunjiba 
Community Council; it became the owner of the hotel on behalf of the 
community. With the backing of the community, Dunjiba also bought 
the licensed general store and post office, the railway station and several 
houses. The ADC Annual Report does not give details of the cost of the 
hotel, merely noting that it was ‘funded’. 
22  George Tongerie (1925–2013) was brought up at Colebrook Home, which moved from 
Oodnadatta to Quorn. He knew Charles Perkins from their time together with the Aboriginal 
Progress Association in Adelaide in the 1960s. 
23  George Tongerie, interview, 11 March 2008.
24  Shirley McPherson was Chair of the ADC at the time of the Transcontinental Hotel purchase. 
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George Tongerie and other senior community members at Oodnadatta 
saw owning the hotel as a means of controlling sales, especially the sale of 
fortified wine (port) that came in 2 L glass flagons. With its high alcohol 
content and sweet taste, port was the (troublesome) drink of choice for 
many Aboriginal drinkers. Maude Tongerie recalled that the drinkers ‘were 
having flagons for breakfast’. A local doctor reported that alcohol-related 
injuries and trauma were common causes of visits to the Oodnadatta 
hospital (Johnston 1991). Once it owned the hotel and the general store, 
the first action of the Dunjiba Community Council was to get rid of the 
flagons that were being sold from the store in the hours before the hotel 
opened for on-premises drinking. The council staged a spectacular and 
symbolic act of destruction:
The first job—we had to get someone to dig a hole, a great big pit. 
We brought out all the plonk from the store. The boys lined them all out 
and guess what they were doing all day, for half a day? Shooting them 
down this big hole! The damage—the ‘red ned’—all down the big hole!
After this, both the hotel and the store were restricted to selling 
a maximum of two bottles of beer per person per day over the counter, 
and the premises were closed at 8 pm. It was agreed that wine and spirits 
would be available to non-Aboriginal patrons of the hotel dining room 
only. No formal training or advice was provided to the Aboriginal board 
on alcohol policy, governance matters or hotel management—‘we just 
used common sense’, Maude Tongerie explained. She recalled that they 
actively encouraged people to eat before drinking alcohol: ‘I said, if you’re 
going to have your drinkies, have your mai, have your mai ’.25 She also 
advised patrons to have a rest and a shower before going for a drink; 
however, apart from this, there is little evidence of any conscious attempt 
at teaching moderation. Instead, Maude and George led by example:
We were the only two non-drinkers [at first]. It was only down the line 
that we got more non-drinkers on there, because once we went there and 
we were their auntie and uncle drinking lemonade and cold water.
Two years after buying the hotel, the Dunjiba Community Council 
applied to declare the areas in town where the children played ‘alcohol 
free’ (Adelaide Advertiser 1988: 4). These early attempts at harm reduction 
were accompanied by welfare strategies and other initiatives, such as 
arranging for people to have better access to second-hand clothes, and 
25  Mai = food from plants or food generally, or ‘whitefella’ food. 
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providing curtains for their houses to give people a psychological ‘lift’. 
The extent to which these strategies worked can be seen in the report of 
the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Langton et al. 
1991), which noted that the Aboriginal community at Oodnadatta had 
moved from relative dependence with no land and no economic base in 
the 1950s, to a position in which they owned business enterprises and 40 
houses and had a strong community council.26 The store and the hotel 
both employed Aboriginal people, even though they were managed by 
non-Aboriginal people. Although there have been no formal evaluations 
of the effect of Aboriginal ownership of the Transcontinental Hotel, the 
restrictions were judged successful by observers who commented on 
Aboriginal people’s improved health and drinking habits (Shaw & Gibson 
1988: 170, Mattingly 1988: 212).
The purchase of the Transcontinental Hotel owes more to George and 
Maude Tongerie’s temperance leanings, and fortuitous connection with 
Charles Perkins, than any considered government strategy to regulate 
alcohol sales or support Aboriginal self-determination. George Tongerie 
knew Perkins from their time together in the Aboriginal Progress 
Association in Adelaide in the 1960s. George was an ex-serviceman, 
Justice of the Peace and Member of the Order of Australia: he was 
celebrated enough that when he died in 2013, the Premier of South 
Australia attended his memorial service. Maude was a non-drinker who, 
while not being an official member of the WCTU in South Australia, was 
clearly known to them, as she features in a WCTU publication celebrating 
Aboriginal women pathfinders who served their communities (Beeson 
1980: 61); she was also a Member of the Order of Australia.
Woden Town Club, Canberra, Australian Capital 
Territory
In 1988, the ADC guaranteed loans for the development of a licensed 
Aboriginal club in Canberra, the Woden Town Club—a controversial 
decision enabling returns not only from alcohol but also from poker 
machines.27 Several government offices, including the DAA, were located 
in Woden, and the club was designed to attract Indigenous public servants 
26   Comments made by Commissioner Elliott Johnston (1991).
27  I have included the Woden Town Club in this discussion of hotels as it differs from other 
Aboriginal social clubs that are primarily within discrete, remote Aboriginal communities. 
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from around the country who lived in Canberra. Perkins supported 
the development of the club and became its president, thus fulfilling 
his long-held desire for a club for Aboriginal people. Aware that there 
were numerous clubs for different ethnic groups in Australian cities 
(e.g. Croatian clubs, Italian clubs, Greek clubs), Perkins had long wanted 
a similar-style club for Aboriginal people.28 
The ADC approved a grant of $286,300 to the Aboriginal Corporation 
for Sporting and Recreational Activities, and a loan of $100,000 for 
refurbishment and renovation of the club premises. Established in the 
windowless basement of Bonner House, a building owned by the ADC, 
the club opened in June 1988. The premises soon ran into serious financial 
difficulty, incurring losses of $10,000 a month. Subsequently, the club, 
and Perkins himself, became enmeshed in controversy over the role of 
the ADC in the purchase of poker machines for the premises (Christie & 
Young 2011).29 The Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Gerry Hand, asked 
for an audit and an investigation into the ADC’s role in the purchases 
of the Woden Town Club and the Oasis Hotel in Walgett. As a  result, 
Perkins’s actions were subjected to intense scrutiny by the Senate Estimates 
Committee and the Audit Office. 
Characteristically, the Audit Office was more interested in the viability of 
these enterprises than their social benefits; it found that the ADC had not 
satisfied itself that the Aboriginal owners were capable of engaging in the 
enterprise, as required by the Aboriginal Development Commission Act 1980 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1989a, 1989b). At the Senate Estimates 
Committee hearing, CLP Senator Grant Tambling (Northern Territory) 
was particularly unrelenting in his pursuit of Perkins, suggesting that 
it was irresponsible to have used ‘taxpayers’ money’ to start the Woden 
Town Club when so many other clubs were failing. Perkins replied, with 
asperity, that ‘Blacks are taxpayers as well, which some people tend to 
forget’. Further, he argued that the club had only just opened, that it 
usually took around two years for such a venue to get on its feet, and that 
the original grant had been spent on renovations because the previous 
owner had left the place in a ‘shambles’. Teething problems were only to 
be expected. Another senator’s question, about who the club was for, gave 
Perkins an opportunity to explain the club’s purpose:
28  See Fire Talker, a documentary about Perkins’s life by Ivan Sen (2008).
29  The club acquired 47 poker machines, something that would raise eyebrows today in view 
of current concerns about the damage caused by Aboriginal people’s use of poker machines.
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It is a club for Aboriginal people and their friends. Everybody is welcome 
down there. You have two other clubs near there which compete for 
clientele, and that is natural enough … There is not one Aboriginal 
club in Australia. We want to start one because we think it is important 
for Aboriginal people to have some facility where they can go, where 
they know there are standards set, in terms of dress and behaviour, 
by Aboriginal people, by the board.30
Unconvinced, the Audit Office criticised the ADC for funding projects 
that placed ‘undue’ emphasis on employment opportunities and on 
creating social facilities for Aboriginal people, rather than focusing on 
business activities. As Perkins explained, the club was intended, at least 
partly, as a venue for inculcating moderation and standards of social 
behaviour. However, the Audit Office did not attach importance to these 
social goals. The Woden Town Club went into liquidation and closed 
after six months, making it impossible to observe its social impact, either 
beneficial or detrimental (Christie & Young 2011). Unlike the ‘Aboriginal’ 
hotels in rural communities such as Oodnadatta or Finke, and the 
community-based licensed social clubs in discrete remote communities 
in the Northern Territory or Queensland, the Woden Town Club lacked 
a local community of interest that could mobilise to support the project.31 
Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse, Northern Territory
In 1987, the Pitjantjatjara-speaking community of Imanpa in the Northern 
Territory bought Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse on the Lasseter Highway. 
The highway took tourist traffic from the Stuart Highway south of Alice 
Springs to the motels and resorts at Uluru. The Imanpa community made 
the purchase with no assistance from the ADC.
Imanpa was a new community, formed when local pastoralists, the 
Kunoths, offered to excise a living area for Pitjantjatjara-speaking 
people from their station; they chose an area away from the highway 
and roadhouse in the hope of dismantling a drinking camp that had 
developed there. The  roadhouse had a monopoly on sales of alcohol 
30  Perkins was omitting the ‘clubs’ located on remote communities in the Northern Territory and 
the taverns in Queensland communities in saying that there was not one Aboriginal club in Australia, 
parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id: committees%2 Festimate% 
2Fecomd881026a_ece.out%2F0025.
31  After this episode, Perkins was dismissed from his DAA position by Gerry Hand, but was later 
exonerated of any wrongdoing.
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to Aboriginal people in the region. By 1980, Aboriginal drinking had 
become sufficiently problematic for the Liquor Commission to persuade 
the licensee to suspend takeaway sales. At one stage, the Aboriginal 
community considered establishing a licensed club at Imanpa, as a way 
of counteracting the sale of beer from the roadhouse, and they asked 
the Liquor Commission for advice on setting one up. Their request was 
not answered, and the community lost interest. Instead, in 1987, the 
community bought the Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse by raising funds for 
a deposit through profits from the store at Imanpa, and via contributions 
from a community ‘chuck-in’ system (Tangentyere Council 1991: 
97–8). The store had been established with help from Uniting Church 
advisers; its purpose was to pay for the community’s essential services and 
maintenance. Imanpa’s financial integrity qualified it for a bank loan of 
$500,000. This was paid to the community’s company, Lisanote Pty Ltd, 
which became the owner of the roadhouse. The people of Imanpa were 
proud of managing this without any government support.
The aims of the purchase were threefold: to help Imanpa people secure an 
economic base; to raise funds for the purchase of a nearby cattle station; 
and to reduce the harm from alcohol sales (Pitjantjatjara Council 1990: 
35–9): in other words, a mixture of economic and social goals. Once 
the community owned the premises, new rules were put in place; the 
non-Aboriginal manager was directed to de-emphasise liquor sales and 
to focus on catering to tour buses by improving the décor, providing 
food and selling locally made Aboriginal artefacts. Lisanote’s additional 
liquor restrictions included a six-can takeaway limit for Imanpa people, 
restricting alcohol sales to the late afternoon and stopping all sales on 
request during ceremonies or community festivities. Ownership of the 
premises gave community members the freedom to introduce a harm-
reduction strategy that, while unusual, was culturally appropriate; a  list 
of names of non-drinkers who had asked the licensee to prevent them from 
buying alcohol was posted so that they could not be pressured to buy 
alcoholic beverages for their drinking relatives (Pitjantjatjara Council 
1990: 39). This request represented a peculiarly Aboriginal form of social 
control, in which individuals externalise authority—by giving it to an 
individual or a regulation—to take the socially awkward step of refusing 
requests (Brady 2004: 116). It is unlikely that any ordinary hotel or 
roadhouse that was not community owned would agree to implement 
such a policy.
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Fig. 23 Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse, Lasseter Highway, 2009
Source: M Brady
Unknowingly, the Imanpa community’s priorities—to de-emphasise 
liquor sales and to improve sales of food—echoed the ideals of the 
Gothenburg system of alcohol control. However, these locally created 
social-control initiatives were soon undermined by the liberal sales 
practices of two competing roadhouses. In 1988, a roadhouse at Curtin 
Springs to the west, changed its previous, more restrained practice, and 
began selling greater volumes of takeaway beer to local Aboriginal people. 
In 1989, Erldunda Roadhouse, located to the east of Imanpa, applied 
for a takeaway licence. In a vain attempt to keep the region relatively 
‘dry’, the Imanpa community and the Pitjantjatjara Council objected 
to Erldunda’s application. However, given that the Imanpa community 
owned a similar outlet at Mt Ebenezer, its objection was complicated to 
argue and difficult to sustain. The Northern Territory Liquor Commission 
was not sympathetic. It noted, derisively, that the community had ‘its own 
liquor outlet’; that out of 40 adult males, only two were non-drinkers; and 
that most of the drinkers had severe alcohol problems. Disagreeing that 
the addition of a takeaway licence at Erldunda would attract Aboriginal 
people, the Liquor Commission granted Erldunda an unconditional 
takeaway licence (Rae 1989). Alcohol-related injuries to Imanpa people 
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increased following the end of the virtual monopoly that Mt Ebenezer 
had enjoyed. The uncontrolled sales of takeaway beer along the Lasseter 
Highway precipitated a long campaign for sales restrictions led by the NPY 
Women’s Council (Lyon 1991, d’Abbs et al. 1999, Brady 2005: 132). The 
Women’s Council eventually succeeded in prompting an inquiry by the 
Race Discrimination Commissioner into non-discriminatory mechanisms 
for restricting alcohol sales to residents of Aboriginal communities in the 
region. The Women’s Council eventually persuaded the roadhouse at 
Curtin Springs to try various restriction regimes (Race Discrimination 
Commissioner 1995).
Imanpa faced many problems in the 1990s, not all related to alcohol 
consumption or ownership of the Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse. For example, 
there were governance and accountability problems related to debts 
accruing from the purchase of a cattle station; community indifference 
regarding governance; stealing from the community store; and problems 
with staff. The community board continued to instruct the roadhouse 
manager to implement alcohol-management regimes; however, at least 
one manager expressed frustration that he did not have the freedom to 
apply any of his previous experience of running a licensed club in an 
Aboriginal community—he was ‘just the publican’ with no power. 
By  May 2009,32 a four-can limit of full-strength takeaway beer was in 
place, and the arrangement worked well; a community member managed 
the list of names of ineligible drinkers as well as a list of those who were 
banned for bad behaviour. For such an arrangement to work, the keeper 
of the lists has to be tough and consistent: inevitably, they had to deal 
with either close kin or long-term companions. Imanpa was fortunate in 
having competent leaders, including several women, who were prepared 
to involve themselves in these roles. The community council also put in 
place a number of other limitations. For example, it was decided that 
Aboriginal people should not use the roadhouse dining room and should 
consume their beer allowance away from the roadhouse—partly to 
prevent them importuning tourists for more beer. Another limitation put 
in place by the Aboriginal council was that alcohol could not be supplied 
to residents of the Aṉangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara lands. These 
limitations undoubtedly affected the profitability of the enterprise.
32  The author made a field visit to Mt Ebenezer in 2009; further information and background was 
provided by Norman Steele, Glendle Schrader and Matthew Ellem of Wana Ungkunytja, and Richard 
Preece.
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By the late 2000s, Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse was not trading well, and was 
using all surplus funds to clear a large debt that had accrued over several 
years. As well as having difficulty creating the economic base that people 
had hoped for originally, the roadhouse suffered from the Global Financial 
Crisis, which resulted in a change in the type of tourists it attracted. 
After 2008, there were fewer international visitors, and more Australian 
‘grey nomads’ who tended to cater for themselves. In March 2012, the 
roadhouse became insolvent and closed. It reopened in October 2013. 
In conjunction with the Ngaanyatjarra Council, the Imanpa community 
decided to try a new arrangement in which it still owned the land and 
the roadhouse buildings, but was no longer involved in the business 
itself. The business was leased to a branch of the Ngaanyatjarra Council 
(Indervon), which employed managers and took over the liquor licence.33
The aim was (and is) to use the lease money to pay off old debts; once the 
business becomes viable again, it will be returned to community ownership. 
Ngaanyatjarra Council is an Aboriginal organisation concerned with the 
wellbeing of Aboriginal people. This means that, although the Imanpa 
community no longer has a direct role in running the roadhouse, the 
present managers still act in the interests of Aboriginal people. By mutual 
agreement with the community, they stopped selling takeaway alcohol 
as a separate item. To be eligible to buy four cans of beer, all customers 
(including those on tour buses) must first purchase hot food to be 
consumed on the premises. Owning the roadhouse has not been easy, and 
the expected financial rewards have not been forthcoming; however, as has 
been the case in several other instances, Aboriginal ownership has enabled 
a measure of local control over alcohol sales. The  roadhouse artefacts 
shop and gallery cuts out unscrupulous traders, and gives Aboriginal 
craftspeople a fair return for their work.
Another instance of a community attempting to constrain a troublesome 
outlet by buying it was at Daly River, where, in the late 1970s, two 
Aboriginal communities, Peppimenarti and Daly River, had objected 
to the renewal of the liquor licence at the Daly River Hotel Motel. 
They argued that any licence in the area should be under Aboriginal 
control to regulate consumption. When the hotel was offered for sale, 
the Peppimenarti community applied for funds so that an Aboriginal 
association could purchase the facility as part of a tourism venture (Stanley 
33  Indervon Petroleum Pty Ltd, is the fuel distribution arm of the Ngaanyatjarra Council 
(L Hewson, Manager, pers comm, 2014).
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1985: 34). Their offer failed. In the late 1990s, the Nauiyu Nambiyu 
Aboriginal Corporation at Daly River purchased the Daly River Roadside 
Inn and caravan park.34 
The Wayside Inn, Timber Creek, Northern Territory
In 1999, Aboriginal organisations bought into two licensed hotels at 
Timber Creek, a small remote township on the Victoria Highway between 
Katherine and Kununurra in the Northern Territory: the Wayside Inn and 
the Timber Creek Hotel. The township of Timber Creek lies between the 
East Kimberley of Western Australia and the Victoria River District of the 
Northern Territory, two regions popular with tourists. Timber Creek is 
also in the heart of pastoral country. Hence, hotel customers were often 
ringers, stockmen and cattle-truck drivers, as well as tourists and local 
Aboriginal people.
Fig. 24 The Wayside Inn, Timber Creek, 1991
Source: M Brady
The Timber Creek Hotel, which grew out of an original outback store 
known as Fogarty’s, had a single air-conditioned front bar, a restaurant 
and a convenience store. Next door was the Wayside Inn, a licensed 
34  At Fitzroy Crossing in Western Australia, the Aboriginal communities of the Fitzroy Valley 
purchased the Crossing Inn in 1988–89; this case is discussed in the next chapter.
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roadhouse with a beer garden, petrol bowsers, tourist camp and small 
supermarket. The Wayside Inn was licensed to cater 24 hours a day to 
long-distance travellers. Its extended opening hours, limited restrictions, 
cheap grog and outdoor facilities where smoking was permitted made it 
popular with Aboriginal drinkers.
Two organisations representing Aboriginal communities in and around 
Timber Creek, the Ngaliwurru-Wuli Association and Gunamu Aboriginal 
Corporation, entered into a joint venture with the non-Aboriginal couple 
who owned both the Timber Creek Hotel and the Wayside Inn. The 
Aboriginal entities took a 50 per cent share in the Timber Creek Hotel 
and took over full ownership of the Wayside Inn, with the licence being 
issued to the Timber Creek Wayside Inn Joint Venture Pty Ltd. In what 
the Licensing Commission (2008) later referred to as an ‘unusual’ joint 
venture, two ostensibly competing, and adjoining, hotels were owned 
or part owned by the same Aboriginal entity, and were managed by the 
original owners and joint-venture partners. This complex arrangement 
was further complicated by the involvement of the two Aboriginal 
organisations, one of which (Gunamu Aboriginal Corporation) owned 
the title for the land on which the Wayside Inn stood,35 while the other 
was responsible for management. 
In previous years, the owner of the Timber Creek Hotel, Mr Fogarty, 
after consultation with the local community, had limited takeaway sales 
to six cans of beer, banned sales of wine and spirits to Aboriginal people 
and prohibited ‘book up’ (selling on credit). These initiatives had cost 
Fogarty 25 per cent of his sales (Legislative Assembly of the Northern 
Territory 1991: 151). Nevertheless, both outlets were lucrative. The gross 
profit from a small number of poker machines alone earned the Wayside 
Inn $133,000 (Northern Territory Department of Justice 2009: 119–26). 
In purchasing the Wayside Inn, the Aboriginal community entered into 
a business arrangement; additionally, it sought to use the opportunity to 
deal with binge drinking. The Inn’s new owners barred unruly customers 
and experimented with alcohol-management strategies, such as restricting 
troublemakers to light beer for a certain period, as determined by 
a ‘tribunal’ led by an Aboriginal policewoman (who was also a member of 
the main landowning family) (Weekend Australian 2000: 1–2). New rules 
proscribed abuse of staff, fighting, refusing to leave the premises, bringing 
35  The Indigenous Land Corporation transferred title for the 2 ha of land to Gunamu Aboriginal 
Corporation in July 1999 when the joint venture commenced. 
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weapons into the town, spitting, theft, humbugging, supplying to barred 
persons, bad debts, damage to property and disturbing the peace. The 
Inn was closed for ceremonies and funerals, as directed by the traditional 
owners (Bartlett & Duncan 2000: 229). It is difficult to know whether 
these interventions made a difference, because Aboriginal people drank 
at both hotels, which were virtually side-by-side.
The Wayside Inn had to repay a substantial loan, which meant that 
there was pressure on the manager to make money. It is unclear whether 
there were any profits remaining after expenses had been paid that could 
have been distributed for the benefit of local people, or upkeep of the 
property. The property, which was under attack from white ants (i.e. 
termites), did not get the maintenance it required. 
In 2009, the original 10-year joint venture came to an end, and the 
traditional owners decided they wanted to own the Wayside Inn 
independently. The Ngaliwurru-Wuli Association announced on its 
website that it planned to take over management of the supermarket, 
tourist camp and adjoining Wayside Inn. However, according to the 
Licensing Commission, the previous licensee (i.e. the joint venture) had 
failed to transfer the licence to any new entity before it dissolved, and had 
also failed to submit redevelopment plans for the building itself. One or 
both Aboriginal organisations were responsible for material alterations, 
renovations and redevelopments, which (for licensed premises) required 
the agreement of the Liquor Commission. Licensing inspectors and 
lawyers repeatedly tried and failed to resolve these issues (Northern 
Territory Licensing Commission 2010a). Meanwhile, white ants, which 
are endemic in the Northern Territory, continued to eat the Wayside Inn, 
transforming what was already a complex situation into a disastrous one. 
A decision was made by Ngaliwurru-Wuli to pull down the dilapidated 
building and restart the business in another form.
The situation descended into farce. The building was demolished but 
Ngaliwurru-Wuli failed to obtain building permissions or a properly 
qualified project manager; a new concrete slab poured at the site of the 
demolished pub turned out to be non-compliant and unusable. No 
one, including the Licensing Commission, knew who held the licence 
of the (non-existent, white-ant consumed) hotel. Without informing 
or consulting with its lawyer, Ngaliwurru-Wuli decided to relinquish 
the liquor licence; in July 2010, in a fax to the Licensing Commission, 
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it announced that the board did not wish to continue with the transfer 
of the licence.36 On these instructions, in September 2010, the Licensing 
Commission cancelled the gaming machine and liquor licences of the 
Wayside Inn under a section of the Liquor Act that states that cancellation 
can occur if the premises have not been used for the sale of alcohol for 
a  period of 90 days.37 Why Ngaliwurru-Wuli surrendered its valuable 
liquor licence rather than organise an interim arrangement for alcohol 
sales, or transfer the licence to another entity, is unknown. There is 
no annual fee for a liquor licence, which means there was no financial 
disincentive for the organisation to have the licence suspended rather than 
cancelled. The decision appeared illogical to both Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal observers, not least because a 24-hour liquor licence is worth 
a considerable sum. An Aboriginal community member who had been 
positive about the extra controls made possible by local ownership, was 
taken aback at the demise of the licence: 
I don’t know why the licence got sent back! We had restrictions in our own 
way because we [were] the licence holder. We say ‘don’t serve to particular 
people’; if [there were] domestics, leader would come up and say ‘you are 
banned from the pub’. It was really good. Now if you want to not serve 
people it’s complicated. [After a death] people would ask ‘you mob shut 
down while we grieve, one or two days?’ It happened quite often. I don’t 
understand why Ngaliwurru gave it back … We got bad advice from 
legals and I know the community wanted the development because the 
building was falling apart, we wanted to make a more welcoming 24-hour 
licence. At the time when [joint-venture partner] and his family had it, 
the building was run down. The directors said we’re not renewing the 
agreement in 2009 because of this. We got a floor plan drawn up, concrete 
etc. I told [Ngaliwurru-Wuli director] ‘We can keep licence on hold until 
we build a new setup’. But the CEO they had, gave bad advice and let 
the licence go. I was in Darwin when this happened. They didn’t get any 
advice. I was not called to give evidence at the cancelling hearing.38 
The disappearance of the Wayside Inn deprived the travelling public of 
the four basic services that such licensees are required to deliver 24 hours 
a day (food, accommodation, fuel and hospitality). Wayside inns are still 
36  The President of the Ngaliwurru-Wuli Association sent a fax to the Liquor Commission on 
22 July 2010 to this effect (Northern Territory Liquor Commission 2010b: 3).
37  The Timber Creek Wayside Inn Joint Venture Pty Ltd was finally deregistered by ASIC in 2011 
(ASIC Gazette A064/11, 5 August 2011). 
38  Brady fieldnotes, 12 August 2014.
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important in the outback because of the lack of population centres and 
service points, even if their need has diminished in recent years (Racing, 
Gaming and Licensing Division 2003). 
Only one source of alcohol remained in the township, the Timber Creek 
Hotel, which had an indoor bar with minimal features (e.g. a pool table), 
and restrictions on takeaway times and types of alcohol.39 Drinkers could 
no longer move to an alternative drinking place with longer opening hours 
and a beer garden, as had happened in the past. However, despite having 
no involvement in the ownership of the hotel, the community was able 
to negotiate restrictions and other arrangements with the licensee, such as 
closing the bar to Aboriginal people when ceremonies or funerals were on. 
The hotel manager agreed to maintain an incident register and a banned 
person register (Northern Territory Licensing Commission 2010b). As it 
turned out, it was not necessary for Aboriginal people to own the premises 
to negotiate alcohol controls. However, such controls were only possible 
because the community had a longstanding relationship with the licensee; 
there are no guarantees that the controls would survive a change of licensee.
While some local Timber Creek people resented the hotel for making 
money out of ‘us blackfellas’ ‘who buy all year round’ (unlike seasonal 
tourists), other Aboriginal community members were ambivalent. 
One spoke about the original purchase of the Wayside Inn: 
We wanted to buy it to reduce alcohol intake but it created more problems, 
people drank more. [We] wanted to get a business to make money—and 
alcohol makes more money. Now we want to buy a block and make an 
art and craft centre, sandwiches and coffee, make a facility we can use to 
have meetings in.
Although the Wayside Inn has gone, an Aboriginal association, Gunamu 
Aboriginal Corporation, owns the businesses on the site—the Wirib40 
tourism park, caravans, fuel pumps and a store—and has sought 
professional advice on management and finance. Plans have been drawn 
up for a new supermarket on the site, but there is to be no liquor licence 
there. All that remains of the Wayside Inn is a concrete slab, on which 
the hotel’s original coolroom has been cemented as a memento; a mural 
above it depicts the dingo dreaming, painted by the grandson of a senior 
traditional owner. 
39  Prices for takeaways are extremely high; for example, $80.50 for a carton of 24 cans of full-
strength beer and $20.50 for a sixpack (as at August 2014).
40  Wirib = ‘dingo’, ‘a significant local dreaming’.
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Fig. 25 Remains of the Wayside Inn, Timber Creek, 2014
Source: M Brady
The Indigenous community hotels: Hopes 
and outcomes
Most of the hotels discussed here were purchased during the 1980s, a decade 
when serious alcohol problems were becoming evident in the Indigenous 
population (cf. Hunter 1993), as shown in Table 2. Aboriginal people 
and government officials had anticipated that Aboriginal people would 
exert control over alcohol consumption, but this did not always develop. 
Funding agencies, such as the ADC, as well as the Australian Government, 
promoted self-management, self-determination and economic and social 
development for Indigenous people. These goals at times contradicted the 
motivations that led Aboriginal people and organisations to seek licences 
to sell alcohol, such as a desire for social improvement and economic 
development; to prove that Aboriginal people were capable of running 
economically viable enterprises; to provide employment and training; to 
enable Aboriginal people to socialise, set their own standards and learn to 
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Social improvement and economic development
Indigenous and non-Indigenous community-hotel enterprises had their 
philosophical origins in sometimes idealised notions of social improvement 
and self-help, as described in Chapter 2. In the Barossa and the Riverland 
regions of South Australia, where notions of self-sufficiency were deeply 
embedded in Lutheran communities and agricultural cooperatives, 
community ownership of the local hotel was seen as an integral part of 
fundraising for the betterment of the town. Many, if not all, of the non–
Indigenous run South Australian hotels seem to have achieved this goal; 
they distributed substantial sums to local community and educational 
activities, town parks and gardens, and charities and sports associations. 
However, an obvious influence on their profitability, and thus their ability 
to be generous to local causes, was the size of the population base. Towns 
such as Ceduna, Nuriootpa, Loxton and Renmark—whose community 
hotels raise enough revenue to make substantial financial donations to 
local organisations and facilities—have resident populations ranging from 
3,000 to 7,500 people, and these numbers are boosted by tourists and 
other travellers. By contrast, several of the Indigenous-owned hotels were 
in towns with very small resident populations. Timber Creek and Imanpa 
– Mt Ebenezer have resident populations of around 250. Even though 
both locations are supported by substantial through traffic and visitors, 
much of their customer base is seasonal and can be affected by economic 
downturns. As a result, they made minimal (if any) distributions of 
revenue for the benefit of their communities, and Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse 
became bankrupt.
Despite the aspirations for social improvement and job creation that 
accompanied Indigenous purchases, none of the hotels profiled here 
provided much Aboriginal employment. It was their considered decision 
not to employ local Aboriginal people in direct sales of alcohol, and not 
one had an Aboriginal manager. Aboriginal people tended to be employed 
as groundsmen, gardeners and cleaners, rather than front of house staff.41 
Indeed, as employers of local people, Indigenous community-owned 
hotels compare woefully with their non-Indigenous counterparts. The 
Loxton Hotel in the Riverland, for example, employs 85 local people; 
the Nuriootpa Vine Inn, a community-owned hotel in the Barossa 
Valley, has a staff of 120. As well as having bigger populations, these non-
41  At the Crossing Inn in the Kimberley, backpackers work behind the bar.
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Indigenous premises are located in relatively rich tourist towns, operate 
substantial accommodation and restaurant facilities, and have a work-
ready local population from which to draw their workers. The Oasis Hotel 
in Walgett was said (optimistically) to have been purchased to provide 
hospitality training and employment for local Aboriginal people. This 
failed to eventuate because the training program was poorly planned and 
implemented, and neither the ADC nor the hotel license holders, took 
any responsibility for it: no trainee learned how to tap a keg or run a cellar 
and no Aboriginal person was enabled to engage in business to the point 
of self-management and self-sufficiency (Commonwealth of Australia 
1989a, 1989b). 
The goal of controlling sales
In 2001, Justice Tony Fitzgerald identified control over alcohol supply as 
a major priority for Indigenous communities: it was the major determinant 
of Indigenous submissions to the licensing authorities regarding 
nearby liquor outlets (Fitzgerald 2001, Brady 2004). However, there 
are impediments to any community group—especially an Indigenous 
group—attempting to regulate sales from ‘normal’, commercially run 
premises: the legislation is complex, the criteria for objections are narrow42 
and the procedures involved are often protracted (Bourbon et al. 1999). 
Licensees vigorously contest any attempt to ‘unfairly’ limit their trade 
(Pitjantjatjara Council 1990: 18). Some licensees have started petitions 
objecting to community moves to change sales practices (Wright 1997, 
Brady et al. 2003: 67) and some have argued (ironically, in view of their 
history) that they could not impose certain restrictions on sales because 
these would be racially discriminatory (Lyon 1991, Race Discrimination 
Commissioner 1995).43 In their access to licensing authorities, Aboriginal 
groups and licensees are not equal. Not all Aboriginal groups can afford 
legal representation to present their case, and many lack the resources to 
42  For example, harm minimisation has only been an explicit objective of the South Australian Liquor 
Licensing Act since 1997 (Bourbon et al. 1999: 13, Brady et al. 2003). In 2014, a CLP Government 
announced that it would abolish the Northern Territory Licensing Commission (to save ‘red tape’) and 
hearings (thus reducing the opportunity for community objections) (Vangopoulos 2014).
43  Actions that would otherwise be unlawful can be exempted if they constitute a ‘special measure’. 
However, there is a dilemma; normally, special measures treat a disadvantaged group advantageously 
but, in the case of alcohol restrictions, they treat the disadvantaged group disadvantageously—that 
is, by restricting a person’s rights to purchase ‘goods’. The dilemma is addressed by the fact that the 
restrictions confer a group or collective right (Calma 2004). 
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present supporting evidence for their submissions.44 Conversely, liquor 
industry lobby groups support licensees; have contact with ministers, 
policy advisers, policy writers and the liquor licensing authorities 
themselves (Secker 1993); and tend to be antagonistic to Indigenous 
and government harm-reduction initiatives.45 In view of these factors, 
it is understandable that some Indigenous groups have found it easier 
to become licensees themselves than to object to the practices of other 
licensees.
Fig. 26 Notice at Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse, 2009
Source: M Brady
44  In its submission to the Sessional Committee on the Use and Abuse of Alcohol by the Community 
in the Northern Territory in 1990, the Pitjantjatjara Council wrote that while it had been successful 
(before the South Australian licensing court) in obtaining changes to licence conditions reflecting 
community desires, in the Northern Territory, it had had to rely on a mix of formal and informal 
arrangements, some of which were not noted on the liquor licence concerned ‘depending on the 
proclivities of the licensee and the prevailing philosophy of the Liquor Commission at the time’ 
(Pitjantjatjara Council 1990: 16). 
45  For example, the Australian Hotels Association. Other liquor industry groups, such as the 
Brewers Association and Distilled Spirits Industry Council, have also objected to National Health and 
Medical Research Council drinking guidelines, and to health warning labels on alcohol containers 
(Ford 1988: 5, ABC News 2004, 2007a, Stark 2008: 7).
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All the case studies discussed in this chapter followed similar patterns: 
after taking control of the hotel, the community group limited trading 
(Saggers & Gray 1998). The hotels at Finke, Oodnadatta, Mt Ebenezer, 
Daly River and Timber Creek were purchased to ‘control the drinking 
problem’ or ‘reduce harm’. At Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse, a sign on 
the outside wall of the premises explained some of the background 
to  the  community-instigated controls over sales: ‘By arrangement with 
the  Pitjantjatjara Council, the licencee [sic] will not sell “takeaway” 
alcohol to persons who are residents of or travelling to Pitjantjatjara lands 
in South Australia’. These publicly displayed notices were needed to quell 
disputes with disappointed drinkers and to clarify for naive tourists—who 
might otherwise be persuaded to buy beer for Aboriginal people—that the 
rules were put in place by the Aboriginal community. Some of these rules 
might appear authoritarian to outside observers; however, decisions about 
what is acceptable and unacceptable that are made by Aboriginal owners 
or communities represent a more legitimate form of authority than those 
made by (possibly racist or unsympathetic) non-Aboriginal licensees. 
Vague plans to moderate drinking
Some government advisers and many Aboriginal people who advocated 
for licensed clubs mentioned wanting to teach Aboriginal customers 
moderate and ‘civilised’ drinking patterns—as an alternative to explosive 
binge drinking. This was never a defining rationale behind the purchase of 
hotels by Indigenous associations: rather it was a vague hope, occasionally 
voiced. Once owned by Indigenous groups, hotel enterprises paid more 
attention to controlling sales than changing drinking behaviour. In fact, it 
is difficult to find any examples of Indigenous-owned hotels introducing 
behavioural change programs for on-premises drinking, although some 
attempted to implement harm-reduction measures, such as providing 
good quality food and diversionary activities that might have contributed 
to minimising the demand for alcohol. Examples of what could have 
been done include the ‘Sober Bob’, or designated driver, programs that 
police sometimes run in hotels; providing sober drivers with free non-
alcoholic drinks; installing a breathalyser machine so that customers can 
see how rapidly their alcohol levels can rise; demonstrating the effects of 
intoxication on perception by showing people ‘drink goggles’.46 In some 
46  Drink goggles = goggles used in health education, which can be worn to simulate alcohol 
impairment.
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instances, such as the Finke Hotel (in its early years) and Mt Ebenezer, 
local Aboriginal community members were actively discouraged from 
drinking on premises, which meant that no attempt was being made to 
use the premises as a venue for cultural change in drinking. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, at Fitzroy Crossing, Aboriginal drinkers 
were at liberty to buy takeaway beer from their community-owned hotel 
and consume it off premises, in an adjacent park; this went on for many 
years. Most Aboriginal customers followed this practice: only a minority 
of Aboriginal customers drank in the hotel. When takeaway sales were 
finally banned in 2007, these unrestrained outdoor drinkers were forced, 
under protest, to drink on premises. In an ironic reversal of the civil rights 
struggle to repeal drinking bans and to force licensees to accept Aboriginal 
people into their pubs, many of the outdoor drinkers of Fitzroy Crossing 
objected to having to drink in their own hotel. 
Rather than trying to re-educate drinkers or engage with customers about 
reducing the harm caused by heavy drinking, Aboriginal community-
owned premises have relied on a plethora of signage—what might be 
called ‘arms-length instruction’. There seem to be more signs in Aboriginal-
owned hotels, and in the social clubs in remote communities, than in other 
licensed premises. Dress requirement signs once kept Aboriginal people 
out of hotels: now they are prominent in Indigenous-owned premises—
‘No singlets. No thongs. Sleeved and collared shirts only after 6.00 pm’. 
Numerous signs deal with proscribed behaviours: ‘No spitting in the 
garden bar or you will be banned from the Inn for 3 months’; ‘If you hit 
a staff member the pub will close immediately’. There are signs explaining 
the (often elaborate) barring rules: life bans, barring until further notice, 
barring for different periods of time—‘drunk and refusing to leave: 1 to 7 
days; aggressive arguing: 1 to 7 days; humbugging: 1 week’. It is difficult 
to know how strictly some of these are applied. There are also signs about 
who is allowed where: ‘Children most welcome in lounge’; ‘When you 
are allowed back in the pub, you will only be allowed back in for 3 hrs 
(12 noon to 3 pm) for the first week’; ‘No open drinks to leave the bar’.47
47  Signs seen at Indigenous-owned hotels at Fitzroy Crossing and Oodnadatta.
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The challenges inherent in community 
ownership
There is little evidence that Indigenous community-owned hotels have 
become truly social enterprises. Most have struggled to achieve the 
basic aims of benefiting the community, promoting a sense of social 
responsibility and having a workable participatory structure (Defourny & 
Nyssens 2006). Most have also struggled financially, except for one hotel, 
which is economically viable but whose profit-maximising behaviour 
makes it atypical of social enterprise. This case is discussed in the next 
chapter, together with an analysis of the complex reasons underlying 
developments in this instance. 
Before buying a hotel, a community group should, ideally, engage in 
long-running consultation and should be prepared for a polarising and 
bitter debate (Lang 1994: 223). It must then form a proprietary company, 
organise business plans and obtain loans, set up management structures, 
arrange community representation and decide on policies. Such an 
organisation and the hotel itself must be compliant with the features of 
the relevant state or territory’s Liquor Act. This is just the beginning: there 
is much more to running a hotel than this. The case of the Wayside Inn at 
Timber Creek illustrates how Indigenous organisations (which are often 
small, unskilled and isolated) and the communities they represent are 
sometimes badly advised about the legal structure and joint partnership 
arrangements for their purchase: the Wayside Inn closed, at least in 
part, because government, quasi-government and non-government 
bureaucracies with the potential to provide competent advice and ongoing 
guidance failed to do so. 
The Australian Hotels Association, a peak organisation that represents 
the interests of its hotel members, does not provide Indigenous-owned 
hotels with any special help or advice on governance or management 
matters. It offers its members general assistance on industrial issues, such 
as policy documents on responsible service and the hiring and firing of 
staff.48 State licensing authorities restrict themselves to providing random 
checks on staff, weights and measures, infrastructure (i.e. exits and toilets) 
and compliance issues (i.e. serving underage and intoxicated drinkers); 
they have no capacity to assist community hotels (either Indigenous or 
48  Information provided by the Australian Hotels Association, South Australia.
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non-Indigenous) with governance issues and appear to have no interest 
in taking on this responsibility. It is unfortunate that licensing authorities 
(or other agencies) do not offer such help, for Indigenous community-
owned hotels are subject to many of the same challenges and difficulties as 
their non-Indigenous counterparts in South Australia, but they have fewer 
resources to deal with them. Exacerbated by living in small, interwoven, 
rural or remote communities, these challenges include staffing and 
governance issues and the pressures of remaining financially viable.
Indigenous-owned hotels find it difficult to recruit and retain competent 
staff, including managers, because of the isolation, remoteness and 
particular stresses of dealing with alcohol sales and Indigenous people—
an issue fraught with historical, social and cultural sensitivities.49 
The manager’s job is more complex in an Indigenous-owned entity, for 
he or she must liaise with a board that is usually made up of community 
members who have no special training or experience in the hospitality 
industry, may not be fully literate and may themselves have ambivalent 
attitudes towards drinking. Board members are usually untrained in 
governance matters; research into Indigenous organisational management 
has highlighted the need for boards and managers to have adequate 
governance training and guidance (Mantziaris & Martin 2000, Brady 
2002, Sharma 2005). At times, boards misconstrue the boundaries of 
their role and that of the manager, as was the case at the Oasis Hotel at 
Walgett where there was no articulated ‘separation of powers’ between the 
manager and the directors. Arguably, a manager needs to be able to operate 
independently of his or her community board. A manager should have 
the authority to caution staff who break the rules—for example, by giving 
free drinks to relatives—and to bar customers from service. However, in 
an Indigenous context, these powers carry advantages and disadvantages 
that vary greatly and depend on the qualities of the manager. Managers 
inexperienced in Indigenous contexts need to be monitored by board 
members and pulled into line if necessary. 
Another difficulty peculiar to community-owned premises rests on the 
misinterpretation of what ‘community ownership’ means. This confusion 
was manifest at Walgett; some Aboriginal directors initially believed that 
their ownership of the Oasis Hotel gave them the right to make free use 
49  In one case, a newly appointed manager at Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse claimed he had been 
threatened by a community member with a spear and had jumped out of a window to escape, 
‘running for his life’ (Phelan 2012).
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of the hotel’s stock (Commonwealth of Australia 1989a: 21). It seems 
that non-Indigenous residents of Ceduna had the same idea when the 
community bought the hotel there in 1949: some thought the drinks 
would be free (Larkins & Howard 1973). Local staff at Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous premises are sometimes pressured to give special 
privileges or free drinks to their friends and relatives. Several of the South 
Australian community hotel managers dealt with this by having daily 
stocktakes and spot checks. Indigenous hotels have attempted to avoid 
or circumvent some of this pressure by hiring non-Indigenous workers—
‘neutral’ people from beyond the community—or by displaying signs that 
prohibit unwanted behaviours. Nevertheless, if might have been useful 
had the Indigenous hotels and their governing boards or corporations 
known of the existence of the non-Indigenous community-owned hotels 
in South Australia; perhaps both groups could have benefited from 
networking and exchanges of experiences and strategies? Indigenous-
owned hotels have struggled with numerous dilemmas: keeping turnover 
high, repaying loans, keeping customers happy and distributing profits, 
while simultaneously maintaining some social responsibility to minimise 
alcohol-related harms among their local population.
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The Indigenous purchase 
of the Crossing Inn
In 1989, at a time of upheaval in the Australian government’s management 
of Aboriginal affairs, community groups at Fitzroy Crossing formed 
a company and, with an ADC loan, bought shares in several enterprises. 
These included a supermarket, shops, a caravan park and Fitzroy Crossing’s 
only licensed hotel and source of takeaway alcohol, the Crossing Inn. 
While there was widespread support for the purchase of the supermarket 
and caravan park, buying into the Crossing Inn was controversial from 
the beginning. Local people hoped that as a development project, the 
purchases would improve their social and economic circumstances, and 
that owning the hotel would encourage people to drink on the premises 
(rather than off premises) and adopt a less damaging drinking style. Nearly 
20 years later, several official inquiries found—and a good deal of public 
opinion agreed—that neither of these goals had been achieved.
The history of the Crossing Inn
The Crossing Inn has been part of the lives of the pastoral workers of 
the Fitzroy Valley in the Kimberley region of Western Australia since the 
1890s. Joe Blythe, the first pastoralist in the region, established Brooking 
Springs station in 1888, and built his homestead where the Crossing Inn 
now stands. The settlement of Fitzroy Crossing takes its name from the 
place where travellers once forded the Fitzroy River. Blythe’s rough shanty 
homestead originally served as a hotel and store, and his son held the first 
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official ‘wayside house’ licence in 1897. Amid the ‘crazed’ drinking style 
of the frontier, the pub undoubtedly did well (Pedersen & Woorunmurra 
2007: 85, Hawke 2014). Today, Fitzroy Crossing has a settled population 
of approximately 1,500, and a mobile population of around 4,500 living 
in 45 discrete communities within a 200 km radius. The town lies in the 
southeast corner of Bunaba country, between Broome in the west and 
Halls Creek in the east; however, the region itself lies at the intersection 
of several traditional groupings of people who speak different languages: 
some from the Kimberley cultural bloc, others from the Western Desert 
region (Kolig 2000). In this instance, as in many others, the pub was part 
of the colonialist project: it aided the conquest of new areas. Pubs on the 
frontier provided accommodation and grog to new settlers as they pushed 
inland (hence the notion of the ‘wayside house’), and introduced alcohol 
and drinking to those who had been displaced (Kirkby 1997: 28). 
Fig. 27 Mural in Salem Shelter, Halls Creek
Source: M Brady
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Apart from its drinking, the Kimberley region is noted for the violence of its 
frontier history. During the ‘era of stockwhip and rifle’, Aboriginal groups 
were violently displaced by pastoralists: it was colonisation in its harshest 
form (Kolig 2000: 14). There were massacres of Aboriginal people by 
police and pastoralists, outright warfare and strong resistance by Aboriginal 
people, both passive and active, exemplified in the exploits of Aboriginal 
warriors such as Jandamarra (Marshall 1988, Pedersen & Woorunmurra 
2007, Hawke 2014). The arrival of the Catholic Church in the region in 
1934 (at Rockhole Station and Balgo Hills), and the United Aborigines 
Mission (UAM) in the 1940s, provided Aboriginal people some protection 
from the excesses of the frontier (McDonald 2001: 56–7). In 1952, the 
UAM took over from the Department of Native Affairs’ Depot at Fitzroy 
Crossing, running a children’s home and distributing rations. The children’s 
parents were largely working on the cattle stations of the Fitzroy Valley. This 
was the fertile land of Nyikina, Bunuba and Gooniyandi traditional owners, 
and the people had become part of the labour force of the cattle industry, 
joined later by the Walmajarri and Wangkatjunka groups who moved into 
the stations from the desert regions.
In 1965, the embryonic town of Fitzroy Crossing was isolated and remote; 
it consisted of a police station and residence, a post office and residence, an 
Australian Inland Mission nursing post, the UAM mission and the hotel, 
which was at the end of a track near the river. Ten Aboriginal people were 
employed at the hotel, with the men earning between £1 and £3 per week, 
and the women from £1 to £2 10s. At the time, the basic wage was £15 19s 
(Hawke 2014: 27–8). These Aboriginal workers lived near the hotel at 
a camp that lacked any amenities, was littered with tins and bottles, and 
where pigs and dogs roamed freely. The hotel’s publican agitated for the 
removal of the camp and disclaimed any responsibility for it. According 
to Steve Hawke, it was the Licensing Court that suggested the creation of 
a proper native reserve to accommodate the Aboriginal people living there. 
The equal wages case for Aboriginal pastoral workers was in the offing, and 
the camp’s population began to increase once the surrounding properties 
started evicting Aboriginal workers and their families; some people walked 
off the stations voluntarily. The evictions and mass unemployment that 
spread to the Western Australian pastoral industry followed the requirement 
for station-owners in the Northern Territory to pay Aboriginal workers 
award wages. It meant that the population of Fitzroy Crossing exploded 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The UAM ‘packed people in’ 
(Hawke 2014: 165), and different mobs from pastoral stations began to 
set up their own squatter camps in and around Fitzroy Crossing, such as 
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the people who walked off Noonkanbah in 1971.1 This, together with 
the expectations of political change following the 1967 Referendum and 
the abolition of the last alcohol restrictions in Western Australia in 1971, 
made it a dramatic period of turmoil and transition (Oscar & Pedersen 
2011: 89–90, Thorburn 2011). Not all Fitzroy Valley Aboriginal people 
were in favour of these changes at the time, or in retrospect: some believed 
that drinking rights ‘ruined everything’ and that equal wages did ‘a lot of 
damage’ (Marshall 1988: 23, 30). 
Fig. 28 Liquor restrictions sign, Fitzroy Crossing, 2009
Source: M Brady
1  These camps eventually became the different communities (or neighbourhoods) in and around 
Fitzroy Crossing. The Go Go Station mob became Bayulu; the Christmas Creek mob became 
Wangkatjunka; the residents of old Mission camp became Junjuwa community; the Noonkanbah mob 
from Loanbung became Kadjina and Yungngora; and the Fig Tree Camp people were incorporated as 
Kurnangki community (Hawke 2014: 196). 
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Selling grog
According to a local observer in the 1970s, young and old Aboriginal 
people imitated the drinking behaviour of their white peers in style and 
quantity, which is to say that Aboriginal men were no heavier drinkers than 
‘respectable’ white men in the north of Western Australia (Kolig 1974: 51). 
The Crossing Inn was happy to supply them all. While talking about his life 
to Paul Marshall (1988: 76), Jock Shandley, a Walmajarri man and Fitzroy 
Valley drover, told of buying takeaways from the Crossing Inn:
I used to be a drinker myself. After Aborigines were given citizenship 
rights, we used to go in to the Fitzroy Crossing pub and tell Dick Fellon 
that we wanted rum or whiskey or whatever. He’d say, ‘Yeah, come into 
the store’. He’d give us as many bottles as we wanted. He had to make his 
money I suppose, and he must have made a lot of money out of us. I used 
to drink all that stuff back then, but I began to realize what it does to you. 
That’s when I stopped drinking. 
The sale of copious quantities of canned beer from the Crossing Inn 
resulted in what locals described as ‘Fitzroy snow’; from the air, you could 
look down on shady trees and see, glinting in the sun, a carpet of white 
cans surrounding them where seated drinkers had chucked their empties. 
Moderate alcohol consumption was a style of drinking that never gained 
a foothold on the northern ‘frontier’, nor in Fitzroy Crossing. Hawke 
(2014: 190) has written about the ferment of new ideas, hope and activism 
in the town in the 1970s that ran alongside an orgy of self-destruction, 
as rampant drinking and alcoholism quickly became a feature of life in 
the fringe camps. According to Shandley (cited in Marshall 1988), the 
grog was too strong and it led people away from the old rules. In 1974, 
anthropologist Erich Kolig (1974) described the drinking problem at 
Fitzroy Crossing as ‘acute’; he reported that senior Lawmen—who, at 
the time, were attempting to revive traditional punishments—organised 
a roster of ‘prestigious men’ to patrol the public bar at the Crossing Inn, to 
remove drunken people and seclude them in bush camps (46).2 
Oscar and Pedersen (2011: 92) noted that during these years, the non-
Aboriginal owners of the Crossing Inn ignored the social and health 
consequences of their desire to make money. A study of morbidity rates at 
2  According to Kolig (1974: 49), Aboriginal elders believed that the Western judicial system and 
the use of jail was ‘too soft’ by comparison with Aboriginal Law. However, he was pessimistic about 
whether the traditional kerygma (mythology, dreaming) would provide any solutions to people who 
were ‘sodden’ with grog—a situation, he said, which had no sacred precedent. 
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Fitzroy Crossing between 1978 and 1983 found that violence and alcohol 
were the most common causes of hospital attendance for both men and 
women (Holman & Quadros 1986: 31). By the 1980s, the hospital 
records showed that between 75 per cent and 85 per cent of fatal injuries 
incurred at Fitzroy Crossing were alcohol related (Moizo 1991: 184). 
An anthropologist who made fieldwork visits there, Bernard Moizo, 
described the situation at various times between 1980 and 1987. At the 
Crossing Inn in 1980, there were three bars: the lounge bar, the garden 
bar and the ‘Blackfellow’ bar. No bare feet were allowed in the first two 
and, as Aboriginal people were, for the most part, the only ones with bare 
feet, they congregated in the ‘Blackfellow’ bar, or went bush with their 
takeaways. Moizo explained:
The ‘Blackfellow’ or ‘Aboriginal’ bar was a large dark room with high 
concrete walls that separated it from the garden bar. There were no lights, 
no tables, no chairs, only two wooden benches. A huge grid, welded at 
the top of the bar on one end and fixed at the ceiling on the other end, 
symbolised quite clearly the racial relations within the pub. Aborigines 
handed the money through the square holes of the grid and were handed 
back glasses of beer … I was struck by the atmosphere. Between twenty 
and thirty Aboriginal, [sic] men and women, most of them drunk, were 
shouting, arguing, swearing or fighting each other. The noise was amplified 
by the size of the room and the concrete walls. The ambience was pathetic, 
but it got worse when the iron curtain dropped down on the bar and the 
police walked in … In the garden bar things were different: a few non-
Aboriginals would enjoy their beer under the cool shade of centenarian 
trees. Here there was no shortage of tables, chairs or bar stools. Inside, in 
the air conditioned lounge bar … a few customers emptied their stubbies 
… Patrons in the garden and lounge bar were probably as drunk as were 
the Aborigines, but they were quiet and enjoyed their drinks in a pleasant 
ambience. (51–2)
Five years later, it was increasingly common to see young Aboriginal 
people in the more salubrious lounge or garden bars, but these drinkers 
were people holding regular jobs or who had been to Perth for schooling. 
On Friday nights, there were cheaper prices (‘happy hour’) in the garden 
bar where most of the non-Aboriginal population drank, but not in the 
Aboriginal bar, which was often closed on Friday nights.3 The clientele 
3  Moizo (1991: 68, note 5) documented one occasion when around 40 Aboriginal people walked 
into the garden bar to protest about the unfairness of this and to demand ‘their’ bar be reopened on 
Fridays with ‘happy hour’ prices.
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of the Aboriginal bar had dropped off, as more drinkers made the switch 
to takeaway alcohol. Once a taxi service became available in 1984, they 
used the pub as a bottle shop: 
They called a taxi, were driven to the pub, bought a carton of beer and 
were dropped off in one of the many drinking spots in the bush around 
town. This presented some definite advantages. Firstly, one could choose 
with whom one would drink. Secondly it was easier to flee into the bush 
when the police arrived or when a fight was about to start. (56)
The advent of the taxi service, and the increasing availability of private 
vehicles, meant that grog could more easily be carted in larger volumes 
to a variety of drinking places, including those far away from the pub 
and town. Prior to this, open-air drinking with takeaway beer had taken 
place anywhere and everywhere, most often under trees close to the pub 
or, to avoid trouble when walking home, close to home communities. 
An Aboriginal man, ‘Patrick’, explained this practice to Moizo:
You see us Bunaba … we drink here, right under that big fig tree. Number 
one place this one … we are next to that hotel, when you want more grog 
you just go there and get some. Look behind, well there is that creek, if 
you need one good cool bath to sober you up a bit this is the place now 
… I know that track all the way [home], even dead drunk I can go back 
home. (178)
Moizo mapped the spatial distribution of drinking spots, most of 
which were established in the late 1970s. These revealed the tendency 
for members of the same kin and language groups to choose to drink 
together. Despite, or perhaps because of this, disputes and arguments 
among drinkers frequently degenerated into violent fights, triggered by 
a drunken lack of control in speech, heedless mention of secret Law matters 
or jealousy. By mid-1988, the drinking was so problematic that local 
women formed an action group called Women Against Alcohol (WAA). 
The group was led by Topsy Chestnut, an influential Gooniyandi woman 
involved in community development work (cf. Hawke 2014).4 The WAA 
aimed to raise local awareness of problem drinking and alcohol-related 
domestic violence. Clinical research showed a high prevalence of alcohol-
related problems among Aboriginal drinkers in the region (including 
4  It is worth noting here that 1988 was also the year in which Aboriginal women in several other 
regions began to mobilise against alcohol-related troubles—in the Northern Territory at Wadeye, the 
Tiwi Islands and at Curtin Springs in the Pitjantjatjara lands.
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Fitzroy Crossing), with two-thirds scoring two or more on the CAGE5 
questionnaire, which is sensitive in detecting ‘excessive drinking’ (Hall et 
al. 1993: 1095, Hunter 1993). Three-quarters of this sample identified 
alcohol use as a major community concern in the Kimberley. In view 
of the amount of alcohol being consumed, this is not surprising; Hall 
and colleagues (1993) found that median consumption over a drinking 
occasion or day was approximately 10 standard drinks per person (i.e. 
104.5 g of pure alcohol).6
Non-Aboriginal people monopolised most jobs in the town, which 
circulated among them without being advertised; they also dominating 
the local enterprises and businesses. The publican, for example, owned 
the supermarket, the caravan park and the shopping complex. Between 
1985 and 1987, four Aboriginal people were employed at the pub for 
weekly rubbish collection. The low level of Aboriginal employment, their 
exclusion from participating in, and benefiting from, local enterprises, 
together with increasing problems associated with alcohol from the 
Crossing Inn, created growing dissatisfaction and a mood for change. 
The ADC, which was established to assist Aboriginal people to engage 
in business enterprises (among other aims), gave people an opportunity 
to buy into local businesses and to change things at Fitzroy Crossing.
The proposal to buy the Crossing Inn and 
other businesses
In 1988, the owner and licensee of the Crossing Inn, Jack Sandford, 
placed the business on the market, together with other holdings owned 
by his family over several decades: the supermarket, shops and a caravan 
park. Alerted to this impending sale, the ADC had the Sandford holdings 
valued; subsequently, the ADC (and its successors) became a significant 
player in the future of these Fitzroy Crossing enterprises. The ADC 
engaged Bill Arthur, a social scientist at the Aboriginal Economic 
Research Unit in Perth, to investigate the feasibility of purchasing the 
businesses for the Aboriginal communities of the region. Arthur’s terms of 
reference included explaining to Aboriginal people the implications of the 
5  CAGE is an acronym for the four questions that make up the questionnaire.
6  At the time, the National Health and Medical Research Council definition of a ‘harmful’ 
amount of alcohol was more than 60 g a day for males (Hall et al. 1993: 1096).
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purchases, documenting Aboriginal support or objections, and putting 
forward ideas for a Trust structure and options for ownership and control 
of the enterprises.
Arthur’s observation, that the issues were ‘complex and new’, was an 
understatement. As was the case with other Aboriginal hotel purchases, 
Aboriginal people at Fitzroy Crossing had limited educational backgrounds 
and little, if any, experience of planning or running such an enterprise; 
they were also completely unaware of the existence of mainstream 
community-owned hotels in South Australia, from whom guidance could 
have been sought. At most, some Aboriginal people at Fitzroy Crossing 
had experience running cattle stations; however, some of these had not 
been commercially successful.7 
Arthur’s (1988) Interim Report pointed to a difference of opinion within 
the Aboriginal community about buying into the hotel. Although they 
supported community ownership of the supermarket, caravan park and 
shops unconditionally, people were guarded about the purchase of a share 
in the Crossing Inn. Arthur reported that ‘directly negative statements 
only apply to the hotel … and people are uncomfortable about it at this 
stage’.8 Those who were most uncomfortable were older men (although 
only two older men had stated categorically that the community should 
not be involved with the hotel) and women. The supporters of the hotel 
purchase were mostly younger adults who appreciated the potential for 
commercial development, including Patrick Green, a Bunaba man, who 
was to have an ongoing role in the businesses. The supporters of the 
idea perceived its potential: capturing the hotel’s profits would give local 
people the opportunity to purchase other enterprises, which would make 
them less reliant on government. Arthur (1989a) wrote:
The bottom line for them appears to be that if they don’t own [these 
enterprises] then someone else will, and that by owning them they will 
stop the money flowing out of Fitzroy Crossing. (executive summary)
Arthur (1988) soon discovered another difficulty: that different players—
the ADC and various Aboriginal community interests—held different 
perspectives on the purpose of the purchases. There was the ADC view, 
which saw the purchases in a commercial light; a local view, which saw 
7  However, in 1991, ATSIC acquired Leopold Downs Station for the Bunaba people, a large and 
very productive cattle station with a river frontage (Thorburn 2011: 108).
8  Arthur’s (1988) Interim Report was not paginated.
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the purchases as a way to address a social problem; and another local view 
that saw the purchases as a means of generating both commercial and 
social benefits. 
According to Arthur, local expectations that owning the hotel would 
alleviate excess drinking took precedence over commercial discussions of 
both the hotel and the supermarket. Despite these differing—divergent—
aims, someone was going to buy the hotel and sell alcohol to the Aboriginal 
population (so the thinking went), in which case, it might as well be locally 
owned, enabling some measure of control over sales: the obvious ethical 
dilemma of profiting from the sale of a substance that was so patently 
damaging to so many Aboriginal people, notwithstanding. The problem, 
from the perspective of various Aboriginal community members, was the 
packaged nature of the deal: presumably the hotel could not be excised. 
To  overcome the potential conflict between commercial success and 
negative social consequences, the Aboriginal community hoped to find 
directors of the company and managers of the facility who had ‘special’ 
qualities, not just commercial qualifications or experience in running 
businesses. As Arthur (1989a) explained:
People do not see the project in simply commercial terms. They see it 
as a development project and as a means of improving their social and 
economic circumstances through participation. Therefore to own the hotel 
as assets in which they have no involvement, has little or no attraction.
It seems that the majority of mature-age Aboriginal people ultimately 
were persuaded that owning the hotel would ‘relieve the alcohol problem’. 
Their main concern was over the sale of bulk takeaway liquor from the 
Crossing Inn. It was suggested that, once they owned the hotel, takeaway 
sales could be restricted or prohibited to encourage people to drink inside 
the hotel:
In the old days the pub was open from 6  am. He [the owner] didn’t 
care about our people. Wanting to buy in was wanting to control liquor 
sales and [we] didn’t want them to wake up with a beer early morning. 
Let them have food in their guts first.9
Somewhat drily, Arthur (1989a) explained that: ‘It is not that there is 
simply heavy drinking but that there is a certain style of drinking with 
features which I suggest were not envisaged by the Liquor Act’ (10). Apart 
9 Patrick Green, pers comm, 16 August 2012.
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from curbing sales of takeaways, during these preliminary consultations, 
local Aboriginal people suggested a few other harm-reduction strategies 
that, it was thought, could be put in place once they owned the Crossing 
Inn. These included introducing by-laws to restrict the amount of takeaway 
alcohol that could be purchased using taxis; upgrading on-premises 
drinking areas to make the atmosphere more ‘civilised’; introducing 
more hotel entertainment to encourage social drinking; using the profits 
to mount alcohol-education programs; and hiring ‘certain Aboriginal 
staff’—that is, people with particular qualities who would be able to 
effectively control on-premises drinking.10
In view of subsequent events, it is significant that from the outset, 
takeaway sales were identified as a key problem and that there was a plan 
to restrict (or even stop) such sales. The loss of revenue presented another 
major dilemma, as Arthur (1989a) reported:
People can see that if drinking is limited then profits may be reduced 
and the project may not be able to repay the loan. Their concern here is 
that they would be blamed for the resulting lack of commercial success. 
I  suggest that this issue represents something of a dilemma for people. 
(11, emphasis added)
Arthur’s observation implied that, under pressure from the Australian 
Audit Office and a tough new approach by the minister, the ADC had 
made its financial support dependent on the project’s commercial viability. 
This worried some people. Buying the Sandford holdings package was 
not a decision taken lightly by the Aboriginal people of Fitzroy Crossing. 
Eighteen months of consultations and meetings enabled people to air 
their views and debate the issues: it took that long for them to agree on 
a final structure for the company and the governance of the enterprises. 
Leedal, governance and the sharing of benefits
In March 1987, Leedal Pty Ltd was incorporated as an investment 
company—not an Aboriginal corporation; the Fitzroy Crossing Trust was 
created at the same time, with Leedal as Trustee. Each of the Trust’s six 
beneficiary communities had different shareholdings within the Trust, 
which acquired a 50 per cent interest in the Crossing Inn, the supermarket 
10  In retrospect, this seems an unduly optimistic aim. With intimate knowledge of the close 
kinship networks within Fitzroy Crossing, how was it possible for people to believe that Aboriginal 
staff—regardless of how well chosen they were—would be able to ‘control bar sales’? 
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and caravan park using a $1 million loan, and an additional grant from 
the ADC. Several non-Indigenous people with liquor industry experience 
bought shares in the businesses as joint-venture partners with Leedal. One 
was the developer, joint-venture partner and manager of the Fitzroy River 
Lodge (Coppin 2006: 10). Three other non-Indigenous joint-venture 
partners were well-known identities in Kimberley towns (such as Broome, 
Halls Creek and Kununurra) where they owned high-profile and lucrative 
alcohol-oriented enterprises, including bars, liquor stores, hotels and 
tourist facilities.
The beneficiaries of the Fitzroy Trust were (and are) the Junjuwa, Marra 
Worra Worra,11 Yiyili, Kadjina, Bayulu and Kurnangki communities. 
Following Arthur’s suggestion, Junjuwa Community Inc., as the 
representative of the majority of local traditional owners, held the major 
stake: 40 out of 100 ordinary shares.12 The remaining shares were divided 
between the five other communities: 12 shares each.13 Regarding the 
allocation of benefits, Arthur (1989a) explained that:
Beneficial ownership will extend to all communities of the Fitzroy Valley. 
Representatives of the communities will meet to discuss allocation of 
benefits. The spirit of this arrangement will be that Junjuwa (and finally the 
Bunupa of Junjuwa, being the traditional land group) will have the greatest 
and final say regarding all matters including allocation of benefits. Junjuwa 
can be seen as the principal (but not exclusive) beneficial owner. (i)
Leedal’s (2014) board comprised a nominated representative from each 
of the six beneficiary communities. The ADC insisted that a legal adviser 
and an accountant or financial adviser be appointed to the board as well.14 
Learning from the financial collapse of the Woden Town Club in late 
1988, and incompetent management of the Oasis Hotel at Walgett,15 and 
mindful of enquiries into its conduct, the ADC was anxious to protect 
its investment and to ensure that professional advice was available to 
11  Marra Worra Worra is not a community; it is an Aboriginal corporation and multipurpose 
resource centre designed to service decentralised communities. It is the oldest and largest Aboriginal 
resource agency in the Kimberley. It grew out of regular meetings about development programs held 
in the late 1970s by leaders of seven communities in the Valley (Sullivan 1996, Hawke 2014: 198). 
12  Thorburn (2011: 111) reported that Junjuwa Community Inc. contributed $100,000 to Leedal’s 
investments: the existence of this original contribution provokes ongoing discussion about how much 
the organisation should ‘earn’ from Leedal. 
13  Current Company Extract for Leedal Pty Ltd, ASIC database 2012.
14  Since approximately 2000, there has also been a ‘chief operations officer’ for Leedal.
15  Woden Town Club and the Oasis Hotel in Walgett had been purchased with ADC loans 
(see Chapter 6).
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the Trust. As in other licensed hotels owned by Aboriginal community 
interests, the manager was (and still is) a non-Indigenous person. Staff 
working in the bar were also non-Indigenous; Aboriginal barmen were 
tried initially, but the peer-group pressure was found to be ‘too hard’ 
for them.16 
The ADC (1990: 19) announced the deal in its 1989–90 Annual Report:
In February 1990, the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Mr Gerry Hand, 
officially opened the Region’s most important enterprise project for the 
year, at Fitzroy Crossing. The purchase of the town’s supermarket, caravan 
park and a half-share in the hotel and motel facilities in Fitzroy Crossing 
was undertaken on behalf of some twenty-five Aboriginal groups in the 
Fitzroy Valley. These enterprises are managed by a Trust Company whose 
board operates the ventures for the Aboriginal people. 
It was anticipated that after repayment of the loan, the ‘benefits’ 
(i.e. financial benefits) of owning the hotel and other businesses would be 
substantial enough for distribution between several Aboriginal groups in 
the region. Indeed, there were discussions about how widely these should 
be shared out. Consultant Bill Arthur presented people with two options 
to consider. First, profits could be banked annually; communities could 
apply for loans or grants that would be decided upon by some kind of 
representative group. Alternatively, the annual profits could be shared 
out equally among the groups (meaning that each share would be rather 
small). To diminish the tensions that were likely to result from these 
arrangements, Arthur suggested that 40 per cent of the benefits be reserved 
for Junjuwa community, in recognition of the significant landowning 
status of Bunaba people. While two other language groups lived in the 
Junjuwa community, Junjuwa was where the most influential Bunaba 
people resided in 1989. It was thought that the financial benefits accruing 
from the hotel and other businesses could be used to support smaller 
communities that were short of resources, or to set up other ventures. 
Clearly, the Aboriginal people of Fitzroy Crossing believed that owning 
a 50 per cent share in the hotel would enable them to stimulate ‘social 
development’ through employment and training, as well as to improve the 
alcohol problem (Arthur 1989a).
16  Fieldnotes dated 21 June 1993, supplied by Bill Arthur. According to a Leedal spokesperson 
(interviewed in 2012), backpackers were the ‘backbone’ of the workforce at the Crossing Inn. 
Employing non-Indigenous bar staff is common practice in other Aboriginal-owned premises too.
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In an attempt to give the structure a more social and community focus, 
and to enable community views to be made known to management (a 
suggestion made by Arthur after his earlier consultations), a Management 
Liaison Group (MLG) was established. The MLG sat between the board 
of directors and the Aboriginal communities in and around Fitzroy 
Crossing. The MLG, which had an open membership, was intended to 
represent the wider community, not just one faction; it was expected 
to have an understanding of the social problems of the hotel and be 
interested in improving the social and economic situation of the people 
(Arthur 1989a: 7).
Initially, Leedal owned less than a 50 per cent share in the Crossing 
Inn, and the Tarunda supermarket, Fitzroy shopping centre and caravan 
park outright. In 1989, the Fitzroy River Lodge, an extensive tourism 
accommodation facility that included a restaurant and bar, was built a 
short distance from the town. The Fitzroy Crossing Trust bought a share 
in that too.17 As one Leedal director stated:
In the past people would come in, set up a business and charge what they 
liked … now you do business in Fitzroy Crossing with Leedal or you don’t 
do business at all … now we are big enough to say you either work with 
us or we will run you out. (Walker 1995: 5)
Evidently, Leedal soon developed an appetite for such investments. 
Enabled by further loans and grants, the Trust continued to acquire new 
properties and to increase its share in existing ones, including the Crossing 
Inn and the Fitzroy River Lodge.18 In corporate terms, following its 
inception, Leedal accumulated capital and grew its asset base, ostensibly 
to generate revenue for the communities it represented (Coppin 2006: 
7). However, despite owning millions of dollars in assets with profits of 
17  Fitzroy River Lodge has 40 motel units, 30 safari tents, 90 caravan sites, coach and camping 
facilities, pool, tennis courts and golf course. There are no takeaway facilities, only an on-premises 
licence.
18  For example, in 2001, the Trust bought a 42.5 per cent interest in Fitzroy Lodge, with the help 
of a $1 million grant from ATSIC and a $1 million loan from IBA. The purchase of Fitzroy Lodge 
brought into existence a joint-venture partnership between Leedal, Mapigan Pty Ltd, and IBA’s holding 
companies, Fitzroy Inn Investments Pty Ltd and Fitzroy Lodge Investments Pty Ltd (Irving 2007: 6). 
Mapigan was a proprietary company, with Wayne Bowen (the licensee of the Crossing Inn) as the sole 
director and secretary (Irving 2007: 30). In 2006, the Trust borrowed a further $750,000 from IBA to 
acquire further interests in the Fitzroy Lodge and the Crossing Inn; by 2007, Leedal owned a 70 per 
cent interest in the two joint-venture businesses, IBA held a 26.43 per cent interest and Mapigan held 
the remaining 3.57 per cent interest (Irving 2007: 31, Hope 2008: 114–15). Apart from the Crossing 
Inn and the Fitzroy Lodge, in 2007 Leedal owned seven other commercial interests in Fitzroy Crossing.
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around $1 million a year, Leedal’s pursuit of these corporate goals occurred 
at the expense of the community; rather than distributing profits to its 
six ‘beneficiary’ communities, it donated relatively insignificant amounts, 
from time to time, to various community activities.
Fig. 29 The Crossing Inn reception, Fitzroy Crossing
Source: M Brady
The trajectory of alcohol-related harm  
1989–2007
There is no doubt that, once it was partly owned by Aboriginal interests, 
the Crossing Inn implemented some harm-reduction measures. Soon after 
the purchase by Leedal—whose constitution obliged it to monitor alcohol 
consumption in the Fitzroy Valley (Leedal 2014: 5)—the Crossing Inn 
banned on- and off-premises sales of fortified wine (port) and sales of 
flagons. Subsequently, the hotel voluntarily reduced its hours of opening, 
banned sales of 4 L, then 2 L, casks of wine, and discounted mid-strength 
beer (Hope 2008: 123). However, owning only half of the business meant 
that Leedal had to negotiate any changes with its commercially driven 
joint-venture partners (one of whom was the nominee of the Crossing 
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Inn). In 1996, community leaders persuaded Leedal and the hotel’s 
joint-venture partners to run a trial in which the sale of packaged alcohol 
was restricted until after 12 noon, as morning drinking was disrupting 
community employment projects. Although the trial was successful, 
the policy was discontinued due to disagreements among the partners. 
Restrictions, such as selling only light beer, or delaying takeaway sales 
until noon, were put in place in the football season and during funerals 
and other community events at the request of the community, and these 
interventions were reported positively to this author in 1998 (Brady 2005: 
150). Nevertheless, the mere existence of the Crossing Inn, with its bars 
and particularly its off-premises sales, and its location as the only outlet 
for alcohol sales between Derby (260 km to the west) and Halls Creek 
(300  km to the east), constituted an irresistible attraction to a captive 
clientele. Financially, the hotel—and Leedal—made the most out of this 
monopoly.
In 1994, five years after the original part purchase of the Crossing Inn 
by Aboriginal interests, Fitzroy Crossing was described (along with 
Halls Creek) as having the highest drunkenness arrest figures in Western 
Australia (Midford et al. 1994: 5). Drinking in the Valley was said to be 
an ‘unmanaged epidemic’ involving a ‘tide of poison’ in which violence 
had become normalised (Oscar & Pedersen 2011: 92). Clearly, the hotel 
was not monitoring or slowing down alcohol consumption. During pay 
weeks, the area around the premises was populated by drunken staggering 
people, as described by a senior medical officer, Dr J Rowland:
There would be little fires lit in the bushes and people surrounding those 
fires, drunk and drinking, and people wandering around and bodies 
scattered in various poses all around … many stuporous bodies on the 
ground … people that are waving, drunk, bottles and rocks, all approach 
the ambulance and you don’t feel very safe … ‘Which of these bodies 
lying around is the unconscious one we need to assess?’ (cited in Hope 
2008: 109)
Opposite the Crossing Inn was a poorly lit area known to all as ‘Billabong 
Park’ where drinkers consumed the takeaway alcohol bought at the hotel. 
At least one rape and one murder took place there. It was so dangerous 
that even the police were unwilling to enter. Late in 2006, by agreement 
between the police and the Shire (which owned the land), the area was 
closed. This action did not stop alcohol-related brawls and assaults; 
instead, the violence moved to people’s homes, making policing even 
more difficult.
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By 2007, the annual consumption of pure alcohol in Fitzroy Crossing was 
estimated to be 27 L per person, equating to 35 cans of beer per week for 
every person in town (Dr John Boulton, cited in Fitzpatrick et al. 2015b). 
As the Crossing Inn was the only source of packaged alcohol in town, 
and with takeaway sales far outweighing on-premises sales at the Crossing 
Inn and the Fitzroy River Lodge, the Crossing Inn was the source of the 
majority of those 35 cans per person, per week. According to evidence 
given later at a coronial inquest, the Crossing Inn’s licensee reported that 
alcohol sales in the 2006–07 financial year totalled $4  million (Strutt 
2007b). By the time this calculation was made, Leedal had increased its 
equity in the Crossing Inn, giving the Aboriginal company majority (70 
per cent) ownership.19
Aboriginal people of the Kimberley were suffering a complex social and 
health crisis; alcohol abuse was both a cause and a result of many of the 
problems (Western Australian Department of Health 2009). This crisis 
became evident in several ways—primarily through the high number of 
alcohol-related deaths and prevalence of fetal alcohol spectrum disorder 
(FASD). Between 2000 and 2007, there were 22 deaths of Aboriginal 
people in the Fitzroy Crossing region that required coronial investigation 
and that were believed to be linked with alcohol abuse. In one year alone, 
2006, there were eight self-harm deaths. Drinking in pregnancy was 
also common. Out of a sample of 122 women in the Fitzroy Valley who 
gave birth between 2002 and 2003, one-quarter reported alcohol-related 
injuries and one in seven needed an alcohol-related hospital admission. 
Using the AUDIT C assessment tool, 60 of these women were found to 
drink alcohol at risky or high-risk levels during their pregnancies; 55 of 
these consumed seven or more standard drinks on a typical drinking day 
(Fitzpatrick et al. 2015b: 332).20 The researchers considered that these 
calculations were probably underestimations, and noted that such levels of 
alcohol consumption were generally associated with high rates of FASD.
Aboriginal people, particularly those at Fitzroy Crossing, were gradually 
becoming aware of the existence of FASD. Many suspected that it was 
present among the community’s children. Around half the students 
at the local primary–secondary school were reported to have ‘learning 
difficulties’ associated with FASD or with other social and environmental 
19  In late 2006, Leedal acquired a further 27.14 per cent equity in the Crossing Inn from IBA, 
which still owned a 16 per cent partnership share in the Inn (IBA 2007: 135).
20  AUDIT = Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test.
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challenges (Irving 2007: 36). When assessments were conducted a few 
years later, 13 out of 108 children were found to have FASD or partial 
FASD, giving a prevalence of 120 per 1000, which is among the highest 
FASD prevalence in the world (Fitzpatrick et al. 2015a: 454). Of the 
children with FASD, 69 per cent had microcephaly, 85 per cent had 
weight deficiency and all had central nervous system damage, commonly 
showing as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
With all the drinking going on in town, the women’s refuge was kept 
busy: 96 women sought refuge there over a six-month period in 2006, 
with one woman attending on 24 separate occasions in less than a year. 
Over a six-month period, 85 per cent of all trauma patients admitted 
to the local hospital/clinic were intoxicated (Irving 2007: 33, 39). These 
very high rates of alcohol-related harm began to provoke deep concern in 
the community, and local people, particularly women, started to mobilise 
to do something about them. Aware of these rumblings of discontent 
about alcohol consumption, the Crossing Inn voluntarily changed some 
of the rules about takeaway sales in late 2006 or early 2007. The hotel’s 
licensee, presumably in consultation with Leedal, decided that packaged 
alcohol would no longer be sold to people walking into its takeaway 
shop—it would only be sold to people driving in with a vehicle. After this 
relatively minor adjustment, Leedal resisted further efforts to negotiate a 
voluntary accord to restrict sales of alcohol (Oscar & Pedersen 2011: 94).21 
One participant reported at the time:
There are some self-imposed restrictions. We’re saying the current 
restrictions are not working to their full potential. There’s been the closure 
of Billabong Park across the road from the takeaway … they used to go over 
there. Then the licensee upgraded it, but the downside was uncontrollable, 
there were rapes etc., it was very difficult to police. The Shire, whose land 
it is, said it was a breach. It was closed down but the purchase of alcohol 
continued. They had a ruling that you have to be in a vehicle to purchase 
but alcohol was being transported back into communities. There was 
a collapse of senior leadership in the communities and the same with the 
community in town, not functioning at all.22
21  Leedal stated in 2007 that since buying the hotel in 1989, sales had declined by 29 per cent 
because of self-imposed restrictions (Taylor 2007).
22  Brady fieldnotes, 14 August 2007.
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The mobilisation of the community
A tipping point was reached between December 2006 and December 
2007, when the growing alarm expressed by community members and 
service providers within and beyond Fitzroy Crossing triggered a cascade 
of events. After a spate of alcohol-related suicides and other deaths at 
Fitzroy Crossing, in December 2006, the Kimberley Aboriginal Law and 
Culture Centre (KALACC)23 wrote to the state coroner, insisting that 
a coronial inquest was needed ‘to jolt the systems of government, and some 
elements within the local community, into an appropriate level of response’ 
(Hope 2008: 2, emphasis added). Their request was supported by local 
MLA, Tom Stephens. The following July, a bush meeting of women from 
the four language groups of the Fitzroy Valley agreed to campaign for 
a  12-month moratorium on takeaway sales, citing unacceptably high 
levels of violence, assault, rape, suicide, incarceration, FASD, child abuse 
and neglect, and the low life expectancy and quality of life associated with 
harmful alcohol use.24 They resolved to confront Leedal and to approach 
the director of Liquor Licensing. The plan caused uproar: its proponents 
were confronted with accusations, threats and coercion.25 One of the 
proponents was Topsy Chestnut, who had been the chair of the WAA 
group in 1988. The July women’s meeting came up with three aspirations: 
to restrict full-strength alcohol, to invest in the needs of men and boys 
and to turn the police around to a more community-based policing style. 
Further community meetings were held in Fitzroy Crossing across all 
language groups at which people expressed concern about the levels of 
drinking, the deaths and the suicides. Senior women made a presentation 
to the senior men of KALACC outlining the damage alcohol was doing 
to the communities and seeking their support: ‘We want to bring about 
a future where we have respect for our culture, respect for our leaders, and 
safety for our children and families’, the women declared. At the end of 
July, the chair of KALACC, statesman John Watson, issued a press release 
supporting the moratorium.26 In the following weeks, The West Australian, 
23  KALACC is a peak body supporting the Law, culture and languages of 30 Aboriginal groups 
in the region.
24  These effects were listed in an Outline of Marninwarntikura Draft Submission to the Director of 
Liquor Licensing, 24 August 2007 (in the author’s possession). Senior paediatrician in the Kimberly 
Dr John Boulton also publicly called for urgent action on alcohol abuse (ABC News 2007b). The bush 
meeting was organised by the Marninwarntikura Women’s Resource Centre.
25  The stressful nature of this period is captured in interviews with protagonists in the film Yajilarra 
(Hogan 2009). 
26  Kimberley men resolve to support Fitzroy Crossing women (2007). Media release, 31 July.
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the national press and the ABC ran a flood of stories on the proposed 
takeaway ban. The media focused on the fact that the Crossing Inn was 
Aboriginal owned, with one front-page story describing the hotel as the 
Aboriginal pub ‘that poisons its own’ (West Australian 22 July 2007).
The director of Liquor Licensing gave the communities six weeks to find 
locally agreed solutions, after which he intended to commence formal 
proceedings under Western Australia’s Liquor Control Act (Department 
of Racing, Gaming and Liquor 2008). Fortunately for everyone involved, 
by this time, the director had greater flexibility in decision-making, and 
could place less emphasis on purely ‘legal’ factors in decisions; this was 
as a result of the abolition of the previous Western Australian Liquor 
Licensing Court in May 2007. Prior to this, one Licensing Court judge 
had ruled that it was not within his power, or the Act itself, to restrict 
the sale of alcohol to promote public health (National Drug Research 
Institute 2007: 136).
There were last-ditch proposals by Leedal and its partners in the two 
licensed premises for additional self-imposed restrictions, such as having 
no alcohol sales on Sundays and Mondays. These were considered ‘weak’ 
by the women’s group, as these days were already known to be slow sales 
days when there was little cash around. Even though the restriction 
would not affect the Fitzroy River Lodge,27 its general manager circulated 
a petition during the six-week discussion period, urging customers to be 
‘calm and patient’ and to write letters to the director of Liquor Licensing 
protesting against the proposed moratorium on takeaway sales:
Please be advised that the licensees of both the Fitzroy River Lodge and 
the Crossing Inn Hotel are doing what they can to resolve the issue to the 
satisfaction of all members of the community … [You can] visit the Lodge 
and sign the current petition opposing a total ban on takeaway alcohol!
By this time, many different players were involved in an increasingly 
fractious, polarised and public debate. The West Australian and other 
media continued to print articles on alcohol-related problems and the 
role of Leedal. The bad publicity made IBA and its responsible federal 
minister increasingly uncomfortable. IBA, which had inherited the 
ADC’s financial interests in Leedal, owned a 26 per cent interest in the 
Crossing Inn (down from 43 per cent in 2006). At the prompting of 
27  The Fitzroy River Lodge (by this time 70 per cent owned by Leedal) already held a restricted 
licence that allowed residents only to consume alcohol in their rooms.
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the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, Joe Hockey, 
IBA ordered a review of the hotel’s sales practices and restrictions, 
and of the social and economic effect of the Crossing Inn and Fitzroy 
Lodge. IBA’s review added to the quarrelsome atmosphere. On one side 
were those who supported the proposed moratorium on takeaway sales 
and the interrogation of Leedal’s conduct. They included the original 
lobbyists for the takeaway ban (i.e. prominent Aboriginal women and 
senior Aboriginal men); the commissioner of police; the local member 
for Central Kimberley-Pilbara, Tom Stephens; the director of Liquor 
Licensing; and Aboriginal spokesperson Lionel Quartermaine, formerly 
a deputy chair of ATSIC. Arguing that there was nothing worse than ‘our 
own people’ living off the misery and illness of others’, Quartermaine 
called for the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, rather 
than IBA, to investigate Leedal (Strutt 2007a). The other side included 
Leedal spokespeople who argued that banning takeaway alcohol would 
be a removal of Aboriginal people’s rights, and those aligned with them 
who asserted that the review of Leedal was ‘racist’ (ABC News 2007c). 
Leedal fought tenaciously against what became an unstoppable flow of 
events (Oscar & Pedersen 2011: 92). An article published on the front 
page of The West Australian on 25 August 2007, headlined ‘Grog hurts 
quarter of Kimberley under-fives’, highlighted alcohol’s damaging effect 
on babies; this made it politically impossible to oppose the restrictions.28 
From 1 October 2007, the sale of packaged liquor was restricted.29 Perth 
barrister, George Irving, reviewed Leedal’s practices as requested by IBA.30 
Meanwhile, the state coroner conducted an inquiry into multiple drug- 
and alcohol-related deaths.
The inquest
One week after takeaway restrictions were imposed, Coroner Alistair 
Hope arrived in Fitzroy Crossing to conduct hearings as part of an inquest 
into 22 Aboriginal deaths (including suicides) in the Kimberley that were 
28  Dr John Boulton, pers comm, 18 July 2016. The article in The West Australian was by Jessica 
Strutt. 
29  The director of Liquor Licensing imposed restrictions (initially for six months) from 1 October 
2007 on the sale of all packaged liquor exceeding 2.7 per cent ethanol to anyone other than a lodger at 
either of the two licensed outlets in Fitzroy Crossing (the Crossing Inn and the Fitzroy River Lodge).
30  IBA proposed a review team consisting of its chairman, a staff member and Perth barrister, 
George Irving. However, Irving was concerned at the perceived bias in this approach, and the terms of 
the review were adjusted so that he alone would consult broadly and report back to IBA, who would 
in turn report to the minister. The review was announced on 25 July 2007. 
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associated with either alcohol or cannabis (Hope 2008). The abuse of 
alcohol was identified by all witnesses as a major cause of child neglect, 
domestic violence, assaults, threatening behaviour and abject poverty: 
noisy drinking and fighting kept hundreds of people awake at night—
every night. The respected epidemiologist, Professor Fiona Stanley, gave 
evidence about alcohol’s association with damage to the fetus. During the 
hearings, it became clear that the Crossing Inn was gravely implicated 
in many of the deaths. Two intoxicated male pedestrians were found 
to have been killed by drunk drivers on two separate occasions while 
walking away from the hotel, one being run over twice. Two individuals 
had drowned trying to cross the flooded Fitzroy River: one was trying to 
reach the Crossing Inn, the other was leaving the hotel. A man had died 
of a heart attack while drinking in Billabong Park opposite the takeaway 
outlet at the Crossing Inn. Others had committed suicide after consuming 
extraordinary amounts of alcohol bought at the hotel.
Of the 22 Kimberley deaths investigated by the coroner, most were caused 
by self-harm. The coroner was particularly concerned about a cluster of 
eight suicide deaths in 200631 in the Fitzroy Crossing region.32 Most of 
these individuals had consumed copious amounts of alcohol; in 11 cases, 
the blood alcohol levels were over 0.2 per cent, which is extremely high 
(see  Table  3). It is worth noting that a person with a blood alcohol 
concentration of between 0.200 and 0.300 may be disoriented, anxious, 
aggressive and violent, have poor coordination and trouble breathing. 
A blood alcohol reading of 0.318 (the highest noted in Table 3) indicates 
probable stupor; an individual so affected would have little comprehension 
of where they were—any higher and they would risk death from respiratory 
arrest (Brady et al. 2005). Blood alcohol concentrations as high as these 
provide irrefutable evidence that drinkers were able to access and consume 
extraordinary amounts of alcohol.33
31  In 2006 alone, there were 21 Aboriginal deaths from self-harm across the Kimberley region. 
32  The total population of the Fitzroy Crossing region was about 3500.
33  It is, of course, illegal to continue to sell alcohol (for on- or off-premises consumption) 
to a person who is already intoxicated. 
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Table 3 Alcohol-related deaths at Fitzroy Crossing investigated by the 
Western Australian coroner, 2007








1 56 13/03/2000 fitzroy River – Drowned trying to reach 
the Crossing Inn
2 21 15/04/2000 fitzroy River – Drowned in river after 
drinking at the Crossing Inn
3 35 26/05/2000 f. Crossing 0.318% Run over (by drunk driver) 
Sandford Rd
4 17 14/02/2002 f. Crossing 0.226% Hanging
5 57 28/01/2004 f. Crossing 0.140% Multiple injuries, run over by 
two different drunk drivers 
near the Crossing Inn
6 29 18/11/2005 f. Crossing 0.238% Hanging after attending the 
Crossing Inn
7 11 07/10/2005 f. Crossing, 
Perth 
hospital
– Hypoxia (intentional or 
unintentional hanging)
8 52 12/01/2006 Billabong 
Pk, 
f. Crossing
0.189% Ischaemic heart/coronary 
arteriosclerosis, died while 
drinking
9 33 16/04/2006 f. Crossing 0.236% Hanging
10 40 10/10/2006 f. Crossing 0.157% Hanging after attending 
the Crossing Inn
11 23 26/10/2006 f. Crossing 0% Hanging
12 24 30/11/2006 f. Crossing 0.171% Hanging
13 24 26/12/2006 f. Crossing 0.180% Hanging
Source: Compiled from Hope (2008)
The coroner’s inquiry and subsequent report ranged over many aspects 
of Aboriginal life in the Fitzroy Valley34 and drew critical attention to the 
role played by the Crossing Inn. It was a matter of concern, Hope (2008: 
108) observed:
That evidence at the inquest revealed that most of the alcohol purchased 
by [the] deceased persons … was supplied by the Crossing Inn Hotel, 
a hotel part-owned throughout the relevant period by Aboriginal people 
34  Apart from alcohol and cannabis use, the coroner’s report dealt with the social context 
surrounding the deaths, including government services to Fitzroy Crossing, housing, education, 
school attendance, mental health, the role of the police and the hospital. 
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through a Trust, The Fitzroy Crossing Trust, the trustee of which is 
a private company, Leedal Pty Ltd (Leedal), which had originally been 
incorporated through the instigation of the Aboriginal Development 
Council [sic], a Commonwealth Government organisation.
Hope found that Leedal’s self-imposed restrictions had not been successful. 
He was dismissive of Leedal’s claim to be selling alcohol responsibly and 
was unimpressed when the hotel’s licensee claimed that the new takeaway 
sales ban was ‘ill-conceived’ and ‘incorrectly implemented’, since 
objective evidence clearly showed the measures to have been extremely 
effective (103, 123). Reminding Leedal that the original purpose of 
owning an interest in the Crossing Inn had been to correct local alcohol-
related problems, Hope asked why the organisation had not supported 
the takeaway ban. More damaging was his focus on Leedal’s failure to 
substantially benefit the community over its 18 years of operation. Instead 
of helping Aboriginal people in Fitzroy Crossing and surrounds, Hope 
pointed out that Leedal had harmed them, while making millions of 
dollars in profits and acquiring assets. The residents of the ‘beneficiary 
communities’ had received no distributions or dividends from Leedal’s 
profits; nor had they ‘escaped the damaging effects of alcohol abuse’:
It is not surprising that members of the community beneficiaries are 
extremely concerned that there have been considerable social and 
economic and health costs which have resulted from the sale of alcohol, 
particularly from the Crossing Inn Hotel, but that community members 
have seen little or no benefits. (120)
Three of the deceased persons took their own lives in the community 
that was the largest shareholder in Leedal (and which therefore held 
a substantial interest in the Crossing Inn). In observing this tragic irony, 
Hope (2008: 124) suggested that Leedal should consider its credibility and 
‘not act in a way which would be seen by the local community as being 
motivated by self-interest’. His words reprised the insights of nineteenth-
century temperance campaigners, one of whom wrote:
The secret of most of the mischief now worked by the [liquor] trade is 
that the monopoly of the sale of liquor is connected with private interests 
… The brewer, the distiller, the publican, the shareholder, are all deeply 
interested in promoting the sale of liquor. (Wilson 1894: 7)
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The aftermath
These events—the inquest, the attention of the director of Liquor 
Licensing,  the investigations into FASD by prominent medical 
professionals and the intense public scrutiny—combined to provoke 
a series of outcomes and responses from government and associated 
agencies, the management of the Crossing Inn and Leedal itself.
Government responses
The Western Australian Government was quick to respond to the coroner’s 
findings. It announced that a new alcohol and drug treatment service 
would be established in Fitzroy Crossing (Department of Indigenous 
Affairs 2008), and authorised the state’s Drug and Alcohol Office to 
fund research on the effect of the restrictions. Produced by researchers at 
Notre Dame University, the first six-monthly monitoring report in March 
2008 showed an overall reduction in harm: less violence, fewer police 
and emergency department callouts, fewer alcohol-related crimes and 
an increase in school attendance. After 12 months, the local emergency 
department reported a 36 per cent reduction in monthly presentations 
and reductions in the severity of injuries (Henderson-Yates et al. 2008, 
Akesson 2009). 
The federal government also responded with alacrity. The public scrutiny 
of Leedal and its activities reflected negatively on IBA, which still owned 
a share in the Crossing Inn, and on Hockey as the responsible minister. 
Before Irving’s review was completed, Hockey instructed IBA to sell its 
share of the Crossing Inn, retaining only its interests in the Fitzroy River 
Lodge and other investments (Barrass 2007: 6).35 On 9 August 2007, ABC’s 
Message Stick reported that, as a result of the Australian government’s ‘new 
stance on alcohol in Aboriginal communities’, in connection with the 
imminent ‘Emergency Intervention’ in the Northern Territory,36 as well 
35  The chronology of events is as follows: on 23 July 2007, Joe Hockey demanded that IBA conduct 
an investigation into the social and economic effects of the Crossing Inn. On 25 July, IBA approached 
Irving to conduct the investigation, with a short turnaround of 10 days. The terms of reference were 
reviewed and released on 2 August. On 8 August, Hockey instructed IBA’s board to sell its share in the 
pub ‘after he became aware of the damage the hotel was doing to the community’ (Barrass 2007: 6). 
At the time, Irving had not completed his report: he was still at Fitzroy Crossing. Irving’s report is 
dated 13 September 2007. 
36  This ‘new stance’ on alcohol is a reference to the tightening of liquor regulations affecting 




as unfavourable media attention, IBA had offered to sell its share in the 
Crossing Inn to the other joint-venture partners. The sale was finalised some 
months later. Significantly, the Crossing Inn was not included in the IBA’s 
map of ‘principal investment sites’ in its Annual Report for 2007–08 (IBA 
2008: 22). However, it was not until the following year’s Annual Report 
that IBA reported its divestment of the Crossing Inn (IBA 2009: 29). No 
attention was drawn to the fact that IBA gave Leedal a grant through its 
Economic Development Initiative that enabled Leedal to buy out IBA’s 
share. Since the funds were categorised as a grant rather than a loan, they 
were quite separate from IBA’s investment program (IBA 2009: 68). 
Not everyone supported IBA’s withdrawal from the Crossing Inn. Tom 
Stephens wanted IBA to stay involved and to stick to the original business 
plan, which was to ban the sale of takeaway grog (Barrass 2007). Irving 
(2007) also recommended that IBA should stay involved. On the basis 
of his government-sponsored investigation of the Crossing Inn, he 
advised the agency to provide mentoring, training and support to the 
community beneficiaries and Leedal, until Leedal could be ‘transferred 
to an appropriate governance structure, comprised of the community 
beneficiaries’ (47). Mentoring, training and support were clearly required; 
however, they would not be provided by IBA. 
Changes at the Crossing Inn
Leedal’s principals complained that they had been ‘slandered’, but they had 
in fact been shamed. Even the United Kingdom’s Independent newspaper 
featured a story describing the strange irony of the fact that the Crossing 
Inn and the Fitzroy River Lodge were owned by ‘the very people whom 
those businesses are “poisoning” ’ (Marks 2007). The directors of Leedal 
and the management of the Crossing Inn were forced to make changes: 
beginning in 2008, the hotel implemented several harm-reduction 
strategies that, arguably, should have been in place long before. As one 
community member stated:
It was easy for them before. They sold takeaways and said goodbye. It’s 
only since the restrictions came in that the hotel’s been forced to take 
responsibility, and [ask] the police for help.37 
37  Brady fieldnotes, 4 August 2009.
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The ban on takeaway sales had an immediate effect on the Crossing Inn. In 
the three months before the restrictions, takeaway sales from the hotel had 
totalled 8,500 L of pure alcohol; in the three months following, they were 
down to 949 L of pure alcohol.38 The hotel also experienced a surge in the 
number of Aboriginal people drinking on the premises. Extra security and 
staff had to be engaged. There was a 44 per cent increase in the amount 
of pure alcohol (by volume) purchased for consumption on the premises 
(from 819 L in July–September 2007, to 1,180 L in October–December 
2007). Overall, the restrictions had a direct and immediate effect on the 
volume and type of alcohol sold: the amount of pure alcohol sold from 
the Crossing Inn reduced by 77 per cent. 
In March 2008, in a letter to the researchers from Notre Dame University 
who were evaluating the effectiveness of the restrictions, the Crossing 
Inn’s manager revealed the challenges of trying to bring rapid change to 
entrenched drinking styles:
The bars at the Crossing Inn took a dramatic change from having nearly 
nobody in [them] after 1.00 pm to having … between 100 to 150 in the 
bars from 10.00 am till 10.00 pm most days. The ban has forced them 
to seek full strength beer in the bars. From my experiences from working 
in the bar I am well aware that this is not what they enjoy doing … they 
have always chosen to take their alcohol way [sic] to drink. Whether it be 
at home with friends and family or under their favourite tree … After the 
first week of the ban it was pretty obvious that they were not accustomed 
to drinking in the bars for a long period of time as opposed to drinking at 
home … I had to come up with some sort of strategy to slow them down 
and try to help them drink responsibly and to give them some sort of 
break during trading hours. So it was decided to try the following, open 
the bar from 12.00 noon and then close from 3.00 pm till 5.00 pm to 
give them a breather … but … they just caught a taxi out to the Fitzroy 
River Lodge for the next 2 or 3 hours … Quite often we are forced to 
close early. This of course has had a huge effect on our regular contractors 
and locals that used to drink at the Inn because now they just don’t. 
These [Aboriginal] people are being forced to drink in an environment 
that they are not used to and don’t want … A lot of these people do not 
realise that they are not allowed to be drunk on [licensed] premises as 
a lot of them have not drunk in the bars and have only done so since this 
most irresponsible decision was handed down forcing them into the bars. 
(Henderson-Yates et al. 2008, appendix VIII: 109)
38  These takeaway sales would include sales of low-alcohol beer, and sales of full-strength beer made to 
lodgers at the Crossing Inn. Data from the Western Australian Drug and Alcohol Office, August 2009.
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Usually only the haunt of tourists, the Fitzroy River Lodge reported large 
numbers of Aboriginal patrons drinking at their bar. Both the Crossing 
Inn and the Fitzroy Lodge were chaotic, inundated with uncontrolled 
drinkers who, it was reported:
Did not understand the strict bar regulations that applied. When refused 
service because of drunken behaviour and non-observance of other bar 
regulations, they became aggressive to staff and with each other. At the 
same time personal fights would develop between family members. 
(Henderson-Yates et al. 2008: 33)
Fig. 30 Signage at the Crossing Inn
Source: M Brady
As a result, signs were installed behind the bar about the behaviours 
expected of customers on the premises (e.g. ‘no spitting, no humbug’), 
and the Crossing Inn displayed responsible service of alcohol posters.39 
The manager began to sit on a local alcohol and other drug management 
committee established by the Western Australia Drug and Alcohol Office, 
which was dedicated to reducing alcohol-related harm in the community. 
With so much attention now focused on the effects of alcohol on unborn 
39  These were reported in the Leedal Newsletter 2008, November (3).
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children, the Crossing Inn agreed to have plastic beer glasses printed with 
FASD warning messages on them; the Fitzroy River Lodge refused to 
use them, arguing that it was a tourist facility.40 The Crossing Inn started 
to provide hot food over the bar and lunches and afternoon teas in the 
gallery during the tourist season. Pamphlets were printed for members of 
the public explaining what the liquor restrictions were and why they had 
been imposed; new road signs were erected outside the town announcing 
the restrictions.
In the wake of the restriction on takeaway sales, there was a slight decrease 
in takings at the Tarunda supermarket (part of Leedal’s holdings), which 
suggested that some Fitzroy Crossing residents were travelling away from 
home to purchase alcohol and food. It was still possible to buy sly grog in 
Fitzroy Crossing. Nevertheless, following a six-month review, the director 
of Liquor Licensing extended the restriction on the sale of takeaway liquor 
indefinitely (Department of Racing, Gaming and Liquor 2008, Oscar 
& Pedersen 2011). He declared that the restriction, which was subject 
to regular review, was in the public interest:
Negative impacts, and inconvenience experienced by those residents 
who wished to purchase full strength packaged liquor for takeaway, did 
not outweigh the social and health benefits that had been experienced 
by the broader community since October 2007. (Department of Racing, 
Gaming and Liquor 2008: 23) 
Damage control at Leedal
The public exposure of Leedal’s failings provoked it to improve its 
image by publishing a quarterly newsletter. Commencing in 2008, the 
newsletter featured (mostly) laudatory stories about its contributions 
to the community, business awards and appointments to its board, and 
an opinion column written by the chairman. That year, Leedal also 
implemented a strategic management plan to ensure that its directors had 
‘a clear understanding of all major business decisions before voting on 
them’. The aim was to ‘develop the economic base of Fitzroy Crossing 
and to assist Indigenous community members who want to develop their 
own businesses’. A publicity pamphlet—‘All about Leedal’—presented 
the names and qualifications of the company’s bankers, auditors and legal 
advisers. Leedal also made several new professional appointments to its 
40  Such an argument implies that FASD is not a problem for the general population: it is. 
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board, including a lawyer from a respected Perth law firm, and a new 
financial adviser. An earlier legal adviser had been found to be corrupt,41 
and the original financial adviser had reportedly been responsible for 
Leedal’s commercial strategy of redirecting profits to loan repayments and 
new investments, rather than the community.
Irving’s review had found that, instead of instituting an orderly 
mechanism for the distribution of profits to beneficiaries, Leedal had 
gifted negligible sums of money—apparently at whim—to various clubs, 
organisations, school projects and individuals not directly associated with 
the shareholding communities (Irving 2007: 44–5). The issue was treated 
critically by the media42 and reiterated by Hope (2008: 120–1), who 
pointed out that Leedal had no plan in place that ‘would involve some 
distribution of that  income in the relatively near future’. The coroner 
urged the Department of Indigenous Affairs to intervene; however, 
neither it nor the Drug and Alcohol Office had any authority over Leedal 
(Department of Indigenous Affairs 2008: 23).
Stung by these revelations, in 2010, Leedal announced that it was 
providing $250,000 to create a new charitable fund: Yapawarnti Fund 
Inc.43 Directed by representatives from Leedal’s six ‘beneficiaries’ 
(Junjuwa, Kurnangki, Marra Worra Worra, Kadjina, Bayulu and Yiyili), 
Yapawarnti’s purpose was to support Fitzroy Valley’s youth. Funding 
applications were to be assessed by the Yapawarnti board, the makeup 
of which was similar to Leedal itself: it included the directors of Leedal 
and the same chairman. The formation of this charitable association was 
Leedal’s first (belated) attempt to share some of its profits in an orderly 
way with the communities that had made it rich—profits that included 
those derived from the sale of alcohol at the ‘community’ hotel. 
41  The ADC had insisted from the beginning that there be a qualified lawyer and an accountant 
appointed as directors of Leedal. Unfortunately, the chosen lawyer was later struck off the roll of 
legal practitioners, after having been found guilty of embezzling money belonging to the Australian 
Paralympic Committee; he narrowly avoided jail (ABIX 2007).
42  There were headlines including ‘ASIC must investigate profits from Fitzroy pub’, The West 26 
July 2007; ‘Minister wants probe of Fitzroy pub profits’, The West 10 August 2007; ‘Leedal at centre 
of Fitzroy funds row’, The West 1 March 2008.
43  The Yapawarnti Fund was Incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act, 1987 (WA) 
(‘Investing in our children’, Leedal Newsletter 7 August 2010). 
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Fig. 31 Rules of behaviour at the Crossing Inn bar
Source: M Brady
Analysing what happened in Fitzroy Crossing
Unlike other Indigenous-owned hotels, the project to buy the Crossing 
Inn and other businesses was carefully planned, with consultations carried 
out by a locally known researcher who worked with relevant communities 
and interest groups. Local residents genuinely hoped for improvements 
to drinking behaviour as a result of their partnership in the purchase. 
Of  all the  hotels purchased by Indigenous associations since the 1970s, 
the Crossing Inn purchase underwent the most thorough preliminary 
planning. Yet, the hotel came to be responsible for damaging sales of alcohol 
to the communities it was supposed to benefit most. Irving (2007), in his 
report to Minister Hockey and IBA, stated that the Fitzroy project had been 
successful and disastrous at the same time. He explained succinctly:
If success is measured by corporate growth then the Fitzroy Project, 
through Leedal, provides an outstanding example of social and economic 
development. Leedal is now the largest and most successful commercial 
enterprise in Fitzroy Crossing … [However,] if success is measured in 
terms of community involvement in and ownership of the outcome of 
a  project, or in terms of improvements to the community’s wellbeing, 
then the Fitzroy Project must be judged as having failed the community 
it set out to benefit. (5, 6)
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There are a number of interlocking explanations for what went so wrong: 
Leedal and its funders placed profits before people; governments, caught 
up in a period of upheaval in Aboriginal affairs policy, failed in their 
oversight; and the ‘beneficiary community’—the Aboriginal communities 
of Fitzroy Crossing and surrounds—was neither willing nor able to 
intervene in the direction pursued by Leedal.
Putting profits before people
With community ownership enacted through representation on Leedal’s 
board, it would not have been difficult to amend the Crossing Inn’s licence 
to end the sale of takeaway alcohol. An approach to the liquor licensing 
authority in Western Australia, demonstrating community support and 
a plan to negotiate with local Aboriginal service providers in health and 
legal aid, would have sufficed. At the time, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, negotiations such as these were beginning to happen in parts 
of central and southern Australia (Gray et al. 1995, Brady et al. 2003, 
National Drug Research Institute 2007). 
An informed observer of long experience, Stephens (cited in Barrass 
2007: 6), blamed ‘IBA and its joint venture partners’ for diverting the 
project to the new goals of asset acquisition and rapid loan repayment. 
He reflected that:
A key feature of the initial business case upon which the joint venture was 
established involved a strategy that was widely endorsed within the local 
community and supported by me, involving an end to the sale of takeaway 
alcohol … Instead, IBA and its joint venture partners have effectively 
put in place an alternative business strategy that has seen aggressive sales 
of takeaway alcohol underpinning these excessive profits and returns, 
allowing the joint venture partners to pay back their loans and cover 
their borrowings at a rate much faster than ever originally planned. This 
reneging has compounded the human misery within Fitzroy Crossing and 
significantly contributed to the alcohol-related deaths and suicides within 
this community. 
The focus on commercial rather than social goals for the Crossing Inn 
had commenced with community consultations, which revealed fears 
that, should the hotel and other enterprises not be a commercial success, 
Aboriginal people would be ‘blamed’ (Arthur 1989a: 11). When Leedal 
initially devoted considerable effort to repaying its $1 million loan from 
the ADC, it was presumably responding to such pressure. Leedal decided 
243
7. THE INDIGENOUS PURCHASE Of THE CROSSING INN
that its guiding principles were to develop an economic base in the 
region, which is understandable. The joint-venture partners encouraged 
this emphasis on profitability. Leedal originally owned less than half the 
shares in the businesses. The other partners in the original joint venture 
were part of the liquor industry; they were hardly likely to be sympathetic 
to public health strategies and ideas about harm reduction or social 
wellbeing. They were well-known Western Australian entrepreneurs who 
owned regional tourism and hospitality businesses in the Kimberley and 
elsewhere; their association with the business of selling liquor pointed 
Leedal in a particular direction. The less experienced Aboriginal board 
members, drawn from local communities, may have wished to take the 
business in a different direction, but their voices were not as strong. 
One early board member recalled:
We had no training when we started as directors of the company, no idea. 
We were making decisions about the business that were ill-informed. We 
relied on [name] and others [non-Aboriginal board members] to supply 
that information about the industry.44
However, there is more to the story. The loan to the ADC was paid off 
relatively quickly. By the turn of the twenty-first century, the company 
was wealthy. Leedal acquired other assets and increased its equity in the 
Crossing Inn, strengthening its position. Why was Leedal persistently 
unwilling to keep faith with the original spirit of the purchase—to reduce 
alcohol harms, regardless of profits? Why did it not curtail off-premises 
sales for the benefit of the community? Leedal claimed to own assets worth 
more than $10 million, held in trust for the six beneficiary communities.45 
Right from the beginning, Leedal had diversified its investments; it owned 
shops, a supermarket, the hotel, a tourist lodge and a caravan park. With 
such a diversified portfolio, Leedal could have lost some revenue from 
alcohol sales at the hotel without negatively affecting its overall financial 
security.46 However, when members of a state committee of inquiry 
into alcohol-treatment services asked Leedal where its profits went, the 
chairman answered that after loan repayments, the priority was to ‘build 
the assets’. Leedal’s operations manager replied more fully:
44  Brady fieldnotes, KP, interview, 2009.
45  ‘All about Leedal’ (2009) [Pamphlet].
46  By 1992–93, three to four years after its part purchase by Leedal, the Crossing Inn’s alcohol sales 
were estimated to be at least $3 million and the Tarunda supermarket was not far behind with sales of 
$2.2 million (Smith 2006: 263).
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Regarding where the funds go, I want to emphasise that 10 years ago 
when I started here, the company owed more than $1 million in a loan. 
Where does the money go? The Leedal Pty Ltd is a trust for the Fitzroy 
Trust. Obviously the funds stay within that trust. As mentioned … each 
of the beneficiaries or communities that own the company have a director 
from each of those beneficiaries. We have four meetings a year—one every 
quarter—when funds or profits are available we put it to the board to 
decide what to do and it goes back to the communities and discusses 
it with council or community members to acquire a bigger percentage 
of what they had. This is where we have got to own 100 per cent of the 
Crossing Inn. When I first started here it was 42 per cent. In 10 years 
we acquired 10 per cent of that. This was 42 per cent as well, Patrick, 
am I correct. Now it is 70  per cent. (Subcommittee of the Education 
and Health Standing Committee 2010: 5–6, cf. Education and Health 
Standing Committee 2011)
It is not surprising that the operations manager’s testimony gloried in 
Leedal’s commercial success. Many accolades from the business and 
mining sector have been heaped upon the company and its directors, 
including the West Kimberley Small Business Award in 2013, the 
Rhinehart Development of Northern Regional WA Award in 2014, 
and the Horizon Power Leadership and Development Award in 2015.47 
However, rewarding this version of ‘success’ begs the question of whether 
an Indigenous business—more so, perhaps, than any other type of 
business—should be seeking to incorporate social benefits (or harms) as 
valid indicators of good (or less good) performance, or as part of their 
‘normal’ commercial aspirations? (Arthur 1999).48 In a discussion about 
welfare and enterprise, one commentator observed:
While from one perspective the drive to accumulate may be seen as 
a  corruption of the original intent to alleviate the effects of Aboriginal 
unemployment and social dislocation, from the point of view of the 
Indigenous business leaders who run them, it may be seen as a normal 
commercial aspiration to retain profits for expanded operations. 
(Smith 2006: 264)
47  It should be noted that in the same year that Leedal’s businesses won several awards, June Oscar, 
who was one of several leaders responsible for the ban on takeaway sales, was made a member of the 
Order of Australia in recognition of her work campaigning against alcohol-related harm—an accolade 
that was reported in the Leedal Newsletter (12 July 2013).
48  Another decision that could, arguably, be interpreted as being harmful to the physical wellbeing 
of local people occurred when Leedal awarded the franchise to operate a shop within its Tarunda 
Supermarket complex to a fast-food fried chicken outlet, rather than selecting a more healthy 
(although possibly less profitable) option. ‘Rosie’s Chicken’ is a small takeaway franchise designed to 
compete with McDonald’s and KFC.
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Fig. 32 Flyer explaining the liquor restriction in Fitzroy Crossing to 
members of the public
Source: Department of Racing Gaming & Liquor and WA Police
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Failing to act for the community good
Many—probably the majority—of Fitzroy Crossing people had agreed to 
the community’s purchase of equity in the Crossing Inn, believing that it 
would put an end to sales of takeaway alcohol and lead to on-premises, 
sociable drinking. The underlying hope was that the culture of explosive, 
binge drinking, would change. This did not happen, even though 
Leedal’s growing equity in the Crossing Inn gave it greater power over the 
other partners.
The other way that Leedal was supposed to act for the community 
good was in returning money to community shareholders. This practice 
would usually distinguish classic community-owned hotels from typical 
commercial premises: it was what made the idea of community hotels so 
appealing to local citizens in South Australian towns in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. However, Leedal failed to quarantine profits 
that could be distributed for the community’s benefit. Profits from all 
its entities (including the hotel) were reinvested, and millions of dollars 
worth of assets were consolidated, while it made ad hoc and negligible 
donations to various local causes. When asked where the communities’ 
funds had gone, Leedal’s operations manager replied, disingenuously, 
that the board had ‘believed that if we gave cash to communities … [it 
would] end up back down at the pub’ (Subcommittee of the Education 
and Health Subcommittee 2010: 5–6). It is unlikely that anyone ever 
seriously suggested that Leedal’s profits should be distributed in the form 
of cash payouts to communities. That these can be disastrous was well 
documented in several instances some years ago; communities that manage 
compensation or royalty payments have long since devised numerous 
sensible alternatives to cash payouts (Altman & Smith 1994, 1999).49
Leedal’s failure to be receptive to the wishes of the community—its 
shareholders—raises an important question: how is ‘community’ defined 
and how are its wishes ascertained? By 2006–07, one expression of 
community wishes was the groundswell of concern over alcohol-related 
harms emanating from communities in and around Fitzroy Crossing 
(i.e. Leedal’s member communities) that were backed up by reports from 
49  Although, in previous years, mining royalties, compensation and other similar payouts have 
been paid in cash, these days, royalty and other distributions to Aboriginal communities are more 
likely to be allocated to community purpose projects (cf. the Central Land Council’s website), www.
clc.org.au/frequently-asked-questions/cat/clc.
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visiting health professionals. Far from responding sympathetically to these 
genuine rumblings of alarm, Leedal consistently and vociferously opposed 
the suggestion of a six-month moratorium on takeaway sales.50 Even 
more extraordinarily, once the trial restriction imposed by the director 
of Liquor Licensing was over, Leedal argued against its continuation, 
despite clear evidence of its positive effect. Highlighting the perversity of 
Leedal’s stance, Coroner Hope (2008: 122) reminded the public that the 
original purpose of the acquisition of equity in the Crossing Inn had been 
to ‘correct local alcohol problems’. At least one Leedal board member left 
over this issue: ‘the crunch came when women called for restrictions and 
the board wouldn’t support it. I resigned’.51 
Leedal’s opposition to the takeaway ban was evident in its self-published 
quarterly newsletter and in the submissions it made to every relevant state 
or federal government inquiry, senate committee or other investigation 
(Leedal 2009, 2013, 2014, Subcommittee of the Education and Health 
Subcommittee 2010). In these commentaries, Leedal labelled the 
restriction on takeaways ‘prohibition’: for example, the policy ‘in many 
ways reflects “Prohibition” ’ (Leedal 2014: 7). In reality, the restrictions 
were merely a ban on the sale of packaged alcohol containing more than 
2.7 per cent alcohol content, not a ban on all alcohol consumption. 
Nevertheless, Leedal’s use of the term ‘prohibition’ was significant, for 
it allowed Leedal to draw a lesson from Prohibition in the United States 
in the 1920s—namely, that prohibition was a disaster that masked 
underlying problems (Leedal 2009, 2014: 2).52 Leedal (2014) also cited 
a controversial American sociologist, David Hanson, who is critical of 
the prevailing view of clinicians on the effects of alcohol consumption 
on health.53 Confronted with the positive evaluation of the takeaway 
ban produced by Notre Dame University, Leedal’s chairman claimed 
that the study was inadequate. He refused to accept the view expressed 
by politicians and others that the alcohol bans had improved conditions 
50  This was proposed by June Oscar, Emily Carter, the women’s group and the senior men of the 
KALCC.
51  NP, interview, 4 August 2009.
52  Leedal correctly pointed out that prohibition can be accompanied by an increase in illicit alcohol 
production. However, they failed to cite the World Health Organization, which found that during 
Prohibition in the United States, mortality from cirrhosis declined by around 50 per cent. They also 
ignored a wealth of international evidence on the efficacy of liquor sales controls in reducing harm 
(Edwards et al. 1995, Cook 2007). 
53  David Hanson promotes the idea that alcohol improves cognitive functioning and is good for 
health; he argues that the public health approach endorsing alcohol restrictions is a puritanical and 
moralistic temperance movement in disguise.
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and that children were eating and sleeping better.54 Leedal’s submissions 
to various inquires sought to direct attention away from alcohol-control 
measures and towards individual responsibility, alcohol education and the 
need for medical treatment and care for those with alcohol-use disorders. 
In other words, they sought to blame the consumer. In doing so, Leedal 
deployed the same argument the alcohol industry has relied on for decades 
(Burnham 1993, International Center for Alcohol Policies 2004, Sellman 
2010, Leedal 2014).
By denying how serious the situation was in the past, and by publicly 
condemning the restriction on takeaways, Leedal was up against a strong 
body of community and expert opinion that perceived an overall 
improvement in life at Fitzroy Crossing. The awkwardness of Leedal’s 
position, in which it both failed to act for the good of its own community 
and continued to deny its role in alcohol-related problems, was captured 
in questioning at a state Standing Committee in 2011: 
Mr PB Watson (Committee member): Most people think that alcohol is 
a problem in the community. But you have got Aboriginal groups owning 
the places that sell liquor. Is that a problem? Is that an embarrassment to 
the communities, when their biggest problem is alcohol, but the people 
who are selling it are the communities themselves? Is that an issue to you?
Patrick Green (Leedal chairman): It is perceived as a problem. But 20-odd 
years ago we bought it so that we could curb the drinking problem.
Mr Watson: Has it worked?
Patrick Green: I would like to think that we were able to help the 
community in having access to alcohol on certain days and restricting it on 
others. (Subcommittee of the Education and Health Standing Committee 
2010: 5–6, cf. Education and Health Standing Committee 2011)
Service providers at Fitzroy Crossing today deal with a community that 
is significantly different to the one that existed prior to the restriction on 
takeaways. Before the restrictions were in place, the town experienced 
54  Following the introduction of restrictions in 2007, there were regular spikes in the count 
of alcohol-related injuries, continued alcohol runs to buy takeaway supplies elsewhere and some 
increases in emergency department presentations to the Fitzroy Crossing hospital. However, in 
2011, a thorough and evidence-based Standing Committee report noted that overall there had been 
reductions in ambulance call-outs and presentations of domestic violence cases, and a decrease in 
overall alcohol-related trauma. Contrary to claims that up to 400 people had moved from Fitzroy 
Crossing into Broome to drink, a headcount found only 35 Fitzroy Crossing residents there 
(Education and Health Standing Committee 2011: 22).
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almost constant late-night parties and disturbances that particularly 
affected children (Akesson 2009). While there are lingering problems, 
such as illegal sales of alcohol and increased movements of people to 
buy grog (Akesson 2009; Kinnane et al. 2009), no one ever claimed that 
stopping off-premises sales would solve all the alcohol problems; to the 
contrary, advocates of the takeaway ban had anticipated such effects.
Problematic local politics
What prevented the Leedal board members nominated by the six 
beneficiary communities from insisting on ending sales of packaged 
alcohol? There appears to have been no concerted effort to put community 
pressure on the board, despite overt dissatisfaction with Leedal’s direction. 
Two prominent Aboriginal people resigned from the board in 1995 and, 
as mentioned previously, another board member resigned in protest when 
Leedal declined to support moves to trial a ban on takeaways in 2007. 
A former board member said simply, ‘it started off good, but greed got 
to them’. Another former board member recalled feeling increasingly 
unhappy with Leedal’s direction:
I got really unhappy about Board’s direction, and it wouldn’t engage with 
the community. I thought I could make a difference. [It] wouldn’t engage 
with the community … The original idea was to control corrupt and 
irresponsible service [of alcohol] but when aligned with [joint partner 
name], the focus was on making money, it lost its community focus. 
I became disillusioned with everything. 
Unlike other community-owned pubs, both Indigenous and non-
Indigenous, the Crossing Inn had no governing board of its own. The 
hotel has always been one branch of an extensive portfolio of businesses 
belonging to a proprietary company. The Leedal board governed the entire 
portfolio. However, overseeing shops and a caravan park is not the same as 
overseeing a hotel, especially one servicing a vulnerable community: the 
issues are manifestly different. In this respect, the Crossing Inn is unlike 
a Gothenberg-style hotel. Each of the Gothenberg-style hotels of rural 
South Australia, as well as numerous Aboriginal-owned licensed premises, 
such as the Finke Hotel, the Transcontinental Hotel and Mt Ebenezer 
Roadhouse, had boards whose sole responsibility was the hotel. Indeed, 
one of the principles underlying the cooperative ideal of community hotels 
was the election of local people to the hotel board, as this gave residents 
the opportunity to hear directly from the hotel manager about the status 
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and conduct of the hotel, and contribute to hotel policies. The absence 
of a hotel board undermined the capacity of local people to question the 
hotel’s direction, effectively cocooning it from criticism. 
A further explanation for the lack of action by community members, 
or Leedal board members, lies in the nature of people’s affiliations and 
allegiances to different organisations and residence groups in the region, 
and the fact that people in key positions are related to one another 
(Thorburn 2011). Individuals may have been concerned about the 
direction taken by Leedal, but they were unable to change it. Several 
of Leedal’s ‘beneficial community’ shareholders were corporations 
registered in their own right under the Office of the Registrar of 
Indigenous Corporations (ORIC)—a registration and monitoring body 
with considerable regulatory powers of intervention. In principle, this 
provided shareholders with some leverage, as they had the authority 
to seek assistance from ORIC. However, ORIC’s powers to compel 
compliance with corporate law would not have had any effect on Leedal’s 
policy on alcohol sales, which was within the law. Disputes over the 
composition of Leedal’s board and the community bodies represented on 
it have further complicated matters.55 Some prominent individuals have 
fulfilled multiple (and sometimes overlapping) roles and have retained 
these positions for extended periods. While this provides stability, it 
also contributes to conformity in (and domination of ) an organisation’s 
direction.56 For example, the chairman of Leedal has been a director since 
1991. The longest serving Leedal board member, he is also a company 
director of two of Leedal’s beneficiary organisations57 and chairman of 
the charitable fund set up by Leedal in 2010. In a small, close-knit and 
historically embedded population such as Fitzroy Crossing, these features 
of community representation are perhaps inevitable, even if they are not 
desirable. Rightly or wrongly, the perception in the local community was 
that ‘no-one had input into Leedal’. 
55  For example, Junjuwa, the major shareholder, was restructured. Although the community of 
Junjuwa still exists, in 2000 its administrative and economic arm was incorporated under a new 
name: Bunaba Inc.
56  A professional observer familiar with Leedal’s business structure observed, drily, that the word 
‘plutocracy’ comes to mind in this context. 
57  These are Bunuba Inc. (previously known as Junjuwa Aboriginal Corporation), and Marra 
Worra Worra Aboriginal Corporation, both ‘beneficiary organisations’ of Leedal. 
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The original plan for consultation and governance had included an MLG, 
which was supposed to serve as a conduit between the communities and 
the business management arm of Leedal. This group was intended to 
have the social interests of the communities at heart; however, for reasons 
unknown, it lasted only a few years and folded in 1991. When the campaign 
for a trial ban on sales of packaged alcohol finally gathered momentum 
in 2007, it polarised opinion in the town, pitting family members and 
organisations against each other. If the MLG had still been in existence, 
perhaps these fractious relationships could have been improved? 
In his early planning reports, Bill Arthur emphasised that the purchase 
of the Crossing Inn and other businesses was perceived by community 
members as a community development project. Anthropologist Patrick 
Sullivan has questioned whether an Aboriginal community organisation 
should ever become the controller of large businesses, suggesting that, as 
new projects are spawned in the name of the community, ‘the possibility 
of effective community control recedes’ (Sullivan 1996: 97). Community 
development theory has taught us that communities are not always 
homogeneous; that community leaders do not always act in the best 
interests of their people; and that government and community workers 
do not always share the same goals for development (Foster 1982, Rifkin 
1986, cf. Purtill 2017). In the case of Leedal and the Crossing Inn, these 
lessons seem pertinent.
Who was responsible?
Three agents can be held responsible the Crossing Inn’s failure to 
restrain or arrest damaging sales of takeaway alcohol. First, Leedal, as 
a primarily Aboriginal organisation, bears responsibility. Although it was 
originally only half owned by Aboriginal interests, it was eventually fully 
Aboriginal owned. Leedal should have operated with more empathy and 
foresight. Rather than resisting (and in some cases undermining) those 
who expressed genuine concerns about the health and wellbeing of the 
community, and who had irrefutable evidence of alcohol-related harms, 
it could have collaborated with them. For the good of the community, it 
could have decided to cross-subsidise a reduction in its sales of alcohol 
by using income from its other enterprises. The deaths investigated by 
the coroner may not have occurred on the premises of the Crossing 
Inn; however, the alcohol sold there, its volume and manner of sale, 
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was undoubtedly to blame. It is fortunate from Leedal’s perspective that 
Australia does not treat liability for alcohol-related harms in the way that 
Canada does (Solomon & Payne 1996). 
Second, the Indigenous development bureaucracies that funded and 
partnered with Leedal are responsible for prioritising commercial 
aspirations over social considerations. Without abandoning commercial 
aspirations, the ADC and other agencies should have been more alert to 
the (potentially adverse) social implications of their investments. Stephens 
rightly identified the ADC (followed by IBA and their joint partners) as 
being complicit in the perpetuation of aggressive off-premises sales at the 
Crossing Inn, which generated ‘excessive profits and returns’ for Leedal. 
Admittedly, the roles and policies of these agencies were complicated by 
a series of bureaucratic upheavals in Indigenous affairs that coincided 
with the planning phase for the Crossing Inn’s purchase, as described in 
Chapter 2. The original loan for the Fitzroy Crossing businesses came from 
the ADC, and the original negotiations were conducted with the ADC. 
However, by the time the actual purchase of the businesses took place, the 
Audit Office had begun investigating the ADC, resulting in a tightening 
up of its governance and investment strategy. The minister wanted more 
attention paid to the commercial viability of the ADC’s investments and 
demanded greater public accountability (Pratt & Bennett 2004). With 
the advent of ATSIC in 1990, local ADC staff—the people who had 
helped to broker early consultations over Leedal and the purchase of the 
enterprises—were redeployed. The creation of ATSIC’s development arm, 
the CDC, continued the focus on investments along strictly commercial 
lines, as well as the promotion of joint ventures between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous business people (WS Arthur 1996). However, these 
restructurings and political upheavals do not absolve these agencies from 
an ongoing duty of care. It is extraordinary that, only two years before 
the Crossing Inn was publicly excoriated for its role in alcohol-related 
dysfunction and mortality, IBA described it as one of its ‘most successful 
strategic investments’ (IBA 2005: 12). Within two years, IBA’s position 
became so untenable that it opted out of its stake in the Crossing Inn, thus 
abdicating any further responsibility for it. 
The third failure of responsibility lies with the state government’s alcohol 
regulatory mechanisms, which were not mobilised until widespread and 
long-lasting social, cultural, physical and emotional harm had been done. 
The state’s liquor licensing authority eventually swung into action to 
support the community mobilisation (once it gathered momentum) in 
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2007, but why was it left to the community to do this? It seems odd 
that the director of Liquor Licensing did not step in sooner, particularly 
in light of the extent of alcohol-related harm and suicide that was 
documented throughout the 1990s (Hunter 1993, Hall et al. 1993, 
Midford et al. 1994), not to mention the volatile and dangerous drinking 
practices near the Crossing Inn and the adjoining Billabong Park. 
Further, in view of irrefutable evidence of a specific licensed premises 
being directly associated with measurable harm, it is remarkable that, in 
2005, the director of Liquor Licensing had apparently been so impressed 
with the ‘strong’, self-imposed restrictions adopted by the owners of the 
Crossing Inn that he used the hotel as a model for other remote hotels in 
Western Australia (IBA 2005: 12). Perhaps this was because the hotel had 
instituted some—albeit insufficient—adjustments to its sales practices in 
response to community requests? 
The director of Liquor Licensing intervened only when compelled 
by strong community opinion and when faced with the prospect of 
a coronial inquest into numerous alcohol-related deaths that had occurred 
on his watch. Both he and the coroner were influenced by the political 
climate generated by the Australian government’s tough new approach 
to alcohol consumption. The government’s declaration of the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response (NTER) in June 2007 in response to 
reports of child sexual abuse, violence and neglect in remote Aboriginal 
communities demonstrated its willingness to override locally instigated 
regimes to tighten up alcohol controls.58 
In addition to these three failures, there was also a failure to keep track of 
the health and wellbeing of the people of Fitzroy Valley. In retrospect, it 
seems anomalous that no external body was in a position to call attention 
to ‘sentinel events’ in the region much sooner: a spike in alcohol-related 
mortality, a spate of homicides, suicides and an increase in alcohol-
related morbidity. ATSIC had shared responsibility for the oversight of 
Indigenous-specific health and alcohol program funding with federal and 
state health departments. All these bodies, in effect, ignored what turned 
58  The NTER was initiated by the Australian Government in response to a Northern Territory 
inquiry into Aboriginal child sexual abuse that found it to be serious, widespread and often 
unreported (Altman & Hinkson 2007). The NTER included a number of measures, such as 
providing additional police officers in communities, and tightened existing alcohol-control measures. 
It declared Aboriginal communities, living areas and town camps to be ‘prescribed areas’, and banned 
the sale and consumption of alcohol in them (although there were already 107 restricted areas on 
Aboriginal land and only 15 allowed alcohol in one form or another); it also imposed restrictions on 
the sale of alcohol in the eight existing licensed clubs in remote communities. 
TEACHING 'PROPER' DRINkING?
254
out to be a deepening alcohol-related crisis in the Fitzroy Valley. Practical 
support, advice and ongoing evaluation of Indigenous governance was 
missing. An external review of Leedal’s governance might have uncovered 
why board members felt powerless to change Leedal’s direction.
Abandoning the ideals of a social enterprise
When preliminary discussions about the purchase of the Crossing Inn were 
taking place in 1988, people at Fitzroy Crossing were unaware of the rural 
communities in South Australia that owned their local pubs and had a say 
in how they were run; they were unaware that these cooperative efforts 
had a sound basis in alcohol-management and alcohol-control policies in 
Scandinavia and the United Kingdom. One of the founding principles 
of these community cooperatives, particularly those associated with the 
Gothenburg system, was that the hotel manager should not derive any 
personal profit from the sale of alcohol. ‘Disinterested’ management—
the payment of a fixed salary to managers—was supposed to remove 
incentives for managers to encourage drunkenness. The coronial inquest 
in Fitzroy Crossing in 2007 disclosed that the managing partner of the 
Crossing Inn, Wayne Bowen of Mapigan Pty Ltd, had a remuneration 
package based on a formula in which he received 2 per cent of the hotel’s 
sales and 10 per cent of its profit (Strutt 2007b). 
Although Leedal’s purchase of equity in the Crossing Inn was ostensibly 
motivated by harm reduction, which was supposed to be pursued by 
ending sales of packaged alcohol and relying on on-premises drinking, its 
policy was not modelled on the Gothenburg system, about which Leedal 
knew nothing.59 Unhappily, packaged alcohol sales remained; the sale of 
alcohol contributed to widespread harm, and the profits derived from the 
hotel were not used for projects to reduce alcohol-related harm.60 Without 
a community board specifically for the hotel, there was no focus on the 
hotel as a venue that required a special management style, aims, policies, 
serving practices, physical environment and facilities. As well, because 
the revenue from the hotel was not quarantined, its profits were Leedal’s. 
59  Bill Arthur (pers comm, 20 May 2015) observed that some useful lessons might have been 
learned from the ‘Gothenburg’ experiments in South Australian community-owned hotels had they 
known about them at the time.
60  This was the case up until 2010 and the establishment of the Yapawarnti Fund. However, this 
Fund is not explicitly oriented to reducing alcohol-related harm either. 
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By contrast, the profits generated by the South Australian community-
owned hotels belonged to those hotels alone. With hotel boards made up 
of citizens from the local town, local people were able to decide on the 
allocation of a portion of these monies to local organisations, activities 
and facilities. 
Fig. 33 Nk’Mip wine store, Osoyoos, British Columbia, 2013
Source: M Brady
Leedal’s publicity material, although decorated with Aboriginal 
designs, does not market the Crossing Inn as ‘community owned’ or 
even ‘Aboriginal owned’; instead, the hotel is described as ‘The historic 
Crossing Inn’. The Fitzroy River Lodge does not mention that it is owned 
by Aboriginal communities either. This is in marked contrast to other, 
comparable Indigenous community projects associated with alcohol, 
such as the Aboriginal winegrowing venture at Murrin Bridge in New 
South Wales, which marketed its wine as coming from an Aboriginal-
owned enterprise (McQuire 2011: 1). The Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse in 
northern South Australia openly states that it is owned by the Imanpa 
community. In Canada, the Nk’Mip Cellars and Resort in the Okanagan 
Valley of British Columbia makes a virtue out of the fact that it is 
51 per cent owned by the Osoyoos Indian Band (Anderson et al. 2007). 
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The property is designed to attract tourists rather than members of the 
local First Nations band; nevertheless, Chief Clarence Louie’s photograph 
is prominently displayed, holding a glass of red wine as if to demonstrate 
wine appreciation and moderate drinking. Like Leedal, Nk’Mip has many 
diversified investments; it owns and operates related enterprises catering to 
locals and tourists including a vineyard, winery, caravan park, golf course, 
cultural centre and museum, and a nature park. In the on-site shop, 
Nk’Mip sells its wine—with labels featuring indigenous rock art designs 
and artefacts—alongside First Nations masks, drums and other artefacts. 
In Australia and overseas, enterprises such as these have discovered that 
identifying and promoting themselves as being owned by the Indigenous 
community can be an effective marketing technique. 
Fig. 34 Chief Clarence Louie, Nk’Mip, Osoyoos, British Columbia
Source: Nk’Mip promotional poster, 2013
The Crossing Inn is not a community-owned hotel in the ‘classic’ 
Gothenburg sense, nor is it a social enterprise of the kind discussed by 
researchers such as Defourny and Nyssens (2010). A social enterprise is 
generally understood as a market-oriented economic activity that serves 
a social goal. Commenting on the safeguards that protect the integrity 
of such enterprises, Defourny and Nyssens explain that, in Europe, 
governance structures for social enterprises aim for:
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A democratic control and/or a participatory involvement of stakeholders 
[to] reflect the quest for more economic democracy, in the tradition of 
cooperatives. They therefore add to constraints on the distribution of 
profits with a view to protecting and strengthening the primacy of the social 
mission, which is at the very heart of the organization. (49, emphasis added)
Together with this kind of participatory cooperative governance, 
instituting strict constraints on who can benefit from the profits of such 
enterprises helps to avoid the risk that public subsidies will simply mean 
that more profits are distributed among owners or managers. Public 
support and subsidies are important, as they (usually) enable enterprises to 
avoid purely market-driven strategies. However, the Crossing Inn became 
part of the much larger business entity, Leedal, the Trustee for the Fitzroy 
Crossing Trust and, since profit is the bottom line of business, success in 
business is usually defined as monetary success (Foley 2003: 137).
During the planning process in 1988 and 1989, Arthur (1989b) drew 
attention to the fact that the project was set up as a Trust. ‘It is the job of 
the Trustees’, he observed:
To be aware of the socio-economic realities of the valley, and the 
distribution of the benefits. The Trustees have the final say in the event 
that the project is not fulfilling its aims and objectives, else why bother to 
have a Trust in the first place?
As it turned out, this was a pertinent question, for the larger business 
entity and its members, together with the outside agencies charged with 
the financing, surveillance and governance of the enterprises, failed to 
fulfil the community’s original aspirations for the hotel’s purchase. Having 
a monopoly over alcohol sales in Fitzroy Crossing and the surrounding 
districts presented numerous opportunities, which the company 
squandered. Leedal should have been able to experiment with strategies 
designed to change the drinking habits of the Crossing Inn’s customers, 
thereby diminishing alcohol-related harms in the region. This would have 
enabled the company to confront the moral hazard of profiting from 
the sale of alcohol. Instead, it suited Leedal’s principals to subsume, and 
thus obscure, the complex issues surrounding the sale of alcohol by the 





Drinking, Indigenous policy 
and social enterprise
In this book, I set out to examine the centuries-long project to constrain 
and moderate—to ‘civilise’—the drinking behaviour of Indigenous 
Australians; in doing so, I found that the story extended in several 
different directions. It led me into a socio-historical study of drinking and 
into the history of the idea that drinking is a learned behaviour. That led, 
inevitably perhaps, to a history of aspects of Australian Indigenous policy: 
assimilation, self-determination, and the influence of government advisory 
bodies and economic development agencies on alcohol management 
in Indigenous communities. Finally, the research moved into the area 
of social enterprise, focusing on the tensions and moral dilemmas that 
are inherent in both Indigenous and non-Indigenous social enterprises 
involved in the sale of alcohol.
The first part of this book presented a socio-historical exploration of 
alcohol use. It showed how Europeans have long tried either to suppress 
or improve the drinking behaviour of Aboriginal people—a process that 
began when Bennelong was taught to raise his glass of wine in a toast to 
the health of the king. Such overt efforts to introduce Aboriginal people 
to sociable drinking were soon abandoned, and the authorities resorted to 
prohibitions against Aboriginal drinking, which only disappeared around 
50 years ago. Civil rights, including drinking rights, were achieved by 
Indigenous Australians during the post-prohibition era. This was when 
attention shifted from banning to ‘improving’ drinking behaviour. 
In Europe, there were parallel projects of suppression and improvement 
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dating from the endeavours of the elite to create courtly manners and 
etiquette around food and drink, and to make these into accepted middle-
class values. These European traditions of reform and improvement 
(rather than outright prohibition) in relation to alcohol gave rise to two 
developments that were relevant to my discussion. First, they prompted, 
or were accompanied by, theories of drinking as learned, and therefore 
malleable, behaviour. This novel idea had been hinted at in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, when colonised ‘natives’ (including Australian 
Aboriginal people) were thought to be natural imitators of their colonisers, 
learning what was expected of people who imbibed intoxicating drinks. 
In the twentieth century, theories of social learning emerged from 
clinical studies in the United States and Britain, which posited that, 
rather than being biologically determined and immovable, problematic 
drinking behaviours were learned and could be altered. This new way 
of thinking about alcohol problems counteracted the prevailing disease 
theory and raised questions about whether abstinence was the only viable 
treatment solution. Diffused to Australia, by the 1970s, ideas of social 
learning underpinned Australian government and mission experiments in 
providing rationed amounts of beer to Indigenous people in many remote 
communities. 
European traditions of improvement in drinking behaviour also 
produced models for the reform of the drinking environment. The poor 
and underprivileged were thought to misuse alcohol because of their 
social and  working conditions, their lack of ‘rational’ recreation and 
the unscrupulous behaviour of publicans who pushed sales of liquor. 
The most prominent and influential of the reformist models designed 
to deal with these factors was the Gothenburg system of local, social 
regulation. Its ‘disinterested’, salaried management of bars and liquor 
stores, quarantining of profits for the use and benefit of the municipality 
or local community and citizen participation, combined to reduce poor 
serving practices and intoxicated patrons. I described how politicians, 
government representatives and temperance thinkers from several 
countries, including Britain and Australia, became fascinated by this 
Scandinavian plan, and how its basic principles were taken up and put 
into practice by anti-prohibitionists and reformers of licensed public 
houses. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Gothenburg-
style ideas took hold in regional areas of South Australia, where residents 
bought shares in their local hotels, participated as board members in their 
management and decided on the distribution of profits. My account of 
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this development, and how these community-owned hotels have fared 
over time, set the scene for the case studies presented later in the book as 
studies in Indigenous social enterprise. 
Australian Indigenous policy formed the second major theme of this 
book, in particular, how Indigenous policy both affected and guided 
the approaches taken to alcohol availability and regulation. Unlike the 
United States, ‘prohibition’ for the general population in this country 
applied only to small and atypical districts, such as the ‘temperance 
colony’ along the Murray River, and a scattering of neighbourhoods 
that voted in local option polls to be ‘dry’. However, for the Indigenous 
population (including Torres Strait and Pacific Islanders), prohibition 
applied to people according to their degree of ‘assimilation’; it was lifted 
as part of a wider program of civil rights in which Indigenous people were 
supposed to be incorporated into Australian society as citizens, with all 
the accompanying rights and responsibilities of ‘normal’ (white) citizens. 
The struggle for, and achievement of, the right to drink was really an 
assimilationist project: it was believed that ‘they’ should be able to drink 
like ‘us’. However, as the old restrictions were repealed, jurisdiction by 
jurisdiction, and people began to act on their new freedoms, the question 
of how to manage these new rights arose. Once assimilation evolved into 
self-determination, merely having the same right to drink was not enough. 
Aboriginal people were expected—indeed, were obliged—to produce new 
forms of authority that could deal with the enactment of these rights. 
Previous traditional authority structures were repeatedly found to be 
inadequate; hence, the abandonment of some early experiments in alcohol 
rationing. As part of the transition from assimilation to self-determination, 
Aboriginal people were challenged to invent new modes of self-regulation 
through their local control and oversight of liquor sales from community-
based clubs or via community purchases of public hotels. As illustrated in 
the case studies presented in this book, they did this by creating complex 
lists of rules that attempted to regulate the personal comportment of 
Aboriginal patrons and enforce their social and civic responsibilities; 
the lists also kept track of which patrons were excluded from the premises. 
Aboriginal purchases of licensed hotels were facilitated by policy 
developments, such as the creation of development agencies and the 
promotion of Aboriginal entrepreneurship. As the case studies illustrated, 
the difficulties that followed were due, in large part, to the failure of these 
agencies—the ADC and its descendants, ATSIC and IBA—to foresee 
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problems in underwriting projects that involved alcohol sales, and to create 
policies that would pre-empt these problems. A shift in policy, from an 
emphasis on social goals to primarily economic ones, further complicated 
matters, placing several Aboriginal enterprises at risk by impelling them to 
concentrate on alcohol sales, rather than the wellbeing of the community. 
In the process of recounting the story of these Aboriginal enterprises, 
I showed the extent to which they had unwittingly resembled and replicated 
the strengths and weaknesses of the Gothenburg model of local control 
of liquor sales. I argued that Australian governments, and the agencies 
designed to promote Indigenous self-determination and economic 
independence—being ignorant of both the principles of the original 
Gothenburg model and its practical testing (through the experiences of 
community hotels in South Australia)—were apparently unable to devise 
an enterprise policy that was suited to social enterprise. This, in a sense, 
was what the Gothenburg system aimed to do; it sought create a viable 
liquor business that was socially responsible, avoided profiteering from 
alcohol sales and supported moderate consumption. 
The licensed Indigenous entities discussed here, both the social clubs 
and hotels, needed a different policy framework—one that would 
have benefited by the experiences of Gothenburg-style premises. They 
also needed earlier intervention from external agencies to provide 
troubleshooting around governance matters, and to deflect problems 
of responsible service. In  addition, they needed ongoing guidance and 
monitoring. 
The third field of scholarship I explored in this book was social enterprise. 
I presented material from Europe and South Australia on the conscious 
diffusion of the Gothenburg system, and juxtaposed this with research 
from Aboriginal communities that revealed the inadvertent, unconscious 
mobilisation of this system. Remarkably, Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
community hotels existed in parallel, with each apparently unaware of 
the other. Indigenous hotels (and clubs) shared some goals in common 
with Gothenburg-style hotels: the expectation that ownership would 
enable greater local control over liquor sales, prevent sly grog sales, 
offer employment opportunities for Indigenous people and raise 
revenue for community causes. All the municipalities and communities 
involved experienced successes and failures, leading to the conclusion 
that while social enterprise of this kind is worth attempting, it requires 
considerable effort.
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The business of establishing community-owned licensed premises is fraught 
with contradictions, hazards (moral and otherwise) and challenges. There 
is an inescapable tension within the definition of ‘community benefit’ 
that exists between the goal of moderating alcohol consumption and 
generating a surplus (which might be used to fund community projects) 
by selling it. 
This tension is particularly severe in an Indigenous context, as Indigenous 
people experience a disproportionate physical and social cost from 
alcohol abuse. An Indigenous hotel or club that ‘poisons its own people’ 
is clearly an undesirable form of enterprise. The tension increases when 
an articulate temperance lobby (often led by women) draws attention to 
the inherent moral hazard of a social enterprise (often run by men) that 
sells alcohol. In this book, I documented the efforts of white Australian 
WCTU members and Aboriginal women in central and northern Australia 
who engaged in formal and informal acts of resistance against new and 
existing licences run by their menfolk; both groups, Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal, used similar arguments and rhetoric, pointing out the ethical 
dilemmas inherent in the use of ‘grog money’ for good works. 
The research reported here revealed how the community governance 
of social enterprises is not purely a matter of good administration or 
compliance with the relevant liquor legislation. The administration 
of such enterprises is imbued with the additional challenges posed by 
political contestation, both within and beyond the communities involved. 
As Room (1982: 447) observed, all systems of local control, whether they 
are state licensing systems or systems of local option and decision-making 
around alcohol, share commonalities in that they:
Create at least a partial monopoly for those inside them, whether they 
be state or private interests. They are thus usually very profitable for all 
concerned, and they create large and powerful vested interests in the 
continuance of the basic system, with gradual liberalisations of control 
for the benefit of those already inside.
This observation is borne out by what took place in numerous beer 
canteens  and clubs in remote Aboriginal communities. If a club was 
already in place, and the majority of the community were drinkers, 
then, irrespective of the problems caused by the outlet, the popular vote 
would ensure that the desires of the drinkers (to oppose restrictions, to 
extend hours or to lobby for higher-alcohol content drinks) would be 
carried (Moran 2013: 199). The system comes with a built-in ‘ratchet 
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mechanism’—the community council (or Indigenous corporation or 
state) derives fiscal (and other) benefits from its franchise to sell alcohol; 
therefore, it is politically painful to extinguish that interest (Room 
1982: 447). 
It often takes a religious or popular uprising around alcohol before 
licences and revenues will be taken away (Room 1982). Examples of 
such uprisings were presented in this book: resistance to the Tyeweretye 
Club by Pitjantjatjara women; the wrecking of the Murrinh Patha Social 
Club at Wadeye; and the alarm raised by concerned women and men of 
the Kimberley over takeaway sales in Fitzroy Crossing. In each case, the 
systems of government needed a ‘jolt’ to force an appropriate level of 
response. It is to their credit that these Aboriginal protestors mobilised 
sufficient support to mount challenges that highlighted the moral 
contradictions inherent in these enterprises.
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